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1249-1527 






This thesis aims to relate thirteenth- to sixteenth-century state finances in 
Portugal to the models of 'tribute state', 'domain state' and 'tax state' and to test 
the assumption that changes within and between these stages are essentially 
expenditure-driven and related to warfare. These two problems are tested by 
means of a pre-post case study that observes Portuguese state finances before 
(1249-1369) and after (1369-1527) a period of nearly constant warfare that 
started in 1369. The observation is centred in four aspects: the revenues and 
the economy, the rules regulating the acquisition of more income (fiscal 
constitution), the funding of warfare and the autonomy of the state. This 
requires the combination of both quantitative and textual sources, including 
previously unpublished data, and the systematisation of hitherto dispersed 
materials. 
The thesis argues that the concepts of 'domain state' and 'tax state' adequately 
describe the fiscal systems of the two phases studied but also that the role of 
warfare varies according to the fiscal system. While under the 'domain state' 
strong constitutional and fiscal limitations hindered military confrontation, 
voluntary expansionist wars were a feature of the 'tax state.' Thus, military 
activity appears revenue-driven rather than the opposite. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the expenditure of the 'tax state' shows that two-thirds of the royal 
revenues were allocated to redistribution. 
2 
List of Contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................... 2 
List of Contents ............................................................................................ 3 
List of Tables and Graphs ........................................................................... 5 
Acknowledgements ................................ II ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• II •••• 6 
Author's Declaration .................................................................................... 7 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 8 
The Case for this Case Study ...................................................................... 8 
The Archives ................................................. I •••••••••• I •••• II ••••••••••••••• II ••••••••• 20 
Hypotheses, Methodologies and Structure ................................................ 31 
PART 1- THE HUNDRED YEARS PEACE (1249-1369) ................................. 40 
Chapter 1 - Death and Transformation of a Tribute State ............................ .40 
Section 1.1 War and Prosperity ................................................................. 41 
Section 1.2 - Bimetallism ........................................................................... 51 
Section 1.3 - Decreasing Revenues or Mounting Expenses? .................... 56 
Chapter 2 - A Fiscal Constitution .................................................................. 66 
Section 2.1 'Fiscal Constitution' as a Historical Concept. .......................... 66 
Section 2.2 - The Monetary Constitution ................................................... 68 
Section 2.3 - Representation without Taxation; Taxation without 
Representation .......................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 3 - Grand Strategy and Internal Pressures ...................................... 87 
Section 3.1 An Iberian Scotland? .............................................................. 87 
Section 3.2 - An Open Border ................................................................... 94 
Section 3.3 - Nobles and Municipalities ..................................................... 98 
Chapter 4 - The Invention of a Domain State .............................................. 107 
Section 4.1 - The Concepts ..................................................................... 107 
Section 4.2 - One King, Many Systems ................................................... 112 
Section 4.3 - From Tenure to Custody ..................................................... 122 
Section 4.4 - The Invention of the Domain .............................................. 130 
PART 11- WARS CAME AND A NEW WORLD WAS BORN' (1369-1527) ... 147 
Chapter 5 - Revenue Revolution? ............................................................... 149 
Section 5.1 - The Sisas ........................................................................... 149 
Section 5.2 Ratchet Effect? ........................................•............................ 163 
Section 5.3 - Fiscal Buoyancy ................................................................. 170 
Chapter 6 - A New Fiscal Constitution? ...................................................... 182 
Section 6.1 - Debasement and Consent.. ................................................ 183 
Section 6.2 - The 'Ordinances of Equivalence' ...................................... 1955 
Section 6.3 - Unite and Rule: The Cortes and Extraordinary Taxation .. 2055 
Section 6.4 - The Rise and Fall of 'Public' Finances ................................ 219 
Chapter 7 - War and Royal Finances: a long-term perspective ................... 239 
Section 7.1 - The Sinews of War: Debasement and Grants .................... 239 
Section 7.2 - 'Smoke in the Air' ............................................................... 256 
Section 7.3 - The Empire of the Sisas ..................................................... 264 
Section 8 - A Redistributive Monarchy? ...................................................... 273 
Section 8.1 - The Conservation of the State ............................................ 273 
Section 8.2 - General Accounts ............................................................... 281 
Section 8.3 - Meaningful Fragments ....................................................... 289 
3 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 300 
Appendix 1 - Timeline: War and Taxation in Portugal and England, 1245-
1525 ........................................................................................................ 306 
Appendix 2 - The Libri de Recabedo Regni ............................................ 311 
Appendix 3 - Almoxarifes and Almoxarifados ......................................... 313 
Note on Currencies .................................................................................. 316 
Glossary .................................................................................................. 317 
List of References .................................................................................... 319 
Bibliography ................................................................................................ 321 
1. Manuscript Sources ............................................................................. 321 
2. Printed Sources ................................................................................... 322 
4 
List of Tables and Graphs 
Fig. 1 - Valuation of Bequests in Royal Wills, 1179-1367 ............................................... .46 
Fig. 2 - The Portuguese Bimetallic System, 1140-1279 ................................................... 53 
Fig. 3 - Disposable wealth and intrinsic value of coinage, 1140-1368 (logarithmic scale) ......... 57 
Fig. 4 - Receipt of the High-treasurer, 1278-80 ............................................................... 64 
Fig. 5 - Bullion Currency of Fernando I, 1370-2 .............................................................. 72 
Fig. 6 - Cortes and Taxation, 1254-1369 ...................................................................... 80 
Fig. 7 - Portuguese and Castilian Galleys, 1337-1384 ..................................................... 97 
Fig. 8 - Fiscal and Institutional Innovations in Portugal and Castile ................................... 144 
Fig. 9 - Some Yields of Sisas, 1336-1378 ................................................................... 152 
Fig. 10- Rates of the Sisas, 1336-1408 ..................................................................... 156 
Fig. 11 - Tax-Farms for the 1382 Sisas, by Judicial District (in I.) .................................... 158 
Fig. 12 - Municipal rents and Sisa farms in 1382 Compared (in I.) ................................... 159 
Fig. 13 - Estimate of Royal Revenue in 1401 (in I.) ....................................................... 160 
Fig. 14 - The Receipt of the Portuguese Crown in 1367, 1401, 1433, 1473,1511 and 1527 .. 166 
Fig. 15 - The Main Sisas Collected in Lisbon, 1446-1521 (100=1473) .............................. 172 
Fig. 16 - The Main Sisas Collected in Lisbon, 1446-1521 (exponential representation) ........ 174 
Fig. 17 - Price Movements and Revenues in Beira, 1430-1520 (100=1527) ....................... 176 
Fig. 18 - The lisbon Customs and the Revenue of the Kingdom, 1367-1527 ..................... 176 
Fig. 19 -Intrinsic Value of the r., 1385-1465 (in g Ag per r.) ........................................... 183 
Fig. 20 -Intrinsic and Nominal Values of the r. in Circulation, 1383-1437 ........................... 185 
Fig. 21 - Value Assigned to 1 I. of a Standing Rent in Current Money ............................... 197 
Fig. 22 - Metallic Content of 100 I. (in g of Ag) ............................................................. 199 
Fig. 23 - Metallic Content and Purchasing Power of 100 I., 1385-1435 (logarithmic scale) .... 201 
Fig. 24 - Cortes and Extraordinary Taxation, 1372-1525 ................................................ 214 
Fig. 25 - Extraordinary Taxation, 1385-1525 ................................................................ 229 
Fig. 26 - Notional Burden of Extraordinary Taxes, 1385-1495 (in millions of r.) ................... 236 
Fig. 27- The Financing of the Independence War, 1383-1401 ......................................... 244 
Fig. 28 - Men-at-Arms Wages, 1369-1514 .................................................................. 250 
Fig. 29 - Minimal Quantia to Own a Mount applied in Lisbon, 1317-1418 ........................... 252 
Fig. 30 - 'Vassals' Serving the King, 1372-1483 ........................................................... 254 
Fig. 31 - Extraordinary Expenditure, 1415-84 .............................................................. 259 
Fig. 32 - Extraordinary Expenditure and Extraordinary Revenue, 1415-84 (in dobras) ......... 261 
Fig. 33 - North Africa Extraordinary Expenditure and Extraordinary Revenue, 1415-84 ......... 262 
Fig. 34 - The Growth the Royal Household, 1402-73 ..................................................... 279 
Fig. 35 - The Almoxarifado of Coimbra in the 'Summary' Book of 1511 (in r.) ..................... 284 
Fig. 36 - The 'Set Expenditure' in 1473, 1478, 1511 and 1527 (in %) ................................ 285 
Fig. 37 - Expenditure in North Africa Possessions, 1470-1527 ........................................ 291 
Fig. 38 - Expenditure on Royal Household Pensions, 1446-1527 ..................................... 293 
Fig. 39 - Total Expenditure on Annuities, 1473-1527 (in million r.) ................................... 295 
Fig. 40 - Value of New Annuities Granted, 1473-91 (in thousands of r.; per fiscal year) ........ 296 
5 
Acknowledgements 
My first thanks go to my supervisor W. Mark Ormrod to whom I am indebted not 
only for his expert guidance but also for his generous commitment to this 
project. I will not forget his firm support even when the prospects of finishing this 
thesis looked somewhat bleak. 
I am also bound to thank my funding body, the Funda980 para a Ciimcia e 
Tecnologia, for giving me excellent conditions to complete my PhD. 
I would also like to thank Drs. Monica Bandeira and Hanif Ismail for their 
constrant, friendly support and thoughtful advice. To the members of the Thesis 
Advisory Panel, Dr. Sarah Rees-Jones and Dr. Craig Taylor, along with Drs 
Peter Rycraft, Alvaro Pereira (U. Toronto), Alvaro Ferreira da Silva (U. Nova de 
Lisboa) and Vasco Resende (U. Paris IV) who also read early drafts of the 
thesis, I thank for their suggestions and encouragements. 
I received a great deal of help from my friends at Portuguese Universities, 
namely Maria-Joao Branco (U. Aberta), Herminia Vilar (U. Evora), Adelaide 
Millan da Costa (U. Aberta), Filipa Roldao (U. Lisboa), Mario Viana (U. Aoores), 
Miguel Gomes Martins (Lisbon Municipal Archive and U. Coimbra) and, last but 
not least, Mario Farelo (U. Lisboa). All of them liberally provided me with 
archival references, sources and working papers that proved extremely useful 
for this dissertation. Obrigado to them. 
At last, I would like to confess that research at the University of York would be 
far less interesting without the input of the people working at the King's Manor 
workroom, especially Lexi Ramsden, Pragya Vohra, Carolin Esser, Hannah 
Burrows, Cristina Figueredo and John-Henry Clay, and far more daunting 
without the profeSSional assistance from the staff in the History Department, 
inter alia of Tim Owston. 
Above all, in this occasion I think in all members of my family in the belief that 
my efforts mean, or will mean, something to theml 
Quinta da Fonte Santa, 21 August 2008. 
6 
Author's Declaration 
A paper, entitled Finan9as Regias e Reconquista. Em torno de uma Hip6tese 
de Iria Gon9a1ves, in Portuguese, containing the argument of chapter 1 and 
some of its data was sent in January 2005 to the commission organising the 
Festschrift of Iria Gon((alves which is forthcoming by the Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa. 
The broad argument of part I was sketched in two papers publicly presented: 
'Les Finances de rEtat' (part of the session 'Construire I'Etat au Portugal: 
processus et agents 1300-1500, presented in September 2005 in the 
conference 'State-building from below: Europe 1300-1900' (Mont Verite, 
Ascona) and 'The Hundred Years Peace. War and Portuguese Finances from 
the 'Reconquista' to the Fernandine Wars' presented in September 2006 at 
Conference of the Historians of Medieval Iberia (St Andrews). 
The argument of chapter 4 was first sketched in the paper 'Fiscal Cells: the 
Portuguese Almoxarifado on a Comparative Perspective (13th-15th centuries)' 
presented in November 2006 at the 26th Congress of the Portuguese 
Association of Economic and Social History (Ponta Oelgada). 
Section 5.1 derives from a paper entitled 'A Burden Devoid of Reason' or a 
Lesser Evil? Sales taxes in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-century Portugal 
presented in July 2007 at the International Medieval Congress - Leeds. 
An earlier version of section 6.3 was presented in the paper 'Representation 
without taxation? Portuguese fourteenth and fifteenth-century Cortes and Royal 
Finances presented in May 2007 at the 10th Annual Mediterranean Studies 
Association Congress (Evora). 
In 2006 I contributed to the project Les Mots de I'Imp6t dans les Villes de 
I'Occident Mediterraneen. Glossaire Critique de Fiscalite Medi{JVale (CSIC-
Barcelona and U. Lyon 2; funded by the Comite pour I'Histoire Economique et 
Financiere de la France) by writing the entries' Dez Reais de Ceuta, 
Emprestimo (I and II), Finta, Monetagio, Monop6lio da Moeda, Pedido (I and II), 
Sisa (I, II and III), Sisa dos Ingleses and Talha. These texts incorporate a few of 
the original contributions present in this thesis. 
7 
INTRODUCTION 
The present work concerns the finances of the Portuguese monarchy 
from the thirteenth to the early sixteenth century. Portuguese state finances, 
however, will not be studied for their intrinsic relevance alone. Besides being an 
important, as well as a neglected, element in the country's history, the finances 
of the Portuguese crown constitute a useful instance for testing and assessing 
the hypotheses and problems of a growing field of historical enquiry: fiscal 
history. The role of section 0.1 is to expose the broad problems addressed in 
this thesis and to argue why this particular case can be of some relevance for 
those questions. Subsequent sections will be more concrete. While section 0.2 
will examine the potential of the existing historical sources for tackling the 
problems exposed earlier on, section 0.3 will present the methodologies used 
and the structure of the thesis. 
The Case for this Case Study 
Case studies have a long and illustrious tradition in the history of state 
finances. For historians throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe 
finance history was intrinsically connected with the problems of state- and 
nation-building. As national historiographies and 'public finances' grew together 
finance history became intrinsically connected with the triumph of the state. For 
those nation-centred historiographies, state finances were one aspect in the 
evolution of the country they studied towards state formation and were 
embedded in each country's singular institutional and political history.1 Thus, in 
1967, while studying the financial institutions of Northern France, England and 
Flanders, Bruce Lyon and Adrian Verhulst criticised 'the lack of scholarly efforts 
1 English historiography incorporated fiscal themes in ~s trad~ional constitutional history. In Spain, the finances of 
Aragon, Castile and Navarre were studied separately as individual cases. In France, where the fall of absolutism 
coincided with a great fiscal crisis, fiscal changes were associated with regime change. Bonney, Richard and 
Ormrod, W. Mark, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions and Se~·sustained Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of 
change in Fiscal History', in Ormrod, W. Mark, Bonney, Margaret, Bonney, Richard eds., Crises, Revolutions and 
Seff·sustained Growth. Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830, Stamford, 1999, pp. 1·2. 
8 
to ascertain the similarities and diversities of central and local institutions in the 
principal states of medieval Europe.,2 
Yet, the most important research on fiscal issues focused on the origins 
and developments of the doctrines, practices and institutions of each of the 
nation-states' finances kept a common orientation. Medievalists such as Gerald 
Harriss, Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada and Jean Favier explored the 
emergence of 'public finances,.3 These historians detected in thirteenth-century 
monarchies the birth and development of principles familiar to public finances: 
the need for consent for taxation, the justifications based on the doctrines of 
Roman Law, the notion of a common, 'national' interest as opposed to the mere 
will of the prince. These were the principles that marked the emergence of a 
system of public finances.4 Similar views were held by Portuguese historians, 
namely Iria Gon~alves, A. H. de Oliveira Marques, V. Magalhaes Godinho, Jose 
Mattoso A.. L. de Carvalho Homem, who addressed state finances in their 
accounts dedicated to state-building.5 
Dealing with many states rather than a single one, German-speaking and 
Italian historiographies were more prone to generalise and compare the 
experiences of the different states within their national fields of study.6 A crucial 
influence would stem from the former in the form of the Finanzsoziologie whose 
rich perspectives remain fresh after nearly a century. The term Finanzsoziologie 
was introduced by Rudolf Goldscheid, a heterodox Marxist historian who 
studied extenSively the history of Prussian finances and the financial effects of 
the World War I and whose ideas and the very term were adapted and adopted 
by the influential economist Joseph Schumpeter.1 
2 Lyon, Bruce and Verhulst, Adrian, Medieval Finance: a Comparison of Financial Institutions in Northwestern 
Europe, Bruges, 1967, p. 9. 
3 Favier, Jean, Finance et fiscalite au Bas Moyen-Age, Paris, 1971; Harriss, G. L., King, Parliament and public 
finance in Medieval England to 1369, Oxford, 1975; Ladero Quesada M. A, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252-
1369) Madrid, 1993. 
4 Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 509. 
S See infra pp. 106-8 and 146-8. 
6 On Italian historiography on finances, see the survey by Waquet, Jean-Claude, Le Grand-duch8 de Toscanie sous 
les derniers Medicis: Essai sur Ie systeme des finances et la stabilite des institutions dans /es anciens stats ita liens, 
Rome, 1990, Chapter 1 and Pezzollo, lUCiano, 'La storiografia pill recente suUa finanza italiana della prima eta 
modema: gli studi suUa fiscalita,' Rivista di Storia Finanziaria, vol. 10, Napoli 2003, pp. 33-77. 
7 On the origins of Finanzsoziologie in English see Witt, Peter-Ghristian, 'Introduction: History and SOCiology', in Witt, 
Peter-Christian, Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe. the history and Sociology of Public Finance, Leamington 
Spa, 1987 and Backhaus, JOrgen, 'Fiscal Sociology. What For?' American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 
61,n.1,2002,pp.55-77. 
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Goldscheid's analysis drew attention to a factor that legal-minded 
historians typically neglect - group interest - and also to the effects of war in 
transforming the state.8 In his analysis of Word War I, Goldscheid considered 
that the state went to war resorting to credit, supplied by 'capital', instead of 
simply relying on the services and goods, supplied by 'labour' or tax-base. By 
doing so, in what appeared to be a rational decision, the state became indebted 
and its tax-base physically exhausted by war.9 For Goldscheid, World War I 
merely destroyed what another war had built. Indeed, for the German 
economist, the Thirty Years War had destroyed an autonomous state based 
upon landed patrimony to build a revenue-maximising administration that 
simultaneously fostered economic development and taxed it according to an 
optimal point of taxation.1o States were vulnerable because the rise of taxation 
for military purposes brought by seventeenth-century wars led to what 
Goldscheid called the 'dispossession of the state.'11 
Similarly, Schumpeter's study of imperialism suggested that the states 
operated not on the grounds of rational calculation, fet alone public interest, but 
in obedience to a strong drive (Trieb). Aiming at unreasonable goals, states 
never acknowledge the true impact of their fiscal policy and often overstate its 
common benefits. This he called 'fiscal illusion', after the earlier work of an 
Italian economist. Indeed, Schumpeter's analysis and his emphasis on the 
negative impacts of war were decisive for changing the classical legal and 
political thinkers' view of the state as a rational organiser of society which 
handled 'public finances' as a 'political instrument' to act upon society.12 In 
short, Schum peter regarded state finances as the link between economic and 
political power. State finances could not be intelligible as a separate set of 
'public' institutions acting upon society; rather they epitomized the whole society 
8 On Goldscheid, I follow Goldscheid, Rudolf, 'A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public Finance', in Musgrave, 
Richard A., and Peacock, Alan T., eds., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London, 1962, pp. 202-213 and 
Backhaus, 'Fiscal Sociology. What For?' pp. 62-66. 
9Thus, the state diverted the revenues of taxation to the pockets of the capital owners on whom the state depended. 
Indeed, war did not affect the creditors, since credits are a claim and thus survive conflicts, whereas 'physical' 
resources or services become extinct through death or destruction. This explanation was largely drawn to justify why 
the state had embarked on the long and costly First World War, something Goldscheid believed would never have 
happened had the human and material costs been apparent. 
10 See Goldscheid, Rudon, 'A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public Finance', in Musgrave, Richard A., and 
Peacock, Alan T., eds., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London, 1962), pp. 202-213. 
11 On the process of 'dispossession of the state', see GokJscheid, 'A Sociological Approach', pp. 203-5. 
12 Schumpeter agreed with Goldscheid in that World War I would never have taken place, had the exhaustibility of the 
tax-base when confronted with military effort war been visible to the taxpayers and states. 
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and their changes and transformations directly reflected the social dynamics 
upon which states were built. This fundamental insight diverted the focus of 
'public finances' from the state to the ideology and to the divisions present in 
society which the state reflected rather than created. 
The works of Schum peter and Goldscheid inserted state finances in a 
wider field of intelligibility that supersedes the angle offered by state-centred 
historiographies looking for the emergence of 'public finances' as one 
dimension of 'state-building.' Indeed, this latter view fails to address essential 
questions. To Jean Favier the priority of the demand over revenues is the 
distinguishing feature of 'public finances': public financial systems are those 
where the revenues depend on goals chosen by the state, whereas in private 
finances the amount of the receipt is a contingent factor and needs are 
permanent.13 This implies that whereas the goals of each particular person are 
defined by their income, a 'public' institution can formulate and pursue new 
goals independently from the current income and resort to its prerogatives to 
increase the receipt according to its goals. This view resounds of the bravado of 
Fran~ois I when asked by a Venetian emissary how much he could extract from 
his subjects: 'tout ce dont j'ai besoin, selon ma volonte.'14 
The axiomatic priority of demand over income rests on two assumptions 
that will be debated in the historical scenario studied here: a) the state 
autonomously chooses, formulates and pursues its 'needs', with little concern 
for constitutional and economical limitations; b) by conSidering expenditure 
merely as the pursuit of the monarchy's interests, non-state interests (which are 
ultimately the recipients of expenditure) are excluded from the fiscal system. 
The perception of the fiscal system as a direct emanation of the state 
prevents the discussion of the key problem brought by Finanzsoziologie: the 
autonomy of the state. Indeed, as Jean-Claude Waquet claimed in his study of 
Tuscany, finances consist of the 'transformation of public resources into private 
ones and vice-versa, combining the interests of both public and private 
13 Favier, Finance 6t fises/ite, p. 12; Favier, Jean, 'Introduction', in Comite pour I'Histoire Economique et Financiere, 
ed., L'lm"ot au Moyen Age. L'im"ot public et Ie prefevement seigneurial. Fin XIJe· debut XVJe, vol. I, Le droit de 
imposer, Paris, 2002, p. 1. 
14 Quoted Guery, Alain, 'les Finances de Ia Monarchie Franyaise sous l'Ancien Regime', Annales. Economies. 
Societes. Civilisations, Annae 33 (1978) vol. 2, p. 223. 
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entities.'15 In fiscal activity there is no simple, one-way relation between a state 
which 'builds up' a tributary system upon a passive 'private' tax-base. Fiscal 
systems are negotiated by the state with other social powers which had its 
important agendas that conditioned or even determined the outcome. Recently 
W. Mark Ormrod drew attention to the tendency 'for fiscal systems to outlive 
their periods of productivity and come to serve the interests not of the State but 
of its subjects' .16 
In the historically observable practices and doctrines of state finance, 
'fiscal systems' still answer to the older and wider problem of exchange and 
redistribution of resources. In a classic article on the cultural background of the 
finances of the French monarchy in the longue duree, Alain Guery regarded the 
crown finances from the angle of the distribution of gifts in which the monarch 
participated and upon which the monarchy built its political eminence.17 Drawing 
largely on anthropological inference and non-administrative sources, Guery 
noticed that the finances of the monarchs remained involved in a network of 
non-commercial exchanges, in which the seemingly unilateral bestowing of 
objects, lands and services by a king assured him that he was the reCipient of a 
transfer of power. Ultimately, monarchical supremacy stemmed from a subtle, 
tacit transfer of powers from his subjects to him whereof the gifts to his closer 
subjects were the counterpart. 
The idea that the power of the monarch was founded upon its liberality, 
and hence that the monarch was forced to give, prospered within the European 
dynastic states, including Portugal. According to Fernao Lopes, Pedro I of 
Portugal claimed that in the days in which he did not give, he did not really 
reign.18 The notion of gift as the prime duty of the monarch was clearly 
articulated in 1418 by Portugal's infante Pedro (1392-1449) who wrote that 'the 
princes ought to share what they have by granting privileges as it is their duty, 
15 "Les finances (publiques] realisent Ia transformation des ressources publiques en privees et des ressources 
privees en publiques. Elles se decomposent en un ensemble de processus d'acquisition et de cession qui, mis en 
(BUYre par des sujets eux-memes publics et prives, exercent les uns sur les autres une influence reciproque". 
Waquet, Le Grand-DucM de Toscane, p. 175. 
16 Ormrod, W. Mark, 'Finance and Trade under Richard II', Anthony Goodman and James Gillespie (eds.) Richard II. 
The Art of Kingship, Oxford, 1999, p. 186. 
17 Guery, A., 'Le roi depensier: Ie don, Ia contrainte, et I'origine du systeme financier de la monarchie fran~aise 
d'ancien regime', Anna/as. Economies, Societes, Civilisations, Annee 39 (1984) vol. 6, pp. 1241-1269. 
18 Lopes, Gran. Pedro " chapter I, p. 5. M the Songe du Vargier, polHical treatise in verse, put " in the last quarter of 
the fourteenth century, Las rois sont donatairas at par consequence its sont seigneurs. Guery, 'Le rai depensier, 
p.1243. 
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since it was for this that God gave them power and it was for this that men 
consented to their [the princes'] lordship and their [the princes'] persons 
received sufficient goods' .19 
On the other hand, the capacity for giving had to be matched by a 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the monarch. As such, the first 
examples of taxes were comprehended within this culture of gift-exchanging, 
rather than as emanating from public authority and obligation. This was certainly 
not exclusive to the French monarchy; as Harriss remarked for the Plantagenet 
period in England, words deSignating taxes such as 'benevolences', 'loans' and 
'aids' were more than gracious terms devised to mask direct demands. These 
words conveyed the precise nature of the tax, according to the widely shared 
doctrine of the mutual duties between the crown and its subjects.2o This long-
term perspective offered by Alain Guery highlights expenditure and 
redistribution, instead of focusing mainly on the income side of the budget and 
the correlative expansion of 'public' authority. It reminds us that tax-collection 
and expenditure are closely interrelated and that redistribution was certainly a, 
arguably the, raison d'etre for the conservation and permanence of the fiscal 
powers of the state. If these reflections are accepted, the historical field of fiscal 
problems is far wider than the idea of 'public finances' would suggest. 
The last decades saw the development of 'fiscal history' as a relatively 
well-defined field of historical study, for which comparison between European 
states was an essential instrument. This trend became particularly visible 
worldwide through a few collective works in the 1990s directed under the label 
or 'fiscal history.'21 The direct origins of these collective works are to be sought 
19 'Mais devem os principes partir 0 que teem fazendo a todos mercees segundo que devem, que por esto Ihes 
outorgou Deus 0 regimento, e os homeens consentirom que sobre elles fossem senhores, e receberom cousas 
sobejas aas suas persoas para poderem partir com aqueles que vivem minguados.' Pedro, Infante de Portugal, Livro 
da Vertuosa Benteytoria, ed. A. Almeida Calado, Coimbra, 1994, Book II, Chapter IX, p. 78. 
20 Harriss, G. L., 'Aids, Loans and BeneVOlences', Historical Journal, 6 (1963). pp. 1-19. Like gifts, taxes were 
voluntary. Unlike gifts, though, they resuHed from the initiative of the receiver. Like gifts, they required to be 
reciprocated but in France the compensation for the aids and subsidies conceded to the monarch was hardly 
tangible. often vague and sometimes Simply neglected. 
21 Bonney, Richard, ed .• ESSF. RFS and Ormrod, Bonney, M. and Bonney, R.. eds. Crises. This strand of research 
is to be associated the project 'Origins of the Modern State'. funded by the European foundation for Science. which is 
responsible for Genet, Jean-Philippe and Le Menet, Michel. eds., Genese de I'Etat Moderne. Prelevement et 
Redistribution. Paris, 1987. The label1iscal history' was developed by Charles Tilly in the 19705. Tilly, Charles. ed .• 
The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, 1975. Other important collective works oriented 
towards comparative study are Sanchez Martinez, Manuel, ed., Corona, Municipis i Fiscalitat a Is Baixa Edat Mitjana, 
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in a European-wide project on the 'Origins of the Modern State' which reunited 
historians and data from different historiographical backgrounds. The various 
projects that have claimed the label of 'fiscal history' have worked to transcend 
the nation-oriented approach. Their more recent advocates have proposed 
comparative study as the ground where the hypotheses on fiscal history could 
be tested and verified.22 The approach in these works was not entirely new. The 
name 'fiscal history' itself had been adopted from Tilly's proposals from some 
twenty years earlier and, ultimately, the problems tackled were very similar to 
those of the Finanzsoziologie. Faithful to the comparative stance of the original 
project, the 1990s 'Fiscal History' propounded the study of the evolutions of 
different European pre-modern fiscal systems within the conceptual horizon 
provided by Schumpeter's tax-state/domain-state opposition.23 
The central ambition of these volumes was to conciliate the scholarly 
research on state finances developed by authors from different historiographies 
with the problems set by Finanzsoziologie and other economic theorists. Yet it 
claimed to be detached from the sociology of finances in two important aspects. 
Firstly, the comparative stance adopted by the editors of the 'Fiscal History' 
collective volumes brought forth a more case-sensitive view of the twin 
concepts of domain-state and tax-state. Eventually, these were further revised 
so as to fit a larger quantity of cases than those envisaged by the 
Finanzsociologie, which had remained largely a German and Scandinavian 
affair.24 Secondly, political decisions and factors were considered decisive and 
Bonney and Ormrod stressed that transitions from one fiscal system to another 
were also moulded by non-financial factors.25 These two developments are 
central to the present work. 
Lleida, 1997; La Fiscalita nell'Economia Europea. Secc. XII/-IV. Atti, 2 vols., Florence, 2008, pp. 131-51; Comite pour 
I'Histoire Economique et Financiere, ed., L'imp6t au Moyen Age. L'imp6t public et Ie prelevement seigneurial. Fin 
XI/8· debut XV/8, 3 vols., Paris, 2002. Mention should be made also to the term 'New Fiscal History' claimed by Philip 
T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg in opposttion of an 'older literature' whose authors 1ail to connect taxes and 
government borrowings to polUical development' and 'overlook the reasons behind the seemingly quaint fiscal 
practices of early modem monarchies' (Introduction', Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450-
1789, Hoffman, Philip T. and Norberg, Kathryn, eds., Stanford, 1994, p. 2). 
22 Bonney, Richard, 'Introduction', ESSF. 
23 Bonney, Richard, 'Introduction', RSF, pp. 1·17. 
24 Bonney and Ormrod, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions', p. 1-2. 
25 Bonney and Ormrod, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions', p. 19. 
14 
The models drawn by Bonney and arm rod expanded Schumpeter's 
original transition from the patrimonial state to the tax state into four different 
models of fiscal system: tribute state, domain state, tax state and fiscal state.26 
Each of these models stands for a stable form of interaction between the 
essential processes of borrowing, revenues and expenditure. The set of models 
proposed by Bonney and Ormrod attempt at relating changes in the economy 
as well as changes in the state organisation.27 
. As said, the other difference from the Finanzsoziologie was the attention 
dedicated to 'political factors.' None of the 'political factors' was deemed more 
influential than war. Richard Bonney provocatively declared that the financial 
war effort worked as a 'primum mobile' for changes within fiscal systems.28 The 
extreme financial demands caused by war implied a great deal of innovation 
within fiscal institutions, a more intensive exploitation of the existing resources 
and the development of new revenues. In theory, these changes were provisory 
and intended only to meet the sudden expenditure caused by wars, but 
observable cases show that inflated wartime budgets failed to return to their 
pre-war levels. This is what economic historians call 'displacement (or ratchet) 
effect,.29 
On the whole, this was the argument developed by historical sociologist 
Charles Tilly whose views on state-building accord an important place to the 
relationship between war, 'coercion' applied to an external enemy, and 'capital', 
or monetised, mobile economic resources.3° The state, with its internal 
apparatus and its capacity for mobilizing yet more capital, was a by-product of 
the violent interaction between states.31 Finance became relevant in the 
process of state-building when 'war and preparation for war involved rulers in 
26 Crises, pp. 1-19. 
27 Indeed, unlike the direct opposition between patrimonial state and tax state by Schumpeter and developed later 
within the German-speaking and Scandinavian scholars, Bonney and Ormrod proposed, for instance, that a state 
based on large-scale borrowing should be distinguished from a state based on direct taxation. Indeed, these different 
types of income are coherent with different degrees of state responsiveness to the posseSSions of its subjects but 
also with the dominant economy, being the 'fiscal state' unthinkable without the availability of liquid capital which not 
all economies or countries could dispose of. Oespite the importance attributed to economy, the authors underlined 
that the transitions between fiscal systems are not determined by economy. Crises, pp. 1-19. 
28 Bonney, 'Introduction', ESSF, p. 13; Bonney and Ormrod, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions', p. 2. 
29 Bonney, 'Introduction', RSF, p. 8. 
30 Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital and European States. AD 990-1992, Cambridge MA, 1992, maxime chapter 3, 
'How War Made States and Vice Versa.' 
31 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, pp. 27, 54·61. 
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extracting the means of war from others who held the essential resources [ ... J 
and who were reluctant to surrender them without strong pressure or 
compensation,.32 Beforehand, according to Tilly, the relations between state-
building and finances were marked by Ipatrimonialism,' when states could only 
count on temporary armies and Similarly limited rents and tributes, as functions 
of low monetization and low state capacity for surveillance.33 
While IFiscal history' saw the fiscal demands caused by wars as a prime 
factor in the changes undergone by fiscal systems, its empirical studies have 
made clear that for the period before the sixteenth century the relationship 
between the increasing demands caused by warfare and the evolution of the 
fiscal system was considerably more complex than Simple, direct causation.34 
The demands of warfare triggered dramatic changes, but there are enough 
empirical indications suggesting that the relation between the construction of a 
fiscal system and war as reciprocal.35 The opposing paths of England and 
France after the Hundred Years War are eloquent enough: while the French 
crown after long decades of desperate, short-funded defence, saw its fiscal 
prerogatives and revenue reinforced and soon a policy of territorial enlargement 
would follow,36 for England, the fiscal outcome of the Hundred Years War was a 
state devoid of war subsidies and increasingly dependent on the royal domain.37 
Indeed, wars recall the problem of the autonomy of the state, or of the Ipublic 
finances' and the non-public aspects of fiscal systems, mainly redistribution. 
Possibly, the landed crowns of the peaceful thirteenth century were more 
autonomous from the redistributive pressures coming from the military nobility, 
32 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, p. 15. 
33 Tilly, Caercion, Capital, pp. 29, 86-89. 
34 As Ormrod and Bonney declared, 'ratchet effect' is not a necessary consequence of long-term warfare. Bonney 
and Ormrod, 'Introduction', p. 3. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, p. 89. 
35 In a period where the most profitable forms of taxation were extraordinary, outright war was the only means of 
securing revenues in most European monarchies. At least in England and France, see Henemann, 'France in the 
Middle Ages', p. 110; Ormrod, W. M., 'The West European Monarchies in the later Middle Ages', in Bonney, 
Richard, ed., Economic Systems and State Finance, Oxford, 1995, p. 150. 
36 Ormrod, 'The West European Monarchies', pp. 149-151. It should be added that the mobilization of the political 
support in parliament unimately led to the evaporation of the tax-base. Ormrod, W. Mark, 'The domestic Response to 
the Hundred Years Wa~, in Curry, Anne and Hughes, M., eds. Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years 
War, Woodbridge, 1994, p. 101. 
37 On the eve of Poitiers, atter six decades of stop-and-go conflicts with England and Flanders, the Valois kings were 
still living pragmatically, having not managed to ensure anything like a permanent revenue base, despite renewed 
attempts in that direction. Henneman Jnr, John Bell, 'France in the Middle Ages', RFS, pp. 110-1; see also for details 
Henneman, John Bell, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France. The Development of War Financing. 1322-
1356, Princeton, 1971, pp. 80-90. 
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only too eager to get wages, grants and patronage. Monarchies involved with 
war and benefiting from abundant taxation saw themselves more vulnerable to 
group interests or, in the case of more bureaucratised monarchies, developing a 
group of interest of their own. Circumstantially, late fourteenth-century nobility 
was deeply affected by the post-Black Death erosion of rents and thus the 
king,s patronage became more essential.38 By contrast, many states had 
relatively developed fiscal systems without direct influence of war.39 At any rate, 
the perception of warfare as an 'independent variable' must be attenuated. 
Indeed, as it will be argued, war is not a deus ex machina extrinsic to the fiscal 
systems, it is part of it. The forms and finances of warfare vary along the fiscal 
systems. 
The present dissertation aims to test the models of and the transition 
between them in a concrete instance - the Portuguese state from the thirteenth 
to the early sixteenth century; hopefully, in the process, historical Portuguese 
finances will be constructed as a comparable case. While the understanding of 
the dynamics of fiscal history does not depend on the simple accumulation of 
the quantity of cases, there are good arguments to claim that that a study of 
Portugal will do more than solely expanding the number of instances explored.4o 
If questioned along the lines thus presented, the Portuguese fiscal history will 
also contribute towards a more representative sample of European fiscal 
systems. 
The more comprehensive comparative attempt in fiscal history yet, the set 
of studies presented in The Rise of the Fiscal State in 1999, aptly represents 
the diversity of European fifteenth-century fiscal systems and different political 
38 This point was made by W. Mark Ormrod for England. Ormrod, W. Mark, 'England in the Middle Ages', RSF, p. 46. 
The argument appears developed in 'The Politics of Pestilence: Government in England after the Black Death', in 
Ormrod, W. Mark and Lindey, P., eds., The Black Death in England, Stamford, 1996, pp. 162·7. On the the pr~ssure 
exerted by the nobility on the expenditure of a specific Portuguese monastery in 1365, see Amaral. Luis Carlos, Sao 
Salvador de Grij6 na Segunda Metade do S8culo XIV, Porto, 1994, pp. 169·176. 
39 On the weak direct influence of war in shaping the fiscal system of the kingdom of Navarre see Carrasco Perez, 
Juan, 'L'lmpet dans Ia Fiscalite Royale en Navarre. Les Politiques de Philipe Le Bel (1284·1305)" in Comite pour 
I'Histoire Economique et Financiere, ed., L'imp6t au Moyen Age. L'imp6t public et Ie prelevement seigneurial. Fin 
XIJe· debut XVJe, vol. I, Le droit de impose" Paris, 2002, pp. 177·201. 
40 Indeed Two maps depicting European states in two equally authoritative works, the Philips Atlas of World History 
('c. 1400') and the Westermanns Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, show how controversial, if not meaningless, it is to count 
the number of states in late fourteenth-century Europe ('Europe c. 1400', in O'Brien, Patrick, ed.. Philips Atlas of 
World History, London, 1999, p. 106; 'Europa 1402', Westermans Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, Berlin, 1963, p. 71). The 
former draws the borders of twenty·two political units for Europe c. 1400, whereas the latter identifies thirty·three 
'states' in 1402, excluding fourteen that lie within the imperial boundaries. 
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scenarios. Whereas the fifteenth-century kings of Poland had to defend the 
country simply with the resources of their landed domain,41 the fiscal revenues 
of the Low Countries were assigned to the foreign policies of the Burgundian 
and Habsburg dynasties.42 In the Swiss Confederation, by contrast, there was 
no central financial system and each republic had independent fiscal and 
external policies.43 In the lands of the Holy Roman Empire the situation was 
even more complicated, with a multitude of autonomous fiscal systems, be 
those of territorial principalities, the free or imperial cities or the Northern 
autonomous towns. Throughout his lands, the emperor could in theory dispose 
of some permanent sources of revenue but the permanent ones were for the 
most part pledged whereas the implementation of occasional taxes was 
severely conditioned by the strong autonomy of the principalities. As a result, 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the emperor depended on his 
familiar lands in order to subsidise an external policy. Fifteenth-century papal 
finances were served by three main different sources of revenue, all of them 
derived from a different political relation: revenues from the pope's own Italian 
'state', revenues from 'vassal' kingdoms and a series of obligations payable by 
the clergy all over Christendom.44 In all these cases, the connection between 
the fiscal system and the 'state' (in the strict sense of an entity with an 
autonomous external policy) is loose in comparison with the more compact 
cases of Venice, England, Castile or France (at least, after 1356). 
These cases differ starkly when relationships between the sovereign and 
the state institutions are considered: Venice, France, England and Castile45 are 
opposed to other states, either non-dynastic (Switzerland, Papal States) or part 
of a multi-state dynastiC expansion (Burgundian Low Countries, Jagellonian 
Poland). With its strong connection between territory, dynasty and 
administration, Portugal was closer to the former group. However, Portugal was 
considerably different from Castile, France, Castile and Venice, both in terms of 
sheer demographics and landmass and in terms of military activity. Castile and 
England were states whose projects of war 'implied resources far greater than 
41 Filipczak-Kocur, Anna, 'Poland-Ltthuania Before Partition', RFS, pp. 448-9. 
42 Blockmans, Wim, 'The Low Countries in the Middle Ages', RFS, pp. 297-9. 
43 Komer. Martin. 'The Swiss Confederation'. RFS. pp. 347. 353. 
44 Partner, Peter, 'The Papacy and the Papal States', RFS. pp. 359-60. 
45 In the thirteenth century, Castile incorporated by conquest Muslim states with autonomous organisations. 
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those possessed' (W. Mark Ormrod)46 while Venice had to fund its 'constantly 
expanding empire' (Jean-Claude Hocquet).47 In the French case, expansionist 
ambitions were less continuous but in the reigns of Philippe III (1270-85) and 
Philippe IV (1285-1314) a series of offensive expeditions which spread the 
royal hosts throughout Languedoc, Aragon, Aquitaine and Flanders took place 
and the later stages of the Hundred Years War implied the conquest of lost 
territory.48 
While considering the comprehensiveness of the Rise of the Fiscal State, 
chronology is also important. Indeed, it happens that in the cases covered there 
is clearly also a chronological imbalance, as the period before the fifteenth 
century remains insufficiently explored. The finances of the Low Countries were 
only observed form 1384 onwards, the Polish union with Lithuania dates from 
1387, while authority in Papal Italian lands was re-established in 1420. Only the 
articles about France, England, Venice, Castile and, to a lesser extent, the 
Empire49 pay substantial attention to the previous times. The cases are too few 
to authorize generalisation for this period as a whole, as all, bar the Empire, 
were expansionist states. The fact that the countries whose thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century finances were included are expansionist powers significantly 
limits the spectrum of the cases so far analysed. In all these cases, offensive, 
and to a lesser extent defensive, war decisively determined that the 
development of the fiscal system would be an expenditure-driven. 
Given the importance of war for research on the history of fiscal systems, 
Portugal represents a critical instance to understand the influence of the military 
factor. Indeed, from a state carrying little weight in wider European power 
struggles in the thirteenth century, Portugal evolved into a major world power c. 
1480. In the former period, it can be argued that the country fittingly represents 
a host of other under-represented participants in late fourteenth-century 
European state system, namely those which did not harbour consistent 
46 Ormrod, 'The West European', p. 123. 
47 Hocquet, Jean-Claude, 'Venice', p. 383. 
46 A distinctively offensive rationale would prevail in some stages of the Hundred Years War, namely it came to 
conquer lands long held by the Plantagenet or even to attack England by sea. Similarly, the kings of France actively 
supported w~h men and monies the kingdom of the Scots, of the Trastamara dynasty in Castile and the Welsh 
rebellion of Owen Glendower. Henneman, John Bell, 'France in the Middle Ages', RSF, p. 105. Henneman, Royal 
Taxation, pp. 27-38. 
49 lsenmann, Eberhard, 'The Holy Roman Empire', RFS pp. 243-70. Although Isenmann took a synchronic 
perspective, most of the concrete information is dated from the fifteenth century. 
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expansionist goals: Granada,50 Navarre, Scotland, the Republics of Florence 
and Genoa, not to mention the realms threatened by the Ottomans, including 
Hungary. By contrast, when regarded in its imperial period, Portugal appears as 
expansionist state.51 This dramatic change provides an intriguing testing ground 
for the transition between fiscal models. 
The Archives 
So far, emphasis has been laid broad interpretations and models. Few 
references have been made to what actually constitutes the intrinsic problem 
that separates history from all other scientific enquiries: the sources. Indeed, in 
this respect history follows a different track from the perspectives offered by the 
founders of Fiscal Sociology. Goldscheid claimed that 'the whole of the socio-
economic order concerned is nowhere else as clearly reflected as in public 
accounts' and that 'the state cannot be constituted differently from its budget,'52 
while Schumpeter famously declared that 'the political life but also the spirit of 
the people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may 
prepare - all this is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases,.53 
Although these grand statements are often quoted as a plea to the study of 
fiscal history, they ignore practical heuristic and hermeneutical questions of 
historiography. Indeed, not all fiscal systems are expressed in budgets, 
latissimu sensu 'Public accounts' or 'budgets' are by no means self-evident; as 
any other source, they pose to the historian thorough heuristics and challenging 
hermeneutics. 
The aim of this section is to present the sources that are available for the 
historian. This, however, cannot be done without close reference to the system 
50 The knowledge of the finances of the Grenadine Kingdom is very patchy. See the forthcoming overview 'La 
fiscalidad andalusf: terminologia, balance y perspectivas' by Jose Molina Sanchez for the 2006 Malaga Congress. 
51 It is hard to classify Portugal within Tilly's dichotomy of capital-intensive and coercion-intensive states. As a 
territorial and dynastic state with an efficient centralisation of the means of coercion and a little-integrated market, it 
appears as a coercion-intensive. However, as it was centred on a dominant trading city metropolis, it could employed 
capital in the build-up of armies and navies (Tilly, Coercion, Capital, pp. 27, 54-61). This problem will be addressed in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
52 Quoted in Witt, 'Introduction: History and Sociology of Public Finance,' pp. 7-8. 
53 'The Crisis of the Tax State', International Economic Papers, vol. 4, New York, 1954, p. 7. Quoted in Braun, 
Rudolf, 'Taxation, Sociopolitical structure and state-building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia, in Tilly, 
Charles, Formation of national states in Western Europe, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975, p. 327. 
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of accounting that produced and, sometimes, preserved them. Indeed, in spite 
of the very origin of European archives being inextricably connected with fiscal 
records,54 their survival has proven to be highly contingent. In Europe in the 
period studied, not every single stage of the fiscal process was recorded. 
Records were produced in view of audit which was primarily a judiciary rather 
than financial procedure. It mattered less to see the whole of the state accounts 
than those of the individual officer. For thirteenth- to fifteenth--century 
administrations, unlike the accounting of contemporary states, royal records 
neither primarily intended to draw a balance, nor aspired to being transparent to 
the taxpayers or to the crown. Most of the written documents at the disposal of 
present-day fiscal history were developed for administrative purposes and for 
asserting the permanent rights of individuals and of the state.55 In the European 
states of the period, there were certainly general accounts comprising either the 
revenues or expenses or even the balance of both.56 However only seldom 
were the records of royal finances produced and preserved according to a 
budget-driven rationale. 
Thus, budgets are not self-explanatory. While their systematic features 
make them extremely useful for historian, their significance to the fiscal system 
can only be grasped if the various institutional practices that brought them to life 
and watched for their very preservation are understood. These institutional 
practices determine what can and cannot be said about any country's fiscal 
history and what its accounts actually stand for. The correct interpretation of 
sources can only take place after an enquiry into the reasons for their 
production and eventual survival and the processes of selection, in one word -
on the archive. These questions raise the problem of the 'archive', understood 
54 Eventually the careful preservation of fiscal series attracted other documents whose safeguarding was deemed 
necessary. The English Exchequer, for instance, got a custodial function for documents produced in other 
'departments' such as the Chancery, the Wardrobe, the Council and, latterly, the secretaries of State. Clanchy, From 
memory to written record, pp. 70-71. In Portugal, historians have long related the constitution of a central archive 
with the primitive records of expenditure and revenue. The first to point to this circumstance was eighteenth-century 
diplomatist Joao Pedro Ribeiro in his Memorias Authenticas para a Historia do Real Archivo, Lisbon, 1819. 
55 In fourteenth· and fifteenth·century England, to quote Anthony Steel, 'individual accounts with the crown could be, 
and usually were, strictly aud~ed, but there was no conception of balancing royal or national revenue against 
expenditure as a whole'. The Receipt of the Exchequer, 1377·1485, Cambridge, 1954, p. xxiv. 
56 Guery, Alain, 'Les Finances de la Monarchie Fra~aise sous l'Ancien Regime', Annales. Economies. Societ6s. 
Civilisations, Annes 33 (1978) vol. 2, pp. 219-223. 
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here as the set of motives, practices and rules behind the production and 
preservation of the records and memoranda.57 
Natural causes have decisively intervened to reduce the scope of 
Portuguese archive. The fires that burst in the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake 
consumed the old building of the royal accountancy institutions (Casa dos 
Contos) along with all its documentation.58 With the same catastrophe, the 
paperwork of the neighbouring agencies (the Casa da India and the Casa da 
Mina which dealt with African and Asian incomes and expenditure) 
disappeared, while the chancery records and some collections of the royal 
household, kept in Sao Jorge Castle, survived and formed the core of the actual 
Portuguese National Archives or Torre do Tombo. The complete destruction of 
the archive of the Casa dos Contos has evidently discouraged historians from 
studying the kingdom's financial organization based upon the scanty, disperse 
evidence that chancery records, stray survivals, occasional copies or the 
information of chroniclers afford. Thus, it is not surprising that a comprehensive 
study of the evolution of fiscal institutions of this period is entirely lacking, 
despite the works on affiliate fields by Henrique da Gama Barros, Anselmo 
Brancaamp Freire, Virginia Rau, Iria Goncalves and A. L. de Carvalho Homem. 
In spite of occasional interest by some nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
institutional historians on state finances, the study of the fiscal processes and of 
their documentation has been neglected and the integration of the dispersed 
surviving documents with their 'archive' remains to be done. 
To make sense of such dispersed and diverse sources they ought to be 
understood as fragments of coherent, if lost, archives. Within the period studied 
in this dissertation, it is important to distinguish three different periods with 
contrasting rules and practices for the production and, crucially, the 
preservation of documents; in other words, to identify three different 'archives'. 
57 The concept of 'archive' used here should not be mistaken by the far wider sense that Foucau~ attributed to this 
word. However, the concept used here retains the notion of the archive as a set of rules, previous and independent 
from the research, that regulate what can and cannot be researched, instead of a passive deposn of 'objective' 
documents: 'L'archive, c'est d'abard fa /Oi de ce qui peut etre dit ... c'est aussi ce qui fait que toutes ces choses dites 
ne s'amsssent pas indefiniment dans une multitude amorphe.' Foucau~, Michel, L 'Arch8ologie du ssvoir, Paris, 1969, 
p.170. 
58 Rau, Virginia, A Casa eJos Contos, Coimbra, 1951, pp. 133-134. 
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1180-1300 
From the end of the twelfth century to the reigns of Afonso III (1248-79) 
and Dinis I (1279-1325), the primary interest of Portuguese monarchs was the 
accumulation and transmission of their vast treasuries.· At least from 1216 
onwards, royal wills were composed after a reckoning of the money entering the 
treasuries - the Liber Me; Repositi. Thus, for most of· the period, kings' wills, 
even if discontinuous in time, can be used as indicators of royal fortunes, 
provided they are read carefully and their sums accounted with knowledge of 
the coins and weighs used. But, however eloquent these testaments might be 
about the apex of the system, they are only the tip of an iceberg. From 1216 
there is documentary evidence about the existence of a central register (Libr; de 
Recabedo Regm) that recorded the expenses assigned to the sources of 
revenue and that was used to audit the officers. As no excerpt, let alone an 
original, of this register has so far been found, its actual content remains open 
to debate. At any rate, the volumes of receipt and expenditure for this period 
remain totally opaque and can only be the object of some informed speculation. 
The loss of the Recabedo Regn; books cannot be compensated by the 
charters and letters produced at the royal chancery, as these are far too scarce 
to represent the actual workings of the crown's departments.59 Obviously, a 
considerable deal of royal letters can be found in the national archive's 
miscellaneous collection of Gavetas as well as in the monastic collections. 
These documents have a very varied scope and some of them are related to 
the crown's management (acquisition and leasing of properties, orders to 
custom officers, pawning of chattels). Except for the exceptional copy of a score 
of letters relating with the Coimbra treasury that were found among the 
documentation of Santa Cruz abbey60 and other rare findings, already 
59 It is doubtful that a formal chancery register existed in the reigns of Afonso I (1128-85) and Sancho I (1185-1211) 
and thus present-day historians have to rely on modem collection of diplomas, almost all of them dealing solely with 
transfers of land to monasteries. The chancery register of Afonso II (1211-23) is vastly incomplete and in 1226, 
during the reign of his son Sancho II (1223-48), the practice of recording charters was discontinued, only to return 
with Afonso III (1248-79) and his son Dinis (1279·1325). On the Portuguese chancery registers, see Maria Helena da 
Cruz Coelho and Armando Luis Gomes de Carvalho Homem, 'Origines et evolution du registre de la chancellerie 
royale portugaise (Xllle-XVe siecles)', Revisla da Facu/dade de Letras da Universidade do Porto. Hist6ria, II series, 
vol. XII, Porto, 1995, pp. 47-76. 
60 TAIII. 
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published,61 these documents contain very little useful information on the 
revenues and nearly nought on the expenses, of which some were more or less 
systematised.62 
On the whole, available quantitative information is diffused and limited to 
the central. treasury. The randomness of their survival and the scarcity of 
quantitative information plainly condemn any attempt of systematising the data 
and figures contained in them. In part, this is because their chancery registers 
did not keep their integrity. Although the Portuguese departmental collections of 
these periods have been. depleted by various factors, it can be argued that the 
king's grasp of his finances was not very clear. Indeed, given that the Casa dos 
Contos only appeared around 1296 and that there is no documentary or 
narrative indication of general accounts, the monarch could only obtain a notion 
of the cash-flow of the central treasuries and nothing else. Possibly, the 
Recabedo Regni books could provide a notion of who held the royal lands and 
other sources of revenue. However, it could hardly have allowed for a 
comprehensive overview of the system that allowed the monarchs to amass 
their carefully accounted treasures. 
This pattern of source survival seemingly limits the· historian to the 
institutional description of the financial administration of Afonso III and Dinis I. 
At best, historiography can correlate the changes shown by the accounts of the 
treasuries, as narrated by the wills, and other occasional survivals, with those 
institutional developments. 
61 Crucially, the 1280 letter of quittance issued to a high·treasurer. Deser., vol. I, doc. 8, p. 345. 
62 Very possibly, redistributive payments, like the mara vedis and contias (payments to keep up the military capacity 
of the nobles) were recorded, like the surviving 'accounts of the household of Prince Dinis' from 1278. This 
document, however, cuts a lonely figure as no other register of expenditure seems to have subsisted. 'Inventario e 
Contas da Casa de O. Denis (1278·1282)' ed. Anselmo Brancaamp Freire, Arehivo Historieo Portuguez, vol. X, 
Lisbon, 1916, pp.41·59. 
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1300-1400 
In the fourteenth century, the central treasury lost importance to a system 
of local treasures headed by a/moxarifes. It was through these treasures, fed by 
a given set of revenues, that the crown commanded both redistribution and 
hoarding (in the form of payments of the central treasury). At least once a year, 
they had to report the income they collected to the central Casa dos Contos (c. 
1290). Detailed accounts of the revenues of each a/moxarife and the 
expenditure thereof were entered by the auditors in the books of the Contos, 
which were divided by regions.63 Once completed and inserted in the adequate 
book, this entry or recada~ao had full legal value. Unlike England, where audit 
sessions were annual, officers, or their heirs, were audited in the end of the 
functions. 
Audit was entirely based upon written documents. As we know from 
various passing references, it consisted essentially in comparing the entry of the 
delivery annually sent to the Contos by the scribe with the proofs of expenditure 
thereof (the conto).64 The integrity of these documents was possible because 
each almoxarife was controlled by a scribe who witnessed and recorded the ins 
and outs of the local treasure in the office's ledger (Livro da Receita e 
Despesa). Similarly, the scribe had to update the register of fixed rents of each 
district (Livro do Estado or Tombo do A/moxarifado)65 and produce 
authenticated notes of receipt of the money paid in. In an audit session, the 
a/moxa rife had to produce both the orders for expenditure - letters known as 
a/varas in paper issued by command of the king - and the receipts of his 
disbursements (practical expenditure, pensions and transfers to the central 
treasuries). The scribe's Livro da Receita e Despesa would be checked against 
the original orders of expenditure and against the expected income contained in 
the Tombo do Almoxarifado. While most of this paperwork was likely destroyed 
63 Chanco Afonso IV, vol. III, doc. 374, p. 266 (24 April 1342). ""UN~l"""'-R-JeDo-I'T\r-
64 n, Chane. Dinis, Livro 3, fots. 131·131v (1320). IYc;not I TIl 




after the audit sessions, a record with the summary of the receipt and payments 
thereof was kept. 
As the archive of the Contos burnt with its building in 1755, this 
documentation exists no more. The knowledge of the crown's transactions is 
limited to indirect information in other source collections. Stray survivals in the 
vast miscellaneous collections of the Torre do Tombo (National Archives), 
mainly the Gavetas and the Nucleo Antigo, would be a remote possibility. 
Indeed, orders of expenditure, receipts and even the summaries of the audit 
were in paper rather than parchment. It is very likely that they were destroyed 
after the authoritative arrecada~ao had been entered in the Contos books. Only 
one Livro da Receita e Oespesa survived.66 This random survival provides an 
important insight in fiscal recording: it was in paper, not parchment. Besides its 
inferior durability, paper, reflected the low importance ascribed to operational 
accounts for the men who preserved documents, in contrast to the solemn and 
elaborated parchments that claim and secure perennial rights.67 
The laborious book-keeping of the Contos was designed to control the 
royal officers, not to produce annual balances. This concern appeared in the 
middle decades of the fourteenth century, when the office of Overseer of the 
Finances (Vedor da Fazenda) was created. This officer was dedicated to the 
central management of the king's resources and had to compile totals of the 
annual income which were presented to the king. According to Fernao Lopes, 
the goal of these accounts was to grasp the net receipt of each source of 
income and direct it to the central treasury. None of such balances survived, but 
the figures quoted in the Chronicle of Fernando I appear to have derived from 
them.58 Given that a large part of the revenues at the disposal of the 
Portuguese monarchs were fixed and that tax-farming was commonplace, there 
is no reason to doubt that they were technically attainable after the creation of 
the Vedor da Fazenda in 1340.69 Moreover, the survival of a list of the annual 
66 TT, Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens, Ordem de Cristo/Convento de Tomar, mayo 1, doc. 16. It relates to the lands 
of the Templars held by the crown in the time of their extinction. For this reason, it was kept in the archive of Military 
Order of Christ that inherited the patrimony of the T emplars. 
67 The loss of the current accounts that were committed to paper and the conservation of the parchment instruments 
and grants also affects research on monasteries and other institutions. 
68 Lopes, Cron. Fernando /, Prologue, p. 5. 
69 See infra pp. 138·51 and 284·87. 
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fees paid by the notaries, dated c. 1290,70 and the mention to books where 
special dues were recorded71 testify that it was possible to obtain a workable 
notion of the yearly receipt. Presumably, these memoranda allowed the 
monarch to spend in accordance with the predictable receipt and allocate the 
cost of extraordinary expenses to the right sources of revenue. 
Hoarding retained all the importance it had in the previous phase. 
However, as no balance from this phase survived, the rates of saving are not 
available to the historian. Indeed the revenues that were not spent were 
converted into metal ingots and directed to the royal treasuries, of which no 
document of any sort survives. Another likely destination of the valuables 
collected by the almoxarifes would be the royal mint (Casa da Moeda). 
Notwithstanding the archive of this institution holds no records anterior to the 
radical array ordered by Manuel I. 
The burning of the Casa dos Contos, the rare survival of the paperwork, 
the informal nature of the general accounts, the sixteenth-century array of the 
royal mint by Manuel I and even a fifteenth-century intentional destruction of 
documentation in the re-organisation of the Torre do Tombo, all concur to bar a 
direct knowledge of the financial dealings of the monarch. How far can 
documents from other departments help to fill this vacuum? 
A few municipal archives kept some details on the negotiations on 
extraordinary taxation, especially Lisbon and Porto, but on the whole, the utility 
of such subsidiary documentation for this period is limited. Miscellaneous 
collections - the Gavetas, the Corpo Cronol6gico and the Nucleo Antigo - stem 
from the Torre do Tombo and thus do not contain documents from the Contos. 
The administrative paperwork of the religious orders, noble households and 
municipalities was not the object of careful preservation by these institutions, 
and only occasional dealings between the latter and the crown subsist in some 
municipal archives. The strong notarial culture dictated that entitlements to 
permanent property rights- contracts, sales, exchanges, judicial agreements 
and sentences, wills- were judged worthy of parchment, whereas everyday 
transfers of monies were committed to paper. 
70 Published in Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, Ensaios da Historia Medieval Portuguesa, 2nd ed., Lisbon, 1980, pp. 76· 
81. 
71 Book of the collectae: TI, Gav. VII, ma~ 7, doc. 7; book of the moeda (tax paid in regions where Leonese money 
circulated1: Chanco Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 131, p. 229, vol. III, doc. 173, p. 267. 
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The only coherent documentary collection produced by the central 
administration that survives from this period is the royal chancery registers 
(known simply as Chance/arias). However, these do not keep their pristine 
integrity. They consist of excerpts of the charters and royal letters deemed 
relevant a few generations later. Presumably, the originals were destroyed, 
leaving only their discontinuous and incomplete versions. Again, priority was 
awarded to property rights and solemn agreements between institutions. In 
these records, only eight letters of quittance surfaced and even less tax-farming 
contracts. 
1400-1520 
The prospects of quantifying fifteenth-century finances are less bleak. 
Obviously, the burning of the Casa dos Contos affects the knowledge of the 
crown's financial situations for this period as strongly as for the previous stages. 
Similarly, the absence of a register for orders for payment, the absence of 
accounts of extraordinary expenses, the insufficient knowledge about the loans 
and debt-servicing remain .formidable obstacles to quantification. However, the 
rate of survival is, on the whole, considerably better. The better preservation of 
the chancery registers for the reigns of Afonso V (1438-1480) and Joao II 
(1481-95) and the complete conservation of those of Manuel I (1495-1521) is 
particularly important, as it allows us to get hold of some specific items of 
expenditure by adding up their orders for payment. Moreover, audit became bi-
annual in the reign of Manuel and, accordingly, letters of quittance appear more 
often. 
However, the former appear very different from what the others would 
have looked like, as the late fourteenth century brought considerable change to 
royal finances. The rise of the sales taxes as the mainstay of royal finances 
changed the face of the Vedor da Fazenda's financial management. With the 
sales taxes and frequent extraordinary taxation, the amount of the revenue 
became more contingent and thus harder to anticipate. As, on the other hand, 
the rise of permanent redistributive payments made expenditure more 
predictable, the situation was the inverse of the previous phase. In this new 
fiscal context, the main function of the Vedor da Fazenda was the compilation of 
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annual lists of authorised expenditure distributed among the local almoxarifes 
and tax-receivers to make their payment out of the resources they were 
entrusted with.72 These records of assignments (Caderno de Assentamentos) 
were kept by the almoxarifes or receivers and then destroyed or thrown away, 
once the audit was completed. Only a set of 211 records from 1499-1521 
survived and Anselmo Braancamp Freire, their editor, does not provide an 
explication as to why they escaped destruction.13 There is also a list of all the 
standing annuities for 1523 (Livro das Ten9as) , although there are indications 
that these records were not regular, as this one seems to have been especially 
commissioned by King Manuel 1.74 
The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century records were oriented towards 
expenditure, rather than revenue. The condition of the archive is reflected in a 
dozen or so memoranda which attempt to map the crown's payrolls (annuities 
granted for services, 'gracious' annuities, crown's lands permanently assigned 
to nobles).75 Furthermore, the quantitative data present in these memoranda 
can be complemented by other surviving sources. The near-complete survival 
of chancery registers from Duarte I onwards makes it possible to grasp the 
burden posed by the annuities whose payment required a royal letter from the 
chancery. This information can added to a notice of the new household 
annuities introduced by Afonso V from 1460 to 1473.16 Other permanent 
redistributive expenditures, like the annuities paid in the court (which 
encompassed a substantial part of the nobility), can be known through the 
regulations about the household payrolls of which a few survive, inserted in later 
memoranda.77 The first comprehensive map of the fixed expenditure is from the 
72 These documents state what expenses should be covered with the money and what to do with the rest. They 
explicitly forbade the payment of any writ drawn by the Vedores or even by the king himself! Freire explains that this 
was to show how kings circumvented untimely request for monies. The receipt was estimated either by means of a 
contract of tax-farming or by a simple average of previous years. The Portuguese verb for calculating the average is 
o,~a,. hence or~amento. the Portuguese word for budget. 
73 AHP. vol. VI. 
74 AHP, vol. II. 
75 Household regulation of 1405 or 1406 (RED. doc. 5): Household expenditure with knights and squires of the royal 
household from 1414 (RED. doc. 7); Household regulation of 1473 (RED. doc. 23); annual payroll of household 
annuities in 1462-81 (RED. doc. 8); Summary of the ordinary expense (with particulars) in 1473 (RED, doc. 8); Map 
of set-up expenditure for 1473 (RED, doc. 8); expenditure made in 14n (RED. doc. 25); budgeted expenditure for . 
the year 1478 (RED. doc. 25); Household regulation of 1478 (RED. doc. 26). 
76 Relazione. 8. 
n RED, doc. 5 (from 1405 or 1406) 7 (from 1414) 23 (1473) and 25 (1478). 
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year 1473?8 Thus, considering other European cases, let alone the previous 
period, the dimensions of permanent expenditure might be relatively well 
known, in spite of the lack of audit records. However, the real significance of the 
expending dynamics can only be understood in relation to the permanent 
income. 
As in the previous period, the knowledge of the. revenues depends 
mostly on occasional and scattered records - negotiations with the 
municipalities, tax-farming contracts and, most of all, letters of quittance. The 
nearly complete condition of the chancery registers, assures that more of these 
records survive, especially of the latter two. Regrettably, the letters of quittance 
recorded in the chancery appear not to have followed a stable model and the 
rationale guiding their inclusion in the present chancery registers remains 
unknown. Indeed, whereas they are rare in the folios of Duarte I's chancery 
books, those from Afonso V include at least eighty-two of these, and in the 
chancery record of his short-reigning son Joao II forty-seven of these are 
issued.79 For the following reign, that of King Manuel I (1495-1521), a sizeable 
set of seven hundred and fifty letters of quittance accorded to almoxarifes and 
other tax-collectors can be found in the chancery registers.BO Thus, except for 
the last two decades of the fifteenth century, the information of the letters of 
quittance is rather patchy and discontinuous. Contracts of tax-farming remain 
sparse, but they are more encompassing than those of the previous times, as 
the contractors often tax-farmed kingdom-wide revenues.B1 
The survival of a few general accounts radically changes the prospects of 
the research. Indeed, most of all for the period after the 1470s, present-day 
historians have access to a few discontinuous but comprehensive general 
accounts: of 1402, 1473, 1477, 1511, 1526 and 1527. These memoranda differ 
in many details and cannot be simply put into sequence, as their relations with 
78 RED, doc. 8. 
79 In her index of the Joao II's chancery register, Manuela Mendonca include forty-seven 'charters of quittance'. 
However, the author makes no distinction between the audit-related document from the letter given officer for any 
outstanding debts and the privileges, also called quita~ao, of quitting a job in the royal or municipal administrations or 
the letter stating the permanently relief from a standing payment (normally a rent). 
80 Published in AHP, vols. 1-10. 
81 It should be added the availability contracts with tax-farmers, which so seldom appeared in the previous epoch, 
concem wider revenues. The 1398 -tax-farming contract for the customs and the mint (RED, doc. 4) and the tax-
farming contract for the kingdom-wide sisas, or sales-taxes (RED, doc. 6). 
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the archive are not identical.82 The first one is simply a rough summary of the 
king's planned receipt, copied by a chronicler.83 Those of 1473, 1526 and 1527 
are abridgments of the all-important 'summary book' yearly compiled by the 
Vedor.84 This document combined the predicted revenue with the standing 
expenditure.85 That of 1477 is a proposal of reform aiming at lowering down the 
burden of some items of expenditure for 1478; as such it provides the value of 
the effective expenses. For all their differences, these accounts deal mostly with 
common categories of revenues and broadly similar categories of expenditure. 
The emphasis on the execution and accounting of set-up expenditure 
should not obliterate the fact that this period certainly saw a great development 
of extraordinary expenditure, mainly military. Fortunately, an excellent 
memorandum dated 1473 provides a summary of all the royal military 
expeditions, embassies and other financial operations since 1415. This 
document was copied from the entries (recada90es) recorded in the Contos 
books.86 For other periods, the variations of the volume of extraordinary receipts 
cannot be known because the audit of the subsidies' collectors took place in the 
Casa dos Contos. However, as the application and the amounts of direct, 
kingdom-wide taxes were negotiated in Cortes, parliamentary documentation 
provides some information that can be combined with· some ordnances 
concerning these taxes copied in the chancery records. 
Hypotheses, Methodologies and Structure 
The goal of this research is both to use the 'Fiscal History' models to 
. . . . 
make Portuguese fiscal experience intelligible and to use this case as a test to 
the applicability of these models. This section will briefly explain how this will be 
attempted with the scarce and discontinuous sources at the disposition of the 
82 On the Portuguese early sixteenth-century budgetary technique, see Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, 'A receita do Estado 
Portugues no Ano de 1526. Um Or~mento Desconhecido', Estudos de. Hist6ria de Portugal. Homenagem a A.H. de 
Oliveira Marques, vol. II (Lisbon, 1983) pp. 13-55. For a comparison with the budgetary technique in the 
neighbouring kingdom, see ladero Quesada, Miguel Angel, 'Castile in the Middle Ages', RSF, pp. 180-6. . 
83 Lopes, eron. Joao I, vol. II, chapter CII. 
84 Pereira, 'A Rece~a do Estado Portug~s,' pp. 15-18. 
85 RED, docs. 8 and 25 
86 At least such is the opinion of editor Jorge Faro. RED, doc. 8. 
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historian. Heuristic contingency will exert a considerable weight on thA 
methodological choices. 
The destruction of the Casa dos Contos and other documentary losses 
cannot be compensated. Most phases of the various stages of the whole 
process of collection and spending will remain totally opaque and quantitative 
evidence will be at best fragmentary until the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century. In face of this 'broken' but relatively vast archive, the only adept 
heuristic strategy is to examine a great deal of potentially relevant primary 
sources. The chancery records of each individual king from Sancho I (r. 1185-
1211) to Manuel I (r. 1495-1521), published or not, provide an adequate starting 
point. The second stage is to resort to the chronicles and comprehensive 
thematic collections that were published in the last two centuries order to track 
other sources. Monographs~ dissertations and other works on affiliated fields will 
also provide indications for more documentation, published or not (see 
bibliography) . 
The present approach, based on the combination and systematisation of 
disperse sources, requires a strong deductive element. Indeed, the starting 
point for the enquiries of parts 1 and 2 will be practical, period-specific models 
that can be used as hypothetical frames for incorporating the dispersed 
documentary information supplied by the Portuguese archive. Although records 
are scarce and fragmentary, they are still eloquent enough to 'test' whether the 
hypothesis employed is or is not consistent with them. 
Thus, the argument of the thesis will be guided by two accounts written 
by two very different observers of the Portuguese kingdom: the royal chronicler 
Fernao Lopes (13807-1460) and the Venetian agent Lunardo Da Ca Masser 
who stayed in Portugal between 1504 and 1506. The first in his capacity as 
'keeper of the royal records' and chronicler composed between 1419 and 1452 
the chronicles of Kings Pedro I (r. 1357-67), Fernando I (r. 1367-83) and Joao I 
(r. 1383-1433), by commission of Prince Duarte, of whom he was secretary.87 
These texts were written with the more or less open purpose of presenting the 
new dynasty of Avis as a God-sanctioned saviour of the country against the 
might of Castile. Yet, for all his overt partisanship for the dynasty he personally 
87 Excerpts of his work are published in English. See Lopes, Femao, The English in Portugal, 1367-87. Extracts from 
the chronicles of Dam Fernando and Dam Joao, eels. Derek W. Lomax and R.J. Oakley, Warminster, 1988. 
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served, Lopes' perspective is far from superficial or one-dimensional, Robert 
Southey even deemed him to be 'beyond all comparison the best chronicler of 
any age or nation'. Indeed, he combined a wide usage of memoirs and 
narratives sources, including oral testimonies, coupled with a judicious handling 
of formal records, as much as it would be expected from a head archivist. 88 By 
contrast, our second observer, Lunardo Ca Oa Masser was commissioned by 
the Most Serene Republic to stay at the Portuguese court and provide 'a full 
account on this emerging commercial and military power which threatened the 
Venetian domination of the spice trade. In other words, he came to spy.89 The 
Venetian agent excelled in his duties sent to the Doge his relazione containing 
the product of two years of close observation and intelligence-gathering.90 
Amongst the arguments presented to elevate the new dynasty, Lopes 
laid the claim that Fernando I, the last king of the previous dynasty, had been 
an inept monarch. The management of royal finances is an important part of 
this argument, as Lopes unambiguously critiques Fernando I's treasure-
squandering in opposition to the prudent 'ancient kings' who preferred to 
accumulate their resources. Indeed, Fernando I had started his reign as the 
richest king that ever ruled Portugal, for he had inherited the 'hard to believe' 
treasuries accumulated by his father and predecessors.91 The crown's 
prosperity, however, was broken by the wars that Fernando I kept with Castile 
88 His in-depth knowledge of the royal archive allowed him to capture very well the dominant ideas in the time of the 
'old kings', namely those articulated by the Cortes. Like the popular representatives, Fernao Lopes also mentions 
constantly the 'kings of old', repeats their commonplace of the 'richest king that ever liveth in the kingdom' and also 
commends the hoarding policy of the former kings (Lopes, eron. Fernando I, p. 125). His description of the ways 
devised by kings of old in their relation with the people, the kings gauged that n was their service and prom that 
everybody was rich, thus they could have many and abundant revenues (Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5) is 
an abridgement of the royal answer to the article 38 in the 1331 Cortes (Cort. Alonso IV, p. 45). The Idea was also 
repeated by a 1340 law which was Included in the arly fifteenttKentury legal collection, the Livro das Leis e 
Posturas (Cort. Afonso IV, p. 117). On Lopes' method and historiographical technique, see the studies 'On the 
Sources of Femao Lopes', 'Femao Lopes and the Treay of Santarem' and 'Archivists as Historians: the case of the 
Portuguese fifteenth-century royal Chroniclers' by Peter Russell all included in Russell, Peter, Portugal, Spain, and 
the African Atlantic, 1343-1490: chivalry and crusade from John of Gaunt to Henry the Navigator, Aldershot, 1995. 
89 'Per vedere et intendere que/Ie navigazioni di quello Serenissimo Re ne/l'lndia novamente navegata. he fatto un 
discorso per esser al proposito alia nazion nostra di entender ogni particolarita di quelto pO succeder de quell 
viaggio.' Relazione, § 1. He was arrested and briefly confined to a dungeon, under the accusation of working for the 
Ottoman Sultan. On the stay of Lunardo Oa Ca Masser, Godinho, Vnorino Magalhaes, 'Portugal no comeco do 
seculo XVI: Institui¢es e Economia. 0 Relat6rio do Veneziano Lunardo da ca Masser', Revista de Historia 
Economics e Social, n. 4, lisbon, 1979, pp. 75-88. 
90 The report (re/azione) was included as an appendix in late-nineteenth-century edition of a letter from King Manuel I 
by Italian Lusitanist Peragallo (Relazione). On Venetian diplomatic relaziones, see Oliveira, Julieta Teixeira Marques 
de, Veneza e Portugal no s6culo XVI: Subsidios para s sua Historia, Lisbon, 2000, pp. 32-6. 
B! lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5. 
33 
which entailed inordinate expenditure, commercial recession, taxes' and 
unsound coinage.92 
By contrast, 'old king's were more cautious that warlike Fernando. 
According to Lopes, ancient kings were informed by their Vedores da Fazenda 
of all the income from royal renders and rights and of what remained, after all 
expenditure, 'not only on .embassies but also on everything else', had been 
deducted.93 Then, it was ordered that 'in certain cities and towns' the remainder 
should be traded for gold and silver and brought to a custom-built tower in the 
Lisbon castle and to other places. Lopes adds that the amounts concentrated in 
these places were stated in the public proclamations of the king's death 'and the 
more the late king had hoarded, the more his goodness was praised,.94 The 
chronicler claimed that it was more honourable to add to what his predecessors 
had hoarded than to spend it without putting in more valuables. King Pedro had 
neglected these practices until warned out by the one of his officials who found 
that the king could spare up to 60,000 I. each year so he could 'add up to what 
his father and grand-father had already amassed.' 
In the view of Fernao Lopes, the hoarding by the Portuguese kings and 
the curbing of 'the king's and the kingdom's expenses' were not avarice. Pedro I 
is presented as a lavishly liberal king who had raised the nobles' annuities and 
92 These topics - most of aU the conservation of the coin fineness by Pedro I and Fernando's poor coinages, the 
accumulation of treasures by the former and their subsequent spoiling by the latter - occur in a few other instances in 
the works of Femao Lopes. Lopes, Cran. Pedro', chapter XI; Lopes, Cran. Fernando', chapter XLV, XLVIII and LV; 
Lopes, Cran. Joso " vol. I, chapters XLVIII and XLIX. 
93 The first section where royal finances are addressed is in the chapter entnled 'On the Manner the Kings Used to 
Amass Their Treasuries and to Increase Them,' inserted in the 'Chronicle of Lord King Oom Pedro'. The manner 
used by the king to stockpile riches are presented by the chronicler as the re-introduction of an old practice that 
young Pedro I had neglected until warned by his counsellor Joao Esteves around 1360. He had been a part of 
Pedro's princely household and reached in 1356 the office of overseer of the chancery (Vedor da Chance/aria). 
When Pedro I ascended the throne he had a career as magistrate of the royal courts (Desembargado~ from 1357 to 
1361 and became the kingdom's Vedar da Chancelaria in 1361-65. A. l. Carvalho Homem highlights that he 
survived the 1361 reform of the king's justice, and even suggests that he was "s mentor. For his micro-biography, 
see Homem, 0 Desembargo, pp. 337-338. Thus, Lopes' claim has some independent support. The account leaves 
unclear whether the procedure was an innovation or a mere renewal of an old practice neglected by King Pedro until . 
advised by Joso Esteves. The episode is possibly based upon an informant close to him, intending to highlight the 
role of that counsellor in the central administration. Joso Esteves had indeed been one of the royal legal officers who 
seized a relevant role after the wide reforms of the central departments in 1361. Joao Esteves is the first witness of 
the ordinance concerning bribes and the ordinance on appeals he is assigned, together with Loure~ Esteves, the 
permanent dispatch of fiscal litigation. Homem, A. l. C., 'Subsldios Para 0 Estudo da Administra~o Central no 
Tempo de D. Pedro I', Estado Institui¢es, Sociedade Polftica, pp. 96-9. Fernao Lopes has indeed some connection 
with Esteves but the chronicler might just as well have composed this chapter resorting to departmental traditions he 
became familiar with while a clerk working in the Contos. Joao Esteves had a four-year spell as chancellor until 
replaced by /JJvaro Pais around whom the chronicler centres the events of 1383, someone Lopes is very well 
informed about. On F. Lopes' brief career in the <:entral departments, Homem, 0 Desembargo, p. 302. 
94 'E quanta cads huum rei em elias mais poinha, tanto Iho contavom por muito moor bondade'. 
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year after year set aside jewels, ingots and other valuables to grant to his 
courtiers and visitors. Similarly, he did not alter the coins' alloy 'for greed of 
temporal gain' but cast a prestigious gold coin. Crucially, to hoard was as much 
a question of dynastic pride as it was part of the royal service kings have 
towards their peoples. The purpose behind the accumulation of treasuries was, 
as Lopes claims, 'to defend the people'. The chronicles suggests that those 
kings of old thought that the richer the king was the better he could defend the 
kingdom and wage war, if he needed, without overloading his people.95 
Moreover, by piling up the riches he could maintain the rights of the people 
'without imposing further burden not taking what did not belong to him'. Instead, 
counting with the monies of the Lisbon and Porto customs, old kings sought that 
'all [of the realm] were rich, so that kings could have great and vast renders,.96 
A century and half later, things had changed beyond measure. From the 
report sent to the Doge it is possible to extract a coherent picture of Portuguese 
finances and of the king's financial dilemmas and choices in terms of military 
projects and royal patronage in the time of Manuel (r. 1495-1521). At the centre 
of these questions were the plan designed by the king's inner circle to 'wrestle' 
the spice trade from the hands of the Moor.'97 Yet, the profit generated by the 
royal control of the sea routes was not an ultimate goal, but rather an instrument 
of loftier designs: the destruction of the Mamluk Empire, the blockade of Mecca, 
the financing of more Portuguese crusades in Morocco and the conquest of 
Jerusalem.98 
For the crown, as Lunardo noticed, the resources of the Indian route 
were at the service of a military project, and not the other way round, as he no-
doubt did expect. While he did not provide overall figures for the expenditure, 
the agent was adamant that the empire was run at 10ss.99 The African 
strongholds held by the Portuguese, another pillar of the Emmanueline 
ambitions, entailed another drain of the king's wealth. 'Of those lands [the king] 
95 Lopes, Cron. Pedro I, chapter XII. 
96 Lopes, Cran. Fernando I, Prologue, p.5. 
97 Thus asphyxiating the Mamluks 01 Egypt whose wealth depended on the customs over the spice trade. Plans lor a 
crusade lor the Reconquest 01 Jerusalem were drawn in 1505·7, precisely when Oa Ca Masser stays in Portugal. 
Thomaz, Luis Filipa, 'L'idee Imperiale Manueline', in Aubin, Jean, ed., Le Portugal, la Decouverte et I'Europe, Paris, 
1990, pp. 41·44. 
98 Thomaz, 'L'ldee Imperiale Manueline', pp. 49-50, 53. 
99 Relazione, § 32. 
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obtains neither profit nor revenue, but rather incurs continuous expenditure to 
protect them from the Moors' .100 
Expenses in India and Africa were made heavier by the permanent 
expenditure with the nobles, a key theme in the observations sent to Venice. 
'For a small king and one of such lowly income', Lunardo Da Ca Masser 
noticed, the king was a lavish patron of his nobles to whom he bestowed 'great 
grants and prizes.,101 Allowances paid by courtiers, which Lunardo estimated at 
44,000 ducats, alone exceeded the whole profit of the newly-found Indies.102 
The importance of the king's, disbursements emerges clearly out of the 
relazione when its author notes that no matter how large their income, the 
Portuguese nobles he met were short of money and 'all lived off the revenues of 
the king' without deeming anything but warfare a honest occupation. Although 
the relazione clearly implies that the crown could not avoid the expenditure with 
the nobility, it nonetheless presents the reverse of the medal: the king was 
compensated by the free military service from his warlike nobility. In case of 
invasion, the defence of the kingdom relied on the free service of the nobles, as 
the African strongholds already did. 
For the crown, military activity was the instrument of lofty imperial plans, 
to which its wealth was subordinated. The state was not a commercial venture. 
Thus, the monarchy kept a firm grip on its monopoly of the commerce, 
indifferent to the possibility of a potentially more lucrative policy of free trade, as 
Lunardo suggested. In war the interests of monarchy and nobility coincided. For 
the nobility, war was a means of securing profit, either through sheer plunder or 
through royal patronage, while non-noble contribution to warfare would be 
minimal and limited to the defence of the realm. War entailed a strong mutuality 
between the crown and the privileged. Indeed, redistribution of the state 
revenues (most of whose came from the kingdom rather than from the 
conquests) implied the military effort of the nobles and knights in order to 
contribute to the imperial projects. 
100 Relazione, § O. 
101 Relazione.§ 32. 
102 Relazione,§ 32. 
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.' . 
Although the players remain the same -the king. the subsidised. non-
taxed nobility and the non-noble tax-base- the two fiscal systems described 
appear remarkably diverse. The key difference concerns the place of war. 
Whereas in the early sixteenth-century kingdom military confrontation was 
permanent and costly, in the period of the 'old kings' wars were merely a 
possibility. This is a crucial difference: while Pedro I and his predecessors could 
. amass the revenues from their customs to accumulate impressive treasures on 
behalf of future, eventual wars, Manuel I had to employ his resources to 
maintain the fighting capacity and motivation of his nobility and keep on 
pursuing his grand imperial ambitions. This varying relationship between war 
and finances was captured by Charles Tilly's dichotomy distinguishing coercion-
intensive and capital-intensive states. Whereas the former grow applying 
coercion to concentrate capital, the latter grow by resorting to capital to acquire 
coercive means.103 
The transformation of an accumulation-oriented system to one where 
redistribution and offensive war are intrinsically connected appears as the 
decisive transformation operated in Portuguese state finances. To Lopes the 
dissolution of the system of the 'old kings' had to be found in the conflicts 
sustained by King Fernando with Castile. However, Lopes did not regard the so-
called Fernardine Wars as a primum mobile. Instead, he emphasised the 
patronage of Castilian nobles in the Portuguese court and the unprecedented 
distribution of lands and other sources of income led by queen Leonor· 
(Fernando's wife).104 If the hypothesis of Fernao Lopes is right, in the 
Portuguese case it was the fiscal strength of the monarchy that brought war as 
a form of redistribution. 
At any rate, the origins of the redistributive monarchy that Lunardo 
described in 1506 are to be found in the Fernandine Wars (1369-71, 72,:,4, 
1381-2) and in the subsequent conflict with Castile, which is traditionally called 
the 'War of Independence' (1383-1411). Together these conflicts broke a long 
period of peace which had coincided with minimal taxation (see Appendix 1). By 
contrast the End-of-Century Wars initiate a period with higher frequency of 
taxation and, crucially, the establishment of a permanent tax, the sisas, in 1387 
103Tilly, Coercion, capital, p. 54. 
104 Lopes, Cran. Femando I, chapter XXV, p. 89; chapter XXVII, pp. 93-5, Chapter LVII, pp. 197-8. 
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(see section 5.1 infra). The chronology presented in Appendix 1 suggests that 
the relation between warfare and changes of the fiscal system should be 
addressed in the long-run. Indeed, the two periods display distinctive military 
and fiscal features. In between lays a series of conflicts which allegedly 
constituted the causes for profound changes. This argument, clearly laid by 
Fernao Lopes in his 1430s chronicle of King Fernando I, appeas remarkably 
close to the present consensus of fiscal historians about the role of warfare as 
the driving force behind the transformation of fiscal systems. 
In order to test the importance of warfare in changing fiscal systems, this 
dissertation will resort to what sociologists call a 'pre-post case study', that is to 
say, a study of a given instance before and after the occurrence of a 'critical 
event.' A 'critical event' is one which, considering the theories that are to be 
tested, would be expected to impact significantly on the observed case.105 ln the 
present case, late-fourteenth-century conflicts, the Fernandine Wars and the 
ensuing War of Independence, divide two hypothetically very different periods 
and as such provide the obvious boundary between the 'pre' and the 'post' . 
The two parts are designed to be mutually comparable. Each of them 
parts will have four chapters broadly parallel chapters dealing with the same 
problems: taxation and the economy (chapters 1 and 5), the political and 
constitutional limitations (chapters 2 and 6), the relationship between war and 
state finances (chapters 3 and 7) and, finally, the differing rationales of state 
finances in the two periods (chapters 4 and 8). Even if parts I and II follow the 
same structure and respond to essentially the same questions, chapters will 
retain a great deal of autonomy vis-a-vis their counterparts. This choice was 
dictated by two factors, namely the specific conditions of the Portuguese 
'archive' and the dearth of speCialised research in this field in Portugal. The 
former makes it impossible to construct series or samples to pin down the 
quantitative changes wrought by the wars. The latter demands that even 
seemingly elementary questions of institutional history must be solved. The 
want of specialised studies means that both institutional and quantitative 
questions have to be addressed from primary sources which, being non-serial 
and imprevisible, could not allow a tighter structure. Indeed, a great deal of the 
105 Berg, Bruce L., Oualitative research methods for the social sciences, 5th ed., Boston, 2004, p. 256. 
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work done here was to systematise and confer some intelligibility to disperse 
data. Thus, the comparison between the 'pre' and the 'post' will rely on 
methodologies specific to each pair of chapters which will be explanied 
throughout the text. 
A final problem remains to be addressed: that of the chronological limits 
of this thesis. As section 1.1 will show, the end of the Portuguese Reconquest 
(early thirteenth century or, to use a date, the conquest of Faro in 1249) 
provides a meaningful 'starting point. Thus, part 1 will comprise the years 
ranging from 1249 to 1369 which can be regarded as those of consolidation of a 
domain state. It is harder to find a date that is fit for ending part 2. Two 
extremely important fiscal changes take place in the first decades of the 
sixteenth century: in 1523 the' monarch resorted to a large-scale sale of 
perpetuities Uuros), an expedient that had been very sporadically used in 1500 
and 1521 but that would dominate Portuguese expenditure well into the 
eighteenth century; by contrast, in 1538 the monarchy, under the pressure of 
the Cortes, devolved the administration of the country's only permanent tax to 
the municipalities. Close in time as they were, these two changes stand for a 
break with previous practice and previous problems, making this period an 
adequate end for the research. The date chosen, 1527, has most of all heuristic 
significance, as it is the date of a very comprehensive abridgement of a general 
account that allows the historian a rare foray into a lost archive. 
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PART 1- THE HUNDRED YEARS PEACE (1249-1369) 
The capture of Faro by newly-crowned Afonso III in the spring of 1249 
was the final act of the Portuguese Reconquista. This event was also the 
starting point for what can be seen a 'long century' of peace punctuated by 
short-lived conflicts until it ended with the epoch-turning Fernandine Wars of 
1369-71, 1372-3 and 1380-2. 
Considering the role that recent work on Fiscal History has ascribed to 
military conflicts, it would be expected that thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
Portugal lagged behind its more bellicose counterparts. Conversely, the present 
part, comprising chapters 1 to 4, will argue that despite the lack of military 
stimulus, the Portuguese state developed into a functional 'domain state.' The 
first chapter will address the early thirteenth-century transition from the 
institutional, constitutional and military settings of the Reconquista to an entirely 
different scenario. The remaining chapters will explore the three defining 
features of this 'domain state' from 1249 to 1369: the permanence of a 'fiscal 
constitution' (chapter 2), of a stable military and diplomatic orientation (chapter 
3) and the existence of a system of institutions deployed to serve a definite 
rationale (chapter 4). 
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Chapter 1 - Death and Transformation of a Tribute State 
This first chapter will try to address the end of the Reconquista from the 
perspective of state finances. As section 1.1 will demonstrate, twelfth-century 
and mid-thirteenth~century Portugal was a tribute state plunged in deep crisis, 
as changes in the economy and warfare of the Reconquest deprived the 
monarchy of some of its traditional revenues. Somehow, by 1320 the monarchy 
seems to have recovered some of its accumulated wealth. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 
will address the two responses to this negative conjuncture: monetary 
manipulations and institutional reforms. 
Section 1.1 War and Prosperity 
Four decades ago, in the most significant work on the origins of 
Portuguese finances, Iria Gon~alves argued that the emergence of direct taxes 
was directly related to the end of the Reconquista.1 According to her 
hypothesis, the Portuguese occupation of Faro and of the last Muslim positions 
in the Algarve in the spring of 1249 would have implied the end of predatory 
income to the monarchy, as henceforward no land or town was laid open to 
expansion, extortion or plunder. Deprived of these resources, Afonso III (1248-
1279) had to look for alternative forms of income, notably the extraordinary 
taxes of 1254, 1261 and 1266. According to Gon~alves, the drive towards 
general taxation was a response to the collapse of plunder and tribute. In other 
words, the extinction of an aggressive frontier entailed a fully-fledged 'fiscal 
revolution '.2 This hypotheSiS remained unchallenged in the few paragraphs 
dedicated to royal finances by the general histories of the period3 and its 
explanatory power untested by the scarce quantitative data available. 
, PEP, pp. 11-15. 
2 Bonney, Richard and Ormrod, W. Mark, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions and Self-sustained growth: Towards a 
Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History', Crises, p. 9. 
3 Mattoso, Jose, 'Oois S8culos de Vicissitudes Politicas,' Hist6ria de Portugali, yol. II, Lisbon, 1994, pp. 113-124. 
Homem, A. L. de Carvalho, 'A Corte e 0 Governo Central', Port. Defin., pp. 537-8. Both historians preferred 
highlighting the restoration of royal authority by Afonso III, following the death of his unruly brother, the rex inutilis 
Sancho II in 1248. On Sancho II in English, see Peters, E., 'Rex Inutilis. Sancho II of Portugal and thirteenth-century 
depos~ion theory', Studia Gratiana, 14, 1967, pp. 253-305. 
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The argument advanced by Goncalves was perfectly consistent with the 
notion that Portuguese kings drew heavily on the profits of the military activity. 
Indeed, material gain had been dominant in the Christian kingdoms' fight with 
the Islamic powers. As a military leader, the king himself could gather his own 
spoil or cause his army to be bought off by an enemy town or province. 
Furthermore, the fifth of the booty obtained in 'private' raids against the enemies 
of the faith belonged to the monarch, under the title of an adopted Muslim 
practice.4 War with the infidel was also the occasion for collecting payments in-
lieu of military service, either applied to some non-noble landholdings 
(fossadeira) or upon municipalities qua vassals (excusatio exercifus).5 Likewise, 
the king was entitled to the tenth of tolls and of custom charges which 
constituted likely sources of precious metals.a The combination of these factors 
contributes to explain the great quantities of ingots and gold coins that can be 
found in the royal wills of 1179, 1188 and 1210 (see infra Fig. 1). The 
geography of the royal treasures, revealed in the will of Sancho I in 1210, is 
indicative of the weight of the frontier in the crown's revenues: the monastery of 
Alcobaca, the castles of Belver (Knights of St. John) and Tomar (Templar), 
Leiria and Evora were all key military bases, and even COimbra, while no longer 
a border town, was still far from the northern primitive core of the kingdom 
where most of the king's lands lay? 
The negative effects of the conquest of the Algarve on the crown's 
finances become clearer when the Portuguese situation is compared with that 
of Castile-Leon. Here the Reconquisfa had also come to a halt after the 
contemporary conquest of Seville (1248) but borders with either tributary or 
vulnerable Muslim states were kept. Even without significant plunder, tribute 
assured the Castilian kings the continuation of the old flow of metallic and 
4 Marques, Maria Alegria Fernandes, 'A Viabiljza~o de um Reino,' Port. Defin., p. 58. Still in use In 1224. SS, doc. 
15, p. 191. 
5 On the fossadeira, see Martins, Miguel Gomes, 'Fossadeira', Les Mots de /'Impet dans les Villes de I'Occident 
Mediterraneen. Glossaire Critique de Fiscalite Medievale (www.mailxxLcomlfiscaIHaVGlossairelist.asp accessed in 
June-July 2007); the excusatio is only mentioned in a letter of quittance of 1253, as having been collected for the 
Algarve expedition in 1249 (TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 3). 
8 n, Chancelarias Regias, Chancelaria de Afonso Ill, Livro 1, lois. 34v-35 and fols. 76-76v. 
7 According to Marreiros, most of the royal lands were situated in the present-day districts of Braga, Porto and Viseu, 
all North of Coimbra. Marreiros, Rosa, Propriedade Fundiaria e Rendas da Coroa no Reinado de Dam Dinis: 
Guimaraes, vol. II, Coimbra, 1990, p. 456. In the second will of Sancho I there is a mention to a northern burgh in the 
heart of the king's landed patrimony, Guimaraes. Significantly, however, " is not about coins or metals but about 
pieces cloth: habeat ( ... ) pannos meos de Vimaranes (OS, doc. 194, p. 297). 
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monetary resources from Muslim Africa to the North.8 Unlike post-1300 
monarchies, for whom war implied severe financial strains, military activity and 
profit were integrated in the so-called Reconquista. Additionally, the frontier with 
the Almohad Empire integrated the kingdom with gold-rich commercial routes, 
unavailable before. Like plunder, a share of the trade was absorbed by the 
monarchy. 
Heuristic contingency determines that the impact of the 'Reconquest' on 
the financial condition of the thirteenth-century Portuguese monarchy can only 
be approached via two types of indirect evidence: the contemporary royal 
testaments9 and changes of intrinsic value in the currency, as systematised by 
Gomes Marques.'o Wills have been long used as rough indicators of the 
monarchy's financial situation" but it is when combined with a closer look at 
coinage issued that their implications for thirteenth-century royal finances 
become clearer. 
As historical sources, royal wills have severe drawbacks: they are scarce 
and discontinuous, they display different systems of account and they do not 
conform to a formal standard. The absence of reliable price series for the period 
makes it impossible for us to gain a notion of the king's purchasing power.'2 To 
make things even worse, the published royal documents do not provide any 
reference to the hypothetical key elements of expenditure: military wages and 
fiefs-de-bourse. However, for all the shortcomings, the king's testaments allow 
for a broad diachronic perspective on royal treasure. Some of their expressions 
and bequests clearly hint at an assessment of the wealth accumulated in the 
king's treasures or about to leave the mint at the moment of composition. From 
the wills' own terms, it is possible to see whether they tend to overestimate or 
8 The most notorious example is Grenade which agreed in paying a yearly tribute of 150,000 mara vedis alfonsis in 
1246. To provide a reference, the total receipt of Castilian crown in 1315 was 1,600,000 maravedfs. Ladera 
Quesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, pp. 47·52. For the second figure, Ormrod, W. M., 'The West European 
Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages', ESSF, p. 125. 
II Of 1179, 1188, 1210, 1214, 1221, [12261, 1279, 1299 and 1322. For references, see Fig. 1. That of 1226 has been 
critically dated by Fernandes, Hermenegildo, D. Sancho II, Lisbon, 2006, pp. 141-3. The testaments of 1218, 1248 
and 1324 do not convey quantitiave data. 
loHMMP 
11 Notaby Azevedo, Joao LUcio de, Epocas de Portugal EconOmica, 3rd, Lisbon, 1973, pp. 34-9; Godinho, Vitorino 
Magalhaes, 'FinaFlQas PUblicas e Estrutura do Estado', DHP, vol. 3, pp. 20-40 and Ferro, Maria Jose Pimenta, 'Para 
o Estudo da Numaria de D. Fernando,' Estudos Medievais, n. 2, Porto, 1982, pp. 7·9. 
12 Prices recorded by Oliveira Marques indicate a rough inflationary trend throughout the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries but are too disparate and patchy to provide any sort of usable reference. Marques, A H. Oliveira, 'A 
CirculaQAo e a Troca de Produtos,' Port. Defin., pp. 521-22. 
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play down the actual wealth disposed of. While in their 'poor' wills kings Afonso 
II, Sancho II, Afonso III and Dinis (in 1299) are cautious enough to point to 
alternative methods of payment, should the monies be insufficient to match the 
bequests, nothing of the sort happens in the texts of the well-off Afonso I and 
Sancho 1.13 This difference suggests that eventual exaggerations of the wills 
indicate a sense of wealth rather than mask poverty. Importantly, the sums 
reckoned in the wills reflect the monies and precious metals gathered by the 
individual kings rather than an inter-generational transmission of valuables. 
Indeed, the riches were to be distributed among many heirs, including the 
prince, who inherited the most valuable of the bequests: the regnum. From the 
twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, the king's thesaurus meus was far from 
being something like a thesaurus regni, an element congenial with the throne. 
As a consequence, its balance can be used as a proxy to the financial 
conjuncture of each reign. 
Thus, for all their diversity, royal testaments can provide reliable notional 
values of the royal treasure at a given moment. However, a diachronic 
comparison of the wills is made difficult by their usage of distinct gold and silver 
currencies and even of non-minted precious metals. In order that these wills 
convey an intelligible trend it is necessary that the different valuables 
bequeathed - marks of silver or marks of gold, morabitini, d. and muzmudis-
be quantified in a single unit. Two reasons qualify the mark of gold for this role: 
gold, minted or not, was preferable to silver for hoarding and gold coinage was 
still dominant in the Peninsula.14 Additionally, in regard to its silver counterpart, 
the gold mark has the practical advantage of being expressed in lower figures. 
In order to convert the different values into this chosen unit, currencies will be 
first reduced to their metallic content and added up to the metals expressed in 
bullion. Sums expressed in morabitinos were understood as relating to those 
coined by the monarch who issued the testament.15 Sancho I's 1188 will was 
also written in the probable year of his first gold coinage.16 Coinages and 
13 DR, doc. 334, p. 436 and OS, doc. 194, pp. 297·301. 
14 The gold mark was also a meaningful un~ for substantial international transactions, such as the census of two 
golden marks that Afonso was obligated to pay the pope. Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes, Os Descobrimentos e a 
Economia Mundisl, vol. I, Lisbon, 1981, p. 97. 
15 The relationship between minting operations and issuing the testament is very clear in the will of Sancho II who 
explained that his bequests would be paid by his minters (monetari~. SS, doc. 44, p. 240. 
16 HMMP, p. 36. 
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testaments could have been part of the archetypical occasion for a monarch to 
issue a will: the preparation for an offensive campaign. The testament of 1188 
was made on the way to attack Serpa, whereas that of 1226 was regarded by 
Hermenegildo Fernandes as part of the preparation to the incoming siege of 
Elvas.17 For the conversion of silver into gold, the divisor used was 9.1, which 
corresponds to the average cost of gold in silver terms in the peninsular market 
during the thirteenth century.18 Indeed, although the relative values of gold and 
silver have noticeably varied along the period focused, the data on them are too 
patchy to be applied to the each single testament. These relatively artificial 
devices enable a diachronic comprehension of the totals in absence of price 
. data, even if in very different terms from the way contemporaries would have 
understood the accounts. The results' can be seen in Fig. 1. 
17 Fernandes, D. Sancho II, p. 141. 
18 HMMP, p. 21. 
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Fig. 1 - Valuation of Bequests in Royal Wills, 1179-1367 
Will 
1179 Afonso I 
1188 Sancho I 
1210 Sancho I 
1214 Afonso II 
1221 Afonso II 
1226 Sancho II 
1271 Afonso III 
1299 Dinis I 
1322 Dlnls I 
1367 Pedro I 
Valuables bequeathed 
170,000 morabitinos and 10,575 muzmudis 
123,630 morabitinos, 386,000 s., 837 {fine] silver 
marks, 13,202 muzmudis, 97 meales auri 
Equivalence In 
Portuguese marks of 
pure gold (229.5 g) 
2711 19 
218720 
995521 738,200 morabitinos, 195.615 [fine] gold marks, 




78,000 morabitinos (money of account) 
42,000 morabitinos (money of account) 
37,600 recently-coined morabitinos, 3,000 
morabitinos [of Sancho I?] 
69,400 I. (money of account) 
57,2oo/.(moneyof account), 500 {fine]silver marks 
350,000 I. (money of account) 
871,000 I. (money of account; min. value) 
Sources: Azevedo, Rui de (ed.) Documentos Medievais Portugueses. Documentos Regios, doc. 
330 (will of 1179); Azevedo, Rui de, Costa, Avelino de Jesus da, Pereira, Marcelino Rodrigues 
(ed.) Documentos de D. Sancho I, doc. 30 (will of 1188) and 194 (will of 1210); Veloso, Maria 
Teresa Nobre, Afonso II. RelafOes de Portugal com a Santa Se durante 0 seu reinado, 
Coimbra, 2000, pp. 277-9; Provas, vol. I, part 1, docs. 19 (will of 1221) and 28 (will of 1271) and 
part 2, docs. 11 (will of 1322) and 32 (will of 1367); SS, doc. 44; Brandao, Francisco, Quinta 
Parte da Monarchia L vsytana que Contem a Historia dos Primeiros 23 annos delRey D. Dinis, 
doc. XXXIV, fol. 329-331v (will of 1299). 
When converted to a uniform measure, the changes withstood by the 
royal treasury become intelligible. Accumulated wealth appears to have grown 
19 The mu~iplicator was 3.5235 corresponding to the quantity of pure gold contained in one 4.05 g 
maravedVmorabitino of Afonso VIII of Castile, the standard Christian currency in the Peninsula since 1172 (Francisco 
Olmos, Jose Maria de 'EI Maravedi de Oro de Monso VIII. Un Mensaje Cristiano Escrito en Arabe', Revists General 
de InformaciOn y DocumentaciOn. vol. 8. n. 1, Madrid. 1998. pp. 283-301. The multiplyer of the mazmudis, which 
correspond to haH the Muslim Almohad dobra) was 2.2 g, see Pellicer I Brut. J., Repertorio Parametrico Metro/6gico 
Medieval de los Reinos Hispanicos. Barcelona, 1999, pp. 85-6 and 144. 
20 The multiplyer for the morabitino is 2.865 grams. obtained by multiplying the 750 per 1000 quantity of gold in each 
morabitino coin of Sancho I which weighted of 3.82g. The value of the mea/es auri remains enigmatic and it was not 
included. On the metrology of Sancho I's morabitino, see HMMP, p. 39. On the dating of Sancho I's first coinage 
before 1188, see HMMP, p. 129. 
21 See the previous note. Possibly, the moraMinos expressed here belonged to the second minting of Sancho I. 
22 = 78.000 morabitinos • 3.69 g (weight of morabitino) * 0.66 (maximum Au content in Afonso lI's morabitinos) : 
229.5g (mark of pure Au) = 827 marks of pure Au. 
23 = 42.000 morabitinos*2.4 g (average Au content in Afonso lI's moraMino) : 229.5 (mark of pure Au) 
24 = 37.600 morabitinos novos'2.0 9 (average Au content in Sancho II's morabitino) : 229.5 (mark of pure Au) + 3,000 
morabitinos ve/hos "2.8 g (average Au content in Sancho I's morabitino) = 364.2 
25 = 16.656.000 d./1.(3) (nominal value of the dinheiro novo of 1264) = 12.812,307 dinheiros novos ·0.066 Ag g (Ag 
content of 1 dinheiro novo) = 845.612 gAg: 229.5 = 3.684.585 marks of pure Ag : 9.1 {conventioned Ag : Au ratio) = 
404.899 marks of pure Au 
26 = 13.728,000 d./1.(3) (nominal value of the dinheiro novo of 1264) = 10,296,257 dinheiros novos • 0.066 = 
679.552.962 gAg: 229.5 = 2961 marks of pure Ag : 9.1 = 
27 = 84,000.000 d. = 5.544,000 gAg = 2,4156.863 pure silver marks = 2.684.0959 pure gold marks. 
26 = 156,780,000 d. = 10,347,480 gAg = 45.087.058 pure silver marks = 2,684.6732 pure gold marks. 
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fast between 1179 and 1210. Although the values for 1188 were lower from 
those for 1179, it should be noted that Afonso I died in 1185 and hence the 
crown had to start a new cycle of accumulation with Sancho I. By contrast, 
Afonso II did not prove able to start a similar accumulative cycle. After enduring 
the dispersion of his father's remarkable wealth, Afonso II saw his hoardings 
decrease and neither Sancho II (1223-48) nor Afonso III (1248-79) halted the 
decline that had started under their father.29 The modest values handled by the 
latter in 1271 are particularly telling, since the will was issued after two decades 
of political stability, of improvements in the administration and even after 
benefiting from, unknown until then, general taxation. Furthermore, the monies 
bequeathed by Afonso III were not hoarded but rather assigned to Lisbon 
revenues.30 However, in the reign of Dinis I the crown seems to have achieved 
a remarkable recovery after decades of seemingly troubled finances. The value 
bequeathed in the 1322 will is similar to that of the first two wills. In sum, royal 
fortunes underwent a steep increase between the last two decades of the 
twelfth century peaking in 1210 which was followed by a severe plunge, first 
detectable in 1214 continuing up to 1299 at least; in 1322, a recovery which 
brought back the treasury hoards to values closer to their 1179 and 1188 levels. 
Is it possible to relate these trends with the military context? 
Under Afonso I (1140-1185) and Sancho I (1185-1211) the monarchy 
led a nearly-continuous fight against Islamic states. For a long period, it 
obtained success in major operations - the conquests of Santarem and Lisbon 
(1147), of Evora (1157) and Alcacer do Sal (1158). Nonetheless, after the 
Almohad Empire established its hegemony in the Peninsula (c. 1160-1210), 
Portugal's frontier became largely stationary. While expansion and conquest 
became more difficult, Afonso I and, most all, Sancho I continued to wage war 
against a superior enemy, as the sack of Seville (1176), the attacks on Serpa 
(1188), the capture of Silves (1189) and the collaboration with Castile in Alarcos 
(1195) reveal. These expeditions and countless smaller incursions could not 
29 In the very phrasing of the 1221 and 1226-31 testaments ~ is possible to detect traces of liquidity crisis. Whereas 
Sancho I's 1210 will refers to monies effectively hoarded in his several treasuries, Afonso II orders the sums 
bequeathed in 1221 to be taken 1rom my movables found in the time of my death, that is to say, grain in granaries 
kept, morabitinos, pence, all gold and silver, chattels and many other valuables.' Provas, vol. I, part 1, doc. 19, p. 44. 
Abou1 ninety per cent of the modest values assigned in Sancho II's will were to be taken out of his morabitino 
coinage that was still on the make. SS, doc. 44, p. 240. 
30 Provas, vol. I, part 1, doc. 28, p. 72. 
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have failed to produce some economic benefits for the crown, either in form of 
ransoms, booty, tribute or even taxes in lieu of military service. Hypothetically, 
the great sums accumulated before 1210 derive from such military activity 
against a more powerful and richer enemy. 
Kings Afonso II (1211-23) and Sancho II (1223-48) ruled in a more 
favourable strategic setting, as the Almohad Empire which blocked Portuguese 
expanding ambitions started to crumble in the wake of the battle of Navas de 
Tolosa (1212). Seemingly, Afonso II 'The Fat' ignored this opportunity and took 
no active part in the Reconquista. Enjoying favourable military circumstances, 
spurred by papal injunctions and, unlike his father, unhindered by physical 
problems, Sancho II is only known to have organised and personally led two 
expeditions: Elvas (1226) and Ayamonte (1238 or 1239). In this period, 
advances in Portuguese frontier were mostly due to the military orders and to 
their occasional municipal and noble allies. Of the best prizes at hand - Alcacer 
do Sal, Silves, Mertola, Tavira, Faro - only the conquest of the last was the 
doing of a monarch: Afonso III in 1249. 
At first sight, the decreasing military role of the monarchy under Afonso II 
and Sancho II coincided with the decline in the accumulation of assets. But can 
we infer that the impressive hoardings of Sancho I were due to his military 
activity? The hoarded values revealed in the wills of 1188 and 1210 
demonstrate that Sancho I had the capacity to store gold and silver reserves but 
do not reveal whether they were taken by force or not. After all, the period of 
steepest growth of hoardings from 1188 to 1210 was relatively peaceful, except 
for the two sizeable expeditions held in 1188 and 1189 (capture of Silves) and 
for the desperate defending of 1190 and 1191. The well-known circumstances 
of the capture of Silves, with Sancho I trying to buyout his crusader allies with 
monies from his own treasury, coupled with the twelfth-century chronicles' 
omission of any type of plunder,31 suggest that Sancho I's occupation of the 
Western Algarve in 1189-1191 was unlikely to provide significant booty. After 
the Almohad recovery of the Algarve and devastation of south of the country in 
1191, a five-year truce endured until 1196 and, for the rest of his reign, king 
Sancho I would not challenge the Almohad hegemony. In sum, the fivefold 
31 The chapters dedicated to Sancho I's military entreprises in the 1419 Cronies de Portugal mention looting. 
However, the chronology of these sources remains unknwon. Calado, Adelino de Almeida, 'Introducao', Cr. 1419. 
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augmentation of the treasury by Sancho I was independent of his conquests. As 
such, assuming a direct relationship between the plunder from royal conquests 
and the wealth of the royal treasuries is inconsistent with the available data. 
In what appears to be a contradiction, the period of Almohad hegemony 
(1191-1212) was beneficial for the treasures of the Portuguese kings. This 
paradox, however, can be explained when the military and economic features of 
the Almohad Caliphate are considered.32 The protection of the Iberian Muslims 
by means of frequent and intensive 'holy war' in the Peninsula was, in the words 
of Fernandes, 'the very condition for the survival of the empire.'33 Firmly in 
control of the routes to the African gold sources and commanding the immense 
manpower of Berber tribesmen, the Almohads were able to fund powerful 
offensive campaigns and to sustain the frontier defences against the peninsular 
Christian kingdoms. Regardless of their grand strategic aims, the economic 
effect of the Almohad campaigns was the supply of gold to the Christian half of 
the Peninsula. Thus, while the caliphate stood, there would be a northbound 
flow of gold of which kings like Sancho I could benefit by collecting taxes over 
trade and/or by pillage or by organising plundering raids.34 By contrast to his 
father, who had to cope with the Almohad Empire at its height, Afonso II 
watched its waning. After the battle of Navas de Tolosa in 1212, never again did 
the Almohad emperor cross the strait and the payment, reinforcement and 
leadership of his peninsular garrisons and allies became increasingly difficult. 
Although favourable from a strictly military viewpoint, the disappearance of the 
gold-rich caliphate meant that raids and operations were less attractive than 
before. Far more important than his want of military virtues, the decadence of 
the Almohad deprived Afonso II of the metallic flow that allowed his father to 
amass his impressive treasure. This hypothesis is consistent with the abrupt 
decline of the amounts managed in the royal wills from 1214 onwards. 
In sum, if there is any association between projects of conquest and 
availability of money, the inverse hypothesis seems more reasonable: 
32 On the Almohad empire, see Fernandes, Hermenegildo, Entre Mouros e Critsaos, Lisbon, 2000. 
33 'Trazer a jihad aquem-estreito e a pr6pria condiyao de sobrevivencia do sistema de rela~ao que sustenta a 
constrlJf8o imperial.' Fernandes, Entre Mouros e Cristaos, p. 184. 
34 On this flow, see Kassis, Hanna E., 'The Circulation of Almoravid and A1moravid-type coinage in Christian Europe' 
in Homenagem a Mario Gomes Marques, Sinlra, 2000, pp. 261-273. II tan be poinled out thai the arsenic-rich silver 
used to mint the d. coins of Sancho I differs from that of his predecessor and successors, according to the chemical 
analyses presented by Gomes Marques (HMMP, p. 146). This suggests that Sancho I's immense wea~h was based 
in wholy different monetary and metaHic economy from that of his peers. 
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Portuguese royal claiming of territories lagged behind on account of the 
monarchy's financial troubles. In the 1210s and 1220s Portuguese kings could 
not assemble the resources to occupy the neighbouring lands. The enigmatic 
desertion of Sancho II by the magnates in the siege of Elvas in 1226 might be 
thus explained.35 Conversely, the regular presence of Portuguese knights in 
Castilian and Leonese hosts suggests that the king was not able to patronize 
his fighters accordingly and/or that the Western front was less attractive.36 
A brief reference to the situation in Castile-Leon can be enlightening. 
Here early thirteenth-century Reconqu;sta involved the systematic claiming of 
land, rather than profitable predatory raids.37 The power vacuum in the Mulsim-
held lands of the Peninsula abandoned by a declining empire changed the 
nature of the warfare: instead of clinical, predatory marauding against a 
stronger and wealthier enemy, the Christian kings had to take the initiative and 
enter into money-exhausting, protracted campaigns and sieges. As the military 
historian Garcia-Fitz reckons, Fernando Ill's campaigns were aimed at 
territorial occupation and thus old-time concerns with profit were abandoned.38 
The Castilian-Leonese offensive led by Fernando III and Alfonso IX of Leon 
from 1226 onwards was all but self-subsidising and the monarch had to turn to 
loans to obtain the money required for wages and purveyances.39 Though this 
southwards advance into the Andalusian cities and principalities cannot have 
failed to produce some spoil or tribute, it was funded mainly by the pedido, a 
property tax which redeemed the king's right to debase the currency.40 Still, 
Castile was more fortunate than Portugal in the sense that, while the 
Portuguese border faced de-populated or at least de-urbanised tracts of land 
which only the well-paid Almohad garrisons kept under the banner of Islam,41 
the opulent cities of Seville and Cordoba and a web of middling towns lay just 
across the Castilian frontier. Such conditions make understandable the 
difficulties of Afonso II and most of all Sancho II in launching expeditions with 
35 For an alternative thesis, see Fernandes, D. Sancho II, pp. 148·54. 
36 Fernandes, D. Sancho II, p. 22. 
37 On the economic rationale for war in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Garcia Fitz, Francisco, Castilla y 
Leon frente allslam, Seville, 2001, pp. 74·89. 
38 Garcia-Fitz, Castilla y Lean, pp. 121-5. 
39 Grassotti, Hilda, 'Un emprestito para \a conquista de Sevilla', MiscelBnea de Estudios sobre Instituciones 
Castellano-Leonesas, Bilbao, 1978, p. 231. 
40 Grassotti, 'Un empresmo para la conquista,' pp. 228-234. 
41 Fernandes, Entre Mouros e Cristaos, p. 213. 
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the intensity of their forebears. The plains south to the Tagus would eventually 
be occupied by the efforts of the ideologically-motivated professionals of the 
military orders. 
Thus, royal testaments reveal the monarchy's incapacity for retaining the 
wealth in its treasuries from the ascent of Afonso II to the end of the fourteenth 
century.42 When read in combination with the military history of the period, it 
becomes evident that the gradual decline of the treasures can be associated to 
the end of self-subsidising warfare and to the contact with a wealthier, more 
powerful adversary. The abundant gold, in coins or otherwise, bequeathed in 
the royal wills reflects that royal finances benefited from an economy which, 
peacefully or not, was linked to the gold-rich areas of the Southern 
Mediterranean, rather than from the resources of the kingdom. 
In these terms, Iria Gon~alves was right pointing to the relationship 
between the end of the Reconquista and the financial difficulties for the crown. 
However the explanation for these difficulties lies not in the absence of land to 
conquer and/or plunder but rather in the collapse of the Almohad Empire four 
decades before the conquest of Faro. Given that the empire acted as the 
provider of gold to the bimetallic systems of the Christian kingdoms, it is 
important to ask whether the decay of royal fortunes did not involve monetary, 
rather than purely military, factors. 
Section 1.2 - Bimetallism 
In a bimetallic currency system, gold and silver currencies are 
interchangeable according to their facial values. Gold and silver coins had very 
different usages. Silver pence (d.) were used for ordinary transactions as 
everywhere else in Europe, although unlike countries like England who kept the 
penny strong in intrinsic terms, Iberian bullion currency tended to have a very 
low silver content, seldom exceeding 20% and often affected by severe 
debasements. Thus, fractional coins were unusual as the purchasing power of 
individual specimens was much weaker than their English counterparts. By 
contrast, bulkier transactions and hoarding were expressed and performed 
42 In a passing reference to the treasury he was bequeathing, King Dinis refers to " as the 'wealth that I hay 
assembled' ('este aver ... pera que hu eu hi juntei,. Provas, vol. II, part 2, doc. 11, p. 130. 
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through the Muslim gold coins minted by the Almoravid and Almohad empires. 
These, from 1087 onwards, flooded the Peninsula with their abundant dinars of 
impeccable gold, minted to payoff the wages of their plethoric armies during 
seasonal campaigns.43 This coinage, when transferred to Christian hands, kept 
the name of their original makers: morabitino or maravedi (both names meaning 
from the Almoravids). Its popularity and relative abundance made the 
morabitino the money of account used for more high-profile, prestigious 
transactions: land sales, one-off grants, ransoms, bequests and political 
compensations. 
Bimetallism, as practiced in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Portugal, has 
an important consequence for the crown's finances. In indirect taxes, renders 
and other fiscal transactions, one can assume that whenever possible 
payments the crown would be redeemed in the weakest currency. In other 
words, the effects of the so-called Gresham's Law would prevail. Unless 
coercion intervened, debtors to the king would resort to the weakest tender 
available. However, for the crown, on account of the higher scale of his 
transactions, this was not always possible. Indeed, in the concrete settings 
considered here, some of the crucial expenses affecting the crown were· 
expressed in morabitinos: knightly stipends (significantly called mara vedis) , 
bequests and other bulky transactions (donations to churches, compensations 
for the civil war). In consequence, debasements in gold and silver coins would 
have different effects. When threatened by high standing expenditure, the 
crown would debase the morabitinos, however, in order to keep the revenues 
flowing in, the crown would avoid debasing its pence, as these were the likeliest 
means of payment. Knowing that twelfth- and early thirteenth-century 
Portuguese kings enjoyed complete monopoly of coinage within their territory 
and that they could change its intrinsic and facial values, it is time to ask 
:whether these policies were followed. 
Portuguese coinage up to the fifteenth century has been the object of a 
comprehensive synthesis by Mario Gomes Marques. Thorough, critical analysis 
of dates, attributions, standards and the chemical constitution of the main series 
are all provided in this work.44 Nonetheless, for all the information provided in 
43 Kassis, 'The Circulation of Almoravid.' 
"'HMMP. 
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those areas, the present state of knowledge does not permit to date the 
different minting operations with more precision than the reign. Such broad 
intervals capture only long-term changes. Worse still, there is no certainty about 
the face values in d. imposed upon the different gold coins (morabitinos) at the 
time of their introduction.45 This makes difficult the correct understanding of the 
specific purposes of the different minting policies. Nonetheless, given that 
bimetallic systems were dominant in South-West Europe, the relationship 
between gold and silver coinages is the key to make monetary problems 
intelligible. 
Fig. 2 - The Portuguese Bimetallic System, 1140-1279 
Bullion Gold Coins 
( Morabltlnos) 
Reign Coinages Pure Agld. Change Pure Au! Change 
(av.) morabitino 
Afonso I 5 0.1635 
Sancho I 2 0.095 -42% 2.8 
Afonso II 2 0.0925 -2% 2.4 -14 % 
Sancho II 6 0.05 -46% 2 -17% 
Afonso III 2 0.066 32% 
Source: HMMP. 
The minting of the gold morabitino by Sancho I, which took place 
between 1185 and 1188,46 responded to minting of the maravedfs by the kings 
of Castile (1172) and Leon (1177). Far more than a sign of sudden prosperity, 
this new coinage can be regarded as an attempt to regulate the real value of 
their disbursements with court and army. Additionally, the abundant morabitinos 
minted by Sancho I were used as a form of hoarding as his two wills suggest.47 
King Sancho I also severely diminished the metal content of the d. minted to his 
name. In face of the prosperity of the royal treasuries, this strong depreciation 
45 Gomes Marques deducts the nominal value of Sancho I's golden coin as 15 solidi based in their conversion to 
dinheiros in 1253. HMMP, p. 39. 
46 HMMP, p. 36. 
47 The surviving number of Sancho I's morabitinos is much higher than those of Afonso II. A single morabitino from 
Sancho II survives. HMMP, p. 39. 
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defies complete explanation.48 However, it hints at the fact that Sancho I did not 
fear the negative effects of spreading poor coinage in the market. Indeed, as 
argued above, his revenues depended on the circuit that linked Portugal with 
the gold-rich Mediterranean trade. 
Both the successors of Sancho I struck debased morabitinos at 15%. 
Their debasements, dated 1218 and 1226,49 coincided with their difficulty to 
assure a regular flow to their seemingly depleted treasure. As discussed, 
Afonso II and Sancho II endured the withdrawal of the gold-rich Almohads from 
the Peninsula. Similarly, Castilian and Leonese crowns ceased minting golden 
species in 1221.50 It is possible that the issuing of debased morabitinos 
responded to the need of more money supply in response to the successive 
episodes of dearth that broke between 1217 and 1227.51 Nonetheless, as it will 
be argued (see infra section 1.3), extraordinary expenses surged after the death 
of Sancho I. The relationship between debaSing the morabitino in order to meet 
concrete expenses is clear in the case of Sancho II's puny gold coin whose 
output of 37,000 morabitinos mentioned in his testament of 1226 appears 
directly related to the impending campaign against Elvas.52 
In view of the considerations set above, the depletion of the gold coinage 
made perfect sense as a form of alleviating standing expenses. By contrast, the 
depreciation of the silver coinage would harm royal revenues which, according 
to Gresham's Law, would tend to be redeemed by weaker d .. Possibly guided 
by this principle, Afonso II minted silver coin with the same precious metal 
48 The question is further complicated by chemical evidence that he employed a different source of silver than both 
his father and son. HMMP, p. 146. This debasement shows that he benefited from his minting prerogatives, whereas 
his Castilian and Leonese contemporaries enjoyed less discriminate powers. On the curtailing of royal minting 
prerogatives in Castile and Leon, see 'Callaghan, Joseph F., 'The Beginnings of the Cortes of Le6n-Castile,' 
American Historical Review, n. 74, Washington DC, 1969, pp. 1517-23. 
49 Dates are inferred from Portugaliae Tabellionum Instrumenta. Documenta~o Notarial Portuguesa, 1214-1234, ed. 
Bernardo de sa·Nogueira, ed., Lisbon, 2005, docs. 19-21, pp. 38-41 and SS, doc. 44, p. 240. A 1221 charter (TI, 
Gaveta I, maco 7, doc. 15) mentions 'old' morabitinos, implying that 'new' ones had already been minted. 
50 Pellicer I Bru, Repertorio Parametrico, p. 124. 
51 In the absence of price series and being current price lists few and patchy, " Is for the moment impossible to go 
little beyond Oliveira Marques' broad conclusions: Portugal underwent a strong inflation In the turn of the twelfth to 
the thirteenth century, affecting mainly grain. Marques, 'A Circula~o e a Troes,' p. 521. Recently, however, a careful 
sieving of Muslim chronicles by Fernandes has shown that the price behaviour in both sides of the Strahs changed 
suddenly with the dearth of 1213-14. Fernandes, Entre Mouros e Cristaos, p. 167. In the same year the See of 
Braga asked for help to the king on account of hs sudden poverty. Liber Fidei, ed. Avelino de Jesus da Costa, voLIII, 
Braga, 1990, doc. 878, pp. 313-4. Further dearth in 1220, 1227 and 1237 in Maghreb and Andalus is recorded. 
Fernandes, Entre Mouros e Cristaos, Table between pp. 167 and 168. 
52 55, doc. 44, p. 240. Gomes Marques admhs that the morabitino of Sancho II was Issued in very low quantities: 
only one morabitino of king Sancho II has been found so far, in contrast with the far oommoner findings of 
morabitinos struck by his father and grand-father. HMMP, p. 39. 
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content as his father. The conservation of the fineness of the silver currency fits 
Afonso II's coherent attempts at improving the collection and management of 
his revenues. 
The financial policy of Sancho II appears to have been less coherent 
than his predecessor's. By contrast with the reign of his father, silver currency 
was strongly and repeatedly debased under Sancho II. Very likely, his erratic 
monetary policy can be explained by the well-known crisis of royal authority that 
dominated his whole reign until he was dethroned by his brother Afonso III in 
the civil war of 1246-8. Whatever the precise motivations, the severe depletion 
(-46%) of the silver content of the d. cannot have failed to deteriorate the 
crown's revenues. Although examples for an increasingly stringent coercion for 
payments might be found in scattered documents,53 the surviving royal charters 
give no evidence of Sancho II having attempted reforms similar to his father. 
The fact that six different editions of the d. were minted to his name indicates 
that seignioriage and debasement were his major reactions to the decrease in 
his wealth revealed by the wills. Indeed, while Afonso II apparently made the 
right choices, politically weaker Sancho II mismanaged the recession of gold 
and resorted to the ultimately self-defeating expedient of debasing the coinage. 
This might have played a part in the dissent of the nobility which so powerfully 
contributed to the overthrowing of Sancho 11.54 At any rate, the difference in the 
values hoarded between Afonso II is coherent with these contrasting policies. 
It comes as little surprise that unlike all his three predecessors, Afonso III 
did not mint gold coins under his name. In order to improve the metallic value of 
his revenue, Afonso III poured abundantly into circulation his 'new pence' 
(dinheiros novos), whose silver content was fortified (0.066 g) in relation to the 
previous currency (0.05 g) which saw its facial value decrease accordingly. This 
complex policy which will be analysed infra (see section 2.2) clearly inverted 
that of his brother and predecessor. By then, the apparent rarity of gold had 
given the mortal blow to the bimetallist system. The king recognised that the 
gold flow that characterised the wild days of the Reconquista was lost for good. 
Moving farther apart from regional tradition and recent past, Afonso III adopted 
53 Mainly those relating to the abuses over the lisbon Jewry in the 1240s and to harsh fiscal demands imposed upon 
Coimbra in 1238·44. TI, Sa de Coimbra - Primeira Incorporayao, mayo 12, docs. 36 and 40; m~o 13, doc. 12,34 
and 35. I thank Filipa Roldso for informing me about this latter set of documents. 
M Fernandes, Sancho II, p. 242. 
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the 'European' system of reckoning in I. s. and d. (the equivalent of pounds, 
shillings and pence). As the royal wills already hinted at, under Afonso III 
Portugal was entirely dissociated from the economic circuits dominated by the 
African gold. Henceforward, and up to 1457 at least, monetary decisions would 
affect simultaneously revenues and expenses. 
Section 1.3 - Decreasing Revenues or Mounting Expenses? 
The combined representation of the value of royal wills and metal 
contents in the regnal coinages in Fig. 3 shows that the slump in the royal 
treasuries of Afonso II (1211-23), Sancho II (1223-48) and Afonso III (1248-79) 
was paralleled by the weakening of both coinages. Conversely, the recovery of 
the latter by king Dinis (1279-1325) was accomplished after a long period 
without changes in the silver currency. At first sight, this suggests that the whole 
process could be described as a crisis of revenues, aggravated by monetary 
deficiencies. The incapacity to accumulate assets revealed by the wills dated 
between 1214 and 1299 can be interpreted as reflections of decreasing 
revenues, while coinage suggest that the strains undergone by Afonso II and 
Sancho II were also related with expenditure. Is this broad description coherent 
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Sources: Fig. 1 and 2. 
If near-permanent war of attrition with the Muslim powers supplied the 
royal treasury, the collection of revenues within the borders of the realm also 
depended on some form of coercion and/or arbitrariness. On his deathbed, 
Sancho I sent to the municipality of Lisbon promising not to force again the tolls' 
personnel to tax-farm the sources of revenue as he had done throughout his 
lifetime.55 Days later, Sancho I solemnly promised to the men of Lisbon that he 
renounced the collection of taxes he imposed on trade and abusive 
extraordinary demands (pedidas).56 He exacted from the church of the realm 
prerogative, informal contributions with the pretext of defending the frontier.57 
Moreover, like their Leonese and Castilian neighbours, Afonso I and Sancho I 
exploited their minting prerogatives by issuing debased bullion (Fig. 2), a device 
which could not fail to boost their incomes at least temporarily. The itinerancy of 
the first monarchs with their highly mobile retinues58 was also the pretext for 
abusive exactions from villages, towns and monasteries.59 Indeed, throughout 
the country stood an ancient but well-oiled logistical system at the service of the 
peripatetic kings, securing their living and the upkeep of their households 
without the intervention of money.50 Itinerancy allowed twelfth· and early 
thirteenth-century kings and their retinues to live off the country and spared the 
monetary costs of a standing court. Under Sancho I royal visits were an integral 
part to his rule.61 
The diversity of more or less forceful means to which Sancho I resorted 
testifies how arbitrary exercise of power contributed to increase royal treasuries. 
After all, this voracious and unchecked exploitation of the resources of the 
realm matched the accumulation of riches by means of war. The concept of 
'tribute state' reflects both what happened within and without the borders of the 
55 OS, doc. 195, pp. 301-2. 
56 OS, doc. 196, pp. 302·3. 
57 Branco, Maria·Joao, D. Sancho " lisbon, 2006, p. 171. 
58 On the royal visn, see Goncalves, Iria, 'Alguns aspectos da visita regia ao entre C8vado e Minho, no seculo XIII,' 
£studos Medievais, n. 10, Porto, 1993, pp. 33-57. 
59 TI, Chanco Afonso II, livro 1, fol. 42v (Monastery of Mancelos in 1219); TI, Gaveta IX, mayo 10, doc. 27 
(Monastery of Santa Cruz, undated). • 
60 By 1258, this logistics was still operative and the minute obligations and services that a royal stay implied were 
well remembered by the elders, as royal enquiries amply testify for the regions wnh better hunting grounds. 
Goncalves, 'Alguns aspectos,' pp. 33-57. 
61 Branco, D. Sancho ',pp. 115-6, 175·80, 212-4; Vilar, Herminia Vasconcelos, D. Afonso II, Lisbon, 2005, p. 254. 
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regnum. Coercion, more or less declared, was integral to the finances of the 
state.62 Conversely, there are unsystematic but coherent indications that the 
autocratic rule of Sancho I largely attenuated under his less forceful son. This 
orientation, which was already felt in the dying days of his father, materialised in 
the founding moment of his reign, the assembly of 1211, where his famous 
General Laws were issued.63 As Maria-Joao Branco has pOinted out, much 
against the dominant current notion of Afonso II as a precursor of the 
Portuguese centralisation, the General Laws of 1211 stand for an attempt to 
circumscribe the powers of the monarch.54 In fiscal terms, as Branco noted, the 
laws, namely those securing private ownership from the assaults of royal 
officers and forbidding the confiscation of salvaged goods by the monarchy, 
protected the economic life of the kingdom.65 
Instead of the voracity displayed by his father, Afonso II attempted to 
develop a system of collecting royal dues guided by regular procedures and 
dependant on regular recording, in ways unknown to autocratic Sancho I. 
References to the De Recabedo Regni books, which constituted the basis for 
auditing of the royal officers, and to the Libri Repositi which recorded what 
entered and left the royal treasuries, appear in 1216. In the same year, Afonso 
II issued a regulation of the household logistics alluding to the punishment of 
dishonest officers.66 In 1220 he organised a wide enquiry on the state of the 
royal domain, the Inquisitiones. Finally, in 1222 Afonso II issued two more 
statutes concerning punishment of deceitful officers and the auditing based 
upon the Recabedo books.67 The developments did not stop in his reign. 
Recently, research by Filipa Roldao has shown that that in the 1230s debt-
62 Interestingly, the charters of Sancho I employed the term fiscus to denote his judicial as well as tributary authority. 
Branco, D. Sancho I, p. 173. 
63 On these Laws in English, Branco, Maria-Joso, 'The General Laws of Afonso II and his policy of "centralisation": a 
reassessment', in Gosman, Vanderjag1, A. and Veenstra, J., eds., The Propagation of Power in the Medieval West, 
Groningen, 1997, pp. 79-95. 
64 Branco, 'The General Laws,' pp. 86-7. On the historiography on Afonso II as the pioneer of 'centralisation, see 
Vilar, D. Afonso II, p. 254. 
65 Branco, 'The General Laws', p. 87. The relevance of constitutional protection of property rights is obviously a major 
theme in recent developments in Economic History. North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R., 'Constnutions and 
Commitment: The Evolution of Instnutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,' The Journal 
of Economic History, Vol. 49, n. 4, Dec. 1989, pp. 803-832. 
66 TT, Chanco Afonso III, livro 3, fols. 7V-8. 
67 TI, Chane. Afonso III, livro 3, fols. 8-8v; TI, Leis, M~ 1, doc. 12. 
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collecting was performed by two officers, the executing almoxarife and the 
controlling scribe, which had to observe set procedures.58 
These new institutes - the Inquisitiones, the Libri De Recabedo, the Libri 
Repositi, the control by a scribe - constituted innovations of Afonso II that set a 
pattern for the later fiscal recording of the Portuguese crown. However, they 
stand for an improvement of the management of his revenues, not for the 
creation of new sources of income to compensate the lost revenues. Apart from 
the declining tributary revenues, it is likely that moribund Sancho I's penance 
and promises of forbidding his ruthless exploitation affected the revenues of the 
kingdom. Similarly, the decision not to debase the coinage deprived Afonso II of 
short-term income. The values mentioned in King Afonso's last will (1221) 
indicate that his reforms were insufficient to claim back some of the opulence of 
his father. At any rate, by the end of his reign, the personal treasure of Afonso II 
had even fewer assets than in its early days and Sancho II did not invert this 
trend. Indeed, the situation seems to have deteriorated in his reign. A seemingly 
steady inflation59 and the strong debasements of the d. by Sancho II cannot fail 
to have led to a decay of real income. A few charters granted to the 
municipalities in his reign state that their annual contributions expressed in 
golden morabitinos could be redeemed through payments in bullion 
(morabitinadas)?O Even the farming of a wealthy centre like Santarem was 
estimated in silver coinage?1 Decaying revenues are also a plausible 
justification for Sancho II to alienate the king's right to the fifth of all plunder in 
the hands of the bishoprics.72 
For Gon~alves, Afonso III overcame the financial strains by the creation 
of new forms of revenue, in particular the general taxes of 1254, 1261 and the 
general loan of 1266. This claim, however, overestimates the importance of this 
taxation. Although the global proceeds of three general taxes are unknown, the 
68 Roldao, Filipa, Escrita e Poderes Urbanos nos conce/has de Coimbra, Santarem e Lisboa, Lisbon, 2007, pp. 104-
173. 
69 Marques, 'A Circulay80 e a Troca,' pp. 521-522. 
70 e. g. 55, docs. 17 (1224). 
71 This is inferred from the debt of '30,000 mara vedis of lOs.' owed by leading tax-farmer Domnus Daniel (TT, 
Chane. Dinis I, Livro 2, fol. 84v). As Maria·Jose Pimenta Ferro argued, maravedis of 10 s. were silver coins, possibly 
Muslim dirhams. Ferro, Maria Jose Pimenta, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de D. Dinis', Do Tempo e da Hist6r;a, vol. V, 
1972, pp. 206-9. 
72 DR, 358, p. 483 (1185); TI, Chancelarias Regias, Chancelaria de O. Afonso II, Livro 1m fols. 76-76v (1218); 55, 
doc. 15, p.191 (1224). 
59 
existing indicators downplay the dimension of the income generated by such 
taxes. Two different sources document the contribution of three of the nine 
bishoprics of the realm to the tax of 1261 and the loan of Santarem in 1266. 
Together, Braga, Coimbra and Viseu paid about 990.5 marks of pure silver in 
bullion?3 Dividing by the rate of 9:1 (to compare with the wills) this would mean 
around 108.5 marks of pure gold. In the 'loan' of 1266, the second centre of the 
reign (Santarem) paid only 10,000 1.,74 equalling some 517 marks of pure silver. 
Historians have long detected in the reigns of Afonso III and of his son 
determined and consequent attempts to increase the crown's revenues. Already 
in the 1290s, a contemporary Castilian author commented how Afonso III had 
'amplified his revenues:75 Similarly, a text recovered in the Cr6nica de Portugal 
de 1419 applauded Afonso Ill's 'strict regulation of his household and the realm 
and the keeping of his wealth in good array'.16 Historians' appraisal was not 
essentially different, as they have unanimously hailed the reign of Afonso III 
(1248-79) as a decisive turning pOint in the construction of the Portuguese 
monarchy.77 Jose Mattoso pointed to Afonso's systematic acquisition of urban 
property and to the tighter control of his officers as essential aspects of what he 
regarded as the 'triumph of the monarchy'. 78 
From 1258 onwards, Afonso III developed a stop-and-go policy of 
systematic concentration of sets of coherent, contiguous patrimony, sometimes 
by sales, sometimes by more or less leonine 'agreements.' His focus was in the 
hottest property in the country: urban housing and shop stalls (mostly, though 
by no means exclusively, in Lisbon)?9 Abundant, if unsystematic, instruments of 
sale do not illustrate the strong degree of coercion these operations involved, 
73 TAIII, docs. 11-17, pp. 245-52. The calculations are as follow: 14,586/. of Portuguese old d. • 240 • 0.05 9 (Ag in 
Portuguese old d.) = 175032 gAg. 2607 I. of Portuguese new d. • 180 • 0.066 9 (Ag In Portuguese new d.) = 
30971.16 gAg. 3915 I. of Castilian coins + 278 maravedis of 16 s. = 82748 sol. Burgaleses • 0.2 9 (pure Ag in 
Burgales) = 16549. 1217 I. of Legioneses d. + 134.5 mara vedis of 8 s .. = 25416 sol. Burgaleses • 0.2 9 - 6 % 
(difference from legionenses to Castilian coinage) = 4n8 g Ag 
74 PEP, p. 32. 
75 The words belong to Juan Gil de Zamora who wrote his Liber lIIustrarum personarum to be read by prince Sancho 
(future Sancho IV) while he was active in the court of Alfonso X: 'he kept the realm in peace, amplified his revenues', 
fortnied towns and castles, and the fear he inspired did refrain the Sarracen'. Ventura, D. Afonso III, p. 267. 
76 Cr. 1419, chapter 77, pp. 142-3. 
n For an overview on the historiography of this king, see Ventura, Leontina, D. Afonso III, Lisbon, 2006, pp. 24-35. 
78 Maltoso, Jose, '1258-1264: 0 Triunfo da monarquia portuguesa. Ensaio de Hist6ria Politica,' Analise Social, vol. 
XXXV, n. 157,2001, pp. 899-935. 
79 Maltoso, '1258-1264: 0 Triunfo,' p. 905. Ravara, Ant6nio, 'Introducao ao Estudo da Propriedade Regia Urbana 
com D. Afonso III e D. Dinis,' Ocidenta. Revista Portuguesa de Cultura, Nova serie, Vol. LXXXI, n. 400, 1971, pp. 
99-104. 
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most of all in Lisbon.8o Nevertheless, the acquisition of urban houses proved to 
be a very profitable option in the long-run as contracts were not perpetual and 
thus could be improved for the landlord. Afonso III also tried to rationalise the 
management of his dispersed and encroachment-threatened lands in the 
North81 and ordered his representatives in Guimaraes to recover lost lands.82 
His goal was to convert the rents from kind to monetary and he tried to 
maximise his revenue by imposing a centralised municipal structure. By buying 
or building shop stalls and housing in the urban centres, by creating new 
settlements whose renders would be paid in cash, by alienating the custom 
duties in Porto from the hands of the local bishop,83 and obviously by means of 
general taxes of 1254, 1261 and 1266, Afonso III deployed extensive efforts to 
tap the country's monetised economy.84 Under Dinis I there were firm 
instructions to accrue the royal urban property on every possible occasion.8s 
Later in his reign Dinis I continued to accrue the domain by turning his attention 
to the fertile, paddy wheat-fields of the Tagus which were subject to piecemeal 
acquisition from the end of the thirteenth-century onwards and were to be 
exploited directly by the king.86 
The success of these measures, in turn, would only be possible thanks to 
the stability of the coinage. Indeed, the establishment of a stable coinage was 
perhaps the most important achievement of Afonso III. Although, as it will be 
clarified, the king's plans were significantly changed by strong opposition, the 
monetary policy of Afonso III, which Dinis I did not alter, seems to have been 
guided by the reinforcement of the coinage (see supra chapter 2) . 
. In spite of the vast transformations undertaken in the second half of the 
thirteenth-century, the assets hoarded by Afonso III and Dinis in 1271 and 1299 
were modest and not essentially different from that of Sancho II in 1226. This 
80 In Lisbon, the king appropriated many public spaces to construct his houses, depriving the inhab"ants of some 
facilities and markets. This is stated by the municipality of Lisbon in an open assembly with King Dinis, six years 
soon after Afonso Ill's death. TT, Chane. Dinis I, Livro 1, fol. 163v-65. In 1261, the king commanded the council of 
Lisbon to force men into dwelling in his shops. TT, Chanco Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 49v. 
81 Some examples: Henriques, 0 Rei e a Terra, vo!.I, pp. 133-8; Ventura, A Nobreza de Corte, vol. I, p. 506. 
82 TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fols. 60v (1259), 79v, 79vbis and 79vbisbis (1265). 
83TT, Gaveta I, mayo 1, doc. 15. 
84 Mattoso, Historia de Portugal, pp. 119-121. 
85 Ravara, 'Introd~o a Propriedade,' p. 103. 
88 Even if this did not exclude pressure as it is clear from some individual cases, as n is clear in some letters of 
acquisition included in Afonso Ill's chancery. TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 49v and Livro 3, 1ols. 16-23v. 
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circumstance points. to expenditure as the reason behind the incapacity to 
accumulate shown by Afonso II and his successors. 
In 1210 Sancho I bequeathed to his elder son alone 200,000 morabitinos 
but in 1214 the royal treasury had no more than 78,000. For all his abundance, 
Sancho I had left arrears, such as 56 marks of gold owed to the Papacy.87 The 
charters of Afonso II include a considerable number of aids in monies provided 
to the bishoprics, either by assignments or by one-off gifts. In one of them, 
Afonso II explicitly mentions that he was succouring the See of Braga in 'time of 
material hardship,.88 Just like with Afonso II, the early phase of Sancho II's reign 
was marked by sudden expenses. A deathbed agreement of Afonso II with his 
sisters had meant that the sizeable frontier towns of Alenquer, Montemor and 
Torres Vedras were assigned to them.89 As Sancho II's testament of 1226 
makes clear, his father had left insufficient monies to clear his late bequests, of 
which some 16,000 morabitinos were still owed.90 In 1223, his very first regnal 
year, still during his minority Sancho II was forced to pay to the Archbishop of 
Braga and other lords a heavy indemnity of 50,000 morabitinos,91 a sum which 
closely matches the whole of his father's bequests to him in 1221. 
Under Afonso III expenses appear to have been kept at a high level. To 
put in perspective the sums bequeathed in testament and got from taxation, 
there is a rough indication of regular household expenditure in the summarised 
account for the royal maintenance between October 1257 and July 1270.92 
Maintenance (cozinha) was the name for the logistiCS and supply of the 
permanent courtiers, hangers-on and visitors.93 Considering the amounts 
handled by its receiver, this worked as an important form of redistribution. In 
those fourteen years, the audited officer 'obtained and delivered' 135,231 I. in 
87 MH, I, pp. 50·51 (doc. 27). 
88 To Evora, in 1214 (Arquivo Catedralicio da Sa de Evora, CEC 3-111, doc. 90) and in 1221 (TI, Gaveta I, maca 7, 
doc. 15). To the Santa Cruz monastery in 1214 (TI, Sa de Coimbra, OR, mayo 2, doc. 44.). To Braga, twice in 1218 
(Liber Fidei, III, pp. 313-314 and ADB, ColefAo Crono/6gica, Pasta 1, doc. 29; Caixa 2, doc. 26). In the latter of 
these, the 'economic hardhsips' of the episcopal see are expressly mentioned as the reason for the gift. I thank Maria 
Joao Branco for accessing me her unpublished calendar of Afonso II's charters. 
89 The latter was valued at 4,000 morabitinos. Fernandes, D. Sancho II, p. 101. 
90 55, doc.1S, p. 191. 
91 Fernandes, Sancho II, p. 109. 
92 Document in Ribeiro, Joso Pedro, Disserta~Oes Chronologicas e Criticas Sobre a Historia e Jurisprudencia 
Eclesiastica e Civil de Portugal, vol. III, 2nd part, 2nded., Lisbon 1857, doc. XXX, p. 86-7. 
93 The explanation for the word cozinha is found in 1599 chronicle: E havia um livro em que se assentavSo que se 
chama va da cozinha 0 qual de pouco tempo para eel se chamou cia matrlcula nelle se escrevia toda a despesa que 
se fazia e as pessoas a que se dava a moradia. Leao, Duarte Nunes do, Descr~ao do Reino de Portugal, Lisbon, 
2002, chapter. LXXXVI, p. 277. 
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cash. apart from dairy and livestock. In metallic terms. this equals some 462 
marks of silver. More impressive is the information about the revenues aSSigned 
to the household of Prince Dinis which amounted for 40.000 I. each year from 
1278.94 some 2.068 marks of pure silver. 
Nevertheless. the most important evidence is the reckoning of the liquid 
income entering the treasury in the years 1278-80 in the letter of quittance of 
the high-treasurer Vicente Martins.95 This source states clearly that these were 
'monies and valuables received and then spent.'96 As the document combines 
nineteen European and North African currencies. besides gold dust, silver bars 
and silverware, coinages are reduced to their silver content, making accounts 
easier (Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4 - Receipt of the High-treasurer, 1278-80 
Coins and/or commodities 
300.561 I .• 4 s .. 6.5 d. of coins and commodities expressed in 
Portuguese currency 
3870 I .• 12 s. of Leonese currency 
7083 Gros Tournois 
125 I. 15 s. T ournois 
Other European silver currencies 
Silverware 
Silver in bars 
Gold dust 


















Note: *-conversions indicated by the source; "-conversion based in exchange rates, not intrinsic 
value. 
Source: Deser .• doc. 8. p. 345; Pellicer I Brur. Reportorio Metrologico. p. 128; Spufford. 
Handbook of Medieval Exchange, pp. 156. 157. 184. 
This letter of quittance allows for a new perspective on the declining 
curve of the sums bequeathed in the royal wills. Using the same conversion rate 
for the royal wills (*9.1), the total 16,226 marks of silver obtained are equivalent 
to 2,136 marks of gold. a metallic value comparable to the late twelfth-century 
94 'Inventario e Contas da Gasa de D. Denis (1278-1282), ed. Anselmo Brancaamp Freire, AHP, vol. X,lisbon, 1916, 
p.41. 
95 Deser., vol. I, doc. 8, p. 345. 
96 De omnibus iIIis que ipse (thesaurariusj de me et de omnibus allis loco et nomine mea recepit, et de omnibus iIIis 
que dedit et expendidit per meas cartas et per meum mandatum. 
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testaments. True, there is a crucial difference: gold, whether in bar or in 
coinage, is almost absent, accounting for a mere 14.23 marks, 1.5 % of the 
value entering the treasure in 1278-80. This difference confirms that the 
finances of the monarchy were founded on a silver-fuelled economy, in contrast 
with the gold hoardings of Afonso I and Sancho I. The receipt of the treasurer 
shows that 95% of the silver entering the royal treasury came minted in 
Portuguese coins. The crown drew its resources from the internal economy. 
Anyway, at least apparently, the prosperity of the first kings had been 
restored, albeit if with alternative means and possibly with a smaller purchasing 
power. In the time between 1185 and 1188, the treasury had received more 
than the lifetime accumulation of Afonso I. Unless we assume that expenditure 
took away most of the resources, it would be extremely problematic to reconcile 
the bulky two-year proceeds of the treasury with the mere 69,400 I. bequeathed 
by Afonso III in 1271 (some 3,600 silver marks). Although the crown had a high 
cash-flow, it retained only a small fraction of it. 
The incapacity to hoard was only inverted between 1299 and 1322. The 
latter date is that of the second will of King Dinis whose 350,000 I. are, when 
converted to marks of gold (Fig. 1), roughly equivalent to the wills of 1179 and 
1188. Thus, the will of 1322, marks the recuperation of the accumulative 
capacity of the monarchy.97 The wealth disposed by Pedro I at his death 
confirms the fact that monarchs managed to slowly but surely accumulate value 
at the rate of 9,000 I. (the equivalent to 51 marks of gold in the measure used). 
However, it reveals more than a return to the past. Previous royal wills show 
how the accession to the throne could be a occasion for some material 
weakness. The movables were freely disposed by the monarch, the heir to the 
throne receiving his share as a son and not as a king. This practice clearly 
hindered the capacity to accumulate at least until 1322. The will of 1322 marks 
indeed the end of the king's prerogative of disposing of his treasuries. In his last 
will, King Dinis clearly distinguished the sums to be parted among his wife, 
descendants and religious institutions from those that should remain in the 
Lisbon treasure to be used 'for the defence of the kingdom and war against the 
87 The terms will of 1324 confirms that the 350,000 I. constituted a treasury that could not be spent. Prov8s, vol. I, 
part 2, doc. 11, p. 130. Dinis' grandson Pedro I bequeathed the same value in 1367. Ferro, 'Para 0 Estudo da 
Numaria de O. Fernando,' pp. 9-10. 
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enemies to the faith,.98 Henceforward, hoarding was part of the royal duty and 
future war the justification for the existence of a system of revenue collection 
and the kings would no longer make monetary bequests of their wealth in their 
wills.99 
88 OPera defendimento dos regnos de Portugal e do Algarve OU no servisso de Deos contra os imigos cia Fe.' Provas, 
vol. I, part 2, doc. 11, p. 130. 
99 Note however that the will of Pedro I includes some bequests. Ferro, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de O. Femando,' 
p. 10, note 22. 
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Chapter 2 - A Fiscal Constitution 
This chapter will address the political limitations and opportunities that 
defined the monarchy's capacity to translate its political authority in taxation 
both in its hidden (debasement) and conventional (by legitimate general taxes) 
forms. This will be done by importing the concept of fiscal constitution from 
economic analysis. Section 2.1 will discuss this concept, while following 
sections will test whether fiscal-constitutional principles limited royal power to 
manipulate the currency (section 2.2) and to impose taxes (section 2.3). 
Section 2.1 'Fiscal Constitution' as a Historical Concept 
The concept of 'Fiscal Constitution' was advanced by economic theorists 
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, soon after the 1978 'tax revolts' in 
California.1 Their goal was to identify which limitations on the state's taxing and 
spending powers a 'rational citizen/taxpayer' should chose. The two economists 
departed from the assumption that, for all its protests of moral, benevolent 
intentions, the state is by definition expansive and revenue-maximising. Thus, 
they dismissed all claims of self-regulation on behalf of the state as intrinsically 
impossible.2 For these reasons, Brennan and Buchannan considered that non-
governmental entities had to present a set of rules in order to 'limit and 
appropriately direct [ ... ] the power to tax' and institutions to impose them.3 Such 
'fiscal constitution' would be analogous to the 'game rules' which players agree 
on before actually playing. After accepting the regulation, the players would be 
free to chose whatever 'strategies', or 'in-period choices' in their terminology, 
suited them better, as long as it was in accordance with the rules. The 
distinction between constitutional design of and concrete decision-making 
would assure that the constitution would be formulated without anticipated 
knowledge of the individuals' position. The two authors also pledged that there 
I Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. M., The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge, 
1980. 
2 Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, p. 163. 
3 Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, p. 9. 
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should be effective rules whose observance would be assured by a non-
governmental watchdog with the means to control the government's decisions.4 
Brennan and Buchanan were obviously concerned with contemporary 
politics and constitutional systems rather than with modelling fiscal experiences 
of the past. Yet, although their goal was to intervene in the current fiscal 
policies and their financial analysis bore on contemporary democratic 
governments, the relevance of the concept of 'fiscal constitution' for the 
historians' descriptive analysis was recognised by R. Bonney and W. M. 
Ormrod.5 The term 'fiscal constitution' however had to be understood in a 
broader way. Indeed, a crucial aspect of applying the notion of 'fiscal 
constitution' in long-term historical analysis is that it assigns no room for 
changes of ideology or discourse. By definition, the rational homo oeconomicu5 
of Brennan and Buchanan would be unsusceptible to ideological propaganda 
and persuasion. Thus, as seen by Bonney and Ormrod, rather than normative 
principles applied to fiscal decision-making, the concept of 'fiscal constitution' 
would be the balance between the principles, practices and attitudes of rulers 
and ruled concerning state finances.6 Thus, each state, be it 'domain', 'tribute', 
'tax' or 'fiscal' state, would have its fiscal constitution. Yet, such a vast, 
structural understanding of fiscal constitution is methodologically unworkable 
within concrete historical settings and does not help in distinguishing their 
specificities. In the present context, it is more important to simply ask .whether 
any sort of fiscal constitution functioned in the times of the 'old kings' that is to 
say under the 'domain state.' 
Brennan and Buchanan's idealised fiscal constitution has to be thought 
of in different terms in order that their plea for political reform can be used as a 
historiographical model. This implies three precise adjustments: 
1) contracts between rulers and ruled and customary norms 
limiting royal prerogatives should be included in the category 
of constitutional 'rules', although in legal technical terms they 
might not be. What ought to define a constitution is the 
4 Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, p. 5-7. 
5 Bonney, Richard, 'Revenues', ESF, pp. 431-4. Bonney, Richard, 'Introduction', RSF, pp. 6-7. Bonney and Ormrod, 
'Crisis, Revolutions and Self-sustained Growth: Towards a conceptual model of change in Fiscal History', Crisis, pp. 
1-3. 
I Bonney and Ormrod, 'Crisis, revolutions,' pp. 1-3. 
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existence of explicit principles effectively restraining the fiscal 
powers of the state; 
2) In the context of thirteenth-century and fourteenth-century 
Europe, any hypothetical 'fiscal constitution' sets not only the 
rate and type of taxation but also its very implementation, as 
universal taxes were for the most extraordinary. As such, the 
notion of 'taxpayer' ought to include 'potential taxpayers'; 
3) The institution responsible for fiscal constitutional decisions 
needs not to have been a permanent one. 
In spite of these adjustments, the model retains its fundamental 
assumption: as they are by definition incapable of self-restraint, fiscal powers 
can only be checked through external control. The effective regulation takes the 
form of principles distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate in-period decisions. 
By no means discourse, 'mentality' or the king's goodwill are to be taken for 
effective constitutional mechanisms. 
In the case here concerned, it can be argued that the basis of a fiscal 
constitution emerged in the 1250s and 1260s and was observed until it was 
disrupted by the rule of war-weary King Fernando. In fact, this constitution did 
never manifest itself more clearly than during the Fernandine Wars. When the 
constitutional principles were challenged by Fernando's military ventures, they 
emerged with great clarity in the discourse of the Povos, the municipal towns' 
representatives in the Portuguese parliamentary institution, the Cortes. 
Section 2.2 - The Monetary Constitution 
In the immediate aftermath of the First Fernandine War - ended by the 
Peace of Alcoutim, signed on 31 March 1371 - Fernando I summoned the 
Cortes to be held in Lisbon four months later.7 Their purported aim was to 'set 
straight and improve the condition and order of these realms,.8 The declared 
benign intentions hint that the summoning of the Cortes was a response to the 
7 Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 14. 
a 'Correger e me/horar 0 estacio e regimento destes reinod. See Cort. Fernando', vol. I, p. 15. On the same Cortes, 
see also Marques, A. H. de 0., 'Lisboa, Cortes de (1371)', DHP, vol. 4, pp. 8·9. 
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criticism of Fernando's minting of two new species of bullion with a thin silver 
value and poor leadership in war, the latter ripe and loud enough to echo in the 
later chronicles.9 In one reply to an article of grievance, the king explicitly 
declared that he sought to reach some form of agreement with the Cortes 
concerning the notorious debasements he had perpetrated during the war.10 
The possibility that by holding Cortes the king was procuring a general tax to 
finance a fresh offensive against Castile can not be totally excluded either.11 
Whatever the precise reasons behind the summons and the particular 
agendas of the two parts, the representatives of the municipalities seized these 
Cortes to voice before the defeated king the grievances accumulated· in two 
years of war. As in customary fourteenth-century practice, these 'general' (as 
opposed to 'special' or municipal) grievances were presented in a written list of 
articles drafted before the actual talks took place.12 Most concern practical 
cases and bring forward concrete solutions but, for all their apparent casuistic 
stance, the grievances of 1371 and 1372 present a remarkably coherent 
argumentation. Often, the municipal representatives resort to principles which, 
they claimed, where those observed by the 'kings of 01d'.13 
In the very first of the articles of 1371, the municipal representatives 
declared that no substitution of coinage could ever be performed without their 
consent. They alleged that the recent introduction of new, strongly debased 
silver coins, the grave and the barbuda, was in flagrant opposition to what 'had 
been sworn and conceded by the late kings in their names and in the names of 
their successors,.14 Indeed, the face values of the four coin types minted by 
Fernando I during the war (Fig. 5) were at odds with the relation between facial 
• Lopes, Cron. Fernando " chapter XXXVI, p. 119. 
10 Cort. Fernando', vol. I, p. 16. 
11 This very reason caused two meetings to take place shortly afterwards in Porto (July 1372) and Leiria (October· 
November 1372) The generic justification given by the king could have been a decoy for a thoroughly financial 
request In the 1372 Cortes of Leiria, where a general tax was requested, the summoning letters did not mention 
nothing but similarly amenable intentions. Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 123. On these two Cortes, see Marques, A. H. 
de Oliveira, 'Leiria, Cortes de (1372)" DHP, vol. 3, pp. 451·2 and Rodrigues, Maria Teresa campos, 'Porto, Cortes 
de (1372), DHP, vol. 5, p. 127. 
12 The original document does not exist. As often happens with Portuguese parliamentary records, the questions 
subsist together with the king's answers and thus are phrased with the king as subject and the Povos as indirect 
object. 
13 'Os reis que dante torom/os reis dante v~. This evocation of the older kings' practices is central to the 
argumentative strategy in many other grievances (1., 23rd, 29th, 31·, 35Ih, 93rd, 971h, 101"). Cort. Fernando " vol. I, 
pp.16,26,28,29,32,60-3. 
14 'Aquilo que pelos Rejs dante nos toJ outorgado e prometudo por sij e por os seus S098sors de se guardar.' Cort. 
Femando', vol. I, p. 16 {article 111). 
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and intrinsic value of the dominant currency for generations (the 'new pence' or 
dinheiros novos).15 The evils associated with such a decision were detailed. The 
dearth caused by such an abrupt change in the intrinsic value was made even 
worse by the war situation. Indeed, price inflation had widened liability to non-
noble military service which, as in England, was graduated according to annual 
income expressed in nominal, not metallic, terms. Thus, in some districts the 
holders of an income of 500 I. had to render mounted service, even if the sum 
was insufficient to buy a horse. The growth of real salaries, the difficulties in the 
execution of wills and price-settings ruinous for the vendors also constituted 
targets of the complaints. In face of such dire consequences, the 
representatives, as 'citizens and natives' (cidadaos e naturais), demanded not 
only that Fernando I abode by what the old kings had 'prescribed' (ordinhado) , 
but also that the persons who brought their old d. to the mint should have them 
back, regardless of the costs this operation would entail for the monarch.16 
As mentioned, the king declared that he was seeking an agreement with 
the Povos regarding coinage in the Cortes.17 While there is no further indication 
about that agreement, nominal values of the much-maligned barbudas and 
graves were indeed reduced after the Cortes of Lisbon. Although the reduction 
fell short of what the Povos demanded (Fig. 5). it is possible that it arose of that 
elusive agreement.18 Nonetheless, soon Fernando's wilful policy against Castile 
would result in yet other change in the Portuguese monetary system. In mid 
1372, probably in Mayor June, Fernando I resumed his monetary experiments 
by minting yet another new type of bullion with excessive nominal value - the 
coroado - and by enforcing its use through a price regulation.19 Again, Fernando 
I, hard-pressed as he possibly was by open discontent and strife,20 summoned 
the Cortes. This time the summons explicitly claimed that the goal of the 
15 On these coinage experiments, HMMP, pp. 87·103. 
Ie Coff. Femando I, vol. I, p. 16 (article 1"). 
11 Cort. Femando I, vol. I, p.16 (article 111). 
Ie Maria Jose Pimenta Ferro claims that this resuhed from the agreement (Ferro, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de D. 
Femando I,' p. 23). However, W this debasement resuhed from an agreement, H probably would not have been 
censored by the Povos as H was in the Porto Cortes of 1372. Cort. Femando " vol. I, p. 83. On the timings of 
Femando minting operations, see HMMP, pp. 172-175 and Figure 5, infra p. 34. 
lSI Coff. Femando I, vol. I, p. 82. 
20 The possibility that the king was forced to do so by violent opposHion can not be entirely eliminated either. ferro, 
Maria Jose Pimenta, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de D. Femando,' p. 32. However, the chronology of the peasant 
revolts in 1371·4 is very imperfectly known. Oliveira Marques was Inconclusive, while RHa Costa Gomes 
distinguished two dmerent bursts in late 1371 and other in the mid 1373. Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, Portugal na 
Crise do S8culo XlV, Lisbon, 1987, pp. 516-8; Gomes, Rita Costa, D. Femando I, Lisbon, 2005, pp. 272 and 274. 
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assembly was to deal with 'coins and price-setting.'21 Apparently, by 
summoning the Povos Fernando I aimed at yet other post-factum consent for 
his fresh monetary alteration.22 Just like the coins issued for the First 
Fernandine War, this represented a purely prerogative decision, made without 
prior consultation from the Cortes.23 
The minting of the metal-depleted coroados flew in the face of the Povos 
views on the king's minting rights. In the Cortes of Porto/1372 the claims for 
illegitimacy of minting by the Povos was re-asserted in still louder terms.24 
These alterations, the municipal proctors roared, were opposed to what had 
been 'ordained between the kings of the ancient times and the POVOS.25 This 
time the Povos even dared to specify concrete rules: only dinheiros novos could 
be issued and only in the quantity produced by one pair of furnaces during one 
year. The plea to return to the standard of the traditional tender was renewed 
even more vigorously in the Cortes of Porto/1372.26 The monarch proved more 
amenable, although not entirely compliant. He consented in the abolition of the 
price-setting which was implemented together with the infamous coroados.27 
21 Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 81. The date for the summons is unknown. 
22 However, given that the surviving version for the summons is undated, the sequence of the decision process 
remains extremely blurred: was the new coinage minted before or after the summons? Hypothetically, the minting 
took place whilst the municipalities were preparing their parliamentary commissions. In any case, textual evidence 
hints at, but is no proof of, an issuing of the coroados before the Cortes. In the text of the Cortes, Fernando I answers 
to the complaint about the new coinage claiming that he had addressed the matter 'through a separate letter'(per 
carta apartada) to the towns. This can either mean a letter 'separate from the summons' or a document issued in the 
Cortes in the letter-emission sessions directed to the municipalities that preceded the written answers to the articles 
(for instance, Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 83). This agrees with the answer to the third grievance which refers to the 
'letters taken by the municipalities' (Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 85). 
23 Gomes Marques claims that the change was already under place by Mayor June 1372, thus a few weeks before 
the Cortes but presumably after the issuing summons. HMMP, p. 173. To make things more complicated, the Idea 
that Fernando I summoned the Cortes in order to use his recent coinage to bargain for support in other projects, 
namely for a general tax for the new attack on Castile which he was already envisaging in the Spring of 1372, cannot 
be discarded. However, both the summons and the date of the negotiations prior to the treaty of Tagilde between 
Fernando I and John of Gaunt are unknown. Russell, P. E., The English intervention in Spain and Portugal in the 
time of Edward III & Richard II, Oxford, 1955, pp. 186·203. Gomes, D. Fernando, p. 101. 
24 • Per razam da moeda que per nos foi (fecta e da almotayaria.' Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 81. 
25 See article 27 of 1371 (Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, pp. 27-28) and article 2 of 1372 (Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 83). 
Also, HMMP, pp. 101-5. 
26 The minting of the coroados was unanimously received with hostility. This time, however, the critiques took two, 
markedly contradictory, arguments. According to most of the municipalities, the solution found by Fernando I had not 
addressed the fundamental problem • the disproportionately high facial value - for which the only solution was a 
return to the old dinheiros novos. Yet, the grievance voices two hitherto unheard interest groups: those who had 
acquired a stronger purchasing power by selling their silver to the mint and receiving new coinage and the mercantile 
cities, namely Lisbon and four border towns. For these, weak coinage was beneficial for the acquisition of imports, 
most of all from Castile, which had an even thinner currency. N:. such, they put forward an alternative: the fiddling of 
the coroados' alloy with the face values of Fernando's older bullions as adjusted between the two Cortes. Cort. 
Femando I, vol. I, p. 82 (articles 1 and 2 of the Cortes of Porto/1372). 
27 Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 85 (31d article). 
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Moreover, King Fernando approximated the three new currencies' nominal 
values to the standard of the 'kings of old' and harmonised them (Fig. 5). The 
return to the old standard by means of nominal depreciation would be 
Fernando's fourth and last monetary intervention. 
Fig. 5 - Bullion Currency of Fernando I, 1370-2 
COINS: Dlnhelro Barbuda Grave Coroado 
novo 
Silver content 0.056 1.08 0.51 0.25 
(grams): 
Pre-war Nominal value 1.(3) d. 
- - -
gAg per s. 0.504 
- - -




Between Jul. 1369 and the Comes of (In s.) 
Lisbon (Aug. 1371) 
gAg per s. 
· 
0.054 0.034 
Post-war Adjustment and Introduction Nominal value 
· 
14 7 5 
of the coroado (in s.) 
Between Apr. 1371 and the Corrtes of 
Porto (Jul., 1372)28 gAg per s. 
· 
0.077 0.072 0.05 
Final adjustment Nominal value 
· 
2.33 1.16 0.58 
13 Jul. 1372 (in s.) 
gAg per s. 0.462 0.437 0.428 
Source: HMMP, pp. 91-106, 169-182; Cort. Fernando, I, pp. 16,31-2, 81-4; Ferro, 'Para 0 
Estudo da Numaria de D. Fernando: pp. 18-26. 
What does the Cortes met during the monetary changes of 1370-2 reveal 
about the fiscal constitution? The strong debasements during the war and 
before the Cortes of Porto/1372 make clear that under King Fernando the crown 
was able to pursue a minting policy unhindered by constitutional limits. The 
criticism of the Po vas, however strong and coherent, was only a reaction to 
28 Gomes Marques thinks that the creation of the coroado took place before the reduction of the nominal value of the 
barbudas and graves, as the coroado would represent a retum to debased coinage In full contrast with Femando's 
policy after the peace treaty of Alcoutim. However in the spring of 1372, Fernando was already scheming a fresh 
offensive against Castile and the coroado could have been another war coinage. Russell, The English intervention, 
pp. 186-203. Gomes, D. Fernando, p. 101. 
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done deals which no constitutional mechanism halted.29 Although they invoked 
at least one rule of the hypothetical fiscal constitution - the prohibition of 
debasing coinage -, no legal or institutional mechanism preventing 
unconstitutional in-period decisions was present. Considering the concept 
above presented, it can be said that no fiscal constitution existed. Naturally, 
consent by the Cortes cannot be regarded as a constitutional mechanism, given 
that the Cortes had to be summoned by the monarch and, worse still, in 1371 
and 1372 met post-factum.30 Moreover, the Povos agreed to negotiate the 
principles they defended. Capable of alleging the principle but incapable of 
enforcing it, the municipal representatives ended up by negotiating with the king 
and eventually reaching a settlement.31 The situation of 1371-2 certainly seems 
at odds with the notion of a constitution: rulers could circumvent the principles 
without opposition and taxpayers regarded constitutional rules as negotiable. 
Parliamentary opposition was made stronger by widespread social unrest 
but it voiced a coherent argumentation rested on limitations on the monarch's 
effective minting powers. Apparently, rules for a fiscal, or at least monetary, 
constitution existed. Central in the Povos argumentation about coinage is the 
idea that King Fernando's actions disrupted the constitutional order that had 
existed under the 'ancient kings'. This was asserted clearly in the Cortes of 
Porto/1372 when the Povos claimed that alteration in the alloy of the coinage by 
the monarchy was a matter of consent by the Cortes; it was a plain legal 
prohibition for the king resorting to the mint. According to the Povos this 
prohibition had been prescribed by the kings of old and, as claimed by the 
proctors of 1372, even included technical specifications: no more than two 
furnaces during one year and the standard was that of the dinheiro novo. How 
far did this argument emerge from the effective practices of the 'kings of old'? 
Surprisingly, the allegation made by the municipal deputies to the Cortes 
that the 'old kings' bound themselves and their descendants to preserve the 
standard of the coinage was not a simple idealization of the past. The position 
29 Marcelo Caetano argued that the discourse of the Cortes of Leirial1372 showed 'the consciousness that the king's 
power is limited by the obligation to listen to the Cortes in some cases and when debasing the coinage he has to 
require the consent of the Cortes cit. in. Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, 'Leiria, Cortes de (1372), DHP, vol. 3, p. 452. 
Yet, as we have seen, Femando acted with little consideration for this alleged 'limit'. 
30 According to the leading legal historians, Cortes could not sommon themselves nor be summoned by other than 
the king, desp"e two well-known exceptions. Sousa, Armindo de, As Cortes Medievais Portuguesas (1385-1490) vol. 
I, Porto, 1990, pp. 87-88. 
31 In terms of silver weight, the diminution was very close to the subtle devaluation of Dinis. HMMP, pp. 167-8. 
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of the Povos in 1371 and 1372 was directly inspired by the constitutional 
settlements reached under Afonso III (1248-79). The allegation in the 1372 
Porto Cortes that the minting output had been limited to the work of two 
furnaces in one year by the ancient kings is taken from a statute issued by 
Afonso III in the Cortes of Guimaraes (April 1261). Similarly, the 'oath' to 
conserve the standards of the coinage mentioned in 1371 as having been taken 
by one of the ancient kings in his name and in name of his successors can 
easily be identified with the oath made by Afonso '" before the prelates of the 
realm in March 1255.32 However twice circumvented by Fernando I, the 
prohibition against debasement was backed by constitutional doctrine and 
practice which dated back to the reign of Afonso III (1248-79). 
Like nearly all his predecessors had done before him, with Afonso II 
being the exception, Afonso III replaced the current coinage in his first days in 
power.33 Indeed, since the twelfth century Portuguese monarchs had regarded 
as their prerogative replacing, or 'breaking' to use the contemporary term, the 
currency by new, debased coins.34 This practice obviously harmed many 
interests, including those of the landlords, and for this reason, in Portugal, like in 
Aragon, Castile and Leon,35 the prerogative to re-coinage came to be limited to 
a period of seven years by the end of the twelfth century.3S Eventually, in Leon 
(at least from 1202) and Castile (at least from 1215), the towns obtained from 
the monarchy the suspension of this right in exchange for a tax, the moneda 
32 Not enough is known about the political culture of the parliamentary proctors to discuss whether they knew the 
existence and the very letter of those documents or whether the oath and its content had crystallized within 
customary law. Femao Lopes who probably knew well the 1371-2 Cortes and who repeats many of the arguments 
then produced, ascribes the creation of the dinheiro novo to Afonso IV (1325-57) instead of Afonso III (1248-79). 
Also, one of his most likely sources, the 1435 memorandum on the currency changes in Portugal presented to his 
patron, king Duarte, makes the same mistake. So it is probable that the document was not very well known and thus 
not a central feature of the argument of the Povos in 1371 and 1372. See Lopes, eron. Fernando I, chapter LV, p. 
188. The memorandum is published in Oeser., vo!.I, doc. 32, pp. 274-81. 
33 Afonso III minted coin, presumably in the name of his brother, in January 1248 according to Caetano, Marcello, As 
Cortes de Leiria de 1254, Lisbon, 1954, pp. 12·14. Gama Barros gives the date 1247. Hist6ria da AdministrBfSo 
Publica em Portugal, vol. III, Lisbon, 1947, p. 136. See on the coinage itself, HMMP, pp. 62·72. 
:w Moreover, unlike their Castilian or French counterparts, they enjoyed an effective, full monopoly on minting rights 
within the country. On the incomplete construction of the mint monopoly by the French crown, see Miskimin, Harry, 
Money Prices and Foreign Exchange, New Haven, 1963, pp. 51-2. On the Portuguese monopoly, see HMMP, p. 10. 
35 On the moneds and the Cortes of Castile-Leon up to 1252, O'Callaghan, 'The Beginnings of the Cortes,' pp. 517-
23. Russell, J. C., 'The Medieval Monedatge of Aragon and Valencia,' Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. 106, n. 6, Dec., 1962, pp. 483·504. 
36 In Portugal, this situation is less clear, but in a charter dated 1255 Afonso III refers to the intention of changing the 
coinage, as 'his successors used to.' 'Prout predecessores mei usque ad tempus mei regiminis eam conusueuerum 
franger~ (underlined mine). Karta luramenti published in Oeser., vol. I, doc. 4, p. 340. Frangere relates to the 
physical destruction of the coins and not their ~ebasement. 
74 
(orera which compensated the monarch for not exercising his prerogative.37 As 
no such agreement emerged in Portugal, Afonso III could freely 'break' the 
currency and impose the circulation of his coins as he did in 1247. Seven years 
later, however, Portugal acquired the foundations of a monetary constitution 
that would become very different from that of its neighbours. 
In the winter of 1253 Afonso III was envisaging a second re-coinage for 
the next year, the seventh of his effective rule. Anticipating the inflation the new, 
debased coinage would cause, the king issued an extensive list of maximum 
prices. While setting the prices, Afonso enlarged the royal council in order to 
include representatives from the municipalities. Their role was to assent to the 
setting of prices, as they did. However, the representatives seemed to have 
seized the occasion to dispute the new coinage and the two parts looked for a 
settlement. Eventually, months later in the Cortes of 1254/Leiria, Afonso withold 
his plans for a (ractio monete in exchange for a kingdom-wide subsidy paid by 
all households in the realm, as was customary among peninsular kingdoms.38 
This was to prove more than a temporary settlement as one year later, in 
response to the municipalities' 'humble and insistent supplications', Afonso III 
swore in the hands of the bishop of Evora that he and the kings after him would 
never demand a general tax as a compensation for a kingdom-wide re-coinage. 
The king could still obtain the customary rights asked for by his predecessors in 
fractione and pro fractione monete, meaning presumably the seigniorage taken 
for each re-coinage. Formal letters testifying the oath (kartae iuramentl) were 
issued and sent to the head of the major clerical institutions and to the pope.39 
With this oath, the municipalities and lords of Portugal avoided the payment of a 
tax in lieu of royal coinage, as was customary in Castile and Leon. 
The luramentum of 1255 was but one of the political compromises that 
the Povos' deputies referred to in 1371. When a new septennial period was 
about to expire, the king announced the minting of a new, silver-richer species 
of d .. As the luramentum forbade the crown to order a re-coinage, a better-
quality bullion could only be imposed together with a facial devaluation of the 
~ O'Callaghan, 'The Beginnings of the Cortes,' p. 1523. 
38 For this occasion the municipal delegates, acted and deliberated as legal proctors for the first time, thus effectively 
binding the communHies they represented to their actions. Caetano, As Cortes de Leiria, p. 44. 
39 Letters published in Oeser., vol. I, docs. 4 and 5, pp. 340-1. 
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depleted old d .. 40 While well within the terms dictated by the oath of 1255, this 
cunning move totally opposed its spirit and, understandably, Afonso III met with 
the objection of prelates, barones, religiosi et populus regni who demanded the 
summoning of the Cortes once more. In the ensuing assembly held in 
Guimaraes in 1261, the king agreed on withholding the change of facial value of 
the existing coin. As a form of compensation for the loss he incurred, Afonso III 
tried to extract a new monetagium. This was eventually conceded by the 
barons, prelates and municipal representatives but only in exchange for the 
king's firm compromise of never again changing the currency nor demanding 
another tax.41 
The settlement reached in 1261 obtained the form of royal charter, later 
known as the Instrumentum Super Facto Monete. This letter stated the material 
limits that all further coinages had to observe and obliged the king and all his 
successors to abide by them.42 The monetary compromise came along the 
creation of a new coin, the dinheiro novo, valued at 1.(3) d. and with 0,066 g of 
pure silver, whose alloy and titre had to be observed by future monarchs. New 
coinages could only be made once in a year and were strongly limited to the 
yearly output of two furnaces. In sum, the amplitude of the monetary policy of 
any king was severely restricted. 
The rigid terms of the Instrumentum were observed by later monarchs. 
Numismatic evidence confirms that the monetary constitution was not broken by 
any monarch up to King Fernando.43 Chemical analyses on the bullion of Dinis I 
(1279-1325), Afonso IV (1325-57) and Pedro I (1357-67) have confirmed that 
these 'kings of old' stood to the compromise by keeping the amount of silver in 
the dinheiro novo as defined in the Instrumentum.44 The dinheiro novo coins 
from Dinis I onwards display a slight reduction of the prescribed weight of the 
40 HMMP, pp. 164-9. 
41 The Castillian crown also made a similar compromise in 1268. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, p. 59. 
42 Although in terms of diplomatic it has the features of a royal charter, it contains declarations and compromises in 
the name of the both parts of the agreement. Thus, the later designation of instrumento (written version of a contract) 
is legally and politically more adequate. Published in Oeser., vol. I, doc. 5·A, pp. 341-343. 
43 The limited coinages of innovative highly-valuable types under King Dinis and King Pedro I (the torOOs de prata 
and the rea~ did not constitute a real challenge to the substance of the 1261 settlement, as neither of these new 
coins was designed to replace the current dinheiro novo and their high face value was consistent with the standard 
set in 1261. HMMP, pp. 83 and 89. 
44 The average weights (in grams) for the surviving dinheiros novos of these monarchs are: Afonso III (0.745) Dinis 
(0.725) Afonso IV (0.725) Pedro I (0.735). This last figure is probably due to the smaller time of circulation of Pedro 
I's coins, replaced in 1369 by Femando I's diverse currencies, and not to any intentional change. ~ a matter of fact, 
the proportion of silver remains the same. HMMP, pp. 75-7, 167-9. 
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coinage, but the quality of the alloy remained the same and, thus, the weight 
loss can be better explained by the wearing out of silver. This minor difference 
does not detract from the fact that Portugal underwent one century of currency 
stability, in contrast with the abrupt devaluations of the last decades of the 
Reconquest. Statistical analysis of hoards and findings has been used by 
Gomes Marques to estimate that the output of the royal mint under Afonso IV 
and Pedro I was considerably smaller than that under Afonso III, a piece of 
information which suggests the observance of the restrictions in terms of money 
supply defined by the latter king.45 
However, there is more than negative evidence for the strength of the 
monetary agreements between Afonso III and the estates of the realm. As 
Maria Jose Pimenta Ferro noticed there is a short entry in the chancery record 
of Dinis mentioning a 'carta de concillis super immutationem de moneta.'46 
Although this document, datable from October 1291, did not survive, it seems 
clear that by that date the municipalities wrote to the king about coinage, 
presumably to re-state the prohibition. Similarly, the only surviving document 
relating to the Lisbon Cortes of 1325 is the royal answer to the grievances 
presented by the municipality of Santarem. In the preamble, Afonso IV mentions 
the municipal proctors who had been elected in response to the summons 'to 
pay me homage and for the matter of the cOins.'47 What was this 'matter of the 
coins'? What precisely it refers to cannot be ascertained as no general articles 
remain for this assembly. In the face of the present institutional and numismatic 
research and the silence of chronicler Rui de Pina, speculation becomes 
inevitable. A likely hypothesis is that Afonso IV wanted to notify his subjects of 
the start of the minting, in the terms of the Instrumentum of 1261. Another 
possibility is that Afonso IV was seeking to debase the currency, maybe in view 
of his imminent war with his half-brother.48 However, the possibility that Afonso 
IV managed to manipulate the currency should be dismissed in light of 
numismatic evidence. Gomes Marques has already confirmed that the coinage 
45 Marques justifies these low outputs with the purpose of keeping the amount in circulation. See HMMP, pp. 151-2, 
169. 
46 TT, Chane. Dinis I, livro 2, fol. 66v, quoted by Ferro, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de D. Oinis,' pp. 221-2. 
47 'Pera mj fazerem as menages e outross; per feito dss moedss segundo uos mandel, Cort. Afonso IV, p. 13. 
46 Pina, Rui de, Chronics de elrey Dom Afonso 0 Quarto, ed. Paulo Craesbeeck, 2nd, Lisbon, 1936, chapter III, p.l 
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of Afonso IV was not substantially different from that of his father.49 In 
consequence, the 'deed of the coins' mentioned in 1325 did not have serious 
consequences for the coinage standards and supply set by the Instrumentum 
Super Facto Monete. The likeliest case is that Afonso IV had to endure a refusal 
to mint beyond the conditions defined in 1261. Such refusal is clearly consistent 
with the numismatic evidence. This hypothesis is also backed by a sentence 
that Fernao Lopes attributes to Afonso IV: 'if my people had consented 
[debasement] again, I would rank amongst the world's richest kings,.5o 
Section 2.3 - Representation without Taxation; Taxation without 
Representation 
The concession of subsidies by the Cortes was another focus for 
constitutional contention during the reign of Fernando I. As he had done with 
coinage, King Fernando actively sought the authorisation of the proctors of the 
Povos reunited in Cortes for collecting subsidies. Little more than a year had 
elapsed since the peace settlement of Alcoutim (March 1371) when Fernando 
signed an offensive alliance with England (the treaty of Tagilde in August 1372). 
Envisaging a new strike against Castile, the king of Portugal summoned again 
the Cortes to meet in Leiria, in the centre of the kingdom. The intentions were 
clear: to ask for a subsidy, given that monetary manipulations proved politica"y 
untenable.51 By then, the king and his counce"ors were aware of the hostility 
that monetary operations could arise. 
In the Cortes of Leiria, which took place in October 1372, Fernando I met 
again with clear opposition.52 The argument of the Povos was that through 
prises, purveyances, unpaid repair works, military service and currency 
alterations, they had borne the brunt of the war and as such paying a tax would 
be, they claimed, a 'burden devoid of reason,.53 Again, negotiation ensued, with 
4g HMMP, pp. 75·7. Moreover, its coinage seems to have been relatively scarce. 
50 'Se Ihe a seu poboo conssetira outra vez mudsr a maeda, que elle fora huum dos ricos Reis do mundo'. Lopes, 
eron. Fernando I, chapter LV, p. 147. In the text of Lopes, this statement applies the introduction of the dinheiro novo 
by Afonso III which Lopes ascribed to Afonso IV given that other common designation of the coin was the dinheiro 
afonsl. The chronicler's error has been demonstrated by Gomes Marques (HMMP, p. 68). Given the mention to the 
'deed of coinages' in 1325, Lopes might well have ascribed to the same Afonso two different processes: the minting 
of the dinheiro novo (by Afonso III) and the demand flor a change in the coinage (by Afonso IV). 
51 Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, pp. 126-8 (4111 and 7Ih articles of Leiria Cortes). 
62 This is explicn in the 5" article of Leiria Cort. Fernando', vol. I, p. 126. 
63 Cort. Fernando', voL I, p. 126. 
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the municipalities making the payment of sales taxes conditional to a reform of 
the domain and a revision of the grants Fernando I had bestowed upon the 
nobility.54 
Once more, we find that the Povos and the king had to negotiate and to 
reach an agreement outside the Cortes. The well-known principle of no direct 
taxation without consent of the taxed common to states, like France, Castile and 
England,55 was not yet established in Portugal. As such, unlike what happened 
with coinage, the Povos could not invoke any constitutional text. This time, it is 
well worth to notice, their case did not rest on constitutional arguments, neither 
in ancient customs or laws: the Povos resistance against the sisas was merely 
grounded on abstract 'reason' (razaom). Nevertheless, the principle that 
taxation required the joint consent of the kingdom's municipalities in the Cortes 
also had a respectable constitutional history behind it dating back to the reign of 
Afonso III. In order to understand it, there is need to understand the relation 
between taxation and representation, back to the first Cortes, as summarised 
on Fig. 6. 
54 The broad plans for this project are presented in the POVOS'3,d article. Cort. Femando', vo!.I, pp. 124·5. 
56 Ormrod, 'The West European,' pp. 128·32. 
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Fig. 6 - Cortes and Taxation, 1254-1369 











































Church tenth (3 yrs) 
Church tenth (2 yrs) 
Church tenth (2 yrs) 
Church tenth (2 yrs) 
Sources: PEP; DHP, 5 vols.; Mattoso, Historia de Portugal, vol. 2: Cort. Fernando I. 
Notes: * doubt over its existence/date; the Cortes of 1291 and 1303 are only referred to in 
Mattoso, Hist6ria de Portugal, vol. 2, p. 133; the Cortes of 1369 are dated in Gomes, Rita 
Costa, D. Fernando I, Lis boa, 2005, p. 271; Gon~lves mentioned a subsidy demanded by 
Pedro I in 1361, being this the year of the only undisputable Cortes reunited in his reign; 
however, the remaining records of these Cortes do not refer to it. PEP, p. 206. 
It was during the negotiations around the minting of the dinheiro novo 
coinage that the Cortes had emerged as a body whose consent bound the 
whole kingdom.56 The first known general taxes, the monetagia, were justified 
by the conflict of interests surrounding the royal minting prerogatives. First, the 
Cortes of 1254 had established that taxation was not a royal prerogative, but a 
concession of the estates of the country reunited in the Cortes. In 1261, 
according to the legal historian Marcello Caetano, the Cortes were an 
56 Beforehand, of the three meetings that can be labelled Cortes, those of Coimbra 1211 and 1226 and that of 
Guimaraes in 1250 were held basically to pay homage to the ruler either in his first years (1211 and 1250) or in his 
legal majority (1226). None had any fiscal implications, nor did "s participants include people outside the clergy and 
the nobility. Azevedo, Maria Antonieta Soares de, 'Coimbra, Cortes de (1211)' DHP, vol. 2, pp. 94-5. 
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independent, if temporary, institution with given features and where municipal 
representatives acted with full autonomy, and not merely an enlarged royal 
aUdience.57 However, these cases do not stand for direct relationship between 
the Cortes and taxation, as the assemblies met to decide on matters of coinage, 
not on taxation, which appears merely as a by-product of that negotiation. 
Indeed, the link between taxation and representation proved ephemeral. After 
the coinage-related Cortes, the subsequent meetings, as far as they can be 
known, are dominated by the conflicts with the clergy (1273, 1282, 1285), with 
noble immunities (also 1285, 1288, 1289, 1291) or with the rebellious crown-
prince Afonso (probably 1320 and certainly 1323). Only the Cortes of 1308 
could prove to be an exception,58 as their date coincides with the grant of a 
subsidy for the wedding of Infante Afonso. 
After the debates surrounding taxation in the 1250s, no outstanding fiscal 
needs troubled the relationship between the crown and the local representatives 
in the Cortes. Yet, in spite of their absence of fiscal intervention, during this 
period the Cortes grew in importance. After a decade of adjustment between 
the monetary interests of the crown and of the communities, the assemblies 
were called to other functions. Late thirteenth-century and early fourteenth-
century Cortes played an essentially political role as they provided Afonso III 
and Dinis I with political support and legitimacy against their internal rivals, the 
clergy and the nobility.59 
The Cortes' function as a political mediator was followed by partiCipation 
in law-making.60 Under Afonso IV (1325-57), however, the statutes by the king 
issued in Cortes, whether laws or concrete remedies to grievances presented 
therein by the municipal proctors, constituted material limits for future legislation 
57 Caetano, Marcello, Subsfdios Para a Historia das Cortes Medievais Portuguesas, Lisboa, 1963, p. 5. 
58 The matter is still involved by doubts. These Cortes and the subsidy hitherto granted are known through a late 
fifteenth-century chronicle. Pina, Rui de, Chronica do Muito Alto e Muito Esclarecido Principe Dam Diniz, Sexto Rey 
de Portugal, 2nd, Lisbon, 1912, chapter XVIII; PEP, p. 151. The existence of the subsidy is confirmed by a letters 
patent sent to Lisbon by Dinis acknowledging the 'service' that the city had made him, making no mention of Cortes; 
AML, Livro dos Serv~s a el-Rei, doc. 1. 
69 As in Castile, the Cortes were normally favourable to the monarch. Maltoso, Historia de Portugal, vol. 2, p.133. 
Ladero Quesada, Fisca/idad y Poder Real, pp. 304·5. 
60 Dinis issued legislation during sessions of Cortes but there is no certain indication that the assembly played any 
part in its design. Mattoso, Historia de Portugal, p. 133. 
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and for action of the royal officers.51 In these days, the Cortes were dominated 
by the redress of the grievances presented both individually by each 
municipality and collectively, after a preparatory meeting.62 Although the 
initiative of summoning remained an undisputed right of the king, the redress of 
the municipal and 'popular' grievances came to dominate the agenda of the rare 
Cortes that met in the time of the old kings. Coinage and taxes are absent from 
the remaining grievances presented to Afonso IV and Pedro I in Cortes.63 In 
flagrant opposition to better-known cases, like Plantagenet England, the redress 
of grievances was unrelated to the crown's fiscal pressure. Under Edward III 
(1327-77) parliament constituted the link between taxation, regarded as an 
obligation of the subjects, and redress of grievances, taken seen as the main 
obligation of the ruler.54 In the 1340s this became a relatively explicit trade-off. 55 
Despite, or indeed because of, the claims against the king's judges, 
military and fiscal officers, the grievances of the mid-fourteenth-century Cortes 
hint at a strong convergence of interests between the crown and the 
municipalities.66 The monarchy proved responsive to municipal aims for reforms 
in justice57 and, more than that, promoted the defence of non-noble property. An 
article presented by the Povos in the 1331 Cortes of Santarem about a matter 
as sensitive as the export of precious metals shows the convergence between 
the king and the towns: the representatives of the Povos asked for its 
prohibition as 'the richer your land, the nobler and more prised it will be and you 
better served and the Povos with larger profit: 68 As a response to this request 
the monarch issued a law, considering that 'the richer and more honoured his 
61 As was said in 1371, '[the kings of old] ordered that no official could decide against it [what the king had granted in 
Cortes] and that any charter issued by him be invalidated.' Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 63. Caetano, 'Subsidios para a 
Hist6ria,' pp. 20-23. 
62 Thus happened in 1325, 1331, 1340, 1352, 1361. On the new procedures and the changing nature of 
representation in the Cortes aiter 1331, see Caetano, 'Subsidios para a Hist6ria,' pp. 13-16. 
63 See Cort. Afonso IV and Cort. Fernando I, vol. I. 
64 Harriss, G. L, King, Parliament and public finance in Medieval England to 1369, Oxford, 1975, p. 97. Ormrod, W. 
M., The Reign of Edward III, 2nd, Stroud, 2000, pp. 62·5. 
65 Harriss, King, Parliamen, pp. 310-2. Ormrod, The Reign, pp. 64-5. 
66 On the reforms on justice in the fourteenth ~entury, see Homem, Armando Luis de Carvalho, 0 Desembargo 
Regio (1320-1433) Porto, 1990, pp. 213-29. 
67 Marques, Portugal na Crise, p. 293. Pedro I fought the 'departmentalisation' of the justice and tried to abolish the 
intermediary judiciary instances, thus bringing more litigation in the central bodies of justice. On the judiciary reforms 
of Pedro I, see Homem, Armando Luis de Carvalho, 'Subsidios para 0 Estudo da Administra~ao Central no Reinado 
de Pedro I', Portugal nos Finais da Idade Media. Estado, Institu~Oes e Politica, Lisbon, 1990, pp. 63-96 . 
. 68 'Quanto a vossa terra formais rica tanto sera mais nobra a mais pr~da a vas melhor sarvido a os povos com 
maior proveito.' Cort. Afonso IV, p. 45. 
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land, the better he will be served and his men will gain more.,69 Years later, a 
broad paraphrase of this answer would later head a royal statue abdicating the 
royal rights over findings in non-royal lands.7o For someone like Fernao Lopes, 
who not only knew the legal traditions and the Cortes records but also knew the 
financial straits of his days, such a political relationship appeared striking, even 
blissful. For this reason, his panegyric of the kings of old not be easily 
dismissed: 'the kings gauged that it was their service and profit that everybody 
was rich, thus they could have many and abundant revenues,.71 
Contrary to what Fernao Lopes might have longed for, the cooperation 
between the Cortes and the monarchs did not derive from the latter's immense 
wealth. Indeed, even reliable notices of taxation granted by the Cortes between 
1308 and 1369 (Fig. 6), a variety of sources show that Portuguese kings did not 
abdicate extraordinary revenues. Simply, they bypassed the Cortes. First of all, 
Dinis, Afonso IV and Pedro I sought to obtain alternative sources of 
extraordinary taxation: the Jewry and the clergy. Like other European 
sovereigns, Portuguese kings could divert to their coffers the ecclesiastical 
revenues under certain circumstances defined by Rome.72 The Portuguese 
Jewry also contributed with occasional servi90s, besides their usual genesim.73 
Both these resources are exploited from the early fourteenth century onwards. 
The Jewry of the kingdom had been liable to pay an annual servi90 by means of 
sales taxes since 1306.74 The servi90 was augmented in 1317 (from 20,000 I. to 
40,000 I.), 1339 (from 25,000 I. to 35,000 I. and 1372 (from 35,000 I. to 40,000 
I.). Church proved also compliant with royal demands throughout the fourteenth 
century.75 In all likelihood, transfers from ecclesiastic taxation were even more 
69 'Quanto a sa terra for maijs Rica e maijs honrrada que tanto el seera milhor seruido e as sas gentes ualeram maijs 
e seeram milhor manteudas.' Cort. Afonso IV, p. 45. 
70 Cort. Afonso IV, pp. 116-7. 
71 Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5. 
72 Unlike fourteenth-<:entury England and France, Portuguese kings had to appeal directly to Rome and only resorted 
to the clerical revenues in wars against the unfaithful. Ormrod, 'The West European,' pp. 132-3. A tenth of the 
clerical revenues was collected under the justification of coastal defence against the North African piracy in 1320-2, 
1341-2 and 1345-6. The collection of the deeimas depended on papal approval and was irrespective of any 
consultation of the national clergy, let anole the summoning of the Povos. See infra notes 16 and 17, p. 84. 
73 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. III, docs. 370 and 416, pp. 261 and 327. 
74 TI, Chanco Dinis I, Livro 3, fol. 104v. 
75 Before the Fernandine Wars, Portuguese kings only resorted to this tax on four occasions: a triennal tithe in 1320; 
a biennal tithe in 1341 for defensive and offensive war against the Muslims of Grenade; another biennal tithe in 1345; 
a quadrennial tithe in 1355 to rebuild castles in the Algarve. DP, vol. I, doc. 46, p. 40, doc. 71, p. 83, doc. 81, pp. 98-
103; MH, vol. I, doc. 92, pp. 217-221. Again, Castile proved more demanding and in the same period obtained a total 
of twenty years of the ecclesiastical decimas. Ladera Ouesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, pp. 203-7. In the rEign of 
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substantial, with the tenth of the tithe being assessed as 62,822 I. in 1320.76 At 
any rate, while often resorted to, the tenth of the tithe remained an extraordinary 
revenue. 
Similarly, municipalities were also called to make some extraordinary 
contributions. However, they were not summoned as a whole. The repeated, 
formal, kingdom-wide demands made to the Church and to the Commune of the 
Jews show a contrario why the municipalities managed to escape regular direct 
taxation. The Church and the Jewry were entities with autonomous institutions 
and, thus, they could self-assess, organise the collection of taxes and secure 
payment. Municipalities, by contrast, were a diverse lot which had no common 
kingdom-wide or regional institutions. 
As several examples make clear, Portuguese kings obtained subsidies 
by dealing directly with each municipality. Each municipality regarded itself as a 
collective vassal and, for this reason, it accepted that it was bound to serve the 
king in some precise occasions, defined by custom (not by abstract 'necessity'). 
As such, the legal liability to pay taxes fell upon the municipality, not unto the 
individuals living in it. When Afonso III intended to send fifty knights in succour 
of his ally in 1266, he asked for a loan from each of the municipalities in order 
that he could gather the required funds. After securing the sums borrowed 
under that guise, the monarchy avoided the repayment and persuaded each 
municipality to forgive the debt.77 In the following decades, the crown continued 
to demand specific, extraordinary services (servi~os) from its municipalities. It 
was also through direct negotiation with different municipalities that Dinis 
obtained the aid granted to fund his diplomatic travels in 1304, as no parliament 
met then?8 In 1339, the municipality of Salvaterra claimed that it was exempt 
from paying in a servi~o.79 Another example is the 60,000 I. subsidy demanded 
from the municipality of Lisbon destined to the kingdom's fortresses in 1357.80 
Fernando I there were also a biennal half-tithe agreed in 1376 and another biennal half-tithe the next year (OP, vol. I, 
135, pp. 1S()"154, doc. 141, pp. 162-165). I thank Mario Farelo for some of these references. 
76 This figure is known via a eighteenth-century copy of the original that was published in Almeida, Fortunato de, 
Hist6ria da Igreja em Portugal, 2nd ed., vol. IV, Porto, 1971, pp. 91-143. 
77 That the municipalities regarded it as a loan is clear in the long-lasting hope of retribution of Santarem that only 
wrote it off twenty-three years later. PEP, p. 32. 
78 According to fifteenth-century chronicler Rui de Pina, King Dinis 'received great subsidies in monies from his 
Povos'. Pina, Chr6nica do ( ... ) Principe Oom Oiniz, chapter XI, p. 71. 
79 Because it was exempt from serving in the royal host Chane. Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 171, pp. 275-6. 
80 This subsidy was labelled pedido. AML, Livro I de Servicos a .aI-Rei, doc. 2. 
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Municipalities resisted any attempt to transform these services into permanent 
payments by demanding formal oaths declaring that the loan could not be 
regarded by him or by his successors as a precedent.81 
Individual negotiation was in the interest of the rivalling municipalities 
who could acquire individual privileges, sometimes at the expense of others, not 
unlike contemporary English examples.82 Moreover, subsidies let municipal 
oligarchies with a freehand in apportioning the burden vis-a-vis the political 
centre. On the other hand, as Fernando I found out, when approached 
individually, municipalities proved more amenable to the fiscal interests of the 
king than when reunited in parliament.83 At any rate, the monarchy had to 
compromise with the municipalities. Indeed, the most efficient form of municipal 
taxation, the sales taxes or sisas, depended on the control of the local 
markets.84 Although shared and disputed by the crown, the mechanisms of 
market-regulation were still held by the municipalities in the times of Fernando 
1.85 Constitutionally, this was reflected in the need for municipal consent to fixing 
prices, as happened with the 1253 setting of prices and with the 'Pragmatic' 
statutes of 1340, issued in Cortes.B6 The sisa posed for the monarchy the 
problem of how to collect, store and distribute the proceeds of the sales tax 
without the collaboration of the municipal administration. In these conditions, the 
need for individual municipal consent to extraordinary taxation formed an 
effective constitutional check on the crown which had to negotiate individually. 
The arguments of the municipal opposition against the military ventures 
of Fernando I reveal a fiscal constitution which had taken form in the times of 
Afonso III and that had stood since then. Until 1371, an unchallenged 
constitution helped the stability of the currency. The complicated negotiations 
81 Barros, Hist6ria da Administra~ao, vol. III, p. 158. See exact words in PMH, Leges, I, p. 127 and Chanco Dinis I, 
livro 6, fol. 227. See the similar principle in action in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Aragon. Sanchez Martinez, 
Manuel, Furi6, Antoni and Sesma Munoz, Angel, 'Old and New Forms of Taxation in the Crown of Aragon (13th -
14th Centuries), La Fisealita nell'Eeonomia Europea. Secc. XIII-IV. Atti, vol. I, Florence, 2008, pp. 105-6. 
82 Such a device resounds of Edward Ill's attempts at exacting subsidies directly from the shire ~ommunities either by 
negotiated grants or by payments in lieu of eyre. Bryant, W. N., 'The financial dealings of Edward III with he ~ountry 
communities, 1330-60', The English Historical Review, vol. 8S, 1965, p. 767. 
83 See supra pp. 204-S. 
84 Royal letters ordering that the clergy participated in the sisa collected in the Algarve abridged by Jorge Faro. Faro, 
Jorge, 'Introduction', RED, p. LXXIX. 
85 Marques, Portugal na Crise, p. 148. In the 6th article of the Cortes of 1361 the municipalities had already warned 
the king that 'deeds of prices and weights (almota~arial had always belonged to the municipalities'. Cort. Pedro I, p. 
34. 
88 Oeser., vol. I, doc. 3, pp. 334-40; Cort. Afonso IV, pp. 103-19. Even Fernando I agreed with this when the issue of 
the price setting of 1371 was discussed in the Porto Cortes of 1372. Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 81. 
85 
that followed Fernando's disastrous manipulations show to what extent 
Portuguese kings were conditioned by the political action of the municipalities 
which reacted to what they perceived as an abuse of power. When Fernando 
disregarded the monetary standard set in 1261, the municipalities brought the 
monarch to the negotiations table in the Cortes. Ultimately, Fiscal Constitution 
had its watchdog not in the Cortes but in the municipalities which had 
autonomous executive powers. The fiscal constitution translated the strength of 
municipal organisation vis-a-vis the king. 
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Chapter 3 - Grand Strategy and Internal Pressures 
The 'kings of old' accepted constitutional limitations in their attempts to 
tap their subjects' wealth. At any rate, the crown's military enterprises in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries did not push for kingdom-wide direct 
taxation or for the break of the Instrumentum Super Facto Monete. However, 
despite the claims of the Povos, there was not any sort of constitutional 
limitation on warfare, offensive or otherwise, and the monarchy could claim 
taxes in lieu of military service existed. Considering the behaviour of 
contemporary dynastic states and the absence of formal, constitutional 
Iimitations,1 did the relatively peaceful Portuguese kings act on considerations 
of dynastic interest? Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will overview military involvement of 
the Portuguese crown and the solutions found. Section 3.3 will look at internal 
equilibra that might have contributed to check dynastic ambitions. 
Section 3.1 An Iberian Scotland? 
A glance at the year-by-year comparison with the wars fought by the 
English crown (see Appendix 1) shows how scarce military activity of the 
Portuguese monarchy prior to the Fernandine Wars was.2 Considering other 
European examples, where war worked as one key factor for fiscal pressure,3 
the relatively peaceful pattern drawn in the time line is certainly coherent with the 
scarcity of direct taxation documented in the last chapter. A brief reference to 
the situation in Castile, whose documentation has similar limitations to the 
Portuguese and with whom Portugal shared its geopolitical position, can be 
enlightening. Whilst in Portugal two aids and two monetagia were collected in 
the period studied, in the same time-span (1258-1369) Castilian and Leonese 
1 On this limitation, see Blockmans, Wim, 'Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in 
Preindustrial Europe,' Theory and Society, Vol. 18, n. 5 {Special Issue on Cities and States in Europe, 1000- 1800] 
Sep., 1989, pp. 745-9. 
2 As n will be argued warfare was limited in space since most of the action took place in the borderlands and in the 
sea; limited also in purpose, as do-or-die dynastic quarrels that provided the casus belli for England and Scotland, for 
England and France or within the Empire were hardly of substance up to 1383; and, as a consequence of the latter, 
also limited in time. 
3 Ormrod, 'The West European,' pp.124-27. 
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assemblies had granted at least thirty-four general aids of different kinds.4 
Considering the information published by Ladero Quesada, wars (both civil and 
against the Moors) were used as a direct justification for ten of these taxes and 
the other seven were destined to redeem the nobility's military annuities and 
wages in arrears.s The intention of this chapter is to make intelligible the 
relationship between warfare and state finances prior to the Fernandine Wars 
by looking at it under two complementary angles: first geopolitics and then 
internal politics. 
The relative peace ensuing the Reconquista can be related to various 
exogenous factors, such as geographical position, lack of expansive projects, 
relative military weakness or even to doctrines of 'just cause' adverse to war 
with Christians.s Most importantly, a series of settlements between Portugal and 
Castile during the second half of the thirteenth century, culminating in the treaty 
of Alcanices in 1297, removed the equivocal situation relating to the tenure of 
the Algarve and established a clear-cut border defined by common accord 'for 
all perpetuity,.7 Admittedly, the letter of a diplomatic agreement is hardly the 
most powerful of deterrents; yet, after 1297 none of the feudal ambiguities 
connected with overlordships, fiefs, homages - which constituted the constant 
casii belli between Scotland, France, England, the Flemish counties and the 
Empire - would affect the relations between Portugal and Castile. Another word 
should be said about a quintessentially random factor - dynastiC stability. After 
Afonso III (1248-79) had dethroned his heirless brother, a clear father-to-son 
line of succession worked for a century and half: Dinis (1279-1325), Afonso IV 
(1325-57), Pedro I (1357-67), Fernando I (1367-83). Long reigns and smooth 
successions worked evidently as a cause for peace. However, this pattern of 
4 This figure excludes those where the intervention of the Cortes or ayuntamientos is doubtful (1254, 1255, 1259, 
1262, 1265, 1275, 1279, 1284, 1327, 1332, 1337, 1349, 1355-6, 1361-5). Most of servicios affected the two 
kingdoms, le6n and Castille, but even those that seemed to affect only Castile (1320) or Le6n (1292, 1305) were 
counted in. See the detailed inventory in ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, pp. 57-72. 
5ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, pp. 57-72. 
6 See a brief overview of the just war theory in Portugal in Monteiro, Joao Gouveia, A Guerra em Portugal nos Finais 
da Idade Media, lisboa, 1998, pp. 501-3. In English, see Russell, Peter, Prince Henry 'the Navigator.' A Life, Yale, 
2001, pp. 135-60. 
7 Confirm the text of the treaty in Gonzalez Jimenez, Manuel, 'las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla durante el siglo 
XII', As Rela¢es de Fronteira no 5eculo de Alcanices. Aetas, vol. I, Porto, 1985, pp. 21-4. See also Garcia 
Fernandez, Manuel, 'La Politica Internacional de Portugal en el Contexto Peninsular del Tratado de Atcanices: 1267-
1297. Aelaciones Diplomaticas y Dinasticas, Revista da Faculdade de Letras. Hist6ria, sarie II, Vol. 15, n. 2, Porto, 
1998, pp. 900-943. 
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limited warfare can be understood through less circumstantial or even 
accidental factors. 
At first sight, the unequal opposition between Portugal and Castile may 
bear some superficial resemblance to the nearly-permanent Anglo-Scottish 
antagonism which followed the vacancy of the throne of the kingdom of the 
Scots in 1290. In both cases, there is a sensible disparity in the contenders' 
military and financial potential. Although many objections can be raised against 
the comparability of these two scenarios, ranging from the legal status to the 
degree of 'national' hatred, not to mention the dynastic haphazard factors such 
as minorities, throne vacancies and lack of offspring, a contrast with Scotland 
highlights Portugal's strategic position and, consequently, the nature of its 
military commitments and conditions. Indeed, the main differences lay in the 
political geography. All the main centres of the Scottish kingdom were 
accessible from the border, including the most important single source of 
revenue, Berwick-upon-Tweed.8 The vulnerability of the Lowlands was such 
that Robert Bruce tore down the castles south of the Firth of Forth, 'so that the 
king of England and his men should have no places in the area where they 
would be safe from the Scots:9 On the other had, the interior of Scotland, 
courtesy of the steep terrain and the foul weather, was easily defensible but it 
commanded scarce resources and political weight. 
Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Portugal was a mirror image to the 
kingdom of the Scots. Its long boundaries coincided with a rim of 'highlands', 
whereas its 'lowlands' and major centres dwelt far from the border and close to 
the coast. The king's resources and his most lucrative property (housing and 
wheat fields) were located in the coastal urban settlements. Thus, historians 
have had no trouble in trusting Lopes' indication that by 1367 the renders of 
Lisbon and Porto towered above the re~t of the country.10 Moreover, Portugal 
was by no means vulnerable by land. Whereas the Scottish border was nearly 
devoid of castles for strategic reasons, the Portuguese frontier was defended by 
8 Rodgers, Clifford J., War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy Under Edward 1/1, 1327-60, Woodbrigde, 2000, p. 60, 
note 83 and sources cited. 
9 The words are from the Chronica Monasterii Melsa, quoted in Rogders, War Cruel and Sharp, p. 61. 
10 The Lisbon port customs (excluding the decima) alone accounted for between 35,000 and 40,000 dobras, whereas 
all other renders of the kingdom without those of the two major ports were in the region of 200,000 dobras. Lopes, 
Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p.5. 
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an intricate network of fortifications, held by the king's castellans and in times of 
need also manned by local populations, combined with mountainous terrain to 
limit the depth of the enemy penetration. Considering the short width of the 
operations, the cost of defence fell largely on the border municipalities but the 
proceeds of the domain played a relevant role in the war effort.11 Coordinated 
initiatives of castle-building and strategic settlement in the later years of Afonso 
III and earlier phase of Dinis I's reign had made even more defensible the 
country's rugged borderlands.12 Although their martial prowess in the 
Reconquista belonged to a different era, municipalities retained some of their 
military traits, especially when it came to defence operations.13 Led by a 
castellan appointed by the king, the men in the municipalities provided, in the 
opinion of an historian, a 'proper garrison army.'14 
The evasive manoeuvres that defined the thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-
century confrontation with Castile depended on the logistical and defensive 
support of well-garrisoned and well-provided fortresses. To borrow the phrase 
from Miguel Gomes Martins, these were 'dodging wars,15 in which pitched 
battles were avoided and penetrations in enemy territory were cautious. Before 
the Fernandine Wars, no Castilian invasion had ever penetrated more than 90 
km in a straight line. The frontier did not ensure that all the country would 
remain unscathed in the case of a land invasion. The outskirts of Porto were 
reached once (1337},16 Guimaraes was unsuccessfully besieged twice (1139 
and 1369) and non-walled Braga was entered in 1369. Also, the border burghs 
of Chaves, Bragant;a and Elvas were often attacked and the first even remained 
in Leonese captivity for one decade (1218-1231). But, apart from Braga and 
Porto, all other bishoprics (Evora, Coimbra, Lamego, Lisbon, Guarda, Viseu and 
Silves) and the wealthy towns of the lower Tagus valley remained far from the 
11 Came war or peace, the almoxarifes were responsible for channelling part of the crown's agrarian resources to the 
fortresses. The logistical role played by the almoxarifes emerges clearly from the narrative of the first Fernandine 
War. Cr. Fernando, chapter I. By contrast, the infamous purveyances imposed by Fernando I In his first war were 
especially resented because they were unprecedented. As we know by the complaints of the Povos, the old kings 
kept their all· important galley fleets and the border castles through the grain of the royal granaries. See chapter 4 
presented by the Povos in the Cortes of 1372. Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 85. 
12 The more recent synthesis, Barroca, Mario Jorge, 'Arquitectura Militar', in Barata, Manuel Themudo and Teixeira, 
Nuno Severiano, eds., Nova Historia Militar de Portugal, vol. I, Rio de Mouro, 2003, pp. 117-121. 
13 Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 77. 
14 J. Borges de Macedo quoted in Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 137. 
15 Martins, Miguel Gomes, 'A Guerra Esquiva. 0 Conflito Luso·Castelhano de 1336-38,' Promontoria, Ano 3, n. 3, 
Faro, 2005, pp. 19-80. 
16 And even in this occasion, the invading force was defeated. Marques, Portugal na Crise., p. 498. 
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Leonese-Castilian incursions of 1139, 1176, 1190, 1218, 1333, 1336 and 1369 
as well as during the 1250s.17 
The country's political geography was complemented by a defensive 
diplomatic orientation on behalf of the crown. As a whole, the military 
interventions of the Portuguese crown in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
had been limited, both in ambition and in temporal scope. Unlike what would 
happen in times of Fernando 1,18 the Hundred Years War did not precipitate any 
struggle between Castile and Portugal. Without any permanent, direct interest in 
Edward Ill's bid for the French crown, Portuguese and Castilian early 
fourteenth-century diplomacies became, in the eyes of the contenders, 
notorious for their duplicity.19 Castilian intervention on the side of their French 
neighbour had periods of great compromise and intensity, when the house of 
Trastamara shared its enemies with France - Pedro I of Castile or Fernando I of 
Portugal, both allied to England - but ceased altogether as soon as the new 
dynasty was firmly installed in the throne of Castile and Leon.20 Until the 1370s, 
Portuguese diplomacy was guided by non-belligerent principles, along the lines 
of Alfonso XI of Castile.21 Although its diplomacy has not been so closely 
studied as Castile's, the westernmost kingdom of the Peninsula also strove to 
avoid extra-peninsular commitments. The two countries tried their best to 
remain on friendly terms with Capets, Platagenets and Valois. The difficulty lay 
in the sizeable permanent galley fleets that Castilian and Portuguese 
possessed. These armadas, like those of Aragon and Genoa, were coveted by 
the French and, to a lesser extent, English crowns. 
Despite the consistent orientation towards neutrality in extra-peninsular 
fights for most of the fourteenth century, whenever one side managed to lure 
Portuguese or Castilian fleets to operate on his behalf, the two countries aligned 
together. During the war of Saint-Sardos a Gascon counsellor to Edward II 
assumed that a Castilian intervention on either side would entail the intervention 
of Portugal for the same side: meymamant si if [Edward II] a I'afiaunssa de 
17 The fourteenth·century dales and expeditions mentioned are taken from Marques, Portugal na Crise, pp. 491·523. 
18 On Fernando I's external policy, Russell, P. E., 'Joao Fernandes Andeiro at the court of John of Gaunt', Portugal, 
Spain and the African AtlantiC, 1343·1490, pp. 5·15. 
19 The events of 1333 are particularly revealing of this. Rodgers, War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 140·1. 
20 Suarez Fernandez, Luis, Intervencion de Castilla en la Guerra de los Cien Anos, Valladolid, 1950, p.9. 
21 Suarez Fernandez, Intervencion de Castilla, p. 35. 
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Espanya [Castile], qar am sela if aura la Daragom e de Portegual.22 This was a 
sound piece of counselling: in 1341, when French and Castilian warships set 
sail hunting for English transports in the Bay of Biscay they were followed by 
Portuguese galleys.23 Very probably, Portuguese vessels were among those 
defeated in English victory of Winchelsea/Les Espagnols-sur-Mer (1353).24 The 
evidence presented is illustrative of what were the goals of the two countries. 
War against other Christian princes, however, was something a monarch 
that relied heavily on customs had good reasons to avoid. The seizure of goods 
and ships and the arrest of foreign merchants and piratical attacks were two 
acts that immediately followed the declaration of war. For a crown which 
regarded merchants, denizen and alien, with a great measure of protectionism, 
lest it lose one of its major sources of revenue, peace was a natural orientation. 
Unlike England, which taxed exports, Portuguese taxes tapped imports and 
anchorage of ships. Thus, assuring the continuity of external commerce was 
vital for the crown and even the bellicose Fernando I was forced to admit before 
the towns in the Cortes of Leiria how disruptive war was to the country's trade 
and, hence, royal revenues (see infra Fig. 18). This is well patent in the few tax-
farming contracts surviving from this period, some of which contain special 
clauses which granted the tax-farmer the right to suspend the contract in case 
of war.25 Again, what Lopes says about the kings of old, should not be 
dismissed as empty praise: 'they felt it was their service and profit that alilof the 
realm] were rich, so that kings could have great and vast renders,.26 
Unhampered by extra-peninsular diplomacy and united by antagonism 
against the Moor, the relations between the two peninsular neighbours were 
relatively peaceful. Since the thirteenth century, the strongest party, Castile, did 
not harbour projects of peninsular hegemony while Portugal had a decisively 
22 Letter sent by the Gascon seneschal Raymond Durand to Hugh Ie Despenser in 11 January 1325. The War of St. 
Sardos, Chaplais, Pierre, ed., London, 1954, doc. 121, p.127. 
23 Rodger, N. A. M., The Safeguard of the Sea, 2nd, London, 2004, p. 100. Possibly in exchange for trade privileges in 
Normandy which Phillipe VI bestowed the very same year. The privilege is abridged in DP, vol. I, doc. 76, p. 90 .. 
24 This hypothesis is drawn from the parallel between the alliance negotiated by the English with Lisbon and Porto 
which was signed by him in 20 October 1353 (DP, vol. I, doc. 80, pp. 94-97) and the treaty of alliance between 
England and the Basque ports, confirmed nine days later (Suarez Fernandez, Intervencion de Castilla, p. 45, note 1). 
An equal service rendered to the English crown appears as the best explanation for the equality and simultaneity of 
treatment. 
25 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 37, p. 82. 
26 Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p.5. 
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defensive stance. Given the similarity of interests, Portugal had good reason to 
align its external policy with Castile, even if it implied lending its galleys, as 
happened in 1341 and 1353. The two monarchies also shared the same 
perception of the Muslim powers as fundamentally alien to the Peninsula,27 
wherefrom emerged a reasonably coordinated policy against the Muslims in 
Iberia and North Africa. The Portuguese crown organised large expeditions by 
land and sea in 1266, 1309, 1340, 1341 and 1343 in succour of the Castilians 
against Moorish enemies.28 However frequent collaboration seems to have 
been, it had always precise goals and was intended at keeping an 
advantageous peace rather than involving the dynasty in a war. 
One of the better illustrations of the Portuguese stance towards Castile is 
provided by the argumentation the royal council presented to King Pedro I on 
whether or not to help the dethroned king of Castile in 1357. Pedro I had been a 
reliable ally of the Castilian monarch, having helped him with knights and ships 
in his Aragonese war. Later, Pedro of Portugal even refused to join the Franco-
Aragonese invasion of Castile that eventually overthrew the Castilian 
monarch.29 However, when his dethroned old ally came to ask for support, 
Pedro refused. Lopes voices the discourse of king's private counsellors who 
'thought that the king could not do it without great effort and expenditure and 
great damage of his reign; and worse of all without good reasons to believe he 
would succeed, as throwing the usurper out of Castile either by battle or by 
guerrilla tactics required great might (my underlining):3o 
Paradoxical as it may seem, the defensive strategy of the crown of 
Portugal inspired ambitions of territorial increase at Castilian expenses. It was 
precisely because the border was the mainstay of the defence that the crown 
felt the temptation to attack and incorporate tracts of enemy land. For this 
reason, Portuguese strategy aimed at extending the thickness of the border at 
27 This question was widely developed by Maravall, J. A., 4th, EI concepto de Espana en La Edad Media, Madrid, 
1997, pp. 197·287 and by Krus, Lufs, A visao nobiliBrquica do Espa~o Iberica, Lisbon, 1994. 
28 There were also practical reasons for this: in the fourteenth century the two crowns had to endure repeated attacks 
from Maghreb pirates who preyed upon trading ships and the coastal settlements. 
29 On this circumstance, in English, Russell, The English Intervention, p. 45. 
30 Underline mine. '0 nom podia elrei fazer sem grandes, trabalhos e gasto e mui gram dano de seu reino; e 0 pear 
de todo, nom teer aazadas razoes como tal (eito podesse viir a acabamento [given the extent of the victory and 
popularity of the usurper] Pois quem ouvesse de lan~ar (ora de Castela Henrique e todoloos da sua parte, assi per 
batalha, come per guerra guerreada, gram poderio lhe comviinha teer: Lopes, eron. Fernando I,~hapter XXXVIII, p. 
177. 
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the expenses of the enemy. This would extend the distance between the 
wealthy coastal cities and the frontier. In all conflicts that broke after the 
perpetual border definition in the 8adajoz Treaty of 1267,31 Portuguese kings 
only fought with clear advantage on their side, attempting to use momentary 
Castilian frailty to absorb a portion of its territory. Internal dissensions furnished 
enough encouragement and pretexts for Dinis I and Afonso IV to do so. The 
former invaded war-torn Castile in 1295-6 which led to the Portuguese 
occupation of the Riba-Coa district. This was confirmed in the 'perpetual' 
settlement of the boundaries between the two realms, the already mentioned 
treaty of Alcanices in 1297.32 The 1336-39 war between Portugal and Castile 
took place when King Alfonso XI had been challenged by his half-brother.33 
Even Fernando I's bid for the throne of Castile-Leon, supported by blatantly 
dubious legal argumentation, intended little more than being bought off with a 
few Castilian border towns by the momentarily weak neighbour.34 Although 
things would evolve in a very different direction, Fernando I's attack on Castile 
is not contradictory with the strategic thinking of the kings of old. The invasion of 
Fernando I, like those of Dinis I and Afonso IV, would prove another instance of 
this grand strategy whose ultimate aim was defensive. However, in 1369 there 
would be a new factor: the advent of a staunchly pro-French dynasty in Castile 
entangled the country in wider, European conflicts. 
Section 3.2 • An Open Border 
Castilian raids and invasions could only hurt the kingdom's peripheral 
towns, whereas the coastal cities and the more productive fields trusted in the 
double protection provided by distance and by the densely fortified and 
mountainous border. For all the safeguards offered by the frontier castles, the 
main administrative, demographic and commercial centres could be attacked by 
31 Gonzalez Jimenez, 'Las Aelaciones entre Portugal y Castilla,' p. 11. 
32 Gonzalez Jimenez, 'Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla,' p. 22. 
33 Tellingly, both these wars were followed by alliances and joint attacks on Muslim lands. After the invasion of Leon 
in 1295-7, Portugal joined Castile in the war against Grenada (1309 siege of Algeciras). Within one year of the 1336-
9, the two kings defeated a Moorish invasion of Castile in the fields of Salado in 1340. 
34 Indeed, as F. Lopes notes, Fernando did not wear the title of king of Castile and Le6n but simply that of king of 
Corunna, Zamora and Tuy, the cities he had occupied, as suggested by Sir Peter Russell. Russell, Peter, 'Archivists 
as Historians,' p. 10. Also, Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, chapter XXVIII, p. 81. 
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sea. At sea, the conditions that made the Portuguese border such a formidable 
obstacle with limited manpower and financial resources could not be replicated. 
While on land, terrain and fortification multiplied the strength of the defenders, 
no such devices operated in the open waters. Along the maritime border, 
movement was smoother and, hence, invasions and battles more likely. Naval 
tactics based on the galley allowed for a war of attrition comprising piracy 
against enemy ships and seaborne attacks on coastal towns.35 As N. A. M. 
Rodger wrote of fourteenth-century naval strategy, 'ships were extremely 
valuable; they incorporated a large fraction of the medieval economy's scarce 
liquid capital in a very vulnerable form' .36 Commercial vessels were hard to 
locate on the open sea, but their ports were not. Even if no single ship was 
captured, the ravaging of a port, with its warehouses, registers and dockyards, 
could hit the enemy's economic capacity hard. Moreover, the sea trade was 
more vital to the finances of the monarchy than the distant and meagre 
revenues of the hinterlands. By 1367, customs collected in Lisbon and Porto 
accounted for some 16% of the total revenue.37 The political weight of the major 
coastal cities and towns made this kind of warfare more damaging to the ruler. 
Arguably, this is nowhere truer than in Portugal where the international 
commerce took place along the coast whilst the interior mountains were 
impervious, barren and thinly settled. Thus, while there was no possibility of a 
purely naval strategic invasion by Castile or by Portugal, the sea proved a far 
more decisive battlefield than the country's mountain ranges and plains. Not 
only naval warfare was more sensible to the crown's cashable revenues, as the 
oligarchies of Lisbon and Porto, where the mercantile interests were embedded, 
formed a financial and political force to be reckoned with.38 
35 Rodger, The Safeguard, pp. 91-93. 
36 Rodger, The Safeguard, p. 91. 
37 Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5. 
38 The municipal~ies of Lisbon and Porto were important enough to negotiate an alliance directly with the Edward III 
in 1353 (DP, vol. I, doc. 80, pp. 94-97). The Lisbon municipality could secure loans from the Italian bankers or even 
from the king himself (AML, Livro dos Pregos, doc. 35). Reddaway argued that by the same period, Portuguese 
currency was known as Lusshebornes in London. Reddaway, T. F., 'The king's Mint and Exchange in London 1343-
1543, English Historical Review, vol. 82, n. 32, Jan 1967, p. 4. Given the mention to 'u/ixbonensi libras' by the 
Genoese in 1370(DP, voLI,doc. 116, p.131), he appears to be right. 
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The knowledge of Portuguese naval history is thus essential to understand 
the diplomatic stance of the monarchy.39 Unlike the English crown, which 
counted on the requisition of commercial ships, the kings of Portugal owned 
their own fleet of warships.4o Information on the strength of the Portuguese navy 
becomes consistent around 1317, when Denis I signed a contract with a 
Geonese corsair and merchant Emmanuele Pezzagno.41 By 1325, the 
Genoese-style fleet of the king of Portugal was dangerous enough for Edward II 
to make efforts to prevent it from joining the French party, together with Antonio 
Pezzagno.42 
The constitution of a permanent fleet was an expensive option, since 
complex administration and maintenance, high operating costs and manpower 
requirements meant that galleys inflicted a drain on royal treasuries.43 A fleet of 
20 galleys would cost annually up to 80,000 I., that is to say 8.(3)% of the 
kingdom's notional revenues.44 The increased expenses incurred in building 
and maintaining a state-of-the-art galley fleet represented a heavy burden on 
the monarchy. How costly, in relative and absolute terms, it is obviously 
impossible to ascertain. Yet, there is a discrete set of information that can be 
associated with these new costs for the monarchy. In 1310, one year after the 
admiralty contract with Pezzagno, the Portuguese crown required from the 
church one tenth of the tithe, in what would be the first of a series of transfers 
from ecclesiastical taxation. As the papal concession recalled, the pretext for 
this transfer was to fight Barbary pirates, makes it very likely that extraordinary 
levies from the church had to be called for in the financing of the fleet. Deemed 
essential for any confrontation with the Moors, the galleys concentrated the 
profits of ecclesiastical taxation conceded with the aim of fighting Muslim pirates 
39 There remain significant gaps on the knowledge of Portuguese sea power prior to the great discoveries. Here we 
follow the most recent synthesiS on the Portuguese navy, Duarte, Luis Miguel, 'A Marinha de Guerra Portuguesa,' in 
Barata, Manuel Themudo and Teixeira, Nuno Severiano, eds. Nova Hist6ria Militar de Portugal, Rio de Mouro, 2003, 
p.296. 
40 Russell, The English Intervention, pp.xxi-xxiv. 
41 Brother of the well-known financier of Edward II, Antonio Pezzagno. Marques, Portugal na Crise, p. 358. The 
hiring of the Genoese expert and his retinue by the Portuguese king is part of the European build-up of galley warfare 
which started in Italy in the first haH of the thirteenth century. Unger, David, 'Admiralties and Warships of Europe and 
the Mediterranean, 1000-1500, Ships and shipbuilding in the North Sea and Affantic, 1400-1800, p. 39. 
42 Chaplais, The War of Saint-Sardos, p. 135, nt. 3. 
43 Unger, Ships and shipbuilding, pp. 36-42. According to L. M. Duarte, rowers in Portuguese galleys were paid as 
freemen. 'A Marinha de Guerra em Portugal', pp. 314-318. 
44 Lopes, Cron. Fernando " Prologue, p. 5. The yearly price of 1,000 dobras for a galley is taken from Fernao Lopes. 
Lopes, Cron. Pedro I, chapter XXII, p. 104 which describes events in 1358. 
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or even invaders of Peninsular soil.45 Indeed, when it mattered, Portuguese 
kings could, and did, opt for hiring additional vessels from Monegasque or 
Genoese mercenaries.46 
Fig. 7 - Portuguese and Castilian Galleys, 1337-1384 
Occasion Portuguese galleys Castilian galleys 
(other ships In brackets) (other ships In brackets) 
1337 • Battle of Cabo de S. Vicente c.20 c.30 
1341 - joint succour of Cadiz 10 30 (12) 
1369 - blockade of Seville 32 (30) 12 
1370 - breakthrough of the Seville 16 (24) 20 
blockade 
1381 - battle of Saltes 22 (4) 23 
1384 - breakthrough of the Lisbon 17 (17) 13 (40) 
blockade 
Sources: Monteiro, Saturnino, Bara/has e Combares e da Marinha Portuguesa, vol. I, Lisbon, 
1989, pp. 19-33; Lopes, Cron. Joao /, vol. I, chapter, CXXXIII, pp 260-3. 
The defence of Portuguese coastal routes, fields and towns could only be 
achieved with a sizeable armada. Sheer numbers were tactically decisive, since 
galleys fought individually and had to avoid at all costs being outnumbered.47 
Thus, Portuguese kings consciously developed their fleet in order to obtain, or 
to near, parity in number of galleys with Castile, a goal that which was attained 
in the Fernandine Wars. Disparate information of the armadas put to sea by 
Portuguese and Castilian kings can be taken as indicators of a broad 
equilibrium of naval power. The number of galleys present in the fights between 
the armadas of the two countries were relatively balanced (Fig. 7). This could 
not have been attained without a consistent, conscious policy on behalf of the 
monarchy. Indeed, by 1367 Portuguese notional income was on the region of 
4S Tenths of ecclesiastical revenues were conceded in 1320-2 and 1341-4 to fight pirates and in 1355 to defend the 
Algarve from Muslim attacks. DP, voL I, doc. 46, p. 40, doc. 71, p. 83, doc. 81, pp. 98-103. 
46 On the attack of Seville there were at least 4 mercenary galleys; moreover, some of the ships' captains were 
Genoese. Lopes, Gran. Fernando I, chapter XLII, pp. 136·7. 
47 For individual descriptions, see in Monteiro, Saturnino, Batalhas e Cornbates e da Marinha Portuguesa, vol. I, 
Lisbon, 1989, pp. 19-33. 
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240,000 dobras, which stood for slightly less than a third of the annual income 
of 790,000 dobras available to Castile in 1369.48 These figures, however 
unsystematic, make it clear that despite its demographic and fiscal 
shortcomings, fourteenth-century Portugal could match its potential foe's 
strength where it mattered most: at sea. 
Thus, while the Portuguese border was a low-maintenance military 
weapon, naval warfare was capital-intensive, because a state-of-the-art galley 
fleet required ample economic means. This was possible because the 
Portuguese kings were able to collect and accumulate revenues. Indeed, it is no 
coincidence that the reform of the Portuguese fleet according to Geonese 
models takes place in the 1310s, during the period of accumulation of revenue 
by Dinis (1299-1322).49 
Section 3.3 - Nobles and Municipalities 
So far, this pattern of military involvements has been understood simply in 
diplomatic and strategic terms. The fact that the crown was able to follow a 
coherent and intelligible grand strategy demonstrates its strength. However, no 
state, let alone a fourteenth-century one, can follow an external policy totally 
independent from internal pressures. To start with, resorting to a broad but clear 
simplification, it is possible to divide the endogenous pressures upon the crown 
in two opposed groups of interest: the nobility and the municipalities. For the 
first, war was not only its ideological raison d'etre but also an occasion and a 
pretext for material gain. Presumably, for the other group war was a burden, 
even without extraordinary taxes. 
<48 Lopes, Gron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5. The 30 million mara vedis of 1369 (notional revenue in that year; Ormrod, 
'The West Monarchies,' p. 145) were divided by 38 (the value of a dobla in mara vedis; Spufford, Peter, Handbook of 
Medieval Exchange, London, 1986, p. 160). 
49 In his will of 1299, Dinis declares that he spent most of his money in the war (Provas, vol. II, part 2, doc. 11, p. 
130), while in 1322, he declares that the money bequeathed was gathered by him. This shows that the wealth 
displayed in 1322 was accumullaed between these dales (Brandao, Quinta Parte da Monarchia Lvsytana, doc. 
XXXIV, fol. 331v. This period also saw the emergence of kingdomwide taxation for the Jewry and for the Church. See 
supra pp. 278-9. 
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The end of the Reconquista and the ascent of Afonso III brought the 
'curialisation' of noble families.5o From the second half of the thirteenth century 
onwards, royal service became the ultimate source of honours, distinction and, 
obviously, material gain. The grants and privileges obtained in the court became 
the long-term goal of the strategies of the noble Iineages.51. The weight that 
such post- Reconquista patronage exerted upon the royal finances has been 
suggested above (see chapter 1). However, royal patronage kept a military 
rationale. Discounting the one-off or odd gifts for foreign knights paying homage 
to the kings, a favourite theme amongst chroniclers, the permanent 
endowments made by the king included the ten9a and the contia.52 These 
payments retained a distinctively military nature. 
The term ten~a stands for permanent revenues granted by the king in 
exchange for a service, already performed or to be performed.53 Indeed, the 
fundamental rationale of the ten~a was to reward services.54 This designation 
comprised contrasted situations and the dominant forms of ten~a varied widely 
over time. From the reign of Dinis I (1279-1322) onwards, the ten~a was a rent 
payable by the monarch. In the thirteenth century ten~a referred to the 
precarious holding of a source of revenue which nominally belonged to the king 
or, in other words, to a tenure. In the reign of Dinis, ten9as were disconnected 
from the exercise of authority and, although occasionally allocated in specific 
municipalities, they were royal revenues collected by the royal administration 
that were temporarily diverted to a holder.55 They were, in sum, a rent. Unlike 
previous redistributive payments, it did not entail any function or exercise of 
jurisdiction, but merely the usufruct of the monies produced. The type of rent 
50 Branco, Maria-Joao, 'The Nobility of Medieval Portugal (Xlth-XIVth Centuries)' Duggan, Anne (ed.) Nobles and 
Noblityin Medieval Europe. Concepts, Origins, Transformations, Woodridge, 2000, p. 237; Gomes, Rita Costa, 'A 
Curializayao da Nobreza,' 0 Tempo de Vasco da Gama, Diogo Ramada Curto (ed.) Lisbon, 1998, pp. 245·64. 
51 Branco, 'The Nobility of Medieval', pp. 229,233,238. Also, Gomes, Rita Costa, The Making of a Court Society: 
Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Portugal, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 225·8. 
52 Even though these terms not always resisted the variations and occasional lack of precision of contemporary 
vocabulary and though the institutions they designated were considerably fluid, Rita Costa Gomes and Jollo Gouveia 
Monteiro have established meaningful and operative distinctions between them. 
63 Henceforward, unless stated otherwise, the source of information is Gomes, The Making of a Court Society, pp. 
215-31. 
54 On the doctrinal foundations for the relationship merce·ten~a, see Olival, Fernanda, As Ordens Militares e 0 
Estado Modemo. Honra, Merce e Venalidade em Portugal (1641·178~ Lisboa, 2001, pp. 23-5. 
65 The holding of judiciaVmilitary district (terras) with jurisdiction virtually disappeared from 1287 onwards. Ventura, 
leontina, 'Terras e Julgados', Port. Defin., p. 524. 
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assigned to the holder of a ten~a varied: it could be the municipal rent,56 it could 
be an agrarian property (prestamo or reguengo) or it could be the wages and 
fines allocated to the function of castellan (alcaidaria). Possibly, it could also be 
a sum of money payable by the king's central institutions. 
Unlike ten9as whose values varied extensively according to the dignity of 
the receiver, the contia was a flat payment that allowed a king's vassal to 
maintain a warhorse as well as acquire good defensive and offensive 
equipment.57 According to Gomes, they appear c. 1300, as a counterpart of 
paying feudal homage to the king. 58 More specifically military than ten9as, 
contias bound the recipient to be ready for military service.59 The number of 
vassals receiving contias was carefully controlled by the crown which kept a 
central register of the available knights and replaced them in order to keep a 
numerus clausus.6o By contrast, with the ten9a, the set contia was paid through 
an assignment in a source of revenue or directly by the king's treasury. 
Both these payments supposed a heavy burden on the royal treasury. 
While figures for the ten9as remain unfathomable for this period, the rigidity of 
the contias allows for a plausible guesstimate on their financial impact as, since 
the reign Pedro I, the contia was of 100 I. and this was the standing value in the 
times of the Fernandine Wars were fought.61 Considering that the number of 
registered contia-receiving vassals under the 'kings of old' might have been 
around 2,000,62 a notional sum for the annual payroll of contias under Pedro I 
56 TenfSs allocated to municipalities were for the most reserved for the highest-ranking nobles. The earliest 
examples date from King Dinis. The rent of the municipality of Chaves was diverted to the Count Gon~alo Garcia de 
Sousa (TI, Chanco Dinis I, Livro 3, fol. 18v): the rent of Barcelos were diverted to the counts Joao Afonso Telo in 
1298 and Martim Gil de Riba de Vizela and 1304 (TI, Chanco Dinis I, Livro 3, fols. 3 and 33v). 
57 Unless stated otherwise, information on the contias comes from Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, pp. 33-5 and 
Lopes, Gron. Pedro I, chapter I, pp. 6-9. 
56 Whereas Gomes considers that the status of vassal implied living the court, Monteiro alleges convincingly that the 
existence of territorial books of vassals (livro de vassalo das comarcas) implies that residence in the court was not a 
necessary condition. Gomes, The Making, pp. 220-7. 
59 Gontias were only paid to the nobles who held the status of king's 'vassal' and not simply noble (fidalgo). Gomes, 
The Making, p. 223. 
60 Although they were not technically hereditary, the custom was their father-to-son transmission, as Lopes implieS. 
Lopes, Gron. Pedro I, chapter I, p. 8. 
61 Lopes, Cron. Pedro', chapter XI, p. 50. The value of 100 I. has been confirmed for the reign of Fernando I in his 
chancery register. Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 35; Gomes, The Making, p. 223. 
62 Considering King Fernando's disgruntled remark in 1372 that he could not field the three or four vassals 'his 
honour required' (lopes, Gron. Fernando I, chapter LXXII, p. 254), the figure for the older period must be inferior to 
3,000. 
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would be in the region of 200,000 I .. This sum would be roughly a fifth of 
estimated royal revenues.63 
While ten9as and contias were related to military service, they were paid 
regardless of any effective fighting or campaigning. Whenever war appeared, 
vassals and holders of ten9as saw their gains complemented by wages. 
Although the absence of consistent figures for the period before the Fernandine 
Wars makes it difficult to gauge how war enhanced the knights' budgets, 
existing indicators suggest that gains would be relevant but not impressive. The 
importance of the plain contia was in the equipment provided, as 100 I. were 
notoriously insufficient to adequately arm and maintain a knight.64 The monthly 
stipend of 45 I. for a fully-armoured mounted man-at-arms in the 1369 siege of 
Monterey meant that it would take a sixty-six day-long campaign for a king's 
vassal to earn the equivalent to the 100 I. of the flat contia, if well-equipped.65 
If the nobles and vassals had some reason to regard war as a source of 
gain, the municipal proctors to the fourteenth-century Cortes made clear their 
opposition to potential or effective war. Through the Fernandine Cortes it is 
clear that municipalities had all reasons for being averse to offensive warfare on 
account of the prises, defensive tasks and disruptions on trade. Together with 
the return to the older coinage, one of the most consistent claims of the towns in 
the meetings of 1371-2 was that the king could not wage war without 
consultation of the Cortes.66 The fact that communities' representatives 
challenged the king's right to go to war is symptomatic of where their interests 
laid. 
Municipalities had developed autonomous militias in the days of the 
Reconquest, when the contribution of predatory activity was an essential feature 
63 The general estimate of income provided by Fernao Lopes for the earlier years of King Fernando's reign is of 
960,000 I Lopes, Cron. Fernando, Prologue, p. 5. 
64 The settlement of the Order of Christ (dated 1326) indicates that the annual rent assigned to an adequately 
equipped knight was 500 I. (and 800 I. for a commander).MH, vol. I, doc. 74, p. 156. 
65 Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 35. 
66 Cort. Fernando I, voL I, pp. 16 (Lisbon) 82 (Porto) and 127 (Leiria). Unlike the arguments related with coinage, this 
was a call for innovation. No constitutional statutes or customs are known to have hindered the king's liberty to wage 
war, not even when the parliament played a leading political role under Dinis I. The contrast with £ngland, where 
fiscal contributions allowed parliament to take part in, or at least be informed of, military decisions, is evident. Despite 
the lack of documentation, there is no r.eason to think that the Cortes had ever met to prepare or discuss any 
offensive project. For the Povos, however, n was King Fernando's armed bid 10r the throne of Castile which went 
against what they perceived as th.e correct stance of the monarch. 
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in the economy of the municipalities great and small. 67 When the volatile frontier 
with the Moors gave way to a stable, discrete inter-state border, the municipal 
cavalry assumed the form of a landowning and commercial oligarchy centred in 
the larger urban centres. In the middle decades of the thirteenth century, 
wealthy townsmen changed their warhorses for pack animals in both symbolical 
and effective terms.68 The municipal cavaleiros (knights) became 'citizens' 
(cidadaos) or simply 'dwellers' (vizinhos). However, their military capacities did 
not vanish as crown did not cease to demand armed service from the towns as 
they could provide a strong contingent of cavalry and of well-equipped 
infantrymen (mainly crossbowmen).69 Even in time of peace, municipal 
membership was a very onerous condition because of the obligation of owning 
unproductive military equipment.7o As municipal hosts they were due to serve 
for free during six weeks and the monarch was responsible for their wages only 
if they fought for longer periods.11 The liability to possess horse, armour, 
crossbow or light equipment was defined by a minimal level of value of 
possessions that was called quantia.72 As weaponry and horses were no longer 
regarded as reproductive 'capital,' the crown had to force the municipal men to 
own arms and mount. This is in the origin of what was called the quantia 
system, by which the form of military service was defined according to the value 
of lands of each man.73 
67 Concerns of 'economic rationality', not of strategic convenience, framed the design and execution of the 
expeditions into enemy territory. On the 'economic rationality' in municipal warfare organisation, Garcia Fitz, Castilla 
y Leon, pp. 78-89. Or in English, Powers, James, SOCiety Organised for War,' California, 1987, pp. 162-185. 
68 Fernandes, Entres Mouros e Cristaos, p. 220. 
69 On the quantia system, see Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, pp. 44-58, followed here. 
70 In each municipality, the quantia was set by the king considering the relative affluence of the town and the region's 
horse-breeding potential, in result of which the quantias varied dramatically. Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, pp. 47-
9. 
71 The fighters themselves did not fight for free, as the municipalities defrayed the costs of their own men. E. g. 
Guimaraes in 1369, Vimaranis Monumenta Historica, ed. Joao Gomes de Oliveira Guimaraes, vol. II, Guimaraes, 
1931, p. 413; Louie in 1384 Moreno, Humberto, Actas de Verea~ao de LouIe, vol. I, Louie, 1984, p. 75; Lisbon in 
1386, Martins, Lisboa e a Guerra, p. 57-61. 
72 The orthographical distinction between quantia and contia cannot be identified in contemporary documentation as 
the two forms were interchangeable. We follow here the convention, established by Joao Gouveia Monteiro, which 
marks the semantic opposition between contia (annuity given to the nobles) and quantia (nominal sum that 
demanded the ownership of determinate equipment, like English librate system). Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, 
pp.100-9. 
73 Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 33. The richest among them were induced to own a fitting mount and complete 
armour, a second layer of middling townsfolk had to own a crossbow, whereas the third, poorer rank of aquantiados 
only had obtain light equipment. For the first rank, however grievous it was to sustain a horse, was could also be a 
road to social ascent. Indeed, during the Fernadine Wars, many plebeian knights joined noble retinues. The 
distinction between contia and quantia is often obscured in contemporary documentation because of its 
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The broad opposition drawn in these pages has some shortcomings. For 
individual agents of both classes, actual warfare offered both chances to 
advancement and material risks. Knights could ruin themselves in the king's 
service74 or could benefit from contingent gains, such as plunders, ransoms and 
prises from the povos or even better their contia with a ten9a or increase their 
ten9as. For the townsmen who could afford a mount and complete armour, 
there was the chance of being integrated into a noble retinue and thus became 
a rear-vassal to the king.15 The 'citizens' who chose to serve beyond their 
customary six weeks were also entitled to wages in equal footing with other 
knights. 
Still, at any rate, the class interest of the municipal oligarchies, which gave 
voice to the so-called Povos, appears as opposed to that of the nobility in what 
concerned war. The military capacity of the nobles was sustained by the crown, 
whereas the latter had to provide the means of serving the crown. Yet, this 
opposition was not entirely diametric: Povos indeed opposed actual war while 
nobility favoured the build-up of war. While the antecedents to the Fernandine 
Wars show that there was an aristocratic pro-war party, 76 nobility was not 
interested in war per se but in the likelihood of war. Indeed, in a context of 
military build-up the nobility would be allowed to tap an increased share of the 
kingdom's resources, either by increasing the values of contias or ten9as or by 
increasing the number of noblemen earning them. This was not contrary to royal 
interest. The problem was aptly summarised by Dinis in 1291 and in 1309, 'poor 
knights would not joint the [royal] host nor would provide me the services that 
they ought to for the defence of my land.'77 
The absence of a diametric, direct opposition between the interests of the 
Povos and the nobility's allowed the 'old kings' to accommodate the peaceful 
aspirations of the former, which were convergent with their own hoarding 
objectives, with the redistributive pressures of the latter. 
interchangeable usage of the two words, despite their technical contrast established clearly by Joao Gouveia 
Monteiro. 
74 In his will, Fernando I left some monies for knights that were ruined 'because of his service'. Tavares, Maria Jose 
Pimenta Ferro, 'A nobreza no reinado de Fernando I e a sua actua~o em 1383-1385', Revista de Hist6ria 
Econ6mica e Social, n. 12, Julho-Dezembro 1983, p. 57. 
75 The captain vassals recruited his retainers both within his affinity and in the municipalitieS. For obvious reasons, 
the monarchy fought this practice. Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p.35. 
76 Monteiro, Joao Gouveia, Aljubarrota. A Batalha Real, Lisbon, 2003, pp. 10-18. 
77 CHed in Mattoso, Jose, Identif~ de ~m Pais, part 2, 6th, Lisbon, 2000, p. 124. 
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In this respect, the second half of the fourteenth century was a testing time 
for the monarchy. For the nobility that was affected by the decline of the rents 
brought by the mid-century criSiS, crown's disbursements cannot fail to have 
become even more tempting and needed than before?8 While this was a pan-
European factor, in Portugal it was particularly aggravated by political 
. circumstances. Indeed, the ranks of fourteenth-century nobility were swollen by 
the influx of exiled Castilian knights who sought the court of Pedro I and 
Fernando 1.79 Together with the crisis of the rents, this factor increased internal 
redistributive pressures. While little is known about the post-Black Death phase 
of the reign of Afonso IV, thanks to Fernao Lopes we know that 'peaceful' Pedro 
I while avoiding taking arms against the Trastamara usurpers, increased the flat 
cantia from 75 I. to 100 1..80 Similarly, as the same chronicler testifies, King 
Pedro also enlarged the ranks of the crown-subsidised nobility.81 While Pedro 
managed to avoid war,82 he did not escape a presumably strong growth of the 
standing expenditure, as Fernao Lopes hints at in other chapters.83 If we credit 
Fernao Lopes, it was also King Pedro who first opened the contias to those who 
were not born nobles, a movement his father had opposed.84 
The concrete process of decision-making that led to the Fernandine Wars 
is irreversibly opaque. Discussion of the 'motives' or the 'vested interests' will 
avail little in the present case. Still, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
existence of a functioning, or even prosperous if we believe the Cortes, fiscal 
system constitutes a sufficient cause of the wars unleashed by Fernando. 
Fourteenth-century nobility looked at the monarchy as a wealthy institution 
whose coffers war could open. 
The essential tools of fourteenth-century Portuguese grand strategy, the 
frontier, the contias' knights and the fleet, had different, if equally demanding, 
monetary requirements. Payment of the castellan and his garrison, as well as 
the maintenance and provisioning of the fortifications, was assured by the 
78 Ormrod, 'The West European,' p. 151. On the crisis of the seigniorial economy in Portugal, see M. H. Cruz Coelho, 
o Baixo Mondego nos Finais da/dade Media, vol. I, Coimbra, 1983, pp. 286,320,332 and Amaral, Lufs Carlos, S. 
Salvador de Grij6 na Segunda Metade do Seculo XIV. Estudo de Gestso Agraria, Lisbon, 1994, pp. 156·161, 174·6. 
79 Monteiro, Aljubarrota, pp. 10·18. 
80 Lopes, Cron. Pedro, chapter XI, p. 50. 
81 Lopes, Cron. Fernando, chapter LV, pp.228·9. 
82 See supra p. 88. 
83 Lopes, Cron. Pedro, chapter XI, pp. 50-1 and chapter XU, p. 55. 
84l~s, Cron. Pedro, chapter I, p. 8. 
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specific constitutions of the diverse border municipalities. While in times of 
peace the frontier paid for itself, military payments and the permanent fleet were 
financially much more demanding.85 The lack of administrative accounts makes 
it very difficult to sketch the mechanics of these expenditures but the Cortes' 
depiction of the 'kings of old' offers precious information about the way the 
crown dealt with war effort. One of the critiques made by the Povos in 1371 was 
that the kings of old paid their grants to their vassals 'with their treasures not 
with their renders,.86 This certainly refers to the direct, as opposed to assigned, 
payments of contias. The direct handing over of contias, treasury money, 
instead of land grants became the monarchical practice after Dinis I. 
In other words, the threat of conflict required a permanent war chest, 
especially if the annual revenue was rigid and general, direct taxes troublesome 
to obtain. The hoardings of the Portuguese monarchy have already been 
addressed earlier in section 1.1. The long period of decline of the value 
hoarded after 1210s was halted only in the reign of Dinis, although the first 
unequivocal evidence for the recovery of the accumulative capacity is his 
testament from 1322. The will of Dinis was also important for creating a crown's 
treasury, rather than the king's treasures of his predecessors. After bestowing 
part of his riches to his family and other beneficiaries, Dinis urged that the 
remaining monies should 'stay in the Lisbon treasure to be used 'for defence of 
the kingdom and war against the enemies to the faith,.87 As it will argued for in 
next chapter, the successors of King Dinis followed this policy with some 
success (see chapters 1 and 4). 
The direct relationship between offensive warfare and increase of taxation, 
so often highlighted by fiscal historians, has to be thought of differently in the 
Portuguese case. Indeed, the Portuguese kings' response to the constraints of 
their military setting was not met only through extraordinary taxation but by a 
combination of hoarding, permanent redistribution and demands upon the 
municipalities. The strategy of limited warfare appears as an adaptation of 
III Although capital-intensive, a fleet of galleys was arguably more cost-effective than the more conventional land 
armies. According to values given by F. Lopesfor 1353, a mercenary galley (usage and maintenance of a 'national' 
one would logically be less expensive and paid in weaker coinage) could be hired for an annual 1,000 dobras, that is 
to say 4,000 libras of usual currency. Thus, the renumeration for a month of mercenary service, some 333.(3) libras a 
month, equalled the eamings of only ten full-armoured knights. Lopes. Gren. Pedro I. chapter XXII. p. 104. 
86 Cort. Fernando I. vol. I, p. 35. 
87 Provas. vol. I. part 2, doc. 11, p. 130. 
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external policy to the resources that the country's economy and the strained 
monetary constitution allowed. As it was formulated in the 1322 will of Dinis I, 
the accumulation of metallic resources had a rationale, the defence of the 
kingdom. Ultimately, these savings were earmarked for future wars which, in 
spite of prudent diplomacy, were all too likely given Portugal's geopolitics. This 
is perhaps a polar opposite to the best studied cases.ss This military-financial 
situation terminated when Fernando I finally succumbed to pressures, both 
internal and external, for full-blown commitment to the wars between France 
and England. Although Fernando's aim was the acquisition of more land, along 
the lines of his ancestors' diplomacy, the country eventually entered a lasting 
period of continuous warfare, similar to that which other European countries 
had been enduring. 
In the period covered by part I, Portugal shifted from a coercion-intensive 
to a capital-intensive state, to use Charles Tilly's dichotomy. Twelfth- early 
thirteenth-century and Portuguese kings had a nominal, virtual claim over the 
kingdom's resources and the more significant part of their revenues was 
obtained with a strong degree of, inward or outward, coercion. By contrast, as it 
has been argued, fourteenth-century monarchs used the profits and savings of 
their domain closer to the capital-intensive mode of warfare adopted by 
contemporary republics and city-states. The First Fernandine War with the 
deployment of mercenaries and with the sending of gold to pay for Aragon 
would be the last capital-intensive conflict. 
880rmrod, 'The West European', p. 123·7. 
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Chapter 4 - The Invention of a Domain State 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the institutional changes 
undergone by the Portuguese monarchy as a construction of a domain state. 
This conceptual option along with its historiographical implications will be dealt 
in section 4.1. Section 4.2 will approach the loose integration between the 
political centre and local collection of revenues during the early thirteenth 
century. By contrast, section 4.3 will show how the monarchy improved its grip 
on the country's resources while section 4.4 will describe the emergence of the 
institutions that will define an efficient 'domain state,' 
Section 4.1 - The Concepts 
According to Fernao Lopes, when Pedro I died, newly-crowned Fernando 
was informed that the royal treasury held an impressive sum of 800,000 pe9as 
and 400,000 marks of silver. This equated to nearly three times the annual 
income of Castile and nine times that of Portugal.1 That the considerable 
treasures accumulated by the 'old kings' from Dinis up to Fernando resulted 
from the inter-generational accumulation with virtually no resort to coinage 
manipulations neither to extraordinary taxes constitutes a powerful suggestion 
of the effectiveness of the crown's fourteenth-century fiscal institutions whose 
lineaments Lopes described. 
Notwithstanding the evidence, the system sketched in the chronicles of 
Fernao Lopes has hardly been considered by the historians who overviewed 
Portuguese state finances. Jose Mattoso alluded briefly to the thirteenth-century 
fiscal organisation only to dismiss it as a 'not very coherent system'. This exact 
judgment and these very words were reasserted by A. L. de Carvalho Homem.2 
For Mattoso, the large-scale acquisition of rural and mostly urban properties by 
Afonso III and his 'more aggressive' collection of new dues and old arrears 
1 See supra note <48, p. 98. 
2 'Sistema pouco coerente'. Mattoso, ldentjf~o de um Pais, part 2, p. 194 (first published in 1984); Homem, A. L. 
de Carvalho, 'A Corte~ o-Governo Central', Homem and Coelho, Port. De,., p. 546. 
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derived from the crown's centralising drive after the death of Sancho II. These 
were pragmatic and efficient acts that did not imply any profound institutional 
changes.3 As a result of Afonso Ill's personal intervention, the finances of the 
crown might have become more solvent but not necessarily more organised. 
For Carvalho Homem, the first sign of an improved organisation of finances was 
the emergence of the overseers of finances (Vedores da Fazenda) in the last 
third of the fourteenth century (1369).4 This new office was associated by this 
author with the new fiscal setting brought by the Fernandine Wars. 
This interpretation followed closely that of A. H. Oliveira Marques and V. 
Magalhaes Godinho who had signalled the later decades of the fourteenth-
century as the moment when the finances of the state cease to be 'patrimonial' 
and became 'public'. For the former, this was manifest in the emergence of 
fiscal districts, the a Imoxa rifa dos, and, most of all, of a sales tax common to the 
whole population of the kingdom: the sisa.5 The creation of the Vedores da 
Fazenda, the kingdom-wide implementation of the sisa and the definite 
formulation of inalienability of the royal patrimony with Joao I (1385-1433) 
converged with the doctrinal perception of a crown as a respublica, as a state. 
These transformations represented a rupture with a past based upon a 
patrimonial management of the king's finances and the absence of an 
autonomous institutional apparatus.6 
More or less explicitly, all these authors opposed a state organisation 
with a fiscal administration to an incoherent network of officers and institutions 
subjected to the person of the ruler. According to this paradigm, historians only 
detected coherent organisation in the end of fourteenth century when state-like 
institutions - the almoxarifado, the sisas, the notion of demesne and the 
emergence of direct, public taxes - were established. To a large extent, the 
submission of fiscal problems to the grand narratives of 'centralisation' and 
state-building led Mattoso and Carvalho Homem to assume incoherence for the 
3 Leontina Ventura highlighted the 'great reform of the financial administration that started in the reign of Afonso III' 
('grande reforma da administra~ao financeira que se inicia tamMm no reinado de Afonso J/f) but she did not address 
the long· term impact of these 'reforms', as her work upon the reign of Afonso III. Ventura, Leontina, A Nobreza de 
Corte de Afonso 11/, vol. I, Coimbra, 1992, p. 503. 
4 Homem, 0 Desembargo, pp. 119-133. 
5 Marques, Portugal na Crise, p. 300. This perspective was first suggested in a compact analysis of Portuguese 
'public finances' by Magalhaes Godinho: Godinho, Vitorinq Magalhaes, 'Fina~s Publicas e Estrutura do Estado', 
Dicionario de Historia de Portugal, vol. 3, 2nd, Porto, 1992, pp.21-31. 
6 Godinho, 'Finanyas Publicas,' pp. 21-31. 
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period prior to the 13705. By contrast, the present chapter will show that 
Portuguese finances prior to the Fernandine Wars are intelligible within the 
conceptual framework built by Bonney and Ormrod, namely as a 'domain 
state.'7 
The concept of 'domain state', as it was advanced by Bonney and 
Ormrod, has to be understood in close continuity to that of 'tribute state'. In fact, 
for these authors, the two systems share many of their most decisive features.8 
Unlike the transition from tax state to fiscal state, which cannot be dissociated 
from dramatic changes within the economy, mainly the development of credit,9 
domain state and 'tribute state' share the same type of revenues: infrequent and 
purpose-specific taxes and aids, debasement of coinage in wartime with 
'exactions and extortions' playing a similar role in tributary and domainal 
systems. In both cases, as well, the payments to the state consisted of 
'contributions in both money and kind,,1Q although in the case of the tribute 
state, coercion plays a larger part. Furthermore, it is not the existence of domain 
alone that defines a 'domain state'. Bonney and Ormrod concede that tribute 
states could also resort to revenues from the 'domain', the difference being their 
importance: whereas domainal revenues form the indispensable basis of the 
state's finance, in tribute-based states the yield of the domain is only one 
amongst other equally relevant sources: plunder, surplus of colonised lands and 
tribute.11 Similarly, the resources obtained by these two states are also spent in 
essentially the same activity: military effort. Indeed, whilst later-day tax states 
had to pay for technological and organisational improvements with the 
contribution of their tax-bases and were prone to severe debt-servicing costs 
during and after their conflicts, the armies of tributary and domainal 
organisations counted on booty, conquered land and tribute from occupied 
people to live on. These practices, as well as the resort to labour services for 
logistics, were common to both systems. There is an important difference: some 
domain states could scale the costs in proportion to their less elastic income. 
7 Bonney and Ormrod 'Introduction: Crises, ReVOlutions,' pp. 4-8. 
8 Bonney and Ormrod 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions,' pp. 4-8. 
9 Bonney and Ormrod 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions,' pp. 7 and 18-19. 
10 Bonney and Ormrod 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions,' pp. 5 and 14. 
11 Bonney and Ormrod 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions,' pp. 5 and 12. 
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However this change pales in comparison with dramatic shift brought by tax 
state in this respect.12 
To Bonney and Ormrod, the differences between the systems are mostly 
to be found at the level of the central rule: for tributary rulers, itinerancy was a 
major unifying factor within their states of uncertain borders and unstable 
peripheries, whereas their domainal counterparts could establish a strong 
personal rule without the need for constant military expansion and for constant 
travels in order to re-assert their prominence. This is turn contributes towards 
'relatively advanced' forms of administration, as opposed to the rule by a volatile 
retinue with impermanent officers. As in what concerned expenditure, the 
difference lies on the relatively higher degree of stability provided by a revenue 
based on the domain rather than on such variable revenues as those provided 
by tribute.13 
The notion of the 'domain' is evidently the cornerstone of this system. 
Nonetheless, as the authors avail, this concept is contentious and the usages of 
this word and of its equivalents widely vary within different administrations, 
historiographies and disciplines. The ambiguity starts with the word itself: 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century legal and administrative parlance distinguished 
the dominium from the domanium: while the former referred to the eminent 
seigniorial power that the king enjoyed over the territory of the realm, the latter 
denoted the lands owned by the king, what English administration came to call 
the 'old demesne.,14 However, in Schumpeter's original theory, the domain 
monarchy depended on the exploitation of natural resources owned by the 
monarch. The 'domain' would thus correspond to the estates, mines, human 
labour and minting profits that could form the patrimony of the princes. 
Accordingly, the taxation of commercial activity could not be considered part of 
the domain. Facing this contrast between the economic and legal-administrative 
notions of 'domain', Bonney and Ormrod opt for the latter and define domain as 
the set of regalian rights in the realm, irrespective of their economic nature. 
Thus, rights over trade and transport of merchandise should not be excluded 
12 For more concrete examples see Barta, Janos and Ormrod, W. Mark, 'The Feudal Structure and the Beginnings of 
State Finance', ESSF, pp. 53-79. 
13 Bonney and Ormrod, 'Crises, Revolutions,' pp. 5 and 15. 
14 Leyte, Guillaume, Domaine et Domainalite Publique dans Ia France Medi8vale (Xlle-XVe si6cles) Strasbourg, 
1996, p. 127. 
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from the 'domain', in spite of not arising from the exploitation of natural 
resources.15 
In the context of the thirteenth- to fifteenth-century European 
administrative workings and, consequently, with the available sources, the 
option of equating the domain to the regal ian rights is certainly more 
practicable. The distinction between revenues from direct or indirect exploitation 
of royal landed property and the remaining seigniorial sources Gudicial fines, 
tolls, customs and customary payments) was not an operational one for 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century accounting bodies. When auditing their 
officers, neither the Casa dos Contos, nor the Exchequer nor the Chambre des 
Comptes were interested in distinguishing the revenues of direct exploration of 
regal lands from justice profits, monopolies, military contributions and tolls.16 
Officer and accountant dealt with territorial units which comprised incomes of 
different nature. English sheriffs, French bailiffs and Portuguese almoxarifes 
were accounted as the responsible officers for a district not for a set of 
revenues. Indeed, the collection and spending of the royal revenues were only 
part of the obligations that those officers had within the territory assigned to 
them. 
Thus, domain should be thought of as a set of regular revenues 
organised in territorial units and considered as integral to the dignity of the 
crown or state.17 As such, the history of any domain state, and indeed of the 
state, is intrinSically connected with the changes in the territorial administration. 
The link between a political centre and the territorial control of the realm is the 
15 Ormrod, 'England in the Middle Ages', RFS, pp. 22-5. 
16 In England, the yield of the king's manors and boroughs (the demesne) was included in the general 'farm of the 
. county' which comprised also variegated profits of justice from local courts. See Morris, William A. 'The Sheriff,' in 
Willard, J. F., Morris, William A., Strayer, Joseph, and Dunham, W. N., The English Government at Work, vol. II, 
Fisca/ Administration, Cambridge MAo 1947, pp. 74-75. As such, the sheriff was accounted for together with a series 
of other revenues. Similarly, the legal distinction between property and seigniorial rights was not relevant in the 
operations of the Chambre des Comptes. (Leyte, Domaine et Domaina/ite, p. 195.) In Portugal, the distinction was 
also meaningless until the very end of the fourteenth century, when the century-old Casa dos Contos was divided 
into the Contos proper (also called de Lisboa or do Reino) dealing with the kingdom-wide revenues and the Contos 
da Casa Real auditing only the officers of the agricu~ural estates which reverted directly to the royal household. Rau, 
Virginia, A Casa dos Contos, Coimbra, 1951, pp.25-7. 
17 This definition remains dose to that by Jean Favier: 'un complexe de revenues ef de droits fiissemines dans 
I'espace, ainsi peuf-on definir Ie domaine'. Favier, Jean, Finance ef Fiscalite dans Ie Bas Moyen Age, Paris, 1971, p. 
23. 
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primary condition for a successful domain state.18 This connection which 
Michael Mann called 'territorial centralisation' can be regarded as the state's 
only irreducible power, as the capacity that no other network can produce.19 
Without a contiguous network of spatial institutions linked to the political centre, 
the state would be unable to effectively tap the commercial or agrarian 
resources of the country and, crucially, manage them according to its own 
criteria. Indeed, without territorial institutions the political centre would require 
physical presence to rule, as in coercive, itinerant and volatile 'tribute states.' 
Indeed, domain state is not conceivable without a territorial system susceptible 
of gathering 'expendable income' and transfer, physically or by coordinated 
information and assignment, to the recipients decided by the political centre.20 
Section 4.2 - One King, Many Systems 
One king, many systems: thus could we broadly describe the taxation of 
late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Portugal. Unlike post-Conquest English 
monarchs who enjoyed a 'system of 'undifferentiated government" throughout 
the kingdom,21 the powers of the kings of Portugal were unevenly distributed 
within the realm. Leaving aside tribute and other military-related income, late 
twelfth--century and early thirteenth-century kings claimed as theirs a wide array 
of land-tied contributions throughout the kingdom. Large-scale conquests led by 
the monarchs had brought under the same throne the urban networks and cities 
of the South, warring autonomous towns in the Centre and East together with 
the primitive core of the realm, the rural North. While the vocabulary of the royal 
charters is remarkably homogeneous, each of these universes had endogenous 
institutions and taxes with the authority of the monarch bound together. 
18 For this reason, it is surprising to find that Bonney and Ormrod do not consider the role played by local 
administration in the consolidation of the domain state. For these historians, both tribute and domain states display 
'high levels of local autonomy with royal sanction and/or punishment'. Crises, p. 4. 
19 Mann, Michael, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Resuhs,' War, States and 
Capitalism. Studies in Political Sociology, Oxford, 1988, pp. 27-29. Or, to use borrow idea and an expression from 
Michael Mann, 'the state is indeed a place.' Mann, 'The Autonomous Power', p. 16. 
20 The notion of 'expendable income', originally from Robert Stacey, is taken from Vincent Moss. Moss, Vincent, 'The 
Norman fiscal ReVOlution,' Crises, pp. 40, note 21, and 44-45. 
21 Wolffe, B. P., The Royal Demesne in English History, Loncion, 1971, p. 35. 
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The revenues collected in these different areas belonged to contrasting 
traditions. In the heartlands of the kingdom - in very broad terms the lands north 
of Coimbra - encroachments, overlapping jurisdictions, ecclesiastical and noble 
immunities and liberties, customs and individual, hereditary privileges formed 
impossibly complex jurisdictions so that, ultimately, each holding and each 
hearth had to pay specific rights and fees. In the northern half of the kingdom, 
the territory was divided in contiguous terrae which formed a coherent spatial 
grid.22 These were predominantly, if not entirely, rural areas with a few, but 
time-honoured, common institutions - weight and capacity standards, a judge 
and also customary laws and fines. The judicial scope of these terrae made 
them also convenient scopes for other non-judicial regalian payments. 
However, each terra was an intricate mosaic of three basic types of holdings: 
noble and ecclesiastical immunities, free holdings liable to the exercise of royal 
powers (Lat. hereditates forarit) and king's lands (regalengii, Port. reguengos). 
The 1220 and 1258 enquiries on this area distinguish clearly these three 
situations. The former were those wherefrom no contribution was due to the 
monarch, as all rights of the monarch had been transferred to (or alienated by) 
noble vassals or monasteries. Contributively, these areas were irrelevant, as 
their inhabitants had to recur to seigniorial courts and they were not summoned 
to the royal host. In contrast to these stood the forarii holdings which were liable 
to a varying host of dues and rights,23 comprising both occasional payments 
reminiscent of the judicial and military powers of the monarch and smaller levies 
marking a sort of personal dependency to the monarch. Many of these dues 
derived from the royal itinerancy: some holdings were liable to the storage of 
the king's agrarian produce, while others had to lodge the monarch. Particular 
lineages were bound to serve the king as collectors of levies and of yields, 
whilst others had to fetch or lend particular items to king or serve as 
huntsmen.24 The concrete burden imposed upon each holding varied 
22 There are some monographs on individual terrae: Andrade, Amelia, Krus, LuIs and Mattoso, Jose, 0 CasJe/oe a 
Feira. A terra de Santa Maria nos secu/os XI a XIII, Lisbon, 1989; Henriques, Ant6nio Castro, 0 Rei e a Terra do 
Barroso. Montanha, Periferia e Poder Regio, 2 vols, Lisbon, 2003; In french, albe~ focused on the military aspects, 
see Barroca, Mario, 'Les Chateaux,' Les Confins du Moyen-Age. Art Portugais. XI/·XVe Si8cle, Gent, 1991, pp. 59-
66. 
23 Lat. fora; Port. foros or direitos. See on this word, Merea, Paulo, 'Em tomo da palavra forum', Revista Portuguesa 
de Filologia, vol. I, tomo II, Coimbra, 1948, p. 485-94. 
24~lves, 'Alguns aspectos,' pp. 33-57. 
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immensely. Naturally, the tenants of king's lands were far more heavily 
burdened: not only had they to pay a hefty portion of the production (ranging 
from % to 1/10), but also they were liable to a series of periodical levies in kind 
as tokens of recognition (directura). Furthermore, they were subject to the same 
levies and payments of the forarii. 
The mediocre value and diversity of individual payments, many of which 
were in kind, did not mean that it they had to wait for the itinerancy of the 
monarch to be consumed or transferred. From the second quarter of the 
thirteenth century onwards, some examples of tax-farming of the terrae are 
visible and the Enquiries of 1258 show that officers named 'general mayors of 
the terra' farmed the revenues within the district. 25 They did so by connecting 
the many petty mayors (mordomos) responsible for small-scale units, such as 
villages or valleys or by some types of revenue.26 
However, more often the terrae would end in the hands of a tenant who 
held the functional powers of the monarch within that land: leadership of the 
army and the judging of his subjects in his court. These powers, and the income 
they brought, were not handled directly by the monarch. On the contrary: 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century Portuguese monarchs regarded these terrae as 
feudal beneficia to be distributed to his vassals. Thus, a vassal who held a terra 
as his tenure acted as delegate of the king and, as such, enjoyed all the 
prerogatives due to the monarch within its boundaries.27 Naturally, the transfer 
of the royal rights comprised the usufruct of the revenues. 
The greater development of the municipalities in the Eastern and Central 
small-towns and the relatively recent date of their incorporation in the kingdom 
25 Port. 'mordomos maiores da terra.'Henriques, 0 Rei e a Terra, vol. I, p. 80. Particularly revealing are two excerpts 
of the 1259 Enquiries quoted by Rosa Marreiros: 'Johanes Alfonsi fuit maiordomus Terre et perdidit ipsa terra in 
guisa quod non potuit pagare ipsam terram'; 'Menendus Pelagii fuir maiordomus istius terre qui non potens 
persoivere rendam Domino Regi: Marreiros, Propriedade FundiBria, vol. II, pp. 588-9, not. 281. 
26 Their service as collectors of these rights was in ~seH a right of the king. By collecting the temporally sparse 
revenues due to the king, the mordomo was paying his tax in service. Indeed, being a mordomo was a burden that 
could be redeemed by a considerable sum of money. TT, MaQO 12 de Forais Antigos, fol. 43, for a charter 
confirmating the resumption of the 'service' of being mordomo in exchange for 300 morabitinos. 
27 This situation of tenure is better formulated in later charters, as that of Cerveira in the far North (1266): pro 
maiordomatu et vocibus et ca/umpniis et omnibus a/iis rec/ditibus et directis que debebat habere meus riqus homo 
qui ipsam terram tenebat nomine et loco mei.TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 81 v-82. This is implied in many of the 
General laws of 1211: 'neither we nor those who held the terras from us nor [their] mordomos' can lodge for free in 
the churches, 'neither we nor he who holds terra from us' can force the peasants to make quivers for hunting, 'no 
knight nor any other who holds terras from us' could resort to prises. Leges, pp. 164, 172 and 177-8 (31d, 14111 and 
25111 laws). 
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allowed for the monarchy to impose from the mid-twelfth-century onwards a 
more uniform fiscal grip. Here the king's revenues were not determined by the 
concrete condition of each particular holding; rather they resulted out of a 
collective negotiation with the king that bound the whole community and its 
territory.28 The results of the negotiation were stated in municipal charters which 
stated the king's power over a specific community and the payments therefore 
due to him. To some extent, the revenues were the same as in the Northern 
lands - the fines (coimas) and payments to the court (voz); the obligation of 
military service and the obligatory bequeath of chattels to the king (/utuosa). 
However, the collective, and perhaps a livelier trade, provided the monarchy 
with sources of income unknown further North: municipal tolls, duties of some 
sold goods and the already-mentioned 'fifth' of the booty obtained. 
Moreover, the collective, rather than individual, scale of the taxation 
worked to the benefit of the king. A good example of this is provided by the 
supposedly universal obligation of feeding the itinerant king and his court, the 
collecta: while in the North it induced individual holdings to provide specific 
foods, in the municipalities of the centre, it bound an entire town with its 
hinterland, thus resulting in a hefty sum. Similarly, the payment in lieu of military 
service - which in the North was reduced to paltry, irregular fossadaria - bound 
the able men of the community, horsemen and foot alike. Indeed, while the 
levies of the Northern territories were imposed according to the particular 
condition of a holding before its lord, in the towns of the Centre levies were paid 
by a community which recognised the king as its lord. This implied a decisive 
practical difference: the municipal justices and the collector of revenues were 
appointed by the municipality which, accordingly, kept a portion of the tolls and 
fines. 
Although most charters expose in detail the levies and fines applicable to 
each particular fine or toll, in practical terms the community was a collective 
taxpayer and, at least from the days of Sancho II, tended to pay lump sums. 
The municipal charters were far from attaining any sort of uniformity. In spite of 
a noticeable unifying purpose. the different tributary traditions, the varying depth 
of the negotiations, the contrasting dates of incorporation in the realm posed 
28 On the economic aspects of this negotiation, see Esteves, Rui, The Portuguese Goncelhas and Forais. A Case in 
Institutional History from the eleventh to the mid thirt8enth.centuries,' 2003 (online working paper, Univ. Stanford). 
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limits -or irresistible opportunities - to the monarchs' aim. The Leonese 
moneda was collected in the northern and north-eastern areas formerly 
belonging to that kingdom. Additionally, as the latter area had been subjected to 
Leonese Law, towns were liable to a form of capitation paid on the feast of St. 
Martin known as I Martinica' which was ignored in the other regions of the 
country. At any rate, from the land occupied by muniCipalities the monarch 
could count with greater liquidity of income. 
In the southern cities of the Tagus Basin and the Algarve the monarchy 
resorted to more sophisticated forms of taxation, given the stronger liquidity and 
monetisation of the economy. In these mercantile urban centres the king 
entered the market by selling grain and wine his lands produced or he had 
obtained from tolls.29 A host of tolls paid by goods entering the city and a sales 
tax further controlled the market. Here the right of conquest endowed the king 
with the dues to the former sovereign and as such there universal obligations, 
like the uniform tax over land-use (the jugada) which bound all owners and 
users of the tolls and customs which reflected the control of the space. These 
tolls and customs included the old Muslim tenth which, unknown in the Northern 
terrae, burdened with 10% all products entering the city.30 Sales taxes, in the 
form of a/cava/as, already existed. Moreover, these towns had revenues 
unknown elsewhere. The Moorish communities who had surrendered without 
combat were taxed independently and subject to unique forms of taxation (the 
alfitra and the azoque) besides having to pay a share upon their agrarian 
production. Similarly, Jewish communities continued to pay the same capitation 
tax as in the Muslim occupation: the djyzia (Port. a/giza, genesim). In the 
territories ruled by the Lisbon-Santarem-Coimbra law, owners of arable lands 
were bound to the land-use tax Uugata). Here, the fiscal grip of the monarchy 
was noticeably more uniform than in the Centre: in 1179 the same law was 
imposed upon the three leading centres of the kingdom • Lisbon, Santarem and 
Coimbra • and it would be later it was extended to the coastal towns of the 
Algarve, while most of the towns of the hinterland received the custom of Evora. 
29 In the case of wine, the king reserved himseH the prerogative relego, that is to say the prohib~ion of wine selling 
before the king's wine (both resulting from tolls and produced in the king's lands) had been sold out. 
30 Gonzalez Arce, Jose Damian, De Is Fiscalidad Is/amica a Is Cristiana. EI Dlzirno Real y la Renta Agraria en 
Toledo (siglos XI-XV), (online working paper, Univ. Murcia). It should be noted that the tenth was collected in 1253 in 
Porto. TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 11. 
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ln the charters defining these customs, it is possible to find demands common 
with the rest of the kingdom: the taxes paid for attending the court and the fines 
(voz and coimas), payment in lieu of military service, tolls .. 
Although quantitative indications for the period are dim, the high degree of 
commercialisation of the economy could not fail to endow the monarchy with far 
greater revenues than in the Northern areas. This circumstance was reflected in 
the way royal income was collected. There are clear indications that the 
considerable revenues of the great southern municipalities were tax-farmed by 
financiers (Christian or Jewish) who could advance large sums to the monarchy. 
In the Lisbon-Coimbra-Santarem customary law, the collection of revenues was 
centralised in a single officer, the mayor or, as he became increasingly known, 
the almoxarife. However, neither the Carolingian nor Arabic designations allow 
us to comprehend the profile of this officer (see Appendix 2). Unlike their 
northern counterparts, the mayors of Lisbon, Coimbra and Santarem were no 
petty officers: two mayors of Lisbon were important enough to confirm two royal 
charters in 1158 and 1160.31 Unlike the Andalusian overseer or al-mushrif, 
thirteenth-century Portuguese almoxarifes were territorial officers which 
operated on a municipal scale.32 
While different, the profile of the Castilian almojarife allows a better 
understanding of the almoxarife that appears in the charter from 1199 onwards. 
From the late twelfth century onwards, the Kings of Castile had their Jewish 
almojarife mayor who acted as the king's main financier and advanced the 
profits of taxation.33 He presided over a network of tax-farming almojarifes 
which acted locally in name of the crown in a few southern cities, most of them 
former capitals of Muslim kingdoms.34 While from the first two mentions to 
almoxarifes in the Portuguese documentation (1199 and 1200), it is clear that 
Portuguese almoxarifes operated at the municipal scale together with municipal 
authorities (castellan and judges) and not at the scale of the almojarifazgos of 
31 Cateano, Marcello, A Administra~o Municipal de Lisboa na Primeira Dinastia, 3rd, lisbon, 1990, p. 15. 
32 DS, doc. 79, p. 124 (31 January 1195), doc. 116, p. 180 (28 May 1199), doc. 215, pp. 320·21 {s. d.) and doc. 237, 
p. 349 (17 October 1 [12061]). 
33 The legal Compilation of Alfonso X, the Partidas, finished c. 1261 describes the attributions of the almojarife (Part 
II, title 9, § 5. 
34 ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y Pader Real, p. 235. The almojarife and his associates ~re responsible tor a set of 
revenues known as the almojarifazgos which included the all the royal (.avenues, both fiscal (tolls and tenths) and 
patrimonial (the Bodega Rea~. Gonzalez ~, De La Fiscalidad Islamica, p. 24. 
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the kingdom of Castile, the first almoxarife of Lisbon can be regarded as very 
close to his Castilian counterparts. 
In a letter dated from December 1210, the king urges a certain Cidy, whom 
he calls 'my Jew' (meo iudeo), not to arrest his Christian debtors.35 Nine years 
later, two Jews, Yusef and Salomon 'sons of the almoxarife' sold a vast property 
in the vicinity of Lisbon and in the next year, in Coimbra, another man with a 
Hebraic name (Moussel) is styled as 'son of the almoxarife,.36 Since the sales 
instruments of 1219 and 1220 refer to three Jewish 'sons of the almoxairfe,' 
Cidywas very possibly the father of these men. The reference to an 'almoxarife 
of Santarem' called Domnus Daniel who, together 'with his associates,' owed a 
sum of c. 11,000 morabitinos to Afonso \I confirms that the early-thirteenth-
century almoxarife worked, or could work, as a tax-farmer.37 On the other hand, 
the evidence present in the Laws of 1211 seems to indicate that the holding of 
sources of revenue resulted in the personal gain of the officers, either by simple 
appropriation or by usury with the king's monies.38 When complemented by the 
aforementioned Sancho's letter granting the tax-farmers of Lisbon the privilege 
of not being forced to farm the rents of the lands, the sales of the king's wine or 
the king's tolls against their will,39 these indications show that the collection of 
revenues in the municipalities of the South depended on tax-farms by 
financiers. 
Give the institutional diversity of the realm, Portuguese kings were at the 
receiving end of a tangle of revenues that they did not create and whose 
organisation, set in the municipal charters or in customs, they would not alter. 
Through his physical presence, military initiatives and also coercion late twelfth-
century and early thirteenth-century kings bound together these contrasting 
systems without changing them. At best, there was a clear perception that the 
monarchy conferred some sort of coherence to the different institutional 
35 OS, doc. 196, p. 303 (7 December 1210). 
36 PTJ, 'Lisboa,' doc. 4, pp. 201-2 (December 1219) and 'Coimbra,' doc. 5, p. 209 (September 1220). 
37 'Como fosse achado en hum roo/ das diuidas que he ena mha chance/eria que Don Daniel e seus companheyros 
ficarom por dar a el rey Don Affonso a segundo meu auoo trijnta mil mara vedis de dez so/das.' IT, Chane. Oinis I, 
livro 2, fol. 84v. The document is from 1295 but ~ concems events in the reign of Afonso II (1211-23). The maravedi 
of 10 S. mentioned are Almohad dirhams, a silver coined used here as money of account, not the Portuguese 
morabitino. ferro, 'Para 0 Estudo da Numaria de O. Olnis,' pp. 206-9. 
38 Leges, p. 174-6 {laws 2()1h and 23 th). 
39 OS, doc. 195, pp. 301-2 (December 1210). 
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universes of the realm. All fiscal vocabulary applied in the charter granted in 
1179 to the kingdom's most important municipalities - Lisbon, Santarem and 
Coimbra -could also be used in the northern lands. All the king's sources of 
income are called regalia iura (including taxes, monopolies, military leadership 
and judicial profits) and their collection is ascribed to a mayor or maiordomus, 
not an a/moxa rife. These two words - maiordomus and regalia jura - could be 
used to denote the entirely different things in the context of the terrae of 
primitive Portucale: although regalia jura in Lisbon or Santarem referred to the 
tenth on land trade, the tax on jugada or the old sales-tax (a/cava/a), in the 
North they would refer to the old tax in lieu of military service (the fossadaria) 
and to the obligation of bequeathing the king (Iutuosa). Even when alienating 
them, royal charters refer to the king's lands and jurisdictions with a variety of 
striking expressions such as fiscalia, omnia quod ad regem pertinent, regalia, 
regalia jura, fisca/e servitium or meis directis. However, the very variety and 
level of abstraction of these terms betray their irrelevance to concrete 
administrative practice. Deprived of an autonomous spatial organisation, the 
monarchy depended on its authority over municipal oligarchies, financiers and 
tenants to whom it granted the regalia jura in turn of their loyalty and service. 
The idea of the crown lands or specific rights played little or no part in the 
ideology of the early Portuguese kingship. Indeed, unlike in better-known 
contemporary cases, the symbol of the 'crown' as an institution independent of 
its bearer had not been articulated.40 The self-representation of Portuguese 
kingship, directly influenced by papal doctrine, was rather different: kingship 
was correlative to an expanding regnum, instead of a set of institutions with 
intrinsic lands and functions.41 This doctrine had been formulated clearly in the 
papal bull which recognised self-proclaimed Afonso I (1143-1179) the title of 
king: the Manifestis Probatum Est of 1179. Accordingly, the charters and wills of 
King Sancho I (1185-1211) articulate and transmit the lofty conception of the 
indivisible regnum. As Maria-Joao Branco argues, this indivisibility of the 
40 In England, the first indications of the inalienability of the crown lands go back to the time of Henry II. Harriss, 
King, Parliament, pp. 131-2. In France, the crown became a concept autonomous from the person of the king ~and 
not merely a 'symbol' of him) in the middle of the twelfth century. The idea of lands belonging to the crown first 
appears in royal charters in 1171-2. Leyte also stresses that along with France, Aragon, Hungary, Bohemia and 
Poland adopted similar ideas before the middle of the 13th century. Leyte, Domaine et Domainalite, pp. 200-5. 
41 In this matter I have followed Branco, Maria-Joao, Poder Real e Eclesiasticos, 2 vols., Lisbon, 1999. On this 
doctrine and its application to the royal wills see Branco, D. Sancho " pp. 86, 127 and 163-5. 
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regnum was affirmed against the practice, so common in the Peninsula, of 
dividing the realm between male heirs or to alienate parts of it to compensate 
younger sons or daughters.42 As such, there is no trace of a link between the 
regnum and the conception of a legal person entitled to specific revenues and 
lands, let alone any practical limits imposed to the monarch's disposal of his 
lands.43 In practice, the idea of the inalienability of the regnum did not prevent 
the habit of alienating patrimonial land (reguengos) and/or royal jurisdiction. At 
any rate, the considerable treasure amassed by Sancho I was his personal 
property (mea pecunia) and two-thirds of it were distributed between his 
descendants other than the heir-apparent. As Maria-Joao Branco has argued, 
King Sancho I disposed of his considerable treasury irrespective of other 
considerations. 
The central set of institutions was very loosely connected to the local 
administration. Royal logistics for the wandering Sancho I was secured by a set 
of ministers called oboedientales: the chamberlain,44 butler, wine-butler, tailor, 
etc .. These were men of some status45 who had to 'make our [the king's] 
expenses, keep our cloths, the tenths, and let the king's lands or lend the king's 
grain or sell the king's wine.'46 On the other hand, there was the court mayor 
(maiordomus curie) who distributed the tenures amongst the king's nobles. The 
crisis of the royal finances, first detected in the will of 1214, saw Afonso II, the 
sedentary monarch par excellence, attempting some noteworthy reforms. 
Afonso II, who spent most of his reign between Lisbon and Santarem, 
attempted to discipline the personnel of the royal household with humiliating 
physical punishments for fraudsters in 1211.47 Two regulations of the royal 
household would be issued later in 1216 and 1222.48 
42 Branco, D. Sancho I, pp. 163-5. 
43 Branco, D. Sancho I, p. 165. 
44 Uncler Sancho I, royal charters barely disclose the existence of a chamberlain (repositarius) and of a mobile 
chamber (repositus or camera) as distinct from the sedentary treasure keeps. A law of 1218 still threatened to punish 
the great-chamberlains with compensating the king of anything that is lost in the houses and churches where the king 
choses to lodge and the houses near the churches where the king listens to the church offices. TT, Chane. Afonso III, 
livro 3, fol. 7v. 
45 Indeed the law considers the hypothesis of some ovenyais having the status of knight and employing auxiliaries. 
46 Leges, p. 176 (23th law). Surprisingly, in the General Laws the verb used to describe the holding of an oveflfS 
(te~ from the king is the same as in the tenancies: 'aquele que de nos teuer alguma causa ouven~al'. The ove~ais 
in a later law were later called those who have servicia in domo mea. TT, Chanco Afonso 1II,livro 3, fols. 8-8v. 
47 Leges, p. 176 (law 231h). 
46 Branco, Poder Real e &:iesiasticos, voL II, pp. 39 and 88. 
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The ambitions of the crisis-triggered reforms of Afonso II went beyond the 
discipline of household officers. He organised elusive records known as the 
Recabedo books, first mentioned in 1216. These books apparently recorded 
(some? all?) royal revenues and to whom they ought to be paid. More famous 
are the monumental enquiries on the royal rights, conducted in the non-
municipal lands of the northern dioceses (Braga, Porto, Lamego and Viseu) in 
1220. These enquiries hint at the need to not only control royal logistics but also 
the lands and rights held from the monarch.49 
Even if Afonso II had an impressive knowledge of royal resources and 
possibly of the way they were spent, the impossibly diverse conditions of the 
country meant that only a share of the king's nominal resources would actually 
find their way from the villages and borders to the royal coffers. The intention of 
Afonso II and of his sons and successors, Sancho II and Afonso III, was to 
concentrate in his hands at least the most cashable resources. This seems to 
have been the role of the first central officer with fiscal attributions: the portarius 
maior (Port. porteiro molj. Institutional historians have assigned the role of 
'coordinating the countrywide collection of revenues' to this officer.5o He first 
appears late in the reign of Afonso II in the shape of two portarii maiores who 
witness a royal charter dated 1222.51 In 1225, a single portarius maior 
appears.52 His functions are not easy to discern.53 From his very designation, it 
is likely that he centralised the profits of the lesser local portarii. These appear 
occasionally in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century charters as ad hoc collectors 
49 The enquiries were presented, and conducted, according to a fourfold structure, comprehending: royal lands 
(reguengos), fora (non-patrimonial levies), rights of patronage in churches and possessions of the orders. While the 
first two clearly can be included in the king's revenues, the fourth cannot. The number of categories inquired (four) 
and the number of Recabedo books (four) is probably a coincidence. One could imagine that each of the book 
covered one of this categories. However, the chancery of Afonso II has a consistent policy of multiplying the copies. 
Vilar, D. Afonso II, p. 165. Presumably, tt was included in order to monitor the encroachments made by these 
institutions. Nonetheless, the enquiries of 1220 testify the drive towards the territorial perception and management of 
the regalia jura. Although the practical functions of the 1220 inquisitions are still being discussed, one should 
consider the hypothesis that they could be used as a form of audit. Since they bore upon the Northen section of the 
realm, most of the king's revenues were expressed in kind, a factor that would made the audit procedures 
cumbersome. 
50 Barros, Hist6ria da Administra~o, vol. III, p. 240. On this and related officers, as well on the historiography about 
them, see Homem, 0 Desembargo, pp. 119-33, maxime 121-2. 
51 Branco, Poder Real e EclesiSsticos, vol. II, p. 88 (TI, NCIc/eo Antigo, doc. 480, fol. 70). 
52 SS, doc. 24, p. 210. 
53 Depos~s the minting material in the treasury of Santa Cruz in 1261, TAIII, doc. X, pp . .242-S; and he wttnesses the 
depostt of monies in the same place, together w~ the chancellor in 1265, TAIII, doc. XXVIII, pp. 252-3. Curiously, in 
the year that Afonso III redacted his testament, 1271, the porteiro-mor and raposteiro-mor coincide in the same 
person, LL, doc. es, p. 207. 
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of individual sources of revenue: land and sea tolls and the royal tenths.54 In 
addition, the portarius is often mentioned as the person responsible for the 
demarcation of noble and ecclesiastical immunities and, as such, he was 
probably responsible for the hefty fines resulting of their trespass.55 Thus, seen 
from an economic angle, the portarii dealt primarily with cash or resources 
working as proxies for cash, such as cloth and grain (in the land and sea tolls).56 
As Joao Cordeiro Pereira has highlighted, between the 12505 and the 1270s 
the Portuguese customs system was already able to monitor both the terrestrial 
borders and the ports collecting a uniform tenth (dfzima) on imports.57 This 
could justify the existence of a portarius-maior who would audit or concentrate 
the profits of the local portarii and would himself be held responsible for them.58 
With the development of both central and local officers in the early decades of 
the fourteenth century, the portarius-maior became extinct.59 
Section 4.3 • From Tenure to Custody 
As it as been argued above, the existence of a local administration is 
extremely decisive in the fiscal system. In purely institutional terms, the typical 
relations between the political centre and its nominal resources can only be 
understood if two forms of territorial control are differentiated: 'tenure' and 
'custody'. In the first situation, a set of resources nominally belonging to the king 
in a given territory is assigned to someone, together with judicial, military 
powers and privileges to be exercised within a given same territory. He would 
exert his power in lieu of monarch but oriented towards his own, rather than the 
king's, dynastic interests. For the tenant this would as much a beneficium as an 
officium. In custody, in contrast, a set of revenues are entrusted to an officer 
whose function is to collect, store and spend them in accordance with orders 
emanating from the centre. In this situation, coercive powers are, in theory at 
54 Unlike almoxarifes they were not placed on municipalities to manage set of disparate revenues. Branco, Poder 
Real, vol. II, p.248. 
55 This the oldest documented function of a portarius regis, DR, doc. 356, p. 480 (1185). 
56 Presumably, they also controlled the officers dealing with ports, the riparii, whose importance to royal revenues is 
apparent in the will of Sancho II. S5, doc. 44, p. 240. 
57 Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, Para a Hist6ria das Alfandsgas em Portugal no Inicio do Seculo XVI (Vi/a do Conde -
Organiza~8o e Movimento) Lisbon, 1983, pp. 22-4. 
58 TI, Gaveta XII, mayo 13, doc. 10. 
59 The porteir,a-morsurvived up to 1321. Homem, ODesembargo, pp. 121-8,292,488·95. 
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least, tied to the officer's fiscal functions. It is, thus, simply an officium, as it 
separates administration from patronage and the territory is no longer regarded 
as a benefice. In this situation, both redistribution and military service would be 
assured by the monies extracted by the king's officers from the territorial units. 
This distinction can be recognised in some concrete, well-known 
institutional contexts: the contrast between curial and custodian sheriffs in 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century England.50 The Castilian thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century administrative units (the merinados) were clearly disposed of 
as tenures,61 while the French bailiffs had custodian functions within their 
bailliages. For the present case, the distinction between custody and tenure is 
already clear in the General Laws of 1211.62 In spite of the erratic, fluid 
vocabulary, a contrast between the officers and the tenants who held lands from 
the king is clearly apparent in this legislation.63 The clearest example of this 
difference is perhaps twenty-seventh law which commands that 'those who held 
land from us' should not fail to collect fines on account of poverty and the same 
applied to the castellans and judges of the land 'we [the king] have withhold for 
US,.64 This distinction between lands given away and those retained by the king 
did not apply only to justice and its profits. The third General Law stated that 
neither the king's officers (styled almoxarifes) nor 'those who hold those lands 
from us [the king]' could appropriate the cargo of shipwrecks.65 Another law 
forbids both the tenants of the king's lands and the king's officers (here called 
oven~ais) to pay their purveyances under their just price, as it was customary.S6 
60 Carpenter, D. A, 'The Decline of the Curial Sheriff in England, 1194-1258', English Historical Review, vol. 91, n. 
358, Jan., 1976, pp. 1-32. 
61 For the Castilian meirinados, see Alvarez Borge, Ignacio, Monarquia Feudal y OrganizaciOn Territorial: Alfoces y 
merindades en Castilla (siglos X-XV) Madrid, 1993, p. 206. 
62 The laws are articulated as a response to concrete grievances and as such the laws Indirectly provide a 
description of current administrative practices. Branco, 'The General Laws of Afonso II,' pp. 86-91. 
63 Although, almoxarife and tenente can be sharply distinguished, the vocabulary relative to them fluctuates 
considerably in, predominantly Latin, twelfth-and early thirteenth-century royal charters and other betters, partly 
because the vocabulary of the former was less permeable to colloquial speech. The almoxarife could be translated 
by the Latinate name of maiordomo in twelfth-century charters (as other Arabic offices were translated w"h some 
loose Latin equivalent, whenever available) while tenente is an erud"e word adopted by the historians that seldom 
appears in contemporary sources. The tenurial pos"ion was designated by a rich vemacular and Latin vocabulary, 
including dominus terrae (Port. senhor da terra) divus homo (Port. rico-homem da terra) or ille qui tenebatltenet terra, 
vassa/us. In the present work, almoxarife and tenente will be used as technical terms w~ the meaning explained. 
64 'Alguns que de nos as terras teuerent Leges, p. 179. 
65 'Que os nossos almuxarifes nom leuem deles causa nem aqueles que de nos as terras teuerem nem nenhuum 
outrd. Leges, p. 164. 
66 Leges, p. 176 {23rd law). 
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Similarly, in the seventeenth law, the prohibition of lodging in the churches was 
extended both to the 'mayors' and to those who held the lands from the king.67 
In all these four laws, which were to be applied for the whole space of the 
kingdom, two different situations are envisaged: either authority - with 
correlative material gains - of a given territory was held as tenure or it was 
administered by an officer. In the first case, the idiom 'those who hold lands 
from us' unambiguously signals a vassal/lord relationship whose beneficium is 
constituted by the revenues associated with the rule of the terras.68 If the 
territory was held by tenure, the judiciary fines, the rent of the king's lands and 
an array of personal fees reverted to the tenant (tenente), together with his 
judicial and military power, exerted in the name of the king. Furthermore, the 
tenant was not accountable for the powers he exerted in a territory held by him 
neither for the revenues he collected. At best, tenure comprised the obligation 
of providing free military service with a retinue. 
By contrast with 'those who hold the lands', the officers acted as 
custodians of the king's interests within a given territory. The deSignations 
employed for the custodian officers are diverse (almoxarife, oven~al and 
mordomo) but all exclude a lord/vassal-type relationship with the monarch.69 
Although offices could be lucrative,7o they were not beneficia, as they were 
subordinated to or controlled by other instances of equal standing and oven~ais 
and mordomos were so bound to their mission that they could be forced by the 
king to collect or to tax-farm his revenues?1 
67 Leges, p. 173 (1711lIaw). 
68 The sentence is presumably translating illi qui de nobis terras tenerint, a common phrasing in the General 
Enquiries of 1258. The vassalic connotations of the verb tenere are well known within the Portuguese context. On the 
vocabulary of Portuguese 'feudalism', Mattoso, Jose, 'A Oifusao da Mentalidade Vassalica na Linguagem 
Quotidiana,' Fragmentos de uma Compos~o Medieval, 2nd ed., Lisbon, 2001, pp. 119·131. 
69 In the Laws of 1211, tree different names () are employed to denote this situation. These three words do not 
convey exactly the same: ovenyal (Lat. abediencialis) is a name given to ministers of the monarch who held specific 
sources of revenues. Leges, p. 176 (23th Law). On the term 'ove~', see Caetano, A Administ~o Municipal, pp. 
37·8; Amaral, S. Salvador de Grij6, p. 148·51. Almoxarifes, as it will be explained, combined subordinate judiciary 
and fiscal functions. The fourth of the General Laws, which forbade the almoxarifes to take the dlattels of executed 
traitors, suggests that their actions were at least in theory under the authority of royal magistrates. Leges, p. 165. On 
the control of the almoxarife by the judges and the castellan, see for Instance OS, doc. 116, p. 180 {28 May 1199). 
Mordomo is the loosest of the three, as it could deSignate anything from a petty, near-servile collector of customary 
revenues subject to the tenant to a revenue collector of a major city who could even reach the heights of confirming 
royal charters. Caetano, A Administ~o Municipal, p. 15; Henriques, 0 Rei e a Terra. vol. I, p. 112·7. 
70 Officers practiced usury with the king's monies. Leges, pp. 174·5 (2()1h law). 
71 See the charter<:onfirmating the resumption of the office of mordomo bought from Sancho I by the mordomo Nuno 
Peres for him and for all his descendency (TI, M~ 12 de Forais Antigos, fol. 43). On forcing the abedieneiales to 
tax·farm the revenues from Lisbon, see the privilege of Sancho I, in DS, doc. 195, pp. 301·3 (December 1210). 
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Custody and tenure appear as alternative forms of ruling a given territory 
within the kingdom. In theory, the king could chose which form was more 
convenient to his interests in a precise conjuncture?2 Nonetheless, in practice, 
the contrast between these two forms of administration can be more clearly 
exposed together with two opposing forms of territorial organisation. The rural 
districts (terrae) of the primitive Portucale were held by tenant vassals, while the 
municipalities tended to be administered by their landholding and/or mercantile 
oligarchies, even if occasionally they held as tenures. Indeed, considering the 
opinions of Jose Mattoso, the very emergence of an independent monarchy in 
the person of Afonso I cannot be dissociated from the aspirations of the local 
tenant nobility?3 Thus, Afonso I and Sancho I could not help regard tenure by a 
vassal as the default form of exerting their power on any territory. 
Tenure was eventually exported southwards together with the conquests of 
Afonso I and Sancho I. Up to the middle of the century, several known 
instances of municipalities being held by royal magnates as tenures are 
identifiable. Even fiercely proud municipalities like Lisbon, Santarem or Coimbra 
did not enjoy such exemption and were at least occasionally held by tenants 
and vassals. Lisbon (conquered in 1146) had tenants in 1153 and 1179 and 
circa 1210?4 
Thirteenth-century tenancies retained all their strength before the 
monarchy. The lists of tenants for the reigns of Sancho II and Afonso III made, 
respectively, by Hermenegildo Fernandes and Leontina Ventura allow a good 
perspective on the tenancies in this period?5 While in theory the vassal tenant 
was removable at the king's will,16 in the North there was a clear tendency for 
families to build on their predominance over the same terra. Although tenants 
occasionally incurred the king's disgrace, there was a strong tendency for 
72 While considering in his will the regency for his young son, King Sancho I envisaged the possibility of ruling cum 
recJditibus terra rum, implying that the vassals would not hold them. See comments on this expr-ession by Maria Joao 
Branco. Branco, Sancho I, p. 166. 
73 See his crucial essay 'A Primeira Tarde Portuguesa', Portugal M-edieval: Novas Interpreta¢es, Lisbon, 1987, pp. 
11-35. 
74 For the first two dates, see Caetano, A Administraao Municipal, p. 11. The last reference is simply a mention of a 
particular noble quando ipse tenebat Ulixbonam, DS, doc. 193, p. 295 (5 July 1210). Cases of tenure in these three 
c~ies disappeared in the middle of the thirteenth century with the affirmation of municipal govemment. See infra p. 
130-1 
75 Ventura, A Nobreza deCorte, vol. II, pp. 997-1038; Femandes, D. Sancho II, p. 2n. 
76 The already·mentioned twenty-seventh law of 1211, threatened the tenants who failed to fine or arrest criminals 
with the loss of the land from the king. Leges, p. 179. 
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hereditary transmission.77 Blood constrained so strongly the width of royal 
choices that Leontina Ventura considered that some were indeed 'family 
tenures.,78 The reigns of Sancho II and Afonso III even saw the expansion of the 
tenancies to regions dominated by municipalities. Besides traditional Northern 
terrae, typically municipal areas such as Beira, Viseu and Pan6ias, and even 
cities like Silves (and with it the whole Algarve) and Evora were held as 
tenures?9 Indeed, tenants were still apPointed in terrae which were converted 
into municipalities, as in the case of Barroso which continued to have a tenant 
after receiving a municipal charter.8o In both reigns only the wealthiest towns -
Coimbra, Lisbon and Santa rem - escaped being involved as passive revenues 
in vassal/lord relationships. 
On the ninth of October of 1284, King Dinis solemnly revoked all the 
donations, grants and gifts he had made since the beginning of his reign five 
years before because, as he claimed in the preamble, he was then too young 
and unaware and because experience had shown that these had been in 
detriment of the crown.81 Notwithstanding the emphatic tenor, the crown, the 
entity which the donations so seriously offended, was unheard of in Portuguese 
administrative parlance.82 The very 'crown' as a physical object played no part 
in the monarchy's ideology because, as Peter Linehan claims, the kings of 
Portugal were neither crowned nor anointed.83 Conversely, in European legal 
n All the eight known tenants who held the terra of Barroso from the 1150s to the 1280s, descended from the father 
of the first known tenant; and still at least two of them had been deprived of the tenure by the king. Henriques, 0 Rei 
e a Terra, voL I, pp. 102·3 (fig. 2). Blood was so influential that even the abrupt fall from grace of the grandson of the 
first tenant merely resu~ed in the transfer of the tenure to a nephew from the female line. 
78 Ventura, A Nobreza de Corte, vol. I, p. 267. 
79 However, the concession of tenancies to municipal~ies or sets of municipalities did not imply that the same 
combination of officium and beneficium that ruled the terrae could be applied here. In the cases where municipal 
lands were granted by the king as tenures, the power of the tenant could not have been as discretionary as in the 
terrae: in the context of municipal"ies, military defence was concentrated in a castellan that held the castle from the 
hands of the king and could even be chosen by the municipality, whilst courts were headed by Iocally-elected 
municipal justices. Furthermore, municipal charters fixed in written form the exact sums to be paid for fines, tolls and 
other contributions, thus diminishing the elastic"y of the tenure's receipt. Moreover, many of these municipalities had 
agreed a perpetual farm ~h the king. Thus, while conceding the tenure of a land, the king was endowing his nobles 
w~ a rigid income that his actions could not change. 
80 Henriques, 0 Rei e a Terra voL I, p. 144. 
81 TI, Chanco Dinis, Livro 1, fols. 181·2. The allusion to the crown is in the preamble: 'in periudicium iuris et honoris 
sue corone'. 
82 This claim is based in word searches (s. v. 'coroa', 'corona', 'oorOO8') in a digital version of the publisheddlancery 
registers of Afonso III (1248·79) and the skimming of his second and third unpublished chancery registers. 
83 Portuguese king were elevated upon a ceremonial shield (Port. a~do) and acclaimed by his court (Port. 
ae/amado). On the absence of coronation ceremonies see, in English, linehan, Peter, 'Utrum Reges Portugalie 
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doctrine, 'the crown' was a concept that had been discussed for three 
generations of legal scholars and had by then acquired a precise meaning of an 
'entity entitled to rights and incarnating the common good.,84 
While heuristic contingency makes it impossible to identify the concrete 
donations and grants that had harmed the crown of the realm,85 the expression 
the 'crown of the realm' proved to be a powerful legal weapon in the partly 
military, partly judicial fight to deprive his brother Afonso of his, otherwise 
legitimate, inheritance, comprising three castles in the border. In the text of the 
sentence which revoked the donation done by his father and confirmed by 
Dinis, the king qua judge stated that the fact that those castles were among the 
best in the kingdom and that they laid in its frontier made them dangerous to the 
crown of the realm.86 Significantly, prince Afonso was offered in exchange for 
his strategic castles of Portalegre, Arronches and Marvso, a regular annuity 
equivalent to the total rents of those fortresses payable in harmless Sintra and 
Ourem.87 Because this plea involved a legitimate son of Afonso III, it remains 
very well-documented. Nonetheless, one can argue that, in spite of high-profile, 
this was a paradigmatic case. Indeed, as J. A. Pizarro testifies, from 1284, the 
very year of the revocation, the tenancies started to fade. Moreover, the office 
of court mayor, who controlled the assignment of the tenants disappeared, 
never to emerge again.88 Obviously, this did not imply the total alienation of the 
nobility. Indeed, the exchange of border castles for annuities proposed to Prince 
Afonso might well have been the compensation offered by the monarchy. Of 
this, however, the present information is very scarce as the surviving chancery 
records provide no other example of concession of annuities in this period. 
In spite of the very patchy knowledge of the redistributive activity of the 
monarchy, the introduction of the political symbol of the crown had some impact 
Coronabantur Annon,' The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law: Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal 
Rome in the Middle Ages, Oxford, 2002. 
84 'Entire titulaire de droits incamant Ie bien common'; thus describes leyte the concept of the crown as developed by 
twelfth· and thirteenth-century juridical thought. leyte, Domaine et Domanialite, p. 320. 
85 This has led J. A. Pizarro to deny that this decree had made any practical difference. For him, n worked only as 
one more weapon in the legal, judicial and ideological arsenal that Dinis used to assert the supremacy of the king 
over the nobility whhout even recovering the encroachments his lands suffered as h he threatened to do in other 
occasions. Pizarro, J. A de $otto Mayor, D. Dinis, Lisbon, 2005, pp. 92·3. 
86 LL, doc. 69, p. 222 (1 Octorber 1315). 'Fora teyta em gram perda e dano da coroa do reyno de Portugal que eram 
dos mays fortes e dos melhorescasteios e dos mays perigososo porque stavam na fronteyra del.' 
87 LL, doc. 68, pp. 206-209 (1 July 1300). 
88 Pizarro, Jose Augusto de"Sotto Mayor, D. Dinis, lisbon,2005, pp.92·5. 
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on the administration of the royal revenues. At first sight, the impact seems 
hardly overwhelming: in the terminology of the royal letters kings continued to 
use the first person possessive when referring to the regalian rights, precisely 
as twelfth-century charters used to. However, all land donations made to a lay 
person included the proviso that should there be lack of direct descendant they 
had to revert to the 'crown of the realm.,89 What gave a major importance to the 
revocation of 1284 was that it came alongside a decided administrative 
orientation against the tenure of royal functions and revenues. The 'crown of the 
realm' came to be a synonym of 'custody': in the same period a few 
municipalities got from the monarch the promise of being held by no-one but by 
the 'crown of the realm,.90 The most important evidence on the changes 
imposed by Dinis comes from an isolated folio which opens one of the records 
of the royal sentences issued in 1290 on the trespasses found by the enquiries 
of two years before.91 Here an unknown agent informed the monarch that the 
municipalities and terrae north of the River Lima, an area dominated by tenure, 
had been tax-farmed. The tax-farming of the terrae in the extreme north stands 
for a victory of custody over tenure. 
Naturally, the systematic implantation of custody did not imply that the 
nobility was cut of from the giving hand of the monarch. Very likely, noble 
purses were the ultimate destination of the revenues of the domain. However, in 
the reign of Dinis the nobility was screened out of the landed revenues by the 
intermediation of royal institutions with an autonomous ends. Henceforward the 
monarchy would redistribute monies but it would not distribute districts. In 
absence of any relevant quantitative evidence, the evolution of the word ten~a 
points to a decisive rupture that can be dated to the time of Dinis I (1279-1322). 
In the thirteenth century ten~a referred to the precarious holding of a source of 
revenue which nominally belonged to the king or, in other words, to a tenure. 
The type of rent assigned to the holder of a te~a varied: it could be the 
89 TT, Chane. Dinis, livro 1, fol. 25Ov, livro 3, fols. 30, 41, 42, 44. The only 'pure and simple donations' found in the 
six surviving chancery books of King Dinis correspond to his rights as patron of churches whose peculiar Jegal frame 
was hard to fit into the idea of the 'crown of the realm'. This has already been noted in Farelo, Mario, '0 Direito de 
Padroado na Lisboa Medieval', Promontoria, Ana 4, n. 4, 2006, pp. 285-87. 
90 Montenegro in 1302 (TI, Chane. Dinis, livro 3, fol. 22v); Castelo de Vide and Alegrete in 1299 (IT, Chane. Dinis, 
livro 3, fol. 7); Bemposta in 1316 (TT, Chane. Dinis,livro 3, fol. 101). 
91 TT, Fe"os da Coroa, Llvro 6 de InquiriQOes de D. Dinis, fol. 1. 
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municipal rent,92 it could be an agrarian property (prestamo or reguengo) or it 
could be the wages and fines allocated to the function of castellan (a/caidaria). 
Possibly, it could also be a sum of money payable by the king's central 
institutions. Throughout the reign of Dinis, ten~as were disconnected from the 
exercise of authority and, although occasionally allocated in specific 
municipalities, they were royal revenues collected by the royal administration 
that were temporarily diverted to a holder.93 They were, in sum, a rent. Unlike 
previous redistributive payments, it did not entail any function or exercise of 
jurisdiction, but merely the usufruct of the monies produced. In return, it implied 
fidelity and military service. 
Unlike his strict father, whose testamentary bequeaths were not even 
based in the sums hoarded, Dinis I provides many examples of the good shape 
of his finances after his first will of 1299 (see section 1.1). The relative wealth 
displayed by Dinis I in the last half of his reign and in his testament of 1322 
shows how the crown recovered its accumulative capacity. However, the letter 
of quittance of 1278-80 suggests a high cash-flow in the crown's treasury was 
already a reality in the end of his father's reign. By then, it can be argued, the 
crumbling of the early king's finance had already been compensated by the 
constitution of a 'domain state'. However, and this seems the more coherent 
explanation, the expenditure side of the budget had not yet been tamed. Afonso 
III had not yet managed to master the redistributive pressures of his nobles. 
Presumably, redistribution had not yet found an alternative to tenure. The 
abrupt revocation of 1284 and the virtual end of the tenures was the sign of a 
monarchy that could directly exert its powers and collect its dues and, in 
parallel, could fulfil the redistributive hopes of the nobility without giving away 
administration as a form of patronage. In other words, it was the sign of a state 
that had managed to virtually encompass all his revenues in a system of 
custody. 
82 TenfBs allocated to municipalities were for the most reserved for the highest-ranking nobles. The earliest 
examples date from King Dinis. The rent of the municipality of Chaves was diverted to the Count Go~1o Garcia de 
Sousa (TI, Chane. Dinis I, Livro 3, fol. lav): the rent of Barcelos were diverted to the counts Joao Afonso Telo in 
1298 and Martim Gil de Riba de Vizela and 1304 (TI, Chane. Dinis I, Livro 3, fols. 3 and 33v). 
93 The holding of judiciaVmilitary district {terrss) with jurisdiction virtually disappeared from 1287 onwards. Ventura, 
Leontina, 'Terras e Julgados', Port. Defin., p. 524. 
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Section 4.4 - The Invention of the Domain 
The invention of the crown by Dinis in 1284 cannot be separated from 
profound changes in territorial administration. Indeed, as argued, the decisive 
transformation for the formation of a 'domain state' is the construction of an 
autonomous institutional network. In the reign of Pedro I (1357-67), this network 
existed in the shape of the almoxarifados which formed a grid that virtually 
covered the kingdom.94 The existence of the almoxarifado as a defined area 
whereof an almoxarife was responsible contiguous to other almoxarifados 
occurs clearly in ordinances to be applied throughout the kingdom.95 The 
almoxarifados were fiscal districts headed by an officer, the almoxarife, who had 
to collect, store and spend royal revenues within their territory. They had the 
same internal structure and staff, including a resident scribe who controlled the 
actions of the almoxarife by means of two records: an up~to-date rental book 
and a receipt and expenditure log.96 The rest of the staff had to keep a 
warehouse to keep the king's monies, assets and weapons.97 The principle that 
all almoxarifados were to be audited appears already in 1340.98 
The network of almoxarifados did not emerge out of a tabula rasa. Its 
origins are to be found in southern tax-farmers, the earlier almoxarifes who 
were first and foremost financiers which advanced to the monarch the important 
revenues of the southern municipalities (see section 4.2). As a tax-farmer, the 
almoxarife pursued the king's fiscal interests in competition with the other urban 
authorities. He was clearly not a municipal officer, as the term meus almoxarifus 
employed by Sancho I in 1200 makes clear. The almoxarife was subject to 
higher judicial instances - the fourth of the General Laws, which forbade the 
94 Under Pedro I the almoxarifados were used as spatial reference for judicial enquiries. Chane. Pedro I, nos. 826, 
997, pp. 376, 467. Nonetheless, a 1361 enquiry ordering a clarification throughout the Northern judicial districts still 
had to anticipate the possibility of the investigated locality having no almoxarife. Chane. Pedro I, doc.1175, p. '564. 
95 The law forbidding the export of gold, silver and horses to Castile is sent to the almoxarife and scribes of ~ach 
place. Chane. Afonso IVm, vol. III, doc. 344, p. 199 (31 December 1341). See also DP, vol. I, docs. 63 and '68, pp. 65 
amd 75. The coverage seems to be complete by the early 1340s if not earlier. A document dated 1325 already 
mentions the obligation of the monasteries recording properties (TI, C.R., Cabido da Sa de Coimbra, Segunda 
Incorporacao, mao<> 77, n. 3177, I thank Mario Farelo for pointing me to this document. Unfortunately, some of the 
almoxarifes of the remotest parts of the country -Chaves, Vila Real and Torre de Moncorvo - are mentioned in 
undated documents. 
96 On these, see examples in Roldeo, Escrita e Poder.es, p. 50. See also, Lopes, Cron. Pedro /, chapters II and LlV. 
97 TAIII, docs. XII·XVII, pp. 249-252 (1261). 
98 Chane. Afonso IV, doc. 374, p.266. 
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almoxarifes to take the chattels of executed traitors, suggests that their actions 
were at least in theory under the authority of royal, not municipal, magistrates.99 
While he worked for his profit, he acted as the king's delegate within the 
municipality. 
Indeed, the kings retained the capacity to control the almoxarifes, because 
in his role of custodian of the king's interests within a municipality, the 
almoxarife acted along with a scribe (occasionally referred as the king's scribe). 
The control of the almoxarife by a scribe is a very early feature of this office. 
Indeed, it is mentioned for the first time in a letter addressed to the castelan, 
judges, almoxarifes and scribes of Lisbon in 1206. As Filipa Roldao observed 
for the municipalities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Santarem in the thirteenth-century, 
these scribes are never deSignated as the almoxarife's but as the king's or as 
the town's (e.g. scribanus Sanctarensis).100 
The post-1212 crisis of the Peninsular economy and, possibly, the political 
frailty of the monarchy in the transition from Sancho I to Afonso II seem to have 
affected financial operations to which almoxarifes resorted, with more or less 
forceful demand from the kings.101 Pressed by his internal opposition, Afonso II 
forbade Jews or Moors to serve as tax-farmers (oven~ais) in the General Laws 
of 1211.102 Indeed, the two almoxarifes known for the reign of Afonso II, 
Domnus Daniel and Domnus Petrus Valasqui, were both Christian.103 This 
seems to have worked in favour of the municipal oligarchy which provided the 
monarchy with the obvious recruiting ground for such an important function. 
Finally, the General Laws of 1211 stated that the municipality itself could 
organise the collection of rents with or without the almoxarife, whenever it 
decided to tax-farm the sources of revenue within its territory.104 A few signs 
indicate that post-1212, non-Jew almoxarifes lost ground to the municipal 
authorities. A dispute from the reign of Sancho II hints at the difficulty the crown 
99 On the control of the almoxarife by the judges and the castellan, see for instance DS, doc. 116, p. 180. Leges, p. 
165. 
100 Roldao Escrita e Poderes, p. 215, note 66. 
101 The frailty is visible in the aforementioned letter by which King Sancho I promised not to force the oboedentiales 
to tax-farm the king's revenues. DS, doc. 195, p. 301. 
102 The law is presented as a response to the grievances of the Christians. J..eges, p. 178. 
103 Both are almoxarites in Santarem. The former appears styled as almoxarite Domini Regis as a witness to a sales 
contract dated June 1221. PTI, 'Santarem,' doc. 7, pp. 22-3. 
104 The tax-farming is very clear in the fourteenth of the Law of 1211: 'quando as os concelhos assy querem teenr as 
nossas terras a"endadada~, ct. L~ges, p. 172. 
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had in controlling the Lisbon almoxarife who repeatedly acted on the side of the 
municipal authorities against the privileges of the king's saiiors.105 Furthermore, 
as documented by Roldao, confiscation procedures required the presence and 
assent of the municipal judges and, in the reign of Sancho II, could be done 
without the almoxarife.106 
According to Leontina Ventura, the assignment of tax-collection to 
almoxarifes within well-defined districts named almoxarifados was one of the 
administrative innovations brought by Afonso III (1248-79).107 This claim 
appears to be backed by the emergence of the term almoxarifado applied to 
Coimbra in 1261 and to Santarem in 1267.108 However, careful consideration of 
these and other documents cited here shows that from the emergence of the 
word almoxarifado it does not follow that the kingdom was divided into a 
homogeneous grid of discrete, identical almoxarifados each with specific 
personnel and boundaries. This is visible in the only two known instances of 
kingdom-wide contributions: the annual payments by the notaries and the 
monetagia. In the surviving receipts for the monetagium of 1261 it becomes 
clear that this tax was collected along the bishoprics (incidentally, including that 
of Coimbra); none of its tax-collectors is even styled as almoxarife.109 
At any rate, Leontina Ventura is right in pointing to the frantic activity of the 
almoxarifes under Afonso III. If the poorly-documented reign of Sancho II 
seemingly indicates a rapprochement of the almoxarifes with the local interests, 
in the 12505 the references to conflicts between almoxarifes, acting as 
procurators of the king's interests, and municipalities become frequent.110 
Moreover, confiscation of lands of debtors to the king became more 
105 Fernandes, Sancho II, p. 60. 
106 Roldao, Escrita e Poderes, p. 25, note 73. 
107 Ventura, A Nobreza de Corte, vol. I, pp. 504-6. 
108 As far as it could be detected, the oldest known occurrence of the term almoxarifado dates from 1261 referring to 
the scribe of the almoxarifado of Coimbra (TAIII, doc. X, pp. 242-5). Years later, in 1267, one can find a forced sale to 
the king of a paddy field by a widow of a former almoxarife in Santarem' because of the almoxarifado ('ratione dieti 
Almoxarifattu' (original: TI, -Gaveta XI, mayo 6, doc. 7, copied in TI, leitura Nova.livro 12 da Estremadura, fol. 121 
and in n, Chanco Afonso III, livro 3, fol. 2Ov) and in 1273 there is a the scribanum meum de predieto Almoxarifatu in 
a letter of quittance from the almoxarife of Guimaraes (Ribeiro, Disserta¢es Chronol6gicas, vol. III, 2nd part, doc. 
XXIX, p. 82). 
109 TAIII, doc. XI-XVII, pp . .245-252. 
110 TI, Chancelaria de D. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 13 (municipality of Leiria, in 1.255) and fol. 49v (municipality of 
lisbon, 1261). 
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independent from the municipal authorities in the early 1250s.111 Although 
scattered, there are many references in thirteenth-century royal and local 
documents to property confiscated from almoxarifes.112 In a 1255 document 
testifying the sales of apprehended land, the almoxarife is shown acting 
autonomously by order of a royal writ, while the municipal seal merely 
confirmed the sale, not the act.113 The emancipation of this office appears very 
clear in the well-documented career of Joao Que Veio. He was portarius maior 
in 1236, under Sancho II, he emerged again in a document of 1251 as col/ector 
of the king's debts and became almoxarife of Lisbon between 1256 and 
1267.114 
There is yet a stronger argument for regarding the reign of Afonso III as a 
key period for the country's fiscal organisation: the export of the office of the 
almoxarife northwards. Indeed, in 1254 there is the first mention of the 
almoxarife of Guimaraes.115 As noticed, in the first half of the thirteenth century, 
the almoxarifes are only found in Lisbon, Coimbra and Santarem. The town of 
Guimaraes had been the patrimonial centre of the former counts of Portucale 
and headed the terra where the king's reguengos were more abundant.116 The 
customs disclosed in the enquiries of 1258, show that the granary of Guimaraes 
already concentrated the yields of other terrae. l17 
The first interventions of the first almoxarife of Guimaraes, Martim Real, 
were directed against the abuses of the local municipality on reguengos.118 A 
few years after these conflicts, the same Martim Real issued in the name of the 
111 Roldao, Eserita e Poderes, p. 27. 
112 In 1254, several members of the central curia confiscate a vineyard which had belonged to Martim Domingues, 
almoxarife of Lisbon because of his debts. TI, Chane. Afonso III, Iivro 1, fol. 7v .. In 1267, the widow of an almoxarife 
of Santarem is forced to sell his property to the king ratione almoxarifattu. TI, Gaveta XI, ma~o 6, no. 7. In 1280, the 
heirs of Joao Qui Venit reach agreement with Dinis I in relation to his debts. TI, Leitura Nova, Livro Segundo dos 
Direitos Reais, fols. 157v-158. In 1286, the properties belonging to Pedro Fernandes, former almoxarife of Santarem, 
were confiscated. TI, Chanco Dinis I, livro 1, p. 318. TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 81 {29 December 1265). 
113 The text is clear enough about the secondary role of the municipal seal: Et ego Dominicus Johannis almoxarifus 
recepi supradictus 200 morabitinos [pro dare in debito] et ut hec factum in dubium non vertatur. Stephanus Johannis 
pretor Co/imbrie et Johannis Petri et Martinus Muniz a/vaziles; et Dominicus Johannis almoxarifus et Petrus Egee 
scribanus Co/imbrie sigi//um concilii Colimbrie apponi feverunt ut D. Matheus [the buyer of the land] per istam cartam 
melius se defendst et emparet. 
114 SS, doc. 91, p. 371; Farelo, Mario, A O/igarquia Camarsria de Lisboa, 1325-1433, Lisbon, 2008, Appendix. 2. 
115 TT, Chanco Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 4v. 
116 See Marreiros, Propriedade Fundisria, vol. I, p.223-53. 
117 TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fols . .26v, 27, 27v, 29v, 37v, 89, 95v-96. 
118 TT, Chane. Afonso III,Uvro 1, fol. 5 (31 July 1254); TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 60v (June 1259). 
133 
king a series of eight contracts letting of royal properties in GUimaraes.119 
However, the most important features of this almoxarife's work are revealed in 
the letter of quittance that King Afonso III granted to his two sons in 1273.120 
While he held continuously the renders of the almoxarifado from 30 June 1258 
to 1 April 1263, he held neighbouring terrae for very brief periods.121 Like the 
French prevots, Martim Real seems to have operated within no fixed territory. 
Judging from the mention to a terra administered by after the death of a given 
tenant,122 from the holding of the terra of Sousa in for three or four months in 
1261 and from the holding of Pan6ias in 1261, the year after the death of the 
former tenant,123 the almoxarife of Guimaraes held terrae while these were not 
ruled by royal vassals. Thus, at least in this area, custody of the king's revenues 
was only practiced in the vacancies of tenure. 
In the letter of 1273, the term almoxarifado denotes to a set of rents. 
Indeed, the document distinguishes three types of revenues: on one hand, the 
almoxarifatum, the terrae and the eolleetae.124 The older documental references 
from 1261 and 1267 also become clearer if almoxarifado is interpreted as a rent 
or as a set of revenues, rather than a territory. Indeed, this is clearly the 
meaning of two documents from the reign of King Dinis: instrument of 
confiscated land by an almoxarife and his wife in Santa rem dated 1299 alludes 
to the non-payment of the rent of the almoxarifado which they had farmed,t25 
whilst a letter of quittance from 1280 acquits the heirs of a former almoxarife of 
Lisbon of the 'almoxarifado of Lisbon' as well as of eol/eetae as of tax-farms.126 
While in the first case, the almoxarifado was the name of a tax-farm, in the 
second it is the name given to the income from a set of rents and a col/eeta. 
These first mentions to the almoxarifado indicate that it, like the Castilian 
almojarifazgo, was a set of rents, not a territory. As such, in the reign of Afonso 
III more than a territorial district, resulting of the 'territorialisation' of the 
119 Ventura, A Nobreza de Corte, p. 506. 
120 Ribeiro, Disserta¢es Chronologicas, vol. III, doc. XXIX, pp. 82·5. 
121 That of Neiva from 31 April to 20 June 1253, that of Benviverfrom 3 September to 5 December 1252, etc. 
122 I Terra of Penafiel de Bastuyo and palatia therefrom from the day Egas LourenQO da Cunha {king's vassal] died in 
1261 until 20 june 1261'. Ribeiro, Disserta¢esChronologicas, vol. III, doc. XXIX, p. 84. 
123 On these two cases, see the tenants' list for the reign of Afonso III in Ventura, D. Afonso III, p. 278. 
124 Ribeiro, Disserta~oes Chronologicas, vol. III, doc. XXIX, pp. 82·5. 
125 'Rrenta do almuxarifado que elles [ele e sua mulher] teverom mmdida'. The document is abridged in Roldao, 
Escrita e Poderes, p. 134. 
126 TI, 'Gaveta XU, m8QO 13, doc. 1 O. 
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almoxarife's authority. Jndeed the same suffix intervenes in other contexts to 
designate a regular 'set of rents', as in mordomado (eponym of mayor, 
mordomo).127 In the surviving 1290 memorandum which defined the yearly 
contribution of the kingdom's notaries, the almoxarifes operate within the 
dioceses.128 This reveals both that the almoxarife was already becoming a 
territorial officer and that the no operational grid of almoxarifados yet existed 
under Afonso III. 
In practical terms, the pragmatic, ruthless systematic acquisition of urban 
housing and other properties by Afonso III and the export of a strong custody to 
the Northern lands in the form of an almoxarife created a coherent domain 
which would prove rentable in the long-run. This was what Afonso II, in spite of 
ambitious and sophisticated alterations of the household and curia, did not 
attain. However, the existence of a domain does not imply the existence of a 
domain state. From the fact that a prince, more or less efficiently, has managed 
to widen up his sources of revenue, both in scale and in type, and has taken 
pragmatic measures to improve their collection, it does not follow automatically 
that a 'domain state' has been built. The permanence of the tenure system with 
its characteristic non-distinction between administration and redistribution 
showed that the 'domain' was not perfectly integrated with the 'state'. 
The constitution of a territorial grid of almoxarifados cannot be seen 
independently from the reinforcement of the central management. Even though 
the almoxarifado was not exactly a district, the counter-roll of particulars kept by 
a resident scribe and the permanence of an almoxarife, either as a tax-farmer or 
as a custodian meant that the almoxarifatum was a permanent institution, rather 
than a temporary arrangement. The earlier letters of quittance make clear that 
the writings of all collectors or tax-farmers of permanent royal revenues were 
compiled by a scribe appointed by the king. The wording of the first letter of 
quittance makes it clear: 'Noveritis quod Dominicus Petri dictus Pintus and 
Dominicus Suarii tunc judex de Gaya, mei decimarii in Portu Portugalie, et 
Johannes Petri canonicus Portugalensis meus scribanus super decimis 
127 Or as in the Castilian almojarifazgo. Gonzalez Area, J. D., 'Almojarifazgo', Glossair.e de Fiscalite. 
128 Published in Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, Ensaios cia Historia Medieval Portuguesa, 2nd ed., lisbon, 1980, pp. 76-
81. 
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ejusdem loci compufaverunf .129 The letter of quittance of 1273, shows clearly 
that the audit of the almoxarife of Guimaraes was based upon the writings of the 
Iscribanus de predicfu almoxarifattu.,130 The scribe made possible the laudit' of 
the almoxarifes. 
In the present state of our knowledge, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
the practice of audit started in the reign of Afonso III. The De Recabedo books 
and the enquiries of Afonso II could also be related to some form of 
accountancy. At any rate, the 1273 letter of quittance passed to the almoxarife 
of Guimaraes is clear about the entities that presided over the audit session: the 
maiordomus and the chancellor, the higher officers of the curia regia. Similarly, 
the first unequivocal mention of an audit procedure, that of 1253, states that the 
audit of the tenth-collector of Porto was made before (coram) the maiordomus, 
the chancellor and a third noble, in short, he was audited by the king's curia.131 
For the next decades, there are a few sparse examples of letters of 
quittance after an audit by the curia: the collectors of the monetagium in 1264, 
the royal butlers in 1267, the treasurer Joao Moniz in 1276,132 the almoxarife of 
Guimaraes in 1273, and the high-treasurer Vicente Martins in 1280.133 Although 
these examples do not follow a clear format, it is clear that they are not routine 
documents but with a sort of appeal to the curia in its quality as a court. Indeed, 
as no particulars of account are displayed and only total sums are handled, this 
audit before a curia must have taken place after a previous session of closer 
inspection.134 The 1273 letter refers to the detailed particulars that could be 
found in a separate roll (partes in rotulo sue recapitulationis). This suggests that 
a more hands-on accounting procedure took place before the curia was 
129 TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 3. 
130 Ribeiro, Disserta¢es Chronologicas, vol. III, 2nd part, doc. XXIX, pp. 82·5. 
131 TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 3. 
132 TI, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fols. n·78v, 121, 161, 
133 Deser., vol. I, doc 8, p. 345. 
134 As far as these documents show, the accounting of a royal minister implied two distinct processes, the compotum 
and the recabedum (Port. conta e recado). These names remain very opaque. Possibly, the comparison between the 
recorded items of expenditure and revenue was the recabedum phase, after which came the computation of the 
balance receipts and expenses, the computum. In ahemative, recabedum referred to what the officer collected and 
computum implied the deduction of orders of payment from the total. This would explain the order of the king to take 
contas (filate contas) from the abbot of AIco~: the latter would provide a r.eceipt of the monies he received. The 
sums referred to in this receipt would be counted as expend~ure and thus deducted from the total owned by the 
collector of r~venue. Oesptte the present ignorance about these workings, tt is clear that this form of accounting does 
not stem directly from the innovations of Afonso II. Indeed, no mention is made of the Recabedo Regnibooks or any 
other central records. Whatever procedures computum and recabedum were, they were based on the books supplied 
by the scribe of the officer. 
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involved. This is confirmed by a pair of letters to almoxarifes and scribes to 
settle some debts with the monastery of Alcobaca. In these, the king as a favour 
the abbot, dispensed him the payment of the chancery fees but not of 
presenting contas.135 
The previous, closer audit is perhaps present in the 1273 quittance of the 
almoxarife of Guimaraes. Indeed, after presenting the high officers of the king's 
counsel the scribe mentions a board of five (one the vice-mairdomus, other the 
notarium cancellariae, and three king's clerks). In the document, these are 
called computatoribus, such as the men who worked in the undated quittance of 
Joao Que Veio in the reign of Afonso '" (1248-1279) are also called 
contadores.136 As institutional historians agree, the group of clerks who 
controlled the books of the almoxarife's scribes were eventually reunited in a 
permanent body, the Casa dos Contos. This process was already completed by 
1296, date of a 'second book of the Contos,' as we learn from a later quarrel 
about a sum that the Lisbon municipality owed to the king.137 Apparently, the 
book of the Contos was a set of entries signed by the payees and thus it 
allowed the contadores to track whether the municipality of Lisbon was in debit 
or not. 
What is most important in the emergence of the crown's body of 
professional accountants is the emancipation of the audit procedures from the 
noble-dominated curia. In theory at least, the Contos were an instrument of the 
monarch, rather than an independent court. Once institutionalised, the 
contadores inherited the older functions of the Curia Regis as auditors. The 
emergence of the Contos, datable c. 1290, dated from the time of the 'invention 
of the crown.' While the scarcity of documents prevents the identification of any 
positive link between these two aspects, there can be no doubt that these are 
converging processes: nobles are moved away from both the centre and the 
territory, opening the way for the monarchy's autonomous, instrumental 
institutions (see section 4.3). 
135 Primis denarijs quos receperitis tam de meis debitis quam de omnibus meis redditibus ... et non filietis inde sibi 
Cancellariam sed filate contas. TI, Chanco Afonso III, Livro 1, fols. 7v-S. 
136 Como meu padre rey Don Affonso mandasse receber conto e recado a Joham Que Veo de todalas cousas que 
esse Joham Que Yeo HJCebeu e teve do Almoxarifado de LixbOa per dante Don Joham d~voyn seu moordomo e 
per dante Don Stevam fanes seu Chanceler e per dante seus contadores que son conleudos en'o rool da 
recadacom desse Joham Que Veo. n, Gaveta XII, m~ 13, doc. 10. 
137 LM-1, doc. 28, pp. 195-7. 
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The priority of the Casa dos Contos was the audit of the collectors, but 
they also integrated the king's multi-purpose court (the Desembargo) in the 
reign of Dinis I. The first clear manifestation of the Contos' administrative 
activity ~an be found on a register of letting contracts from 1323 included in the 
fourth chancery book of King Dinis. Here, all the lettings of property in Lisbon 
are signed by the contadores.138 Moreover, one of the few contracts of tax-
farming known for the period - that of the kingdom's whaling - is signed down 
by the contadores 139 
For a brief period the Contos dominated the king's finances. However, the 
decade of 1330 saw some significant changes within the central departments, 
partly entailing greater specialisation.140 The functions of the porfeiro-mor, 
namely the fiscal litigation and immunities were absorbed by a body of legal 
experts (the auditors of the Porfaria). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this 
chapter, the changes in the litigation are of minor importance, when compared 
with the emergence of the overseer of the finances. Indeed, this officer was the 
intermediary between the monarch and the local administration. 
The separation between the auditing body and the financial management 
in the person of the 'Overseer of Finances' or Vedar da Fazenda was a 
meaningful transformation that has passed unnoticed. In 1985, Carvalho 
Homem dated the emergence of this office from the early 13705 and saw it as 
an adaptation of the monarchy to the kingdom-wide taxation in the form of the 
sisas.141 Yet, a closer inspection of the documents of Afonso IV shows that the 
office already existed in 1341, as a certain Pedro Esteves witnessed a contract 
styled as the king's I Vedor da Fazenda.,142 One year earlier this Pedro Esteves 
had struck in the name of the king the tax-farming contract of whaling in the 
kingdom.143 In the beginning of January 1339, Pedro Esteves signed together 
with three of the king's contadores the contract of location of a pair of shops in 
Lisbon. The terms of the document are unusually explicit: the collector of Lisbon 
138 TI, Chanco Dinis, Uvro 4, fols. 82 and following. 
139 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 4 , fol. 12 
140 Homem, 0 Desembargo, p. 124. According to this author, this new arrangement of the fiscal litigation answered 
directly to parliamentary claims expressed in 1331. 
141 OA, Book I, title III § 11. 
142 Homem states that the 'creation' of that office is from 1369 (0 Desembargo, p. 129) but there is no grounds to 
doubt about the 1341 chancery record that mention in 1341 of I Pero Stevez ueedor da ffazenda de nosso senhor 061 
rei dom Affonsso', as the highest bidder for king's houses in Lisbon. Chane. Afonso IV, vol. III, doc. 258. 
143 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 248, p. 378. 
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houses and his scribe 'certified Pedro Esteves and the king's accountants' of 
the outcome of the auction in order to obtain the letter.144 Indeed, as an earlier 
document shows, the important responsibility of controlling the tax-farming 
contracts fell within the Contos.145 In other words, this Pedro Esteves acted 
here as the representative of the king's interests and oversaw the decisions of 
the Contos. 
The origins of the Vedor da Fazenda are to be found in the management 
of the king's revenues in Lisbon, notably with his housing. Indeed, Vedor 
emerges in documents from the late reign of Dinis, seemingly with the role of 
controlling the letting of houses and stalls.146 This situation, the transfer of an 
urban office to the rest of the territory, mirrors that of the almoxarife and shows 
the importance of urban models for the Portuguese fiscal system. According to 
later regulations, he had, among other tasks, responsibility over the tax-farming 
of the royal rights.147 Indeed, the introduction of the overseer of finances seems 
to respond to the widespread use of tax-farming contracts by the monarchy 
throughout the reign.148 The Vedor da Fazenda emerged in the documentation 
after the peace that followed the brief warlike spell in the reign of Afonso IV with 
the Castilian War of 1336-9 and the Salado campaign of 1340. The post-war 
years were a period of definition of the king's rights by means of tight enquiries 
in the Northern lands.149 The actual state of knowledge makes it very hard to 
confirm Fernao Lopes' allegation about the budgetary activity of the Vedores da 
Fazenda,15o but there is no doubt that his version is compatible with the scanty 
data assembled: Pero Esteves, did not work alone, but together with the 
144 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. II, doc. 148, p. 240. 
145 Chane. Afonso IV, vol. I, doc. 91, p. 106 (10 January 1327). This is the instrument of the letting of one of the king's 
houses in Coimbra by the accountants. In the document, n is stated that the 'almoxarife and the scribe of the 
almoxarifaclo of Coimbra said to my Contos that no one else made a higher bid than the said Afonso Domingues.' 
After 1340, this function was usurped by the Vedor. 
146 Farelo, A Oligarquia Municipal, Appendix 2. 
147 Homem, 0 Desembargo, pp. 120-1. 
148 In many sentences from the king's courts, a pair of veclores --a word simply meaning overseer- were chosen by 
the two parts to evaluate the application of sentence or agreement. Examples in CP, Afonso IV, p. 125, (1352). The 
king himseff had a permanent vedor in Lisbon and in his major wheat-fields whose role was evaluating whether the 
occupiers met the conditions agreed in the contract of location. Chane. Afonso IV, vol. " doc. 40, pp. 61-2. 
149 Marques, Jose, 'd. Afonso 'Ve as jurisdi¢es senhoriais,' Jomadas Luso..fspanholas de His/oriB Medieval. 
Aetas, Porto, 1990, vol. 4, p. 1527-1566. 
150 This hypothetical document would have been what Alain .(luery labelled as an etat au vrai, a factual deduction of 
the ordered expenses over the effective revenues. Guery, Alain, 'Le roi d~pensier: Ie don, la 'COntrainte, .at I'origine du 
systeme financier de la monarchie franyaise d'ancien r.egime', Annales. Economies, Societes, Civilisations, Annee 39 
(1984) vol. 6, pp. 1241-1269. 
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treasurer, other clerks and the accountants.151 Moreover, he had access to the 
information produced by the Contos, the accounting body.152 To compose a 
summary of the receipts and expenses at the local level is not unthinkable, 
given that the almoxarifes had registers kept by their scribes and the political 
circumstances were peaceful. There were some other important factors for 
stability, and hence predictability of income. In the North and Centre many 
municipalities had their contribution fixed for good in their charters and this 
made their total of income entirely predictable, at least in times of peace. Other 
important receipts like the notaries' pension (16,218 I. in 1290) and the Jews' 
service (which was fixed in theory, but was often negotiated) were stable. In 
addition, a few tax-farming contracts known of irregular revenues (fisheries of 
the realm, tenths and tolls of Lisbon and Setubal) celebrated in 1336 had a 
seven-year duration making the crown's revenue even more predictable (25,740 
I.). Accordingly, the crown avoided debasements of the currency, as this would 
affect collection based on fixed lump sums, rather than fluctuating rents. In the 
period of peace that followed 1340, revenues could be anticipated and, most of 
all, expenditure could be more easily accounted than the extraordinary and 
fluctuating expenses brought on by wars, the exception being precisely the 
embassies which Lopes highlighted in his description.153 
Temporal coincidence apart, it is again impossible to correlate the activity 
of the Vedor with the consolidation of the almoxarifado system throughout the 
kingdom. Nonetheless, it is clear that the almoxarifados complemented the tax-
farming of kingdom-wide revenues, the general supervision functions and 
possibly the budgetary activity of the Vedor. By expanding the almoxarifes 
throughout the realm, in spite of the different tributary traditions and customs, 
the Portuguese monarchy assured three goals: 1) The encapsulation of 
disparate revenues and rights within a single territorial unit under an officer 
151 It can be sensed that Lopes' text somehow reflects the rivalries within the central administration as Alvaro Pais 
(who is Lopes' focal figure for the first chapters of his chronicle of Joso I) and the successor of the oft-mentioned 
Pedro Esteves as Vedor of the chancery were sacked following the ascent of Fernando I's new Vedor da Fazenda, 
Pedro Afonso. This man did not intervene in the normal attributions of the Vedor da Faz~nda but rather in judicial 
sentences. On these bureaucrats, check the micro-biographies composed by Homem. 0 Desembargo, pp. 281-2, 
337·8,371·2. 
152 Of the 24 letters he subscribes, only once he twice he subscribes alone. Twice he dispatches with the treasurers. 
See 1347 letter signed by the treasurer and the Pedro Esteves about an alleged debt to the king which the Contos 
books proved to be otherwise. LM-2, doc. 28, pp. 195·7. 
153 Lopes, Cron. P.edro " chapter XII, p. 53. 
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which would concentrate, allocate and transfer these resources, according to 
order from the centre; 2) The production of expendable income (once the 
permanent or assigned charges were deducted) that the tenant system did not 
endow him; 3) Finally, the permanent presence of a scribe in all transactions 
made by the almoxarife allowed the king to systematically audit his men. 
Yet, for all the expansion of the almoxarifado, there would be a noticeable 
hole in the coverage of the fourteenth-century network: Lisbon. The 
understanding of Lisbon as a sort of treasury for the monarchy is already patent 
in the reign of Afonso III. Even before his massive real estate operations, he 
regarded the proceeds from Lisbon as the best cash-generators. Indeed, 
wanting to quickly settle the 2,000 morabitinos of arrears still due from his 
father's will to his favourite monastery, Afonso III addressed a letter to the 
almoxarife of Lisbon in order to pay these from the primis denarijs quos 
receperitis.154 Most of all, it was the 1271 will of Afonso III that indicates what 
was the basis for this decisive feature of the country's fiscal organisation: the 
primordial role of the Lisbon revenues. The text of the will is very explicit: tunc 
filius meus qui post me regnaverit faciat utilitatem suam de civitate Ulixb. 
[Lisbon] et de redditjbus eius, sicut de aliis suis vii/is regni sui, sed inde non 
accipiat inde aliquid.155 In other words, unlike the profits managed by the 
territorial almoxarifes, those of Lisbon could never be granted as tenures and 
constituted the mainstay of the king's finances. 
From 1251 to 1318 the almoxarife of Lisbon can be amply documented but 
in the chancery registers of Afonso IV and Pedro I, Lisbon, instead of being a 
district headed by one almoxarife, was actually home for many almoxarifes, 
each managing specific sorts of revenues: house-Iettings (almoxarife das 
casas), letting of shopping houses (almoxarife das tendas) the farmed revenues 
(almoxarife das oven~as), the regal tenths on goods transported into the city 
(almoxarife das decimas).156 This complexity responded certainly to the sheer 
dimension of the sums handled that required separate tax-farming.157 Indeed, 
the reason for the fiscal distinction enjoyed, or rather suffered, by Lisbon should 
154 TI, Chanco Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 2v~3 June 1351). 
155 Provas, vol. I, part 1, doc. 28, p. 72. 
156 See farelo, A OIigarquia Camararia, Appendix 2. 
157 The king's shops (tendas) were tax-farmed in 1293 by at least 350 I. TI, Mosteiro de Santa Maria de Alcoba~a, 
mayo 20, doc. 35. Document abridged in Roldao, Escrita~ Poderes, p. 143. 
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be sought for in one crucial factor: as the country's greatest port, it could 
provide more income in cash than any other town. 
This long overview of Portuguese finances instead of portraying a 'not very 
coherent system' supplied, albeit intermittently, the necessary elements for 
recapturing the rough lineaments of the changes of the kingdom's fiscal 
structure. In absence of important quantitative data, a brief comparison of the, 
reasonably similar, Portuguese and Castilian fiscal evolutions,158 provides a 
good example of the fiscal efficiency of the system produced by the Portuguese 
kings. The relevance of the kingdom-wide coverage by the almoxarifados can 
be understood by contrast with neighbouring Castile which shared the same 
problem, if in a far larger area. Like Portugal, Castile kept an extremely 
heterogeneous fiscal geography. Regions north of Toledo maintained the 
intense fragmentation and diversity of fiscal units, whereas to the south the 
almojarifazgos formed a coherent grid,159 based upon the former Muslim 
political divisions. North of that city, the main divisions were the meirinados 
whose functions were indistinctively judicial and fiscal. Only the development of 
the sales tax (alcabala) during the Trastamara dynasty effectively changed this 
organisation in the North, although the first general taxes, the servicios and the 
monedas where collected by the meirinados. These districts were in the hands 
of nobles who exploited its revenues and exerted the royal seigniorial 
prerogatives.16o Whereas the meirinados were distributed as feuds, the 
revenues of the almojarifazgos were assigned as collaterals for cash advances 
by merchants and financiers. 161 
In fourteenth-century Castile-Leon, the king's revenues were concentrated 
and managed by a almojarife mayor, later called high-treasurer, who acted both 
as the king's paymaster and as the head of a group of Jewish financiers who 
controlled tax-farming dealings in the realm.162 He dealt directly with the local 
158 Information comes from Garcia de Valdeavellano, luis, Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Espanolas, Madrid, 
1970, pp.592·S93 and 610; ladero Ouesada, 'Castile in the Middle Ages.'; ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y Peder 
Real. 
159 LaderoQuesada, Fiscalidad y Poder Real, pp. 140,249-50. 
160 Alvarez Borge, Monarquia Feudal, p. 206. 
161 Gonzalez Aree, Jose Damian, 'De la Fiscalidad Islamica.' 
162ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad, pp. 235-7. 
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receivers. 163 Their religious difference made the holder of the office even more 
ambiguous and politically fragile, the almojarife mayor often becoming either a 
victim of the king's ire (as in 1273, 1329 and 1360) or a preferential target for 
assassins and rioters (1304, 1328, 1355). Capital punishment or mob violence 
inflicted on the Castilian Jewish high-treasurers are more than anecdotal 
episodes: they illustrate the precariousness of the system, unable to cope with 
Castilian troubled internal politics after the death of Alfonso X. 164 In 
neighbouring Aragon, the Catalonian Corts of 1283 also pressured king Pere to 
get rid of his powerful Jewish manager and creditor Jucef Ravaya, using his 
religion as a pretext to stop the king's increasing financial centralisation.165 
A brief incursion into the realm of Aragon might reinforce the plausibility of 
Lopes' claims of a sound management of their scarce resources by the 
Portuguese 'old kings'. In the thirteenth-century Aragonese crown, credit and 
constant warfare went side-by-side. The Aragonese kings, as Martha van 
Landingham sharply summarises, 'instead of a system based on a budget, 
relied on a system based on credit.,166 Within the Aragonese system of credit-
bonds, that made its finances workable without much direct control,167 proto-
budgetary techniques made little sense. Even allowing for the lacunae of 
Portuguese archive, the lack of evidence for credit in the reigns of Afonso IV 
and Pedro I indirectly mirrors the hoarding capacity of the monarchy. Indeed, in 
the early thirteenth century, King Dinis loaned to his subjects and even to the 
Castilian kings.168 
163 Ayala, Pedro Lopez de, Coronica del Serenissimo Rey Don Pedro, Hijo del Rey Don Alonso de Castilla, 
Pamplona, 1591, Ano Septimo, cap. XV, pp. 49, 50. 
164 If we can trust the information of chronicler Pero Lopez de Ayala, the Jewish-Castilian treasurers chronically 
lacked the strength to act against corrupt local receivers. Ayala, Coronica del Serenissimo Rey Don Pedro Ano 
Septimo, cap. XV, p. 50. 
165 Van Landingham, Martha, Transforming the state: king, court and political culture in the Realms of Aragon {1213· 
1387) Leiden, 2002, pp. 136 and 143. 
166 Van Landingham. Transforming the State, p. 120. 
167 Van Landingham, Transforming the State, p. 128. 
168 In 1297, King {)inis gave to Fernando IV of Castile a jewel and gold ingots worth 120,000 Castilian mara vedis (Cr. 
1419, chapter ell, p. 177); years later, the same monarch received from Dinis a loan of 16,000 marks of silver (Cr. 
1419. chapter eVI, p. 182); the monarch paid a debt that the Lisbon municipality owned to Italian merchants in 1296, 
LM-1, doc. 28. p. 195; in 1305 he lent 1,500 I. to a SOCiety of fishmongers together with the ~oncession of the 
monopoly of fisheries for 10 years (DP, vol. I, doc. 33, pp. 24-25). 
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Fig. 8 - Fiscal and Institutional Innovations in Portugal and Castile 
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Sources: see notes 537-47; Pereira, Para a Historia das Alfandegas, pp. 10-15 and 22-6. 
Fig. 8 illustrates clearly how similar institutional backgrounds devolved at 
completely contrasting rhythms. The contrast could not be greater than with 
contemporary war-weary Castile, where institutional development lags behind 
the inventive search for new forms of revenue. In Portugal, the first mentions to 
specialised auditors, contadores, dates from the 1270s and of whom a 
permanent board, the Casa dos Contos, was already in work by 1296; whereas 
in Castile these accountants can only be detected in the documentation from 
1351 and were only constituted into a formal, sedentary body, the Casa de 
Cuentas, in 1432. For Castile, it was only in this late period when the archaic 
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maiordomus ceased to have functions; 1'69 whereas in Portugal this office was 
merely honorary by the times of Dinis I (1279-1325). However, these precocious 
institutional developments only compensated for the lack of new revenues. 
Castile had a kingdom-wide sisa under Sancho IV (1284-1295) and subsidies 
were often collected since the early thirteenth century. In short, Castile-Leon led 
the way in devising new taxes, whereas Portugal put forward new institutions. 
Time would prove that the treasury bequeathed by the Portuguese kings was 
not enough. 
Twelfth-century and thirteenth-century Portugal was to a large extent the 
creation of its expansionist monarchy. However, this did not imply that the 
monarchy had a uniform grip on whole of the territory. Municipal charters and 
customary laws assured the survival of previous forms of organisation. Both 
individual municipalities and nobles took hold of revenues that were nominally 
the king's. In these circumstances, it is no wonder that a stable, operative 
territorial framework for fiscal administration was slow to emerge. By contrast, 
two non-national organisations, the Church and the kingdom-wide 'Community 
of the Jews,' possessed a coherent spatial framework. Like Castile, the finances 
of the Portuguese monarchy were initially built upon the institutional capacities 
of these: the coherent grid formed by the bishoprics and the capacity of the 
Jewry to concentrate and move monies within the territory. Yet in Castile, the 
lucrative transfers of ecclesiastical and Jewish capitals and institutional 
capacities did not stimulate the neighbouring monarchy to create autonomous 
territorial organisation. In the words of Ladero Quesada, 'the kings of Castile 
had no royal domain either in lands or immovables capable of producing 
revenues.'170 Instead, they regarded the Jews as the 'treasury of the kingdom.' 
The contrast with contemporary Castile and Aragon, two monar<:hies 
sharing a similar institutional background is highly telling. More intensive military 
efforts and, presumably, larger and readier financial markets made them favour 
loans, instead of accumulating small revenues. Portuguese kings, constrained 
by the kingdom's fiscal constitution and by a smaller tax-base, opted for 
hoarding and controlling expenditure. Between 1280 and 1340, the Portuguese 
169 For the dates relating to Castile see Valdeavellano, Curso de Historia, pp.592-593. 
170 ladero Quesada, Miguel Angel, 'Castile in the Middle Ages " RFS, p. 180. On Castile, see ladero Quesada, 
Fiscslidad y Poder Real. 
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crown was able to impose an 'undifferentiated', kingdom-wide system of 
custody of the royal revenues which overcame the kingdom's seemingly 
irreducible contrasting backgrounds. Moreover, the monarchy did it with the 
clear goal of recovering the capacity for accumulation that the first decades of 
the thirteenth century had destroyed without compromising its redistributive 
function. In this sense, it is hard to agree with Mattoso or Homem when they 
claim that royal finances lacked purpose. Indeed, nowhere is the monarchy's 
aim of hoarding of expendable income clearer than in the framing of the Lisbon 
fiscal resources. The exceptional status conferred to Lisbon is eloquent enough 
about the 'coherence' of the 'system' with its goals. 
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PART II - 'WARS CAME AND A NEW WORLD WAS 
BORN' (1369-1527) 
'Wars came and a new world was born, a world very contrary to the one 
before.' Thus read the Prologue of the 1430s chronicle of King Fernando I by 
fernao Lopes.1 This emphatic statement had a significant fiscal dimension to it: 
the depletion of the treasury, the feeble war coinage and the hitherto unknown 
material burdens withstood by the Povos, the sales taxes in particular, were part 
of the substance of the post-war 'world' the chronicler thought he himself 
belonged to. 
To a large extent, historians have work-ed along the lines drawn by Fernao 
Lopes and saw war as the cause for the wide transformations they perceived in 
fifteenth-century finances. As explained (see supra section 2.4), Vitorino 
Magalhaes Godinho and A. H. Oliveira Marques saw in the wars of kings 
Fernando I and Joao I the birth of the almoxarifado. Many other historians 
highlighted the depreciation of coinage that started with Fernando I and plagued 
the reign of Joao I (1385-1433) and related it to the ongoing military efforts.2 
Patient research on general taxation by Iria Goncalves demonstrated that once 
rare kingdom-wide taxes became common from the wars of succession of 
Fernando I onwards.3 The explanation was seemingly obvious: increasing 
military activity throughout the fifteenth century intensified the recourse to direct 
taxation. This increase in extraordinary taxation led, in turn, to a more frequent 
meeting of the Cortes for fiscal purposes.4 But more than anything else, late-
fourteenth-century wars were pointed up by historiography as the direct cause 
for the adoption of permanent taxation in the shape of the sisas.5 This view, 
already present in the pages of Fernao Lopes,6 was further elaborated by Iria 
Go~alves who, in spite of the evidence assembled by Jorge Faro, assigned the 
1 'Quando comeyou a guerra ( ... ) nayeo outro mundo novo mujto contrairo ao primeiro.' .Lopes, eran. Fernando I, 
Prologue, p. 4. 
2 Barros, Hist6ria da Administrayao Publica em Portugal, vol. III, p. 147; Marques, Portugal na Crise, pp. 206-1 O. 
3 See chronology in PEP, pp. 205-20. 
• Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 255-6. 
5 Sisas is the plural of siss. The singular form, denoting an extraordinary yearly levy on the sale of a single product, 
as in sisa do vinho, is older. However, as most of the times the tax was applied to many products and it lasted for 
periods longer than one year, the -plural form became far commoner. When all or nearly all sales were liable to the 
payment of a sisa, administrative documents speak of sisas, 'Sometimes qualified as gerais, or universal. 
6 Lopes, Cron . .loBo I, part 2, chapter cel, p. 459. 
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sisas to the reign of Fernando 1.7 In other words, Lopes' chronicles and national 
historiography agreed that war was the prime factor in the transformation of the 
crown revenues. 
The role of the present part is to confront the thesis of warfare-led fiscal 
revolution with the Portuguese case. First of all, the impact of wars on the 
revenues will be considered in chapter 5 after reasonable figures for the receipt 
are constructed. The impact of the late fourteenth-century wars on the fiscal-
constitutional problems will be left for the next chapter, while the question of 
whether war triggered the fiscal transformations of the late fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries will be the subject of chapter 3. Finally, chapter 4 will test the 
same assertion by constructing and interpreting a reliable picture of the 
expenditure of the Portuguese crown. 
7 Significantly, Iria 'Gon~lves ignored Jorge Faro's dear evidence of earlier sisas. She claimed that the first sisa 
demanded by a king was in 1372, a <crucial moment of the fernandine Wars, while faro provided many examples of 
municipamies that held the tax since the 1330s to meet royal land non-royal) demands. 
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Chapter 5 - Revenue Revolution? 
Unknowingly, the opinion advanced by Fernao Lopes and expanded by 
twentieth-century historiography of wars abruptly transforming the crown's 
finances fitted fiscal history's orthodoxy of warfare-led 'fiscal revolutions'. In the 
Portuguese case, the revolution implied resorting to new forms of revenue, 
namely the sisas, the minting profits and kingdom-wide direct taxes. Initially the 
sisas were extraordinary but the long duration and the threat of war allowed the 
king to turn them into permanent revenues. According to this view, the fiscal 
revolution was first and foremost the burgeoning of the receipt driven by military 
expenditure. All the relevant historians, Faro, Gon~alves, Magalhaes Godinho, 
Sousa and Oliveira Marques, hailed the adoption of the sisas as a permanent 
revenue as the cornerstone of this revolution. Though they agreed in that sisas 
were very lucrative and that they stood for a 'modern' type of taxation, their 
perception was not accompanied by any noticeable effort in quantifying the 
crown finances before and after the sisas from the scanty evidence available. 
The purpose of this part is to respond to this challenge by constructing some 
workable figures. 
Section 5.1 - The Sisas 
The participants of the fifteenth-century Cortes would have no difficulty in 
understanding the gist of fiscal history's idea of a transition from 'domain' to 'tax 
state'. From their words it is clear that royal revenues were twofold: the direitos 
reais and the sisas. For them, this distinction was as much a historical as a 
constitutional one - while the former encompassed the ancient dues managed 
within the almoxarifados since the time of the 'old kings', the sisas had been 
granted to the crown by the Cortes during the war against Castile.s As a 1439 
grievance explained, subtly hinting at the Roman fiscum, the direitos reais were 
intrinsic to the Crown (comfiscaaes com a Coroa) and worked as a permanent 
8 Some examples of direct contrast between sisas and direitos reais: TT, Suplemento de -cortes, mao<> 4, doc. 41 
(1439): TT, Mao<> 2 de Cortes, doc. 14 (Cortes of 1459). 
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endowment for the upholding of the king's 'state' or condition (manunten~ao do 
seu estado). The sisas, by contrast, were a voluntary, and hence precarious, 
grant to the monarchy. As the Povos would repeatedly remind the monarchs 
well into the sixteenth century, they were not to be mistaken for a direito real.9 
Nonetheless, as these very objections show, the Povos ultimately came to 
regard the sisas no longer as a subsidy but as a proper tax, in the sense that it 
was imposed upon them by the ruler, regardless of their consent. For them, it 
was clear that the adoption of the sisas during the wars made contemporary 
crown finances wholly different from those of the 'old kings'. 
Parliamentary discourse, however, omitted an essential datum: the sisas 
had been municipal taxes well before the wars of Fernando I and Joao I. Fernao 
Lopes, who worked as secretary of prince Duarte, provides in his chronicle of 
Joao I an educated response to the claims of the contemporary municipal 
representatives: 'because some reckon and avow nowadays that the kings 
made up this yoke and set it upon the people and because things did not go this 
way, we want to dispel this opinion: ( ... ) since the time of Afonso IV before the 
great pestilence ( ... ) the Povos held sisas among them in their towns ( ... ). As 
the kings saw the income of these sisas, they yearned for them and they 
evoked past or future necessities to ask for these taxes graciously for no more 
than two or three years.,10 
This version was adopted by most historians, namely J. Faro and I. 
Gonc;alves who corroborated the pages of Fernao Lopes: under the pretext of 
wars, Fernando I and Joao I obtained from their 'vassal' municipalities the sisa 
and dodged later complaints about their constitutional illegality. Both Faro and 
Gonc;alves followed the hint left by Fernao Lopes and identified a few cases of 
sisas held within the municipality in the reign of Afonso IV.11 By and large, for 
these two historians, the sisa was a municipal tax hijacked by the monarchy for 
its own profit. The hidden assumption was that, well before the kingdom made 
the transition from 'domain state' into 'tax state', there were already 'tax 
municipalities' which met their extraordinary needs with universal, sophisticated 
9 Barros, Hist6ria cia Administra9io, IX, pp. 509-28. 
10 E vendo os Reis tases remdas de sissas, avemdo vontade de as aver, mostrav§ ao povo ll8C8Sidades pasacias ou 
que sram por vir e pedimdolhas graciosamente por dous ou tres anos que logo as leixariom. Lopes, Cron. Joao I, 
part 2, chapter eel, p. 459. 
11 'Introduction,' RED, pp.LXXVIII-lXXX. 
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and acceptable taxation. This was, after all, a seducing narrative that presented 
state-building as a bottom-up construct and suited an older, nineteenth-century 
thesis of the balanced, 'municipalist' 'medieval' state being overtaken by a 
'centralising' monarchy on its way to absolutism. 
With Faro, Gonc;alves and other historians like Magalhaes Godinho and 
Oliveira Marques, the sisas earned the distinction of being a 'modern' tax.12 As 
presented by these authors, to borrow a concept from economists, the sisas 
would draw a perfect 'Laffer Curve': that is to say they strike a perfect balance 
between efficiency and equity. Surprisingly perhaps, a few fourteenth-century 
documents confirmed that the adoption of the sisas resulted largely from a 
conscious choice of the very taxpayers at the municipal level. Jorge Faro 
pOinted out that the use of the sisas directly responded to the problems created 
by the older taxes, the ta/has and fintas. 13 The fact that these taxes were based 
upon property and rent implied some individual and collective privileges and 
exemptions which meant that a great deal of the taxable wealth was out of the 
scope of the tax. Conversely, the sisa on wines was presented by the 
representatives of Porto in 1368 as 'a common and beneficial good to all', as 'as 
both great and small paid communally according to what they spent' .14 
According to the same document sent by the municipality of Porto to the king, 
the sisa also avoided the endless disputes brought by the application of the 
ta/ha.15 But the sisa was not simply equitable, it was also efficient. According to 
Jorge Faro, what made sales taxes so attractive to the municipal authorities 
was the speed with which the money was assembled, in contrast with the -costly 
and lengthy procedures arising from taxes based on landed revenue.16 The 
municipalities which regulated the functioning of the local markets could just as 
well monitor the volume of the transactions and later tax the vendors.17 
ConSidering the data assembled by Faro and also by Gonc;alves, it would seem 
12 It helped that the first municipal~ies known to have held sisas are (mostly southern) ports: Usbon {1336, 1339, 
1341) Porto (1336) Santarem (1338) Setubal (between 1325 and 1357) and the Aigarvian ones (before 1347). 
Significantly, all towns involved were sea harbours, w~h the exception of Santarem, a major river port. Only later did 
the sisas spread to other northern centres: Gaia (1360) Porto de M6s (1363) Braga (1363) Guimaraes (1371). 
13 'Introduction,' RED, pp. LXXVIII-LXX. The tslha was based upon the annual revenue (rends) while the fints taxed 
the estimated value of the property. On these taxes, see Henriques, Ant6nio Castro, 'Talha I' and 'Finta', Gloss .. 
14 Document abridged in Vere~ns. Anos de 1401-1449, ed. J. A. Pinto f.erreira, Porto, 1980,'PP. 364-366. 
16 Documents summarised by Faro in 'Introduction', RED, pp. LXXVIII-LXXX. 
16 'Introduction', RED, p. LXXXI. 
17 At least in fifteenth-century jurisprudence, tax-collection bore upon the seller who had to keep the sisa of the buyer. 
Barros, HistOria da Administ~o, vol. IX, p. 473. 
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that fourteenth-century Portuguese municipalities had found a tax that was as 
acceptable as it was productive. 
Fig. 9 - Some Yields of SiSBS, 1336·1378 
Years Municipality Sales taxed Duration Yearly receipt 
(In years) (In I.) 
{between 1325 and 1348] Setubal Wine 1 (?) 4,000 
Idem Setubal All things 1 (?) 500 
1336 Lisbon Wine 2 25,000 
1367 Lisbon Wine 2 36,000 
1368 Porto Wine 1 19,000 
1377-8 Lisbon ? 4 40,000 
Sources: [1325-1357), Cron. Joao I, part 2, chapter CCI; 1336: LM-2, doc. 3, pp.13-15; 1367: LM-1, doc. 5, p. 33-7; 
1368: TT, Chane. Fernando I, Livro 1, fols. 3Ov-31; 13n-8: TT, Chane. Fernando I, Livro 4, tols. 7v-19; 1382: AML, 
Livro I de Sentencas, doc. 9. 
A monograph on the sisas lies beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation.18 Nonetheless, some aspects of the narrative offered by Jorge 
Faro and Iria Goncalves furthering the views of Fernao Lopes require a brief 
critical revision. In fact, the first documented occurrence of a sisa is not to be 
found among the municipalities but among the Jewry in 1316 as a new form of 
apportioning their annual service (servi~o) to the king.19 Only two decades later 
can we find the first evidence of a sisa held by the municipalities of Lisbon and 
Porto in 1336 in two royal letters kept in the respective archives of those cities.2o 
These first recognisable municipal sisas are not municipal taxes but a serv~o, a 
subsidy required by the crown for its own purposes.21 The decision-making 
process is more explicit in the letter sent by King Afonso IV to the municipality of 
Lisbon causing it to summon the municipal assembly in order to authorise 
18 On the problems of the origins, vocabulary and constitutional evolution, see Henriques, 'Sisas I', '$isas II' e 'Sisas 
III', Gloss .. 
19 As can be seen in a letter inserted in the chancery registers of King Dinis. TT, Chane. Dinis I, Uvro 3, fol. 104, 'on 
account of the sisa that they [the Jews) held among them to pay my services'; per razom da ssisa que antressi 
fezerom pera pagarem a mim os meus seru~s. The Jews were still using the sisa, as shown by the mention of debt 
'of the sisa due to the king' of a Jew, Judas Tintureiro, in 1328. TT, {laveta XII, maca 4, doc. 24. The -same method 
was in use in 1344 when Afonso IV commanded the notaries of Lisbon to authorise the Jews to aocess their 
registers, as the Jews chose to pay their service in the form of sisas. Chane Afonso IV, vol. III, doc. 416, p. 327. 
20 In Lisbon, LM-2, doc. 3, pp. 13-15 (25 January 1336); AMP, livro 1 de Pergaminhos, doc. 18 (18 february 1336). 
As ~ has not been possible to aocess the latter document, I used its abridgment by A. Magaihaes Sasto (V1, pp. 394-
6). 
21 In early 1336 King Afonso IV was already preparing an attack on C8stHe that would result in the war of 1336-8. 
Martins, 'A <luerra Esquiva,' pp. 27-9. from the document mentioned in the earlier note, ~ would seem that the sisa 
held in Porto was assigned to the 'expenses and maintenance of the naves and other ships'. V1, p. 395. 
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(outorgal) the application of a Jax. It was neither a question of 'if' nor 'when' but 
of 'how'. Moreover, in the text, it is the monarch who induces the municipality to 
pay the subsidy by means of a sisa do vinho, as this would be 'common profit' 
of all and would not 'burden the poor'. In brief, sisa was held and farmed by the 
municipality only in order to respond to the demand for a servi90 on behalf of 
the monarchy. The same arguments were used in the case of Porto to justify 
the option for the sisas instead of the troublesome taxes on rent (fa/has) 'of 
which some would be exempt,.22 
In short, unlike Faro and Gon~alves suggested, the sisa was confirmed by 
the municipality after the monarchy itself had presented it as the better way to 
apportion a subsidy to which the municipality was willy-nilly bound. Instances of 
sisas held by the municipalities to pay for their own works, mainly fortifications, 
are only documented after 1355.23 In some cases, like that of Porto in 1367, 
sisas originally meant to pay as a service to the king were diverted to repair the 
city walls with authorisation from royal authority (outorga).24 In spite of Lopes' 
emphatic claim that the monarchy diverted the sisas to its own purposes, the 
surviving documentation suggests the opposite. 
The relevant question is not whether it was the monarchy, the Jewry or the 
municipality that created the sisas - which largely remains an open problem -
but whether the narrative offered by F. Lopes and furthered by twentieth-century 
historiography of the autonomous development of the sisa by the municipalities 
and its subsequent alienation by the monarchy is congruent with the existing 
sources. Through the cases of the sisas held in Lisbon and Porto in 1336 it is 
clear that the sisas could not be held without the initiative or at least the 
intervention of the monarchy. Jorge Faro himself supplied another r.elevant 
case: facing the fiscal evasion of the clergy and their dependants, the Algarve 
towns witnessed a serious diminution in the receipt of the sisas they held to pay 
for constructing watching-towers against Muslim piracy. Thus, their 
representatives required King Afonso IV to compel the clergy to participate in 
these sisas, whose purposes were in the interest of al1.25 
22 AMP, livro 1 de Pergaminhos, doc. 18 (18 June 1336). 
23 LM-1, doc. 6, p. 33 (07 June 1355). 
24 AMP, Livro A, fol. 149 (11 June 1357). 
25 According to faro, these sisas were held before 1347. 'IDti'Oduction RED, p. LXXKIX. 
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With this information in mind, we can better understand the arguments 
about the greater acceptability of the sisas proposed by Faro and Goncalves. 
After all, the efficiency of the tax required universal liability; otherwise the 
privileged would channel the taxed merchandises. In societies where most of 
the rich are privileged, tax efficiency and universality are two sides of the same 
coin. Similarly, privilege opened the way· for fraud.26 Provided that the king 
temporarily granted his binding 'universal' authority, the sisas could indeed 
provide liqUidity. Indeed, in the sisas, most of the pleas revolved around 
privilege. Already, in the 1336 letter to Lisbon, the monarch explicitly indicated 
that he would allow the men of his lands (reguengos) within the municipality to 
be taxed by the sisa on their wine. In the chancery registers and municipal 
archives, most of the documentation mentioning the sisas concerned group 
privileges: the wine traders of the boroughs near Lisbon, the Corsican 
merchants in Lisbon, the men living in the king's lands in Gaia, the Mendicant 
Orders in Porto, the archbishop's men in Braga.27 Indeed, municipalities could 
not legally compel all categories of their diverse populations without the 
assistance of the monarchy. Though living within the boundaries of the 
municipality, nobles, clergy and men living on royal lands (the reguengueiros) 
all had a distinct status. The monarchy, in exchange, had the authority to 
universally coerce the men living in the kingdom and, when sisas were held, 
could temporarily lend this capacity to the municipal governments. For the 
municipalities, the sisas provided an opportunity to extend their fiscal base to 
those who managed to dodge the typical municipal forms of taxation, the finta 
and the talha. All in all, it would be an over-simplification to understand the 
control of the sisas as a zero-sum game, that is to say in purely distributive 
terms, as Fernao Lopes and the fifteenth-century Cortes did. The sisas 
represented an instance where two institutions negotiated and even cooperated 
in order to maximise their interests: the municipality conferred the capacity for 
the monarchy to control the market, while the monarchy temporarily lent its 
wider, 'universal' authority to the municipality. 
26 This is stated by Joao I in 1398 answering to the grievances of the nobility in the Cortes of Coimbral1398: "~ some 
people were exempt from the said sisas, there would be so many frauds that the sisas would yield little, which would 
be great loss.' OA, Book II, title '59 §1. 
27 By the same order: AML, Livro I de Sente~s, doc. 9 (2 December 1357); LM-1, doc. 7, p. 27 (7 June 1355); 
Chane. Pedro " doc. 475, p. 187 (October 1360) and doc. 811, p. 363 {26 May 1361) and doc. 822, p. 370 {15 June 
1363). 
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A second observation on the view offered by Faro and Goncalves 
concerns the allegedly superior liquidity brought by the sisas. These authors, 
just like Fernao Lopes, assume that the sisa collected by the monarchy was 
identical to the extraordinary sisa paid within the municipalities. However, the 
word sisa was applied to a tax that could assume two different forms: ad 
valorem or ad ponderum. From 1336 to 1372, all the known municipal sisas, 
mostly but not exclusively on wine, were levied per capacity and weight units, 
that it is to say ad ponderum. Indeed, the sisas applied in Porto in 1336 and in 
Lisbon in 1355 were paid on the wine entering the town to be sold, in bulk or in 
retail. Sisas were not yet exactly sales taxes and their reflection on the 
consumer was less direct. In fact, they are close to the tolls set in the twelfth-
and thirteenth-century municipal charters - the portaticum and the tenth - that 
taxed the transport of merchandise into the municipal boundaries. Like these, 
the sisas applied an ad ponderum rate to the commodities within the municipal 
boundaries. Bar special privileges, all non-nobles were bound to this levy. 
However, whilst aliens had to pay tolls and tenths in any Circumstance, locals 
had the privilege to be exempt by simply paying a small annual fee.28 Thus, the 
sisas brought two differences: they were temporary and, crucially, they admitted 
no exceptions. However, as Fig. 10 shows, the sisas would still suffer a radical 
change. 
28 local men could pay an annual due of 1 s. and were free to import their merchandise to their town or -city. 
fernando I unsuocessfully tried to abolish this -custom in Lisbon in 1371. See TI, Chan<:. fernando I, livro 1, fols. 
84v-86. 
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Fig. 10 - Rates of the Sisas, 1336-1408 
Date Level Rate Liability 
1336 Municipal (Porto) Adponderum Wine Sales 
1355 Municipal (Lisbon) Adponderum Wine Sales 
1357 Municipal (Lisbon) Adponderum Wine Sales 
1368 Municipal (Porto) Adponderum Wine Sales 
1371 Municipal (Porto) Adponderum All things sold 
1372-5 Kingdom-wide 3.2% - 8 d. 11 I. All things sold 
1373 Municipal (Lisbon) 1.6% • 4 d. 11 I. All things sold 
1376-8 Kingdom-wide Adponderum Wine Sales 
1377-8 Municipal (Lisbon) Adponderum Wine Sales 
1382-3 Kingdom-wide Adponderum Wine Sales & All things sold 
1384 Municipal (Montemor, Evora) Adponderum Wine Sales & All things sold 
1386 Kingdom-wide 5% • 12 d.l1 I. All things sold 
1387 Kingdom-wide 10% • 24 d.l1 I. All things sold 
1401 Kingdom-wide 6.6% ·16 d.l1 I. All things sold 
1408-1530 Kingdom-wide 10%·24 d.l1 I. All things sold 
Sources: 1336: V1, p. 395; 1355: LM-2, doc. 6, p. 23 and AML, Livro I de Sentenyas, doc. 9; 1357: AML, livro I de 
Sentenyas, Doc. 9, fol. 17v; 1367-8: LM-2, doc. 5, pp. 33-7: 1368: TI, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 1, fol. 3Ov-31; 1372-
5: AML, Livro I de Serviyos a EI Rei, doc. 4; 1373- Livro I de Serviyos a EI Rei, doc. 4 (15 February1373); 1376: TI, 
Chane. Fernando I, Livro 4, fol. 28 (Obidos); 1377: TI, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 4, fol. 7vand 19; 1382-3 and 1384: 
TI, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 3, fol. 3-96; TI, Gav. XII, Mayo 1, doc. 13 (copy of the regulation, used in 1384 for 
Evora); RED, doc. 1, pp. 1-7 (sisas collected in Montemor): 1386 and 1387: AML, Livro I de <::Ortes, doc. 7, fol. ~ 
and AMP, Livro A, fol. 177v-180; RED, doc. 6, pp. 48-50. 
Notes: Only sisas about which either the 'rate' or the 'object' is known were included. 
In 1372, in the context of the second Fernandine War, the monarchy 
imposed in all the lands of the kingdom, instead of demanding them directly to 
each and every municipality. This first kingdom-wide sisa brought yet another 
decisive change: it became an ad valorem sales tax. The reasons for this 
innovation are to be found in the interests of the monarchy. It is highly telling 
that the first sisa levied at ad valorem dates from a period when King 
Fernando's monetary manipulations were at their livelier (see Fig. 5). In a period 
of rapid inflation, the yield of the customary rate of 1 s. per 15 litres (almude) 
would be severely affected. Conversely, collecting an ad valorem tax on sales 
would leave the purchasing power of their revenue unscathed from all 
debasement- or taxation-fuelled inflation. 
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The change to an ad valorem rate was deeply resented by the 
municipalities because it was seen as contributing towards dearth in the taxed 
products. Sisas bore heavily on trade, and this threatened the small centres in 
the hinterland. Mas and Torre de Moncorvo, two remote North-Eastern 
municipalities, argued that sisas amplified the cost of living and had imposed a 
standstill on regional commerce.29 The men of Lisbon also claimed that 'the 
sisas on goods sold by weight, cloth, wood and other things were very 
expensive, namely 4 d. per J. the buyer and 4 d. the seller d., which caused 
scandal among the people,.3o Indeed, from the moment the sisas became ad 
valorem the references to the equity of the sisas disappeared from the 
municipal documentation in the 1330s, 1350s and 1360s. The praise that 
impressed Jorge Faro and other historians was replaced by complaints against 
the sisas and municipal attempts to resort to direct taxation.31 After protesting 
against the 'scandal' of the ad valorem rates in 1375, the municipal government 
of Lisbon agreed with Fernando I that the city would never pay sisas again.32 
After the death of Fernando I, one of the first demands of the Povos to the 
newly-acclaimed Joao I was to cancel all the sisas being collected offering 
instead to pay the same value by means of a direct tax.33 
The receipts from the revolutionary 1372 kingdom-wide sisa are unknown 
and, as such, cannot be compared with the revenues of the municipal sisas 
(Fig. 9). If no quantitative figures remain from the first general sisas collected by 
the monarch, the values of the tax-farms of the 1382-4 sisas agreed in the 
winter of 1381-2 provide a workable sum, although incomplete (Fig. 11 ).34 
29 This was felt by municipalities as diverse as Mos or Torre de Moncorvo, in Tras-os-Montes, lisbon, and Sousel in 
Alentejo. Arquivo Distrital de Braganya, Pergaminhos, doc. 32; Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, pp. 141-3; AMl, livro I de 
Servioos a EI Rei, doc. 4. 
30 AML, Livro I de ServiQos a EI Rei, doc. 4 (15 February1373). 
31 See p.158, note 12. 
32 AMl, livro I de Servioos a EI Rei, doc. 6 (25 July 1375). 
33 Barros, Hist6ria ds Administrs98o, vol. IX, p. 419; Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 111-2 (article 6 of the Cortesof 
Coimbra/1385). 
34 None of the tax-farm ~ntracts contain the rates of the siss gersl. The regulation of 1382 survived in the farm 
contract for the sisas of Evora in 1384 where ~ is stated that these 1384 e~ises were to be collected 'in the 'Same 
manner as the municipality had recently paid to King Fernando'. Thus, these values relate to ad ponderum talles. IT, 
Gaveta XII, m. 1, doc. 13. 
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Fig. 11 - Tax-Farms for the 1382 SiS8S, by Judicial District (in I.) 
Tras-os-Montes Algarve Beira Porto" Lisbon* AlentejoQ Estremadura Entre Douro e 
g Minho* 
20,200 13,000 40,000 22,000 105,000 c. 95,500 c. 79,000 Unkwnon 
Notes: 1\ - Porto was part of the comarca of Entre Douro e Minho and it is the only municipality whose tax-farming 
contract survived; given its status as the second city of the realm in population and wealth, it makes sense to isolate 
it, rather than present its considerable 22,000 I. as an average value for Entre Douro e Minho; *. Lisbon was not 
technically speaking a coma rca, or judicial province, on its own but had a separate organisation from the comarca 
system; II • while the comarcas of Algarve, Tras-os-Montes and Beira were farmed as a whole, those of Alentejo and 
Estremadura were not. Of the 45 towns of the comarca of Alentejo, only 11 were farmed (or at least, have surviving 
tax-farm contracts). As there is no reason to think that only the richest or the poorest were tax-farmed, the average of 
these 11 towns' values has been multiplied by 45 in order to obtain a notional value for the comarca. The same 
procedure has been followed for the 16, out of 38, towns of Estremadura, which had 32,910 L 
Source: TI, Chane. Fernando I, Livro 3, fols. 3-96. 
The 1382·4 sisas were expected to yield approximately 400,000 I. per 
annum.35 Considering Pedro I's notional ordinary revenue of 960,000 I., this 
would represent an increment of 41 %. In the last years of the reign of Fernando 
I the proportion would be even higher, on account of at least three factors: a) 
the effect of war on production and trade; b) the assignment of sources of 
revenue to nobles; c) the debasements of 1369 which deteriorated the value of 
the fixed rents. In fact, a proportion higher than 41 % appears to be confirmed by 
the case of the Algarve, whose Direitos Reais were farmed at 27,000 I. in 
1383.36 That is to say the sisas were roughly half (48%) the total yield of the 
royal revenues. This implies an immense growth, but a few disperse 
municipalities, for which the sums for the sisas and direitos reais exist, show 
that the introduction of sisas could be even more decisive. 
35 The sum of Fig. 11 is 374,724/., but the comarca of Entre Douro e Minho, the most populated of the realm, could 
easily provide the remaining 25,226/ .. The value of 400,000 I. makes sense as in 1385, the popular representati'fes 
proposed to King Joao I a subsidy of 400,000 I. to compensate the monarchy for the loss of the sisas ~PEP, p. 136; 
Barros, Historia da Administra~o, vol. IX, p. 419, note 2; Arquivo Distrital de Braga~, Pergaminhos, doc. 050). 
This datum makes it even more likely that the predictable yield of the kingdom's sisas was indeed 400,000 I. 
36 DP, Supplement to vol. I, <loc. 485, p. 420. 
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Fig. 12 - Municipal rents and Sisa farms in 1382 Compared (in I.) 
Municipality Sisas farmed rents Sisa as part of Rents 
Arronches 1000 1500 66% 
Lamas de Orelhao 1250 200 625% 
Portalegre 2000 1200 166% 
Sintra 4400 3400 129% 
Torres Vedras 2000 3000 66% 
Vila Viyosa 2167 1000 216% 
Source: for 1382 sisas, n, Chane. Fernando I, Livro 3, fol. 3 (Torres Vedras), 18v (Lamas de Orelhao), 20 
(Arronches), 37 (Vila Vicosa), 54 (Portalegre), 86-86v (Sintra); for municipal rents, n, Chane. Fernando I, Livro 3, 
fol. 20 (Arronches, 1371), n, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1, fol. 195 (Lamas de Orelhao, 1259), LL, doc. 68, p. 207 
(Portalegre e Sintra, 1297), 55, doc. 2, p. 168 (Torres Vedras, 1223), n, Chane. Dinis, Livro 3, fol. 1v (VHa V~osa, 
1297). 
The farms of the sisas agreed in 1382 indicate that the sisas vastly 
enhanced the strict fiscal base of the direitos reais, in particular within the 
relatively inelastic municipal rents. Fig. 12 shows that the sisas allowed the 
monarchy to tap the wealth that escaped the contributions established in the 
mostly thirteenth-century municipal charters. The case of Lamas de Orelhao, 
located in a region where many municipal charters included standing farms 
(Tras-os-Montes), is paradigmatic. In 1259 the municipal charter farmed the 
land to the municipality for a sum equivalent to 200 1.37 In 1382, the tax-farmer, 
a local squire, was confident of raising more than six times that amount by 
means of the sisas. The purchasing power of 200 I. in 1259 and of 1,250 I, one 
hundred and twenty years later was perhaps comparable. What matters in this 
case is that were it not for the sisas the whole contribution of thar particular 
municipality would be limited to the nominal 200 I. as it was for more than a 
century. 
Indeed, inflation is decisive in understanding the monarchy's preference 
for the sisas. These taxes achieved more than just simply to tap hitherto hidden 
inaccessible wealth. As sales ad valorem taxes, the sisas were pegged to 
37 In the municipal charter, the dwellers of Lamas de Orelhao and the king settled for 150 leonese mara vedis (TI, 
Chane. Afonso III, livro 1, fol. 195) which were worth 1.(3) I..(See the conversion of the rents of Braganza: TI, 
Chanc Dinis, Livro 1, fol. 122 and n, Chanco Dinis, Livro 3, fol. 104v). This means that the 200 I. are not exactly 
nominal. However, this has little importance as there is no indication that the -customary rate of -conversion was 
altered by the monarchy. 
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inflation and, as such, their yield was 'immune' to its effects. In a period when 
price rises and debasement threatened the fixed rents, this was a decisive 
advantage for the monarchy. For this reason, Joao I sought to extract from the 
reluctant Povos yearly concessions of sisas that protected royal revenue from 
the effects of debasement. Virtually no quantitative data whatsoever can be 
supplied for the years of intense war between the death of Fernando I and 
1401. However, a combination of three different sources, including again the 
chronicles of Fernao Lopes, for the year 1401 allows for a rough breakdown 
estimate of the revenues of the Portuguese crown, displayed in Fig. 13. 
Fig. 13 - Estimate of Royal Revenue in 1401 (in I.) 
7.250.000 
32.750.000 
• Salea tax on cloth In 
Llabon(9"1o) 
B All other aal88 tax In 
L1abon (40%) 
D Sales tax In other towns 
(25%) 
II Dlreltoa Reala (26"10) 
Sources: Lopes, Cr6nica de D. Joso I, part 2, chapter CCI, p. 210; MH, doc. 134.; TT, Chane. Joao I, Livro 5, fol. 
61.38 
In 1401, after three decades of war, the nominal revenue of the monarchy 
rocketed: it was roughly 80 times higher than in 1367. Even more meaningful is 
the change in the structure of the receipt: by 1401 the sisas had become the 
mainstay of royal finances, accounting for 74% of the revenue. In 1382, as 
shown above, the sisas had accounted for roughly 41% of the notional revenue. 
38 These values should be regarded as notional. The total figure of 81,600,000 comes from Lopes, eron. Joso, part 
2, chapter cel, p. 210. The values of the Lisbon sales tax are deduced from an information that the 20 000 I. 
correspond to 1/3 of the sales tax before the truces with Castile (the 1400 Segovia truce) given by the king in the 
parliament (Cortes) of Evora in 14'08 (MH, vol. I, doc. 134, pp. 317-319). The cloth sales tax of 1401-4 was valued at 
29,000,000 for the four years. (TT, Chane. Joao I, Livro 5, fol. 61). 
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Is this inversion to be explained by the decadence of the direitos reais or by the 
growth of the sisas? 
The answer is: both. Naturally, considering that a substantial part of this 
growth might reflect the erosion of the Portuguese coinage wrought by demand-
and debasement-driven inflation, the meaningfulness of the nominal growth is 
unclear. Considering the intense debasement of the I., which by 1401 had 48 
times less metal than in 1382,39 the 22-fold increase of the direitos reais in 
relation to the times of the 'old kings' is no increase at all in terms of silver 
content. Contemporary price increases made things worse and, consequently, 
the Direitos Reais were caught by the 'scissors movement' of debasement and 
inflation. Conversely, the increase of the sisas was remarkable. The kingdom-
wide sisas which were valued at 400,000 I. in 1382 were, by 1401, worth 
60,650,000 I. This nominal augmentation of 151 times from 1382 to 1401 clearly 
exceeds the 48-fold degradation of intrinsic value in that period. This nominal 
surge stands for a metallic gain of 300% and reflects an effective enlargement 
of the tax-base that largely compensated the slump of the traditional revenue. 
Although it does not tell the whole history, metallic content hints at a basic 
fact: whilst the revenue of the Direitos Reais slumped dramatically, the sisas 
emerged as the mainstay of the royal finances. This substitution cannot be 
regarded as a consequence of the crown's neglect for its old fiscal structure. 
Indeed, King Joao I sought to preserve the value of the Direitos Reais. The 
profit-orientated usage of minting rights,40 the alienation of ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions justified by wars41 and the 1393 reform of the jugada (an old land-
tax in the South}42 are three clear examples of enlargement of the tax-base. The 
crown tried as well to give new life to its old revenues, notably the fixed 
revenues, by issuing in 1393 and 1399 laws stating that in payments of rates 
expressed in 'old money' each old I. had to be redeemed by five and later ten 
current, 'new' I., diminishing the effects of the depreciation of the Portuguese 
coinage (see infra section 6.2). These laws allowed for a tenfold increase of the 
39 The metallic contents are 4,106 g Ag per I. in 1382 and 0,085 g Ag per I. in 1401. In 1367 the value was 11,08 g 
Ag per I .. 
40 Given their conservative coinage policy, the 'kings of old' did not gr-eatly benefit from the profns of minting. The 
mint in 1402 was valued at 15,000,000 I. RED, doc. 4, pp. 20.21. 
41 In 1405, King Joao gave back to the bishop of Oporto his rights and jurisdiction in the city which he had wr-estled in 
the 1380s 'because of the great necessities brought by wars' (polas grandes neoessidades das ge"as). These were 
sizeable rights, valued at 300,000 I.. TT, Gaveta I, m~ 1, doc. 15. 
42 RED, doc. 2, pp. 8·12. 
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yield of fixed payments whose importance has already been shown (see Fig. 8). 
Yet, these measures had but a palliative effect. The very structure of the 
traditional revenues upon which the municipal farms were based - tolls, 
customs, land taxes - was quantified on twelfth..century and thirteenth..century 
currencies. In 1401 the Lisbon customs and tolls, whose contribution to the 
royal income was highlighted by Fernao Lopes, were collected according to ad 
ponderum rates set around 1377, well before the wartime coinage slump. As 
the moderate success of these measures shows, the Direitos Reais offered 
limited elasticity. 
By contrast, the revenue of sales taxes grew significantly in real terms.43 
How can this performance in such difficult times be explained? The decrease of 
the Direitos Reais explains a contrario the ascendancy of the sales taxes: from 
1387 onwards the latter were collected at a standing rate of 10% (2 s. per I.) 
and, as such, were immune to the intrinsic devaluation and even to inflation 
itself. The ad valorem collection was not the default option: the 400,000 I.-worth 
1382 sisas were ad ponderum, as were those conceded In 1384 by the 
municipalities to Joao, qua 'defender of the realm'. In these conditions, for King 
Joso I the sisas were no better than a subsidy based on landed wealth ..... This 
changed In 1387 when, after three years of continuous devaluations, the Cortes 
accepted the ad valorem sales taxes for one year (see Infra section 6.2). From 
that moment onwards, the monarchy did not go a single year without the slsas, 
a testament to the superior adaptability of the sales taxes to the economic 
conditions prevailing In times of war. 
Equipped with the sisas, the monarchy could well ride the waves of 
inflation. As ad valorem taxes. the sisas could, and did, protect royal revenues 
from the effects of inflation, both accidental (wartime difficulties in supply) and 
self-inflicted (debasements). The theory that wartime sisas bolstered royal 
finances is compatible with the existing data and is to be accepted, insofar as 
by sisas we mean ad valorem taxes and not simply sales taxes. The changes of 
ca Average wine prioe6 in the five yars before 1369 was 0.53/. and 34 I. In 1401, a price 64.15 tines higher. The 
price grew in Yttleat was roughly the same: 64.7 times {from 0.76 to 491.). Viana, Mario, 'Algtms PreQos de VInho em 
Portugal: ~. Hist6ria, vol. 5, Ponta Oetgada, 2001, pp. 605~ . 
.. EJICtpt pefhaps in the speed of coIectIon. The auessment and colfedlon of the f*Iido were very time.contUming 
ptOOISMS. 
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the royal revenue from 1367 to the times of the old kings stand for a major shift. 
Would it have long-term effects? 
Section 5.2 Ratchet Effect? 
'Ratchet Effecf can be defined as the failure of the wartime fiscal burden 
to return to peacetime levels. The last chapter showed how In Portugal the 
permanent adoption of the war-related sisas stood for a radical change In the 
finances of the monarchy. Roughly three-quarters of the royal revenues now 
came from taxation, overwhelming the contribution of the old direitos reais 
which stood for the remaining quarter. However, the 1401 estimate Is 
Insufficient to demonstrate whether the fiscal effects of war survived In the long 
term. 
Under the present heuristic conditions, the financial effects of the fiscal 
regime during the war can be better assessed by comparing a few isolated 
receipt figures. For the period 1367-1527, there are six general accounts of the 
receipt with rough intervals of 30 years between each of them: 1367, 1401, 
1433.1473,1511 and 1527.45 All these aocounts have a very different nature. 
The earlier two, the estimates provided by Fernao Lopes for the reign of Pedro I 
and for 1401, have already been discussed and explored (sections 0.2, 4.5 and 
5.1). The figure for 1433 is a round figure provided by the Infante JoAo In a 
letter to his brother the king.48 All the remaining accounts arise from the same 
budgetary system. although they do not exactly convey the same stage of the 
accounting process. For 1473 we have the precis of the receipt, while the 
document for 1511 appears to be a 'book of summary' which contained the 
.. Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5 (1367); Lopes, Cron. Jofo I, Part 2, chapter ro, p. 457 (1401); Duarte, 
KilO of Portugal, Uvro dos ConHIhos dlel-Re/ D. Dualftl, ed. Jo6o Alves Dias, Lisbon, 1982. doc. 6. p. 47; RED, 
doc. 4, pp. 82·5 (1473); n, NUcIeo Antigo, doc. 352 (1511): Pereira, 0 Orvsmento do &tJdo, pp. ~·5 (1527) . 
.. Oaimilg that • was useless to 'store in the treasury 8 hundJed or two hundJed mIIions, such Is the wealth of this 
reelm.' Admittedty, the decision to inctude thts aude estima18 provided by the ;,lante Joio In his letter to Duarte lis 
arguable. A. H. Oliveira Marques looked askance on this figure, Iaddng as " does 8 ltltement as to which currency 
was being referred to: two hundred mtllion libra appeared him 10 be too inIIgnificant, while two hundred million IMIs 
aeemed an excetsively hefty sum: furIhefmore, the eXSremely btoed Interval of one hundred million between the two 
uns Indicated total ignorance of the kingdom's finances on behalf of Ks ruling elite. Yet, from !he <iOmp8rison with 
!he figures for 1401 and 1473, tIere can be no doubt that the sum Is exp1'8188S In /Ibru, the clefautt money of 
acx:ount befofe the establishment of the real as the money of aocount, In 1435. The second crilici8m Is also largely 
un;uttified. To allege that the expression 1M wealth of thts reelm' (. rlqueza destllImt) _ted to al the taxabfe 
wealth woutd be a more substantal objection. However, Joio Is arguing that • woutd be usetets to hoard .1 monies 
collected in()nl year, as the two hundJed miItion IIbras would be wiUy-nily spent. 
distribution of the predicted expenditure along with the predicted revenue; for 
1527 the existing source is the annual balance:n 
A detailed comparison is impossible, given the elementary nature of the 
first three, barely more than a notional figure. The only dimension that can 
properly be compared within these five estimates is the total net receipt. What 
cannot be doubted, as it is clear from the receipt detailed in the letters of 
acquittal granted to the almoxarifes, is that the sales taxes provided the lion's 
share of royal finances.48 As such, fluctuations of the royal receipt can be 
broadly regarded as a function of the yield of the sisas. 
As has been noted earlier, the sudden rise of the royal revenue In times of 
war was chiefly, though not purely, nominal. Wars were fought by means of 
constant steep devaluations which dictated that the diminutive libra which 
circulated in the reign of Joao I had no resemblance with the coinage of the 'old 
kings'. As such, the 8500% nominal rise observable between 1367 and 1401 
cannot be taken at face value and should be balanced by a comparison In 
metallic terms.49 Yet, even this comparison should also be deemed Insufficient, 
moreover in a period when Europe suffered from a 'silver famine' that was 
particularly acute in Portugal.50 Estimates of the metallic content of the crown's 
yearly receipt ought to be complemented by another 'deflator': an estimate of 
the acquisitive power of the receipt In terms of two basic, and relatively well· 
documented, agricultural commodities: wheat and wlne.51 
Contemporaries, or at least chroniclers like Fe mAo Lopes and Rul de Pina 
and learned men like King Duarte, did not work with these measurements when 
attempting to make diachronic comparisons of the revenues. Instead they 
D On the Portuguese budgetary technique, see PeteR, 'A Receb do Estado,' p. 50 . 
... Few letters of quittance display the partlcutars of the recefpl Those which did are unanimous: sisa. stood for c. 
90% of the receipt. The proportlon of the sisa, In the Iotal receipt presented by the .#moxarlie of Beja In 1440 and 
1441 (TT, Chane. Afonso V, l.lYro 27, fol. 164) sisa, represent 89%; The same propof1Ion can be found In the 
.ImoXSrltado of Guarda In 1436 (TT, Chane. Afonso V, Uvro 18, fols. 63-65) and 1449 (TT, Chane. Afonso V, Llvro 
11, tot 47). 
49 HMMP, pp. 75. 113. 121·2 and 136 (1367, 1401, 1433 and 1473); TT, NA. doc. 3181dated 1~, used for 1511 
and 1527). 
lID Ferro, Maria Jose Pimenta, &tudos de HistOtis MontIIiria Portuguesa (1383-1438) LIsbon, 1974, pp. 21·5. 
" There being simply no price series available, I resorted 10 the prices lists compiled for the two better document 
commodities (wine and wheat). Wheat prices were taken from VIINl. Mario. 'Alguns Preoos de Cereals em Portugal 
(McuIos XIII-XVI)', ArquipMago. HistOtis, n. 12, Ponta Detgada,2008 (forthcomilg) and farlnha, SGrgio, Preyos e 
Stllirlol em Pottugal ns Baixt kIIde Medis. Porto, 2007. 0Idef price lists provided by Marques, A. H. de OlIveira, 
~ j HistOria da AgrlcuIturII em PotfugI/. A 0uestI0 Cetuliltn durin. , kIIde Medis, 3"1, LIsbon, 1978 
and Coello, 0 Baixo Mondego wert also oonsuIted. WIne prices were taken ellCtusiveIy from VIana, 'Alguns Prfl908 
de VInho em Portugal.' 
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resorted to equivalences in the stable golden coins of their time. This allowed 
their contemporaries to gauge the value of the old revenues in the currencies of 
their own time; nevertheless, it is hard to come across a gold currency 
susceptible to provide a diachronic measure for this case.52 The Castilian dobra, 
used frequently by Fernao Lopes, lost all its importance after the minting of the 
Portuguese cruzado in 1457 and disappeared altogether in its native 'Country in 
1475.53 The French couronne which was widely used by the kings throughout 
the fifteenth century would be the ideal candidate, were it not that it was not 
used in Portugal before 1405 and, worse still, it was converted at an official, 
static rate of 120 r. in 1472.54 Being a function of the nominal variations, the 
couronne would constitute an entirely redundant measurement for the post-
1472 period. For these reasons, the gold currencies adopted for the calculations 
that follow are the Moorish dobra and its Portuguese replica, the escudo of 
1435. Although these coins were not as important as those mentioned, they 
circulated within the realm and they are mentioned often enough to provide the 
historian with adequate conversions for the entire period.55 
Though both purchasing power and metallic content constitute apt 
'deflators',56 it should be noticed that price inflation was not a direct threat to the 
Portuguese crown, which owned vast wheat-fields and vineyards. For heuristic 
reasons, it is not possible to interpret the evolution of the receipt in terms of the 
monarchy's most significant item of consumption - military wages. However, two 
other meaningful items have been included here: the yearly subsidy to the 
nobles in order to maintain their fighting equipment and horse, the contia,57 and 
52 Spufford's Handbook of Medieval Exchange provides little information on the Portuguese ~urrencies. Spufford, 
Peter, Handbook of Medieval Exchange, London, 1986, p. 162. 
63 Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes, L'Economie de I'Empire Portugais aux XVieme et XVIi8me Si6cles, Paris, 1969, p. 
133. 
64 This is the conversion rate throughout the reigns of Afonso V and Manuel I as countless examples from their 
chancery registers indicate: e. g. TI, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 30, fol. 93-4 (1475); TI, Chanco Manuel, Livro 42, fol. 
133 (1502) 
55 In 1367, 1 dobra = 4/. (Lopes, eron. Fernando, Prologue, p. 5); in 1401, 1 dobra = 440 I. (Lopes, Crone. JoSo I, 
part 2, chapter CCI, p. 457); in 1433, 1 dobra = 100 r. (OA, Book 4, title 2 § 13); in 1473,1 dobra = 295 r. ~RED, doc. 
6, p. 70); in 1511 and 1527 1 dobra = 370 r.;TI, Manuel I, Livro25, fol. 14v (/th December 1515), Livro 10, fol. 7v. 
56 On the choice of the right 'deflator' for long-term analysis, see fischer, David Hackett, The Great Wave. Price 
Revolutions and the Rhythm of History, Oxford, 1996, pp. 285-6. 
57 For the present exercise we will use the minimal oontias, those paid per knight. for 1367, we will use the 100 I. 
paid in the reign of Pedro I, according to Femao Lopes {Lopes, Cron. Fernando, Prologue, p. 5); for 1401, we will 
resort to the contia paid to a knight in 1398,4000 I. in 1398 {OA, Book II, title ~9 §24); for 1433, we will use the 
valuation at 1,000 r. (Chaves, Alvaro Lopes de, .(ivro de Apontamentos de Alvaro Lopes de Chaves, ed. Salgado, 
Anastasia Mestrinho and 'Salgado, Abilio, Usbon, 1983, p.175); for 1473, n was~lculated at2,SOO r., given that this 
was the value determined by Joao " in 1483 '(Chaves, Livro de Apontamentos, p. 179) and this was the value for a 
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the wages of the scribes of the Contos, a particularly well-documented office 
that has been closely studied by Maria Jose Ferro.s8 Its lacunae 
notwithstanding, this exercise provides a coherent perspective on the long-term 
evolution of the royal finances. 
Fig. 14 - The Receipt of the Portuguese Crown in 1367, 1401, 1433, 1473, 
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In 1401, when decisive truces were celebrated and King Joao I organised 
his finances, the results of the protracted wars became visible: despite the 
dramatic nominal growth, the crown saw its income strongly decline in terms of 
the metallic content and in relation to the foreign gold currencies. This was a 
moradia of a knight/cavaleiro in 1474 (RED, n. 6, p. 206); for 1511 and 1527, we will use the morsdia of 2.500 r. 
because this value established the obligation of a morador to serve the king in an expedition. 
68 The wages of the contos scribes were standardised and we are relatively well-informed about them. for 1367, I 
used the wages paid in 1389 (360 l)year) and for 1401 I used the yearly wages for that year 19,770 I.). In 1432, the 
standing wages were of 102,025 I. per annum. Ferro, Estudos de Hist6ria Monetaris, pp.57·8 and 133-5. For the 
year 1473, I have employed the yearly 48,000 rs. paid in 1469 (TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 31, fol. 97). For 1509 and 
1527, I resorted to the 5,000 and 6,000 that were being paid in 1502 and 1S21 respectively (TI, 'Chane. O. Manuel I, 
livro 2, fol. 46v and TT, Chane. D. Manuel I, Livro 39, fol:69-69v). 
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direct consequence of the systematic debasements to which Joao I resorted to 
fight, and win, his wars (see infra chapter 7). The steep nominal increase does 
not mask the intense depreciation of the, Portuguese libras. However, as the 
sisas were applied according to ad valorem taxes, this new 'metallic poverty' did 
not affect the crown's notional purchasing power, which remained the same 
despite inflation. As such, the purchasing power of those who depended on the 
crown's payments remained unscathed. 
Considering wealth in its monetary sense, it would seem that Fernao 
Lopes' opinion that the 'old kings' were wealthier than the 'New World' ones is 
correct. Yet, Fig. 14 shows that there was something that the kings who 
inhabited the 'New World' of the chronicler could secure in far greater quantity 
than their 'Old World' counterparts: labour. Considering the threats posed by 
wars, more important to the monarchy than the metallic content was its capacity 
to defray its specialised workforce. Under Joao I, the state managed to turn 
inflation to its favour by postponing the adjustment between inflation and wages: 
administrative officers worked for a purchasing power that was three times 
inferior to that of their predecessors,59 whilst the knightly contia whose nominal 
value of 4000 I. was forty times higher than in 1367 had its purchasing power 
halved.6o The priority was to secure military service with the resources at the 
disposal of the king. By defining the intrinsic value of money and the nominal 
terms of contias, Joao I could pay many conti as. Later monarchies would do the 
same with officers wages, while the value of nO-longer important conti as was 
left high. In both cases, there was no other employer competing with the state in 
the labour market. These were the effects of war on the total receipt. Would 
they last? 
The post-war period shows no signs of having ratcheted forward at all, 
except in nominal terms. Indeed, thirty years later, 'ratchet effect' seems even 
more illusory: notwithstanding a steep nominal growth, 'metallic poverty' and 
'foreign exchange poverty' had become even more extreme in 1433. There are 
indications in the reign of Duarte I (1433-8) and Re,gencyof Pedro (1440-8) the 
59 A concrete complaint of an officer about the devastating effects of the 'great dearth' (grande cst:eStia) on his wages 
can be found at TI, Chane. Joio I, Livro 5, fol. '6 (20 July 1389). 
60 With his annual 360 I., a contos scribe of 1367.could buy 305 wine and wheat units, while his counterpart of 1401 
could merely buy 110 wine and wheat units with his apparently hefty 9, no I.. If he had a contia. a knight «>uld buy 
45 wine and wheat units in 1401, while his predecessor of 1367 could only buy 85 wnh his lot ()f 100 I.. 
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revenues slumped.61 The values in Fig. 14 reflect the coinage devaluations 
which constituted a lasting wartime legacy. Similarly, the poor capacity to hire 
administrative and military labour meant that the situation of 1401 was reversed: 
in 1433 the crown's position in terms of specialised labour mirrored the times of 
the old kings. 
'Metallic' and 'foreign exchange poverty' were still felt seven decades later, 
when the debasements had stopped, an impeccable gold currency had been 
created when the gold ingots of the African coast flowed to the royal treasuries. 
The reasons for this are not visible in Fig. 14: the steep debasements of the 
1400s and 1410s that further deteriorated the metal content of the income and 
the slump of prices that lasted from 1445 to 1473.62 Indeed, a particularly 
counter-intuitive consequence of sales taxes is that deflation affects the 
monarchy. While for most subjects sudden price inflation is a life-or-death 
matter, for a monarchy with lands of its own and with a fiscal system based in 
sales taxes, the dearth of basic commodities could hardly be perceiv.ed as a 
problem. Indeed, given that most payments were set in fixed rates, it might 
prove an advantage: price inflation would benefit the monarchy by giving it far 
more money from each sale. By the same token, deflation worked against the 
crown as it limited the amounts paid. Thus, the crown's purchasing power of 
basic commodities underwent a significant growth in 1433 (157% that of 1401) 
and 1473 (175%) during the difficult decades of the middle fifteenth century. 
However, this wealth in commodities did not compensate the monarchy for the 
loss of the receipt in metallic and foreign exchange terms. 
The long-term outcome of the wartime shift to sales taxes and coinage 
debasement was the weakening of the crown's financial position in times of 
deflation. This seems to have been the case in the middle of the fifteenth 
century, as implied by the receipt for 1473.63 In other aspects, some war-related 
features were reversed. Fig. 14 shows that the post-war rise of the conti a 
deprived the monarchy of the military capacity it possessed in 1401. 
61 Chane. Duarte /, vol. III, doc. 618 and '621, pp. 450-55 (the farmers of the sisas of Elvas and Santarem see their 
chatels seiz«l by the king for not meeting the bid,in 1434). ~o, the letter sent by the infante Pedro to Coimbra in 
1441, BAeL, 5erie Azul, C6dice 409, pp. 1~2. 
62 Marques, IntrodiJ98o a Hist6ria da Agricultura, p . .220. 
83 Both the summaries of reoeipt and.expendtture from 1473 and 14n indicate deficits. RED, doc. 8, doc.~5. 
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In 1473, the benefits of the appreciation of the coinage of the previous 
decades were already visible. Although it did not match the 'old kings' and not 
even the reign of Joao I, royal receipt was clearly past the low point of the 
1430s. In 1511 the metallic wealth of the 'old kings' was clearly exceeded and 
the potential commodity wealth was roughly matched. Indeed, after 1489, the 
kingdom resumed the monetary stability interrupted by more than a century of 
constant manipulations. This stability is reflected in the parallel growth of 
nominal and intrinsic receipt, a phenomenon that had not occurred in 1401 and 
1473. However, the value for the contia in 1527 is still very high for the finances 
of the monarchy, showing how exceptional circumstances in 1401 had been. 
The estimates for 1511 and 1527 are remarkably similar. 80th testify to an 
overall growth, be it in metallic terms or in golden coins, in wages paid and even 
in commodities. Unlike the transition from the old kings to wartime, the transition 
from the middle decades of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the 
sixteenth century testifies to an effective growth in all respects, except 
commodities: foreign exchange, acquirable public administration, nominal and 
metallic value.64 
For all the patent limitations of the present exercise, the analysis of the 
revenues allows us to draw some coherent conclusions.65 According to Fig. 14, 
the long-term evolution of the Portuguese finances can hardly be regarded as a 
straightforward 'ratchet effect'. It can be safely said that the 'real' revenue was 
not bolstered by wartime taxation except in nominal terms. The alleged central 
consequence of the wars - the institution of a permanent sales tax - cannot be 
seen as directly causing a ratchet effect. Rather than a solid growth of the 
receipt, metallic depreciation and low wages were the decisive legacy of wars, 
as visible in 1401. 
The suggestion that the sisas were chosen in order to allow the revenues 
of the monarchy to keep up with the purchasing power in a time of galloping 
inflation (see supra section 5.1) is confirmed. In fact, Fig. 14 makes visible the 
64 The early sixteenth century, which so obviously appears as a period of steady growth of the receipt In metallic and 
'real' terms, was a period of intense military activity for the Portuguese crown in North Africa, In the Atlantic and In the 
Indian Ocean. Yet, this circumstance is not to be explained by Ratchet €ffect, as this was not a period of great fiscal 
innovations and the introduction of new taxes. Explanation is to be found .elsewhere, as shown on the following 
section. 
65 It should be noted that in broad terms the evolution is .coherent to that of Castile as described by Miguel Angel 
Ladero Quesada; 'Castile in the Middle Ages', RFS, pp. 182-4. 
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existence of an inverse correlation between the rise of the receipt in terms of 
commodities and the same rise in metallic terms. The periods displaying a high 
amount of acquirable commodities are comparatively poorer in terms of metallic 
content and foreign currency. Indeed, during the periods of stagnant prices the 
sales taxes revealed their downturn: fifteenth-century kings became far more 
sensitive than their 'old' predecessors to the ups and downs of the economy. 
Simply put, for an sisas-based monarchy whose expenditure was set in fixed 
terms, the lower the prices the lower the utility of the income. 
The early sixteenth-century rise in the prices was therefore accompanied 
by a steady growth of the receipt. Considering that this increase cannot be 
explained by the 'ratchet effect' theory, the fluctuations of the receipt should be 
explained not in terms of the direct consequences of the wars but rather in 
relation to the economy itself. 
Section 5.3 - Fiscal Buoyancy 
The evolution of the receipt showed the limitations of the theory of the war-
driven 'ratchet effect'. The stagnation or decadence of the crown's 'real' income 
in the decades after the war shows how military factors alone are insufficient to 
explain the evolution of Portuguese royal finances. By exploring the available 
quantitative evidence, it was possible to indicate a different hypothesis: the 
evolution of the sisa-based receipt was tied to the fluctuations of the economy, 
and, most of all, to inflation. 
The confirmation of this hypothesis requires more detailed data than the 
crude totals provided in Fig. 14. In the present heuristic conditions, only the 
letters of quittance conserved in the chancery books provide a more dynamic 
and accurate view of the royal revenues than that used in the previous chapter. 
Sporadically, information from these letters can be complemented by stray tax-
farming contracts and the figures of general accounts. The chronological 
coverage of the letters of quittance is nonetheless very unbalanced: while no 
registers of letters of quittance survive for the reign of Joao I and only three 
letters of quittance were conserved in the chancery records of King Duarte 
(1433-38), the chancery register of King Manuel I (1495-1521) preserved more 
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than seven hundred letters of quittance of several officers.66 The chancery 
registers of his predecessors Afonso V (1438-81) and Joao II (1481-95) are less 
imposing but nonetheless significant, yielding eighty-three and ninety-one 
letters respectively. Although these registers of letters of quittance had the 
same legal effects, they did not follow a standard format. Some merely state the 
names of the officers, while others provide the total sum of the revenue 
collected. Only a few of these documents break down the receipt and the 
expenses thereof. Whilst all the Emmanueline letters provide either sums or 
detailed accounts of the monies managed by the officer, the three letters of 
quittance passed by King Duarte that survive in his chancery record are devoid 
of any figures. Furthermore, sometimes the sums managed by the officer 
acquitted have no relevance for present purposes, as is the case with most of 
the ninety-one letters of Joao II, of which only eighteen convey usable 
quantitative evidence. 
All in all, when combined, these sources display an impressive growth of 
the revenue, confirming the trends earlier sketched (see supra section 5.2). 
Though the construction of a proper series of revenues is impossible, there is 
enough fragmentary evidence to supply a consistent picture of the evolution of a 
handful of relatively well-documented sources of revenue. For no apparent 
reason, the sets of data that have the widest chronological spread come from 
two contrasting settings: the undisputed mainstay of the royal finances -the 
sisas of Lisbon- and the hinterland province of Beira, where the almoxarifados 
of Guarda and Lamego stood and whose figures for the tenth on imported cloth 
survive. These two settings provide complementary evidence. 
The growth of revenues from the middle of the fifteenth century to the first 
two decades of the sixteenth was very considerable. The steep increases of the 
income provided by five of the twelve 'branches' of the Lisbon sisas provide a 
particularly wide-ranging and consistent set of data as displayed on Fig. 15.67 
. Fig. 15 - The Main SISBS collected in Lisbon, 1446-1521 (100=1473) 
66 One could say that for the reign of Manuel I there is near-serial data for most of the country's almoxarifados. The 
letters of quittance in this reign were published between 1906 and 1916by A. Braancamp Freire (COM). 
87 Since debasements became less intense from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards and considering that a 
'deflated' picture of the -crown's receipt through different indicators has already been drawn, " is now <:Onvenient to 
present revenues in nominal currency. 
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206,211,230,236,257,310,335,357,371,381,434,511-14,550,555,557,619,656,679, 700;RED,doc.8 
Although figures are lacking for the 14605 and 14705, the data are 
consistent enough to provide a discernible evolution of the sisas. Statistical 
consistency apart,68 some coherent traits are immediately observable: the 
slump of 1506 followed by a swift recovery three years later and the more stable 
yield of the sisas on wine and fisheries, two essential parts of the Lisbon staple 
diet, and thus less elastic, and the volatility of the remaining sisas, all levied on 
less essential goods. The explosion of the revenue provided by the sisa on 
precious goods after 1500 is likely a direct reflection of the opening of the Cape 
route to the highly-valued Indian spices in 1498. 
After a period of modest, and perhaps stagnant, income in the 1440s, the 
indexed year, 1473, stands for a steady growth of the nominal revenue of all the 
documented sisas. To some extent, this growth masked the continuation of 
68lntemal statistics show that these data have a fair degree of ~nsistency: there Is very strong positive correlation 
between the evolution of the yield of the sis! on fisheries and that of real estate (1 and 0.998) while the strong 
-correlations between cloth and fisheries ~0.829363) between cloth and spice ~O.831095) and between the latter and 
real estates (0.862613) are noteworthy. 
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debasements139 but the rapid increase of the yield of the sisa of wine in the 
1480s and in the sisa on fisheries and cloth immediately afterwards was no 
longer attributable to the degradation of coinage, as the last meaningful 
manipulation of the coinage occurred in 1472 (with the creation of the chinfrao). 
The stabilisation of the coinage was followed by a period of sensible, but not 
explosive, development of the revenues. In 1493, another year for which there 
is information for all these five sisas, the revenues of the major sisas were 
7,153,000 r., 161% of their revenue in 1473 and 294% of their revenue in 1447-
8. The increase became exponential around 1500, thanks to the sudden 
expansion of the sisa on spice, on land transactions and on fishing. As a result, 
in 1527 the receipt of these five major sisas was worth 18,890,000 r., 393% of 
their value in 1473 and 777% the value of eight years before. 
The sisas of Lisbon reflect what seems to be a kingdom-wide upward 
trend. In 1430s and 1440s the average income of the eminently rural 
almoxarifado of Lamego was 468,125 r., in the 1510s it was of 2,644,196 and 
would near 4,000,000 r. in 1527. The rent of Guarda reached in 1527 the sum 
of 9,483,000 r., an impressive achievement for an almoxarifado that a century 
earlier struggled to obtain a tenth of that value. Examples of such increases are 
not hard to come by among the letters of acquittal, rather than exclusive to 
Beira or Lisbon. In 1426-30 the average receipt of the almoxarifado of Coimbra 
was 388,589 r. while in 1496-1500 the average was of 2,035,737 r. and it 
yielded 3,930,000 in 1527; in 1441, the sisa on the cloth in Setubal was worth 
38,571 r., in 1509 it was worth 337,846 r. The income of the Northernmost 
almoxarifado of Ponte de Lima was only 690,449 r. in 1442, thirty years later it 
remained at 766,000 r., whilst in 1506 it had grown to 1,843,250 r. and to 
3,673,000 r. n 1527. The Customs of Lisbon were farmed at 6,000,000 I. 
(=1,714,285 r.) in 1397, in 1473 they grew to 4,700,000 r. and finally in 1527 
they were worth 12,120,000 roo As argued in last chapter, the observable 
increase of the crown's revenues between 1473 and 1527 implied more than 
simple nominal growth. While it is open to dispute whether the sisa-endowed 
monarchy of 1401 was wealthier than the old kings c. 1367, the figures for 1509 
69 In 1447-8. the year for which the figu~s for five sisas exist. the receipt was 2,469.000 roo sum was 38.8% of the 
income in 1473. However. in metallic terms these revenues in 1447·8 were equivalent to 63.154 Ag 9 {2.429.000 r. • 
0.026 g per r.) whilst in 1473 they were worth 53.340 Ag 9 {5.334.ooo r. "0.01 9 per r.). On the last debasement, see 
HMMP, p. 136. 
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and 1527 show that the royal finances of the early sixteenth century were 
definitely in better shape. 
The relevance of the Lisbon sisas for our purpose does not end here. If 
analysed from a slightly different angle, they reveal that the late fifteenth-
century enrichment of the crown suggested in the previous chapter was directly 
related to the enrichment of the country, rather than to any other factor. 
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As presented on Fig. 16, the data on the sisas of Lisbon are extremely 
telling about the changes in the tax base. While in the 1440s the higher 
revenues came from an essential product, wine, eighty years later the sisa on 
real estate and precious goods were the most productive 'branches' of the 
Lisbon sisa. The sisa on cloth kept growing but had a less impressive 
expansion. The growth of these two latter sisas is even more impressive and 
meaningful: whilst the sisa on real estate was worth a paltry 39,000 r. in 1446, 
in 1527 it was farmed at 3,434,000 r.; the sisa on precious goods {sisa da 
mar~aria) yielded 382,000 r. in 1446 and rose to 5,77{),000 r. in 1516 and to 
6,060,000 r. in 1527. By comparison with these imposing changes, the sisa on 
wine increased from 409;000 r. in 1448 to only 1,104,000 r. in 1516 and finally 
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to 2,124,000 r. in 1527. The tax-base was enlarged mainly within less essential 
goods, while the most essential of the products documented underwent a 
comparatively modest evolution. In other words, the crown's tax-base was had 
become far more affluent and was spending much more money. Accordingly, 
revenues soared, based as they were on ad valorem sales taxes. 
After the 1470s, with the effective enlargement of Portuguese economic 
life, the monarchy enjoyed the advantages of relying on ad valorem taxes. 
Endowed with the sisas, the revenues of the monarchy, so to speak, floated 
thanks to the upward economic trend, seemingly without need for institutional 
changes. The hypothesis sketched above of a close link between inflation and 
the growth of the fiscal receipt can be tested by plotting an indicator of price 
movements against the curve of the revenue. This has been done in Fig. 17, 
with the revenues from Beira, using the only available proxy for the inflation of 
the period: wine prices.7o Fig. 17 also aims at testing the influence of inflation on 
the sisas of Beira, by comparing their yield with an ad ponderum source of 
revenue - the tenth paid in imports of cloth - in the same region. 
70 Based on Viana, 'Alguns Pr8QOs de Vinho.' 
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Fig. 17 - Price Movements and Revenues in Beira, 1430-
1520 (100=1527) 
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Sources: for the almoxarifado of Guarda: 1431-4 - Ma"ocos, vol. I, pp. 18·36; 1436 - n, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 5, 
fol. 83v·85; 1449 - TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 11, fol. 47; 1473 - RED, doc. 8; 1485·7 - COM, 215; 1494-5 - COM, 
332; 1496 - COM, 53; 1497 - COM, 215; 1498 - COM, 93; 1501 - COM, 141 (Incl. chancery payments within the 
Comarca of Beira); 1503-4 - COM, 142; 1505 - COM, 176; 1506·7 - COM, 143; 1508 - COM, 145 ~incl. 'other 
revenues'); 1509 - TI, Nlicleo Antigo 532, fol. 150-1; 1510 - COM, 146; 1513-4 - COM, 147; 1515-6 - COM, 148; 
1518·9 - COM, 555; for the almoxarifado of Lamego: 1434·40 - TI, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 50, fol. 133-9v (farm); 
1441 - TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 27, fol. 116v·117 (farm); 1473 - RED, doc. 871; 1497-1501 - COM, 535-6; 1508-
COM, 408; 1515-6 - COM, 410; 1517 - COM, 579; 1519-20 - COM, 626; for the sisa on imported cloth in Beira: 
1437 - TT, Leitura Nova, Beira, Livro 2, fol. 92; 1460-64 - TI, Leitura Nova, Beira, Livro 2, fol. 21·22v72; 1465 -TI, 
Leitura Nova, Beira, Livro 2, 21v (includes the sisal; 1494-5 • COM, 332; 1496·7 • COM, 53; 1509 • TT, Nlicleo 
Antigo, n. 532, fol. 26; 1511-2· COM, 303 (value for the effective receipt, as the tax-farmers did not meet their goal); 
1513-6· COM, 304, 305,306; 1519-20· COM, 624 (farm). 
The existing sums for the income of the almoxarifados of Guarda and 
Lamego and for the yield of the cloth entering the borders of Beira are plotted in 
against the 10-year moving average curve of wine prices in Fig. 17. In what 
concerns the revenues, the graph offers an already familiar picture: little or no 
growth in the first three quarters of the fifteenth century, with signs of a sudden 
71 Included as part of VlSeu, calculated at 45% the rent of VISeU, as n can be seen from other years for which there 
are sources. 
72 Pieces of cloth known as de Castela were priced at 1,000 r., given that is the price given to the footio in 
neighbouring Alentejo and that those pieoes were priced at 113 the cloth of Bristol. Ferreira, Pr~ e Satarlos, p. 
252-4. 
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rise between 1473 and 1482 (for the almoxarifado of Guarda, at least) and 
steady expansion in the last two decades of the century. Falling revenues in the 
next decade are followed by signs of a gentle, sustained increase that continues 
up to the end of the period. 
As hinted at while commenting Fig. 14, a great deal of these changes can 
be attributed to inflation. As the wine price curve shows, the low income in both 
almoxarifados in the 1430s is associated with a period of extremely low 
inflation. After two ill-document decades (1450s and 60s) the figures for the 
receipt and inflation run again parallel and from the 1490s onwards the 
fluctuations of the incomes of Guarda and Lamego mirror those of the prices.13 
The fact that the lines drawn by the revenues of Guarda and Lamego run 
broadly parallel to the course of inflation is natural insomuch their income was 
essentially that of the sisas. The relationship between wine prices and the 
revenues of the 'hinterland' sources of revenue confirm that general inflation 
had a long-term beneficial effect on the fifteenth-century receipt. From the 
curves of the two almoxarifados, one could infer that the monarchy simply 
reaped the benefits of price inflation and, moreover, of price inflation with a 
stable coinage. 
However, the figures on the tenth of cloth entering Beira demonstrate that 
the revenue expansion was not simply a function of the price inflation. Even if 
sometimes farmed out in money,74 the tenth of the cloth paid at the border 
outposts was an ad ponderum tax, most often paid in kind, at a rate of one 
piece of cloth per ten pieces imported. As such, the interpretation of the line of 
the tenth on cloth is somewhat different, as it reflects that the crown did also 
benefit from 'real' expansion of the country's economy. As such, observable 
fiscal buoyancy does not simply reflect inflation, which was beneficial for the 
crown, but also the effective growth of the tax-base, with more imports made. It 
73 The option for 10-year moving average allows to oonvey short- and medium-term fluctuations. The linear plotting of 
the revenues and prices would show a perfectly parallel line. Indeed, long-term increase of price inflation equalled 
that of the income of Guarda and Lamego. This demonstration was not done here for the sake of space economy; 
otherwise, ~ would be clear that these two curves are indicators of the same phenomenon: the rise of prices and the 
economic improvement. Naturally, this does not imply that there is a mechanic oorrelation, let alone ~U58tion, 
between wine {!) priceS and the receipt of the almoxarlfado. 
74 For fig. 19, I have converted in r. the value of the cloth collected in 1437 (TI, LeUura Nova, Livro 2 cia Beira, fol. 
92) and 1460-64 (TI, Leitura Nova, Livro 2 cia Beira, fols. 21-22v) using the ~urrent prices (compiled In 'Ferreira, 
~e SalBrios, pp252-4. Both Qses refer to farmed revenues. In 1511 and 1512, the revenues were farmed out 
in monies, but ended up by being received by the king's officers ~CQM, 303). 
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was not simply a matter of more money being paid for the same things but of 
more things being paid for.75 
The figures for Beira and Lisbon have been explored from various angles 
the impressive growth of the crown's revenue in the late fifteenth century and 
have been used to argue that the sisas allowed the monarchy to take part in the 
kingdom's steady economic development. This is why one can regard the 
introduction of the sales taxes as a genuine revenue revolution that ended the 
fiscal system of the 'kings of old'. The difference between the booming income 
of Joao II and Manuel I and that of their prosperous great-great-grandfathers 
can also be explored using the existing figures for the Lisbon customs which 
were hailed by Fernao Lopes as the fiscal mainstay of the 'old world' monarchy. 
Fig. 18 - The Lisbon Customs and the Revenue of the Kingdom, 1367-1527 
Years Lisbon Customs Approx. Total Customs as % of 
Receipt Total Receipt 
c. 1367 160,000 I. 960,000 I. 16.6% 
1392 800,000 I. [farm] unknown unknown 
c. 1400 6,000,000 I. 81,640,000 I. 7.3% 
1473 4,700,000 r. 52,500,000 r. 8.9% 
1495 6,000,000 r. [farm] unknown Unknown 
1511 10,723,000 r. 98,360,000 r. (min.) 10.9% 
1527 12,120,000 r. 156,940,000 r. 7.7% 
1557 50,500,000 r. 336,320,000 r. 15% 
Sources: 1367 - Lopes, Cron. Femando, Prologue; 1392 - ANTT, Chane.D. Joao I, liv. 5, fol. 
125v; 1398-9 - RED, doc. 4; 1473 - RED, doc. 8; 1495 - COM, n. 190; 1509 - TT, Nucleo 
Antigo 532, fol. 5; 1527 - Pereira, 0 Or~amento do Estado, p. 62; 1557 - As Gavetas da Torre 
do Tombo, vol. I, ed. Centro de Estudos Ultramarinos, Lisbon, 1960, pp. 891-5. 
75 The problem of the 'cause' of this growth should not.conoem this dissertation. However, n is important to stress 
that the region underwent a strong demographic growth between 1496 and 1527 as attested by Jao Alves Oias. Oias, 
JoSo Alves, 'A Beira Interior em 1496 {Sociedade, Administr89&o, Oemografta), Arquipe/ago. Revista dB 
Universidade dos AQares, $9rie Ci~ncias Humanas, voL IV, January, 1982, p. 142. 
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The lisbon customs, the most important segment of the Direitos Reais, 
provides a counter-model to the sisas. As Portuguese early customs mostly 
collected ad ponderum or proportional duties, according to the items, they did 
not possess the adaptability of the sisas,16 As such, in spite of the continuing 
dynamics of this major sea harbour, the customs of Lisbon lost part of their 
pristine fiscal importance in periods of affluence fuelled by the sisas, as in 1401 
and 1527. It is remarkable that in a period of intense trade and importation such 
as the first half of the sixteenth century, the rise of customs income was only of 
13%. In the same period, the peripheral almoxarifados of Tras-Montes, Vilar 
Real and Torre de Moncorvo, grew 192% and 149% respectively. 
The values for 1557 provide evidence a contra rio for the same claim.n 
Indeed, as the devolution of the sisas to the municipalities in 1538 contributed 
towards the slow growth of the king's overall revenues,18 the share of the 
customs in Portuguese finances grew considerably.79 
The relative stagnation of the customs throws a final light on the problem 
of fiscal buoyancy: the escalation of the income at the disposal of the monarch 
can hardly be explained by legal and institutional factors. Throughout the 
fifteenth century there was, as the petitions presented in the Cortes testify 
alterations in the taxation on some sensitive items like warhorses and weaponry 
as well as grain or bread, in years of dearth. Nonetheless, never did the default 
ad valorem rate of 1408 change. The only momentous change was the 
exemption of the clergy in 1498.80 The rates and the methods of collection of 
the sisa were compiled by the Regulation of 1476 that kept its validity until 
1527. Essentially, this regulation embodied the rich jurisprudence on the sisas, 
including the answers to the fifteenth-century petitions in the Cortes. At any 
rate, neither in the Regimento of 1476 nor in the ulterior jurisprudence were the 
key principles of the sisa ever challenged: universal (including the king) 
76 See individual descriptionS for all coastal customs in Pereira, 'Portos do Mar,' Portugal na Era de Quinhentos. 
Estudos Varios, cascais, 2003, pp. 9-117. Also, Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, Para a HistOria das Alfandegas em Portugal 
no In/cio do S6culo XVI (Vila do Conde - OrganilafAo e Movimento) Lisbon, 1983. 
n The growth in importance of the Lisbon customs would continue for the next century. See figures in Hespanha, 
Ant6nio Manuel, Theory and Society, Vol. 18, n. 5 [Special Issue: Cities and States in Europe, 1000- 1800, Sap. 
1989, p. 712. 
76 Cruz, Os Vec/ores da Fazenda, p. 242-4. 
79 In his Jo8o Cordeiro Pereira provides indications of purposeful attempts to improve the yield of the customs in the 
1530s and 1540s, that is to say after the sisas were devoluted. Pereira, 'Portos do Mar,' pp. 87, 103, 1'06-7. 
80 Serrao, Joaquim Verfssimo, 'lisboa, Cortes de {1498)" in Serrao, Joel, ed., Dicionario de Hist6ria de Portugal, 
Joel 'Serrao, ed., vol. 4,2"d·, Porto, 1999, pp. 24-5. 
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payment of one tenth of the value of the thing bought, sold or exchanged, paid 
half by the vendor and half by the seller.81 The presence of a competitive tax-
farming market, where Jewish and foreign capital played a part,82 prevented the 
ossification of the incomes. The settlement between the king and the 
municipalities in 1538 by which the sisas were reduced to a standing sum 
cannot have failed to halt Portugal's fiscal buyoancy. Thus, from 1387 to 1538 
the sisas made Portugal a full-blown 'tax state: Afterwards, the monarchy was 
forced to rely again on the external trade as it had done in the time of the old 
kings. 
The key effect of war on the royal finances was not to make the kings 
'richer' but to change the nature of the revenues. As the sisas became 
permanent, the monarchy's fortunes became totally intertwined with the 
economic dynamics of the kingdom. In the war years, the ad valorem sales tax 
allowed the monarchs to skip the self-inflicted harms of debasement, which had 
borne heavily on the thirteenth-century Portuguese monarchs. Conversely, in 
1420s and 1430s when prices decreased or stagnated, this had a very negative 
effect on the monarchy's finances, as seen in section 5.2. It is no coincidence 
that this was the period when Lopes wrote his nostalgic praise for the financial 
bliss of the 'old kings' .83 After this period, the sisas ensured that the massive 
economic expansion of the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century 
resulted in a period of effective 'fiscal buoyancy' for the kings of Portugal. 
Indeed, from the comparison of the total receipt between 1473 and 1527 it is 
possible to calculate a 6.8% per annum growth of the revenues, a figure far 
above that of the inflation of commodities (1.8%).84 Thanks 'to the sisas, the 
Portuguese kings could count on a wider tax-base as, having stabilised the 
currency once more, they became richer even in metallic terms.8S Given their 
81 Barros, Hist6ria da Administra9So, vol. IX, pp. 422·507 
82 Marques, Portugal na Crise dos Skulos XIV e XV, pp. 313·4. 
83 Even if the figures for 1433 are possibly too low, this was a negative phase for the erown finances. This was also 
the ideal period for direct taxes. This relationship will be explored infra on -chapter 6. 
84 Between 1473 and 1527 the annual rate of inflation, as measured in wine and wheat prices, the only commodities 
for which there is available data, was between 0.3 (wheat) and 1.8%~wine). Viana, 'Alguns Pr~ de Vinho'; Viana, 
'Alguns pr~os de cereais'. 
85 It is essential to bear in mind that this metallic reinforcement is notional, as most of the affectiv.ely cireulating 
currency was in eopper. Still, it makes sense to .employ notional figures of weight in silv.er, as .copper and silver or 
gold coins were interchangeable. 
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condition as producers, the effects of inflation on the purchasing power were 
relatively unimportant for the monarchs.86 
In sum, the 'revenue revolution' that was explored in this chapter does not 
refer to a mere quantitative growth, war-driven or not; it refers to a wholly new 
relationship between the 'new kings' and the economic life of the realm. While 
the 'old kings' dominated the more cashable segments of the economy, the 
Portuguese 'Tax state' depended on the market. In this sense, as this chapter 
has discussed, sisas were every bit as revolutionary as claimed by Iria 
Goncalves, A. H. Oliveira Marques or V. Magalhaes Godinho.87 However, the 
confirmation of the importance of the sisas only enhances the need for one 
further step in this research. Considering the strict limitations that bore upon the 
financial dealings between crown and subjects in the time of the 'old kings', how 
did the subjects come to accept the collection of the sales taxes? How could a 
threatened dynasty, 'chosen and elected' in parliament,aa adopt and keep the 
sisas during and after the war? 
86 Except as 'redistributors' of revenue, as will be revealed in part 8. 
87 Naturally, the 'Suggestion that the monarchy 'chose' this sales tax because R was a 'better' or more 'modem' tax, as 
occasionally argued, flies in the face of any reasonable understanding of political agency. 
86 This is all the more impressive as in 1538 a far wealthier and established monarch as JoSo III agreed with their 
'devolution' to the municipalities Cruz, Leonor 'Garcia <la, A Gove~ de D. Jo8o II: A 'Fa~nda Real e os seus 
V6dores, Usboa, 2005, p. ~-4. 
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Chapter 6 - A New Fiscal Constitution? 
Constitutional historians have highlighted how the reign of Joso I 
represented a clear break with the previous period. In fact, his legitimacy was 
altogether different from the previous monarchs. Whereas Fernando I had been, 
like his predecessors, the undisputed successor of an old lineage of kings, Joso 
lowed his royal status to the 'election and appointment,1 of the Cortes of 
CoimbraJ1385. Ultimately, his legitimacy derived from the very choice of the 
realm in consideration of his personal aptitude and of his deeds, in one word, of 
his 'merit'. Moreover, not only the three strands of the Cortes called to 
themselves the responsibility of choosing a monarch for the vacant throne as, 
ultimately, the very existence of a monarchy was their choice.2 These ideas 
were systematised in the influential 'Act of Election' of Joso I (1385). 
To a large extent, the discourse of the municipalities in the Cortes of 
Coimbraf1385 re-enacted the ideology and the concrete claims of the 
opposition to Fernando I in 1369 and 1371.3 Circumstances, however, did not 
favour a rigid, nonnegotiable stand, grounded in firm principles. Firstly, there 
was an imminent, full-scale Castilian threat about to materialise and, secondly, 
Joao I showed himself reluctant to accept the throne without receiving formal 
assurance of adequate financial and military support from the barons, 
municipalities and prelates of the realm.4 In the letter of the 'Act of Election',5 
the prelates, knights and the municipalities through their proctors 'pledged to 
assist him with bodies and properties and to sustain all the burdens of the 
1 These ('Jnli~m e nomea~m') are the terms used in the very act of election struck in the Cortes of Coimbra. see 
caetano, Marcello, 'As Cortes de 1385', A Crise Nacional de 1383·85. Subsfdios Para 0 Seu Estudo, Lisbon, 1985, 
p. 98, in fine. 
2 'Veendo nos que ... Rey que ssenpre acustumarom a auver que nos e os dictos Reygnos aJam de manteer em 
directo e eem Justi9a Enos deffenda e ffa9a todo aquello que compre para nom Cajrrmos em ssogei90m ... E por 
que outrassi guardar e enparar estes Reygnos per nos nom podiamos veendo ajnda mais que em tal Caso e 
nBgessidade a nos era compridoiro parteB9ia nomesr esco/her e tomsr e r69Bber a/guma pessoa cJypna -e tal qual 
compria pera os dictos Reynos regsr gouemar deffemder auudo primeiramente consselho delibe~ e acordo 
antre nos sobre tado entedemos e Somos gertos per aquelto que ( ... J Dom Joham ( ... J he tam nobre boom e muito a 
esto compridoira ssofi9iente dipno auto e conuinhuil e que outrassi trabalhou e trabalha tanto por defenssom dos 
dictos Reygnos que mer890 e merece esta onrra dinidade e estado.' Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385', p. 96. 
a This can be seen comparing the claims aired in the Cortes of Leiria and Porto (1371) and the general articles of 
grievances presented in the Cortes of 1385. However, this comparison exceeds the ambn of the present work. On 
the Cortes of Coimbra, caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385' and Sousa, I() Discurso Politico dos Concelhos nas Cortes de 
1385', Revista da Faculdade de Letras. Historis, II Serie, n. 2, Porto, 1985, pp. 9-43. 
" For discussion and references, see caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385', pp. 10-11, 98. 
5 This act was only struck after the redaction of the grievances Sousa, 'OOiscurso Politico,' p. 22. 
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expenses and services that are required for him to maintain the regal status.'6 
The 'Act of Election' goes even further in this line: as the Povos wanted to be 
ruled by a king, they would have to 'aid both with our bodies and goods in order 
to sustain the expenses and services required to maintain the regal honours 
and status and to take on the war'.7 
The present chapter aims at comparing the post-1385 constitutional 
experience in terms of royal finances with the previous period using the same 
concept of 'fiscal constitution', as described in chapter 2. The first stage of this 
enquiry is naturally to assess whether there were constraints on the monarchy's 
fiscal powers, namely on the two main prinCiples of pre-Fernandine fiscal 
constitution - limitations on monetary manipulations (sections 6.1 and 6.2) and 
consent to extraordinary taxes (section 6.2) - were observed. Only then, it will 
be possible to understand this period as a whole (section 6.4). 
Section 6.1 - Debasement and Consent 
Before the constitutional fight over debasements is approached, there is 
a need for presenting some background of contemporary monetary history. 
Steep devaluation of the bullion has been singled out by different authors as the 
key feature of fifteenth-century Portuguese monetary and financial history.8 Yet, 
it is important to stress that decrease of the intrinsic value of the coinage was 
not linear. The complexity of the post-war monetary policy appears more clearly 
when considering the monetary unit - the real - in relation to the coinage 
(rather than the isolated intrinsic features) that a more understandable pattern 
emerges. The long-term picture can be seen in Fig. 19. 
e 'Offerecendo nos sobredictos prelados Caua/eiros ffida/gos e procurador6S dos Cofl98lhoS ( ... ) a 0 ajudar com 
nossos corpos e beens e a ssosteer os encaffegos das despesas e sseruifos que /he eram compridoiras para 
manter 0 estado e honra de rey.' Caetano, 'N, Cortes de 1385,' p. 98. 
7 'Ajudar com os nossos corpos e beens e a ssosteer os encaffegos das deSpes8S e sseru;yos que Ihe eram 
compridoiras para manteer 0 estado e honra de rey e para outrossi ieuar sua guerra em de8nt~, Caetano, 'N, 
Cortes de 1385,' p. 98. On the other hand, ~ must be noted, Joao I shared his power with a representative-counsel, 
dominated by representatives of the cities. Caetano, 'N, Cortes de 1385,' pp. 9-57. 
8 Mario Gomes Marques (HMMP, pp.182-7) A. H. Oliveira Marques (Portugal na Crise, pp. 205-212) V. Magalhaes 
Goclinho (Os Descobrimentos, vol. I, p. 97) and Maria Jose Pimenta Ferro~Estudos de Historis Monetaris, pp. 25· 
36). 
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Note: There is no systematic study of the post·1485 coinages. 
Source: HMMP, pp. 106·124. 
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Fig. 19 confirms that the long-term metallic decadence of Portuguese 
coinage9 is an indisputable fact. Yet, it also reveals two contrasting phases: a 
period of ups and downs is followed by another phase with a gradual, if gentle, 
downwards curve, As such, following Maria Jose Pimenta Ferro, it is useful to 
distinguish two phases: the first roughly coinciding with the reign of Joao I 
(1385-1435) and the second covering the remaining decades (1435-1485). The 
last decades of the century like the first twenty years of the Sixteenth century 
can be taken as a third phase, with entirely different features, namely the nearly 
complete substitution of bullion by copper cOinage,10 
These phases can be easily distinguished. For numismatists and 
historians from the nineteenth century onwards, the reign of Joao I was 
notorious for the decay in the coinage standards. Successive, gradually poorer 
coins were issued depriving the Portuguese libra of nearly all its metallic 
content. Eventually, half a century after Joao I's election as king, each real had 
8 From c. 1435 the real became the standard money of account instead of the old Ii bras which had became 
cumbersome to use for large sums, given their abrupt decadence. The real used to be a coin of half libra but 
eventually became the equivalent of 35 I For the evolution of the real, see Fig. 20. 
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about one hundredth of their previous silver weight value and a seven-hundred 
times higher facial value. By the years 1435 and 1436, Duarte I tried to halt the 
degradation of the coinage by constructing a wholly new system comprising 
strong gold and silver coins (escudo and leal, respectively), bullion (the real 
branco) and fiduciary copper currency (the real pre to, worth 3,5 libras). From 
1435 onwards, the real (or real branco) replaced the libra as the money of 
account. This system and its derivates survived half a century, until the day 
when Joao II ordered that all bullion currencies were to be replaced by copper 
coinages, opening up what specialists consider a 'modern' period of slowly 
depreciating stable coinage.11 Can these changes in policy be explained in 
terms of royal prerogative? 
The first period, 1385-1435, features dramatic ups and downs. Fig. 19 
made clear that the monetary modifications withstood by the coinage in the 
reign of Joao I went far beyond in scope and frequency than the occasional, 
and largely failed, intervention of Fernando I. The facial and metallic alterations 
in the staple coinage used (the r., valued at 0.5 I. in 1385) from the beginning of 
the war to the adoption of the system of account based in the real are 
systematised in Fig. 20. How far did these cycles follow or evade the 
constitutional principle of consent to coinage manipulations that surfaced in the 
reign of Fernando I? 
10 From c. 1435 the real became the standard money of account instead of the old libras which had became 
cumbersome to use for large sums, given their scarce value. The Teal used to be a coin of haH libra but .eventually 
became the equivalent of 35 I. For the evolution of the res/, see fig. 20. 













Fig. 20 -Intrinsic and Nominal Values 
of the r. in Circulation, 1383-1437 
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Source: HMMP, pp. 106-124. 
The cycles on Fig. 20 can be described in abstract terms: for little more 
than a decade, a type of silver bullion was minted in a fast succession of 
emissions with gradually decreasing quantities of precious metal; when the 
quantity of silver per coin became very IOW,12 the coin was discontinued and 
replaced by a different, finer type with a higher nominal value than the previous. 
Under Joao I, this cycle was withstood by four coinages: the real de dez soldos 
(until 1397), the real de tres libras e meia (1398-1406), the meio real cruzado 
(1407-13),13 and the real branco (from 1414).14 This last cycle has a noteworthy 
particularity, as it introduced fiduciary species, namely the reais pretos, small 
12 In both 1397 and 1409 the coinages of the last minting had less than 0.5 gJmark, see Fig. 19. 
13 The minting of the meio real cruzado in 1407 has a different feature from the other three cycles: it was based on a 
coinage considered as a fraction (1/2) of the real de tres libras e meia. As there was no appreciation of the nominal 
value (its value was simply half the nominal value of the previous coinage) contemporaries considered this coin as 
belonging to the same system as the previous one (see OA, Book IV, title 1 §12-13). 
14 The essential details can be presented here: 
Name First Nominal value Ag g at first Ag 9 at last 
issued (in I.) emission emission 
De dez soldos 1384 0.5 2.39 0.081 
De uss libras e meia 1398 3.5 0.318 0.198 
Maio real cruzado 1407 1.75 ~.159 0.159 
Branco or de dez reais 1415 35 0.796 0.254 
Leal 1436 350 2.63 2.63 
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copper coins valued at a tenth of the real branco.15 The cyclical pattern was 
temporarily halted when King Duarte managed to mint a strong silver coin called 
leal ('loyal') with the value of ten of the previous reais brancos.16 Did the 
aggressive monetary policy of Joao I count with the consent of the Cortes? 
As noticed earlier on, in 1385, the stance of the municipal proctors on 
matters of coinage was very similar to the opposition to Fernando I: the minting 
of coin was, like declaring war or peace or like the marriage of the heir to the 
throne, subject to the agreement of the POVOS.17 The very text where this 
request is articulated, the seventh chapter presented in COimbral1385, 
resounds entirely of the anti-Fernandine Cortes of 1371 and 1372: after evoking 
a recognisable version of the principle of quod omnes tangit, debet ab omnibus 
approbari,18 the chapter stated that Joao I's predecessor had 'deprived the 
Povos of their right to be called to discuss the issues of war, peace and royal 
marriages. 
Thus, the Povos demanded that the king should not agree peace, declare 
war or entail wedding negotiations without calling on the Cortes, adding in the 
last clause, 'nor likewise should you mint coin.'19 The king's answer was evasive 
and omitted coinage20 but Fernao Lopes plainly states in his 'Chronicle of Joao 
I' that the new reais were minted by the newly-elected king with the 'consent of 
all.'21 Given that the twenty-fourth article of the Povos demanded the 
enforcement of the recently-debased real de dez so/dos (a coin that already 
16 For the first time in Portuguese monetary history, bullion gave way to a system where copper currency, 
corresponding to one monetary unit -1 real, was used for everyday transactions. HMMP, pp. 137-42. 
16 By that time, silver coinage lost most of the former polhical relevance as the payment of rents, taxes and lease 
contracts was performed in copper currency. The minting of a strong golden coin in 1457 - the cruzado - implied that 
gold stood again at the apex of the Portuguese monetary system. HMMP, pp. 51·2. Henceforward, Portuguese 
coinage resumed its previous acceptance. Go~lves, Iria, 0 PatrimOnio do Mosteiro de AJcoba~ nos S6culos XIV e Xv. Lisbon, 1989, pp. 515·19. 
17 It is important to note, however, that, unlike the articles on decision-making which were presented as a demand, 
this article has the form of a petition. On the difference between the demanding, proposing and petitioning article, see 
Sousa, '0 Discurso Politico,' p. 17. 
18 'Porque he direito que as COUSBS, que a todos pertencem e de que tados sentem carr., sejam a ello chamados.' 
Caetano,'As Cortes de 1385,' p.112. 
19 'Pedem os Povos que nam tomedes guerra, nem ~des pBs sem seu acordo, nem tomedes casamento outrosi 
nem fa~des moeda.' Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 112. 
20 The king stated that the present war was fought for the 'honour and defence' of these realms and no other war was 
envisaged, while as for peace, he would call on the Povos 'n necessary', while royal weddings could not be controlled 
by the opinions of the Povos. 
21 'E assim toi que por acordo de todos mandou el-rei Iavf8r moeda de reais.' lopes, Cron. Joso I, Part 2, chapter III, 
p.11. 
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existed in the reign of Fernando I), there can be no doubt that Lopes' claim 
holds good and that the new coinage enjoyed the endorsement of the Cortes. 
The stance of the Povos in 1385 reinstated a fundamental principle of the 
old constitution, even if pOinting to abstract reasons rather than to the 
constitutional traditions of the realm. However, after a decade of Fernandine 
coinage, the immutability of the old standard was by then a lost cause. In 1385 
the role of the Povos, like Fernando strove to impose, was to give their 
approbation to the royal decisions. Would this principle hold for the remaining 
monetary changes? Did the Cortes have the right to refuse alterations in 
coinage? The fundamental heuristic difficulties surrounding the Portuguese 
Cortes make this a difficult question to answer.22 The only method is to observe 
closely each of King Joao's monetary changes in relation to the meetings of 
Cortes that took place in its date. 
The first cycle of devaluation started before Joao I was elected king in 
Coimbra. First issued in 1384, the real had already been debased twice when 
the Cortes of Coimbral1385 came about. As was mentioned, in these Cortes, 
the municipal proctors backed the impoverished version of the real de dez 
soldos that Joao I had recently introduced with the value of half a libra. In 
October 1385, barely six months after the Cortes of Coimbra, Joao I resorted to 
yet another monetary devaluation, his first as a king, and yet another emission 
was minted in 1386. As neither Cortes nor other formal assemblies met before 
February 1387,23 it is clear that the petition of the Povos had no immediate 
direct effects. 
The adherence to the seventh petition of 1385 is even harder to trace for 
the remaining four emissions, dated between 1387 and 1397. Imprecise dates 
and lack of adequate records for the opening negotiations of the Corte~4 make 
it nearly impossible to associate these emissions, or dissociate from, the eight 
22 The surviving documentation of the Cortes concems the chapters of grievances and their answers and occasional 
legislation rather than the 'agenda' of these meetings or the decisions taken. As a consequence, no direct evidence 
of consent or negotiation of monetary matters can be expected to be found. Of the twenty-six Cortes reunited In his 
reign, all studied critically by Armindo de Sousa, there is no explicn indication that a single one especially met for 
debating monetary purposes. Obviously, this fact does not preclude that changes of coinage had been Indeed 
debated, negotiated or consented in those assemblies. General and municipal 'articles' might include some allusions 
to the subjects debated and many summons indicate that the matter to be discussed was 'to devise how to obtain 
monies to pursue the war', an intention that could be met by debasement. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 
291-345. 
23 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 291-5, 431-35. 
24 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 310. 
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Cortes and the two Ajuntamentos, or formal encounters with the municipalities 
(Coimbral1387 and Serra d'EI-Rei/1393) that occurred in those ten years.25 The 
purpose of the Cortes of Bragal1387, Lisbonl1389, Viseul1391, Coimbral1394 
and Santarem/1396, as surviving summons indicates, was to obtain funds for 
the war.26 Sisas were consented in the first two and the monarchy obtained 
subsidies in those of 1391 and 1394. Thus, the Cortes appear to have been 
summoned because of taxation rather than because of debasement. Only the 
Cortes of Santarem/1396 can be related to the debasement which occurred in 
January 1396 as in that year neither subsidies nor sales taxes were 
consented.27 These Cortes, as those of Bragal1387, Lisbonl1389, Viseul1391, 
met to subsidise an imminent campaign by the monarchy. Thus, even if the only 
clear indication pOints to the fact that at least some debasements - those of 
October 1385 and 1386 - occurred without the consent of the Cortes, it is likely 
that the depletion of coinage for a specific campaign evaded consent, because 
it was first and foremost a military demand (see supra Fig. 27). It should be 
recalled that in his evasive answer to the seventh petition of 1385, King Joso 
reserved to himself the right to wage war. Presumably, in his interpretation the 
prerogative of waging war implied the right to debase the normal currency ad 
hoc. Debasement was so closely linked to military activities that the former 
could well be perceived as necessary to the latter. As such, the Povos could 
well regard these ad hoc debasements as part of the war effort. 
In 1398, King Joso I introduced the real de tres libras e meia. This was a 
wholly new coin and not simply an alteration of standard. It contained four times 
more silver than the last emission of the real de dez soldos. Appreciation was 
however illusory, as the nominal value in I. assigned to the coin was sevenfold 
larger. As such, the introduction of the real de tres libras e meia was very 
similar to King Fernando's much-maligned manipulations. It can be said that it 
met with considerable, if barely perceptible in the sources, opposition in the 
Cortes. Indeed, uniquely for the Cortes of the period, there is unequivocal 
evidence that the minting of a new coinage was brought to the assembly of 
25 See lists in Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 464 .. E" 
26 Here I follow the 'objectives' for these assemblies as critically established by A. de Sousa. As Cortes Medievais, 
vol. I, pp. 297-9, 301, 306-310, 312-3. 
27 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 313-4. On the date of the coinage, HMMP, pp. 100-9. 
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Coimbral1398 in January of that year.28 However, the ensuing confrontation 
was between the ·cities and towns' and ·prelates and noblemen,' not between 
the king and the Povos. Very likely, the disagreement concerned the nominal 
valuation of the coinage, rather than its actual standard or fineness.29 Indeed, 
the high nominal value of this new real made it burdensome to the church and 
the nobles as recipients of rents, military wages, annuities and land-letting 
contracts. As such, oppOSition came probably from the ranks of the privileged, 
rather than from the Povos. The subsequent depreciations of the real de tres 
libras e meia remain undated and cannot be related to any Cortes. What can be 
said is that all the five emissions of the real de tres libras e meia were put to 
circulation in a time of truce or low-intensity military activity. 
Unlike the other coinages, the minting of the meio real cruzado did not 
respond to the immediate needs of the monarchy. Indeed, it was a direct 
answer to a problem that, as parliamentary grievances testify, was a permanent 
concern of the Povos: the drain of silver from the realm. In 1407, war was slowly 
diluting itself in truces and prorogations of truces. The solution proposed by the 
monarchy was to issue a coin with smaller silver content than the real de tres 
libras e meia, presumably because foreigner merchants valued it below its silver 
content, forcing the denizen to pay more. The meio real cruzado, however, was 
not deemed a new coinage, for it followed the standard of the real de tres libras 
e meia. It can be argued that the Cortes of Santareml1406 were identified with 
this decision, although it is not clear to what extent. According to Armindo de 
Sousa these Cortes were simply summoned to obtain a loan to pay for the de-
monetization of the previous species and the minting of the new.30 However, the 
fact that eventually a subsidy was collected for this purpose does not imply that 
this had been the primary aim of this assembly. It is equally plausible to think 
that the subsidy collected resulted from parliamentary bargaining between the 
king and the Povos. 
28 OA, Book 2, title 59 §7. A este responde el-rey que ja sobre esto fa/Iou com os prelados e fldalgos e com as 
procuradores das cidades e vilas que vieraom as sobreditBs Cortes e ouviu as razOes que forom a/egadas pe/as 
partes segundo e/es bern sabem e que porende com seu conselho pora tal meio, qual entender, que cumpre a seu 
servi90 e a prol de sua terra. 
29 It should be reminded that the text where this debate can be read is a law regulating the nominal value of the 
coins. 
30 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 328. 
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At least in this interpretation, the minting of the meio real cruzado reveals 
that the Cortes had a say on the key decisions of monetary policy. Even if, 
contrarily to the old constitution of the old kings, debasements resembled an 
undisputed royal prerogative, wider reforms could not be realised without the 
intervention of the Cortes. If by moeda ('coinage') we understand the 
denomination and the species rather than its intrinsic specifities, it can be said 
that the plea made in Coimbral1385 to summon the parliament for war and 
. moeda held good in a period of war. By contrast, the process of creation of the 
real de trinta e cinco libras in 1414 reveals that in the middle of the reign of 
Joao I monetary policy had already become a royal prerogative. Narrative 
sources describe that, when considering how to finance a large-scale attack on 
North Africa, Joao I considered either collecting a subsidy or debasing the 
coinage yet again. Eventually, the latter - complemented with a general prise of 
salt - was chosen, because the military target of the expedition had to remain 
undisclosed and subsidies could not be obtained without the summoning of the 
Cortes.31 Thus, in the period of peace collecting a subsidy still implied consent 
and negotiation; radical reform of the coinage did not. Naturally, further 
debasements took part without any intervention of the Cortes, as the non-
coincidence between devaluated coin emissions (between Aug. 1417 and Jan. 
1422 and then in 1423)32 and Cortes (1416, 1417, 1418, 1427, 1429, 1430, 
1433) demonstrate. 
It is particularly striking that no Cortes met to approve the real de trinca e 
cinco libras, as this coin implied a radical shift from all the previous systems: the 
use of copper coinage. The new rea', a bullion coin with little silver in it, was 
redeemable by ten reais pretos of copper. This implied fiduciary circulation that, 
by driving down the cost of money, endowed the monarchy with greater 
autonomy in monetary terms. As it happens with the previous coinage cycles, in 
the general chapters of the Povos no protests surface. Considering the vocal 
opposition to Fernando, the tolerance of the municipality towards the creation of 
a whole new system expressly for offensive war without the approval of those 
31 Some details of the decision-making surrounding the attack on Ceuta are well explicH in the chronicle written by 
Zurara, Gomes Eanes de, Cr6nica da Tomada de Ceuta, ed. A. Reis Brasil, 4111 ed., lisbon, 1992, chapter XIII, pp. 
72-5. 
32 HMMP, p. 122. 
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whom this touched - the Povos as well as the noblemen and ecclesiastics- is 
surprising. 
In spite of the anti-Fernandine tirades that were still heard in the chapters 
presented at the Cortes in the 1380s and 1390s, the Povos did not formulate 
any complain against the weak coinage minted by Joao I. Indeed, the 
complaints against the forced conversion of the nominal terms of the lease 
contracts and renders, together with the request formulated at the Cortes of 
CoimbraJ1385 that the circulation of the new, weakened coinage had to be 
universally enforced, hints at where the interest of the Povos laid: the 
debasement. The Povos could come to terms with the loss of metallic value.33 
At least some municipalities linked to the external trade could see the 
advantages brought by the debasements, as they had done in the reign of 
Fernando 1.34 For the Povos, debasement, at least when done in order to fund 
the defence of the realm, had become acceptable. Whatever the reasons -and 
many can be tentatively singled out- it is clear that debasement no longer 
constituted an essential constitutional cause for the Povos and the observance 
of the immutable standard, as stated in the Instrumentum Super Facto Monete, 
was now irrelevant to the Povos. 
Evidence for the principle that Cortes had to consent in monetary 
decisions is even less consistent for the period after 1435. None of the 
important currency alterations can be associated with any parliamentary 
intervention. No Cortes met when King Duarte minted an entire monetary 
system, comprising solid golden and silver coins, bullion and copper currencies 
in 1436.35 That no consent of the Cortes or consultation of the Povos approved 
the nominal valuation of the leal that took place five years later is evident from 
the letter sent to the accounting officers of Estremadura by the regent Pedro on 
this matter in 9 March, five days before he issued the summons to the Cortes.36 
33 From the early days of the interregnum future King Joao I and his supporters considered that the cause had to be 
funded by strong debasement of the coinage. He started by minting a rea/ of excellent quality that was well received 
by the populations and, later, used as amulets and charms. Lopes, eron. Joao I, part 1, chapters XLVIII-XLIX. 
34 Cort. Femando I, vol. I, p. 83 (2nd article to the Cortes of Porto/1372). 
36 HMMP, pp. 183-5. 
36 BACL, Serie Azul, C6dice 409, pp. 163-4 (eighteenth-century copy); on this change, HMMP, p. 126. This 
document is extremely important as, had it not survived, any historian would be tempted to ascribe the nominal 
aneration made in this period to the Cortes of Torres Vedrasl1441 (summoned March 14111 and met April 25111) whose 
declared aim was to deal with 'matters pertaining the finances of the said lord [the king!' ('cousas que perteemyem 
aa 'azenda do dito senhor (re~') BACL, serle Azul, Q)dice 409, pp. 165-6). Moreover, a<Xlording to Sousa, a lost 
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Considering chronological proximity, the Cortes of lisbonl1456 could be linked 
to the minting of the cruzado (lit. 'crusader', a gold coin) and to a new nominal 
valuation of the leal, rated at 15 reais.37 The discussion of these matters in the 
Cortes remains a theoretical possibility, but the critical appreciation of this 
assembly by Sousa shows that these brief (two-week long) Cortes met for 
devising the means to pay for a planned 'crusade' against the Turk.3s 
Furthermore, the chronicler who mentions the creation of the gold cruzado 
makes no reference to the role of the Cortes. In what concerns the issue of the 
real grosso, datable from 1462,39 there is no doubt that it did not pertain to any 
assembly (the last Cortes had been those of Evoral1460). Similarly, the re-
definition of the nominal values of the circulating bullion was made in February 
1479, nearly a year after the last Cortes.40 
The great changes in the late fifteenth century -de-monetization of all 
older silver coins (1484) and the introduction of a new monetary system (1492)-
dispensed with the consent from the Cortes. The most radical change, the de-
monetization of all circulating species ordered by Joao II in 1484, was not 
considered in any Cortes but 'spoken with those in our [king's] council, with the 
mint officer and with other experienced people in this matter:41 As 'Such, the 
publicising of the minting of the chinfrao, the last Portuguese bullion, during the 
Cortes of Coimbra-Evoral1472-3 was an exception-.42 
While the anti-Fernandine constitutional opposition seemed well alive in 
1385 or perhaps was even made stronger by abstract principles and by the 
concrete experience of electing a king, the wars that dragged up to the 1410s 
eluded the attempts to establish a strong monetary constitution. Joao I and his 
successors went far beyond the stop-and-go, tentative monetary manipulations 
of Fernando I. Nonetheless, unlike what happened with King Fernando I, there 
'Ordnance of Matters of Coinage' was published in the (not 'by the') Cortes. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 
361. 
:rT The former possibly took place in 1457, while the latter is first detectable in a transaction dated 2 February 1457. 
On these innovations and respective sources, HMMP, pp. SO, 126 and 251. 
38 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 379. 
38 Deser., vol. I, doc. 37, p. 390. (in this law the pre-1462 and post·1463 are rated differently). This ag~s with the 
suggestion of Gomes Marques that the reais grossos were minted 'probably in 1463', HMMP, p. 127. 
40 HMMP, p. 126. 
41 Deser., vol. I, doc. 44, pp. 394·5 (2SDecember 1489). 
42 Deser., vol. I, doc. 36, pp. 386-9i16September 1471). 
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remain no traces of widespread opposition against coinage manipulation in the 
Cortes of Joao I and his successors. Unlike what was expected, the loud 
criticism heard in the parliaments of Fernando I against depleted coinage 
disappeared from the chapters of grievances presented in the Cortes. Not once 
in the surviving 347 chapters presented in the Cortes under Joao I did the 
Povos complain about debasement, let alone question its legitimacy.43 
Conversely, surviving parliamentary grievances only mention coinage to protest 
against the obstacles on the circulation of the debased coins.44 
Being inextricably connected to his military operations and to 'the 
defence of the kingdom' , the debasements wrought by Joao I and the 
considerable profits thereof were acceptable to the Povos who all but supported 
the circulation of his depleted bullion. After the peace of 1411, a new war 
unfolded between the two bellicose neighbours; this time, however, it was not a 
war for land, but for silver. Like its bloodier predecessor, this war required 
overvalued coinage, so that the silver drain to the neighbour could be averted. A 
great deal of the monarchy's monetary policy was intended to keep the money 
supply and avoid the drain of silver.45 The municipal representatives were also 
aware of these circumstances and the restraints on the export of precious 
metals were a common cause to king and POVOS.46 In the following period, both 
the creation of new species and the rating of silver coinages were deemed as 
sorts of current affairs which required no participation. There was seemingly 
great confidence among the Povos in the monarchs' prerogative. 
This confidence was not entirely vain. Indeed, the late-fifteenth-century 
monarchy was able to sacrifice its short-term fiscal interests for the sake of what 
was perceived as the 'common profit' . Two occasions demonstrate this 
surprising convergence. As clarified in the previous chapter (5.2 and 5.3), the 
rise in prices was beneficial to the royal revenues. Contemporary royal advisors 
43 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, pp. 225-288. The reader should bear in mind that Armindo de Sousa only 
presents abridged versions of the original articles. As these remain unpublished, and extremely dispersed through 
the Portuguese archives and libraries, the systematic reading of the originals is an impossible task for the present 
study. 
44 The enforcement of the legal tender of the new coin was demanded by the Povos in Coimbra/1385 (24th article) 
and Santarem/1430; the prohibhion of the lord to atter the ratio of conversion In Santareml1418 (2M article): the 
permission to export foreign coinage, at least with strong facial value in Leiria·Santaremll433 (20th article). Sousa, 
As Cortes Medievais, votll, pp. 227, 268, 292. 
46 As Maria Jose Ferro argued, Ferro, EstucJos de HistOria Monetaris, pp. 71-6. 
46 Ferro, Estucios de Historia Monetaris, p. 74. 
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clearly understood this phenomenon and c. 1436 this was used as an argument 
for the continuation of the debasements.47 Nonetheless, King Duarte agreed to 
run the royal mint at a loss when he coined his system of strong coins, as in 
order to attract silver to the mint, King Duarte abdicated from profits of 
seignioriage and exempted foreign gold and silver from taxation.48 The negative 
effects that the deflation of the 1430s had on the royal receipt have already 
been shown. The de-monetisation of 1484 provides another telling example. 
The forced de-monetisation of the circulating coins is close to the old ",actio 
monete', which twelfth- and thirteenth-century monarchs regarded as their 
prerogative. As in the f,actio monete, the bullion was channelled to the Mint, the 
circulation of old coinages strictly forbidden and the coinage of a new one 
enforced. However, unlike the ',actio monete, the law of 1484 aimed not at the 
profit of the crown, but rather at providing a 'public good', currency. Indeed, the 
monarchy would experiment slight loss: silver brought by foreigners was 
exempted from the tenth.49 . 
Section 6.2 • The 'Ordinances of Equivalence' 
In the post-war period the debasement of the coinage was no longer the 
bone of contention between the king and the 'realm' as it had been in 1254 and 
1261 (see section 2.1). Yet, the effects of the debasements and of the 
successive changes in the coinage were no less dramatic and wide than in the 
mid thirteenth century. After a century of monetary stability, contracts, rents and 
many other transactions between people of all classes were expressed in 
Portuguese currency. While prices of consumption items could react to 
debasements, permanent, agreed by an old contract or time-delayed payments 
could not. Debasement also affected one-off payments deferred in time like 
47 In the memorandum sent to Duarte I advising the king to mint strong coins, forbid the export of silver and fight the 
'debasement-caused price rise' (aleuantamento das COUSBS pelas mudafl98s das moedas) by fixing prices, the 
Jewish expert Cate/lam opposes those who think that by doing so the king will loose his revenues 'I believe that 
whoever claims that [by minting strong coinage] you deplete your revenues he is wrong, as even H all your rents 
decrease because of low prices, you cannot loose [because you ~an buy the same]' (se alguum vos diser que 
perdeis de vosas rend as a mim parece que errars .•. s verdade senhor he que ssy como se vosss rendas sbayxsm 
pelo sbaixamento das cousas em que vos fallo ... vos perder nom podees). Deser., vol. I, doc. I 32, p. 3n {dated 
1435). 
48 HMMP, p. 184. This deprived the monarchy of a sizeable source of revenue: the mint. The tax·farm of the mint for 
1401-4 yielded a sizeable 20,000,000 I .. RED, doc. 4. This represents accounts for 6.17% of the crown's notional 
revenue. 
49 Oeser., vol. I, doc. 44, p. 394. 
195 
bequests, loans, legacies and arrears of debt. Crucially, it also affected 
disbursements for which there was no market, including military wages and 
redistributive payments, such as pensions paid in noble households and 
contias. The dramatic changes of value were a cause for litigation between 
privates. As such, the combination of depreciation of the nominal currency with 
inflation was a potential liability to different interests and individual agents. 
Like many other agents, the monarchy was both a rent-collector and a 
rent-payer. As owners of the Direitos Reais, Portuguese kings collected many 
revenues expressed in fixed sums whose value was often set in the thirteenth-
century (see section 5.1). On the other hand, given that it was liable to standing 
obligations towards some of its subjects that were also expressed in nominal 
values, such as annuities, pensions, wages, contias, the monarchy was also a 
rent-payer. Indeed, the purpose of the debasements was precisely to pay the 
military that defended the realm. In the wars and the centuries following, 
inflation and debasement hardly affected the crown. The key agricultural lands 
of the monarchy, the paddy fields of the Tagus and the fertile lands in the 
outskirts of Lisbon, were either exploited directly or were let in exchange for a 
portion of the product. Moreover, their yield was partly consumed by court and, 
after 1415, it was diverted to sustain the Portuguese North African strongholds. 
Moreover, the revenues of Joao I depended on the sisas which were, so to 
speak, 'debasement-proof.' The negative effects of the degradation of the 
standing rents were avoided and transferred to the nobles, since a great deal of 
the land-based Direitos Reais were assigned to nobles in payment of contias. 
Thus, debasement allowed the monarchy to control its disbursements and did 
not affect its income. With Joao I, rather than a hidden tax, depreciation was a 
way of transferring the burden of the crown to those who benefited from wages, 
annuities and rents. 
However, given its widely devastating effects, the turnover of coinage 
types and the metallic depletion caused the monarchy to intervene as an 
arbitrator. The situation created by decades of monetary manipulations called 
the monarchy yet another form of financial intervention: to update the payments 
expressed in nominal terms. The monarchy intervened by issuing the so-called 
'ordinances of equivalence' which defined the correspondence between older 
nominal units (Iibras) and the money in circulation. The number of libras of a 
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fixed payment was multiplied according to the denominator established in the 
law. Thus, the 100 I. due as a rent by the municipality of Algodres since the 
reign of Sancho II, an example among countless others, would be redeemed by 
1000 I. in coins of reais de tres libras e meia (minted 1398-1407). After 1409, 
the original 100 I. were reckoned at 5000 I. in the current meios reais cruzados, 
and so forth (see Fig. 21). At last, by the early sixteenth century the sum of 100 
'old' I. was redeemed by 700,000 I. or 20,000 r .. 50 These changes are 
systematised in Fig. 21. 
Fig. 21 - Value Assigned to 1 I. of a Standing Rent In Current Money 
Coins Law of Law of Law of Law of Law of Law of Law of issued 1393 1399 1409 1417 1422 1435 1473 in: 
Pre- 5 10 50 [250]51 500 700 1386 · 
1386- 1 10 5 [20] [50] 500.52 
· 98 
1399- 1 1 4 10 500 -
· 1414 
1415- 1 1 1 - - -
· 1435 
1446- 1.8 . . - - - . 1473 
Sources: 1393 - OA, Book IV, title 1 §6;53 1399 - AML, Livro I de D. Joao I, fol. 88; 1409 - OA, 
Livro IV, titulo 1, § 1-27; 1417 - OA, Book IV, title 1 § 28-43, complete in TT, Chane. Joao I, 
Livro 5, fol. 104-106; 1422 - OA, Book IV, title 1 §44-55; 1435 - OA, Book IV, title 1 § 56-65; 
Azevedo, Pedro de, 'A Lei de 13 de Maryo de 1473, Arqueologo Portuguez, n. 10, 1905, pp. 
176-85. 
60 The nominal value of 100 I. can be documented in 1258, 1433 and 1497: 1258 - Portvgaliae Monvumenta 
Historica, Inqvisitiones, Vol. I, Pars II, Fascivlo 7, column 790b; 1433 - Sousa, Joao Silva de, 'Inquir~o de D. Duarte 
aos AJmoxarifados de Viseu e de Lamego (1433-1424)' Mare Liberum. Revista de Hist6ria dos Mares, n. 11-12, 
Janeiro-Dezembro 1996, p. 136; 1497 - TT, Chane. Manuel I, Livro 28, n. 38. 
51 While in the Ordinance of 1417, only the rate for lettings is shown, the subsequent ordinance of 1422 indicates that 
the rate used since then was 250:1. TT, Chane. Joao I, Livro 5, fol. 104-106. 
52 The limit used is between 1 II January 1395 and 1111 January 1435. 
53 The law converting the old Ii bras in five new libras is only known through a later law (OA, Book IV, title 1 §6). It is 
probable that it took place soon after the strong debasement of 1392. A document from the municipal archive of 
Porto dated 3()th June 1394 mentions liurss de moeda sntigs (I. in the old coins) implying that there was a distinction 
to be made. On the other hand, a privilege conceded by Joao to the lands of Cadima and Arez«Je claims that the 75 
I. of old I. should be converted at five for one ('as long as it is stated in our ordinance'). Chane. Joao " 11-1, doc. 11-83. 
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In theory these ordinances can be seen as the 'negative' of the 
debasement, as attempts to compensate the negative effects of metallic 
depreciation. They were presented as interventions for the sake of common 
good. Indeed, they were issued in the context of pleas that were sent to the 
royal courts. The references against pleas overflowing the courts and the 
emphasis on contracts, debts and bequeaths, rather than levies to the king, 
show that the ordinances were not aimed at defending royal revenues. In the 
Ordinance of 1409, the rates of conversion for debts owed and sums involved in 
individual contracts were 1 :80, while the conversion of rents was rated at 1 :50. 
Similarly, one of the avowed motives for the law of 1433 was to avoid the 
excessive money-related litigation. Furthermore, these laws fought arbitrary 
conversions which would affect the weaker parts. 
Yet, despite their benign intentions, no other monetary question proved 
to be as divisive as these ordinances. Indeed, even if the effects of debasement 
and inflation were more or less universally felt, the concession of these 
ordinances opened up a dispute between rent-collectors and rent-payers. For 
the former, it was clear that the post-1384 debasements threatened the 
purchasing power of their rents. Gradual debasement was particularly harmful 
to the landowners who leased out their land and to lay or ecclesiastical lords 
who were recipients of fixed rents.54 As such, they saw the inverse political 
alignment from the debasements: Povos were favourable to these but hostile 
towards conversion ordinances, and the privileged vice-versa. Needless to say, 
the former would fear that the heavy metallic depreciation dented the value of 
their fixed rents in the old libras of pre-war times. This was especially onerous 
to the clergy whose material obligations to Rome were expressed in metal and 
in strong gold coinages. For this reason, in 1409, the clergy secured for some of 
its rents the privilege of receiving the metallic equivalent.55 Nobility, however, 
would not only see its military wages decrease substantially as well as the 
revenues from the royal lands assigned by the crown as payment for annuities 
and other forms of patronage. 
64 See the complaints of the nobles in 1398 OA, Book II, title 59 §7. 
55 The ordinance of 1409 established that the clergy could demand the equivalent in metallic terms, at least in 
visitation. OA, Book IV, title 1 §17. This practice became known as the costume de Braga and was still in use in 1506 
(TT, NA 318, passim). Signs of preferential treatment of the clergy are already present in 1404 (Godinho, L &onomie 
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Historians working with this period have highlighted how mounting 
depreciation combined with steep inflation to produce a 'scissors' movement 
susceptible of axing the ecclesiastical and nobles' rents. Indeed, according to 
them, metallic decrease was made worse by the abrupt price inflation that 
soared throughout the reign of Joao 1.56 As such, one should ask whether these 
ordinances were indeed issued to protect the nobility, as it has been claimed. 
The effects of the nominal conversions measured in terms of silver content are 
shown on Fig. 22. 
Fig. 22 - Notional Sliver Content of 100 'old' I. (In 9 of Ag) 
1392 
~awof Law of 
~408 







369 1382 ~39357 398 399 ~409 416 417 422 435 ~473 
1106 478 40 200 23 230 66 330 110 [550] [100] 540 350 520 220 396 
Note: It should be noted that these weights refer to the standard bullion. Obviously, from 1414 
onwards payments contained little silver as copper coinage dominated. 
Sources: Fig. 19, Fig. 20; Azevedo, 'A Lei de 13 de Mar(:o'. 
As Fig. 22 makes clear, the intrinsic value of standing payments was 
severely affected during the war period. As such, the monarchy managed to 
dilute the costs of paying its hosts. The laws of 1393 and 1399 only slightly 
attenuated the steep loss in metallic content caused by abrupt depreciation. 
Furthermore, the effects of the first laws were short-lived, as debasements 
resumed in 1395-97 and 1402-6. In 1409, the new 50:1 raised the metal content 
to 69% of that of the old libras. The following debasements and the minting of 
the real de trinta e cinco so/dos (1414) further eroded this recovery and by 1416 
the levels had sunk again. 
de L'Empire, p. 153) and in 1405, when Joao I converted the 3,000 I. of the lands given to the bishop of Porto into 
300,000 I. (TT, Gaveta I, mayo 1, doc. 15). 
56 Godinho, L 'Economie de I'Empire, p. 153. Many contemporary texts, like grievances presented in the Cortes, 
complain about the dearth of the prices. The inflation of the wheat prices in nominal terms in the reign of Joao I had 
already been spotted by the late A. H. Oliveira Marques in the 1960s. Marques, Introduyao A Hist6ria da Agrlcultura" 
p.213. 
57 There is doubt about the date of this law. 
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As the monarchy had free rein in debasing currency, these laws did not 
check the capacity of the monarchy to lower the cost in times of need. The 
major military encounters - the siege of Lisbon (1383-4), Aljubarrota (1385) and 
the recovery of the North (1385-6), the invasion of Leon (1387), the conquests 
of 8adajoz (1396) and Tuy (1398) and obviously the assault on Ceuta (1415) -
were with strongly debased currency deprived of any updating. Similarly, the 
effects of these laws could be short-lived in the pre-Ceuta period. 
A strong recovery came about in 1417. The ordinance approved in that 
year elevated the notional metal content of the payments made in I. to 5,5 g, 
that is to say 115% of the metal paid in the reign of Fernando I. A new 
ordinance in 1422 resulted in payments with 112% of the pre-1385 metallic 
content. This law sanctioned what had been an informal practice imposed by 
some lords,58 as it is well explicit in an adverse petition presented at the Cortes 
of Santarem/1418. The law of 1435 was even more beneficial. The relatively low 
decrease of to 73% the former silver content by 1434 was deemed enough to 
issue a new law, following a representation of the 'nobles and those who held 
the lands,.59 Twenty-five years earlier this value had been considered good 
enough for restoring the old libras. Moreover, the laws of 1422 and 1435 duly 
followed coinage depreciations.6o 
As seen from metallic content, from 1417 onwards, nobility saw the value 
of their rents not only restored but reinforced. As Fig. 22 made clear, the 
nominal adjustments established by the monarchy from 1422 onwards 
managed to equate the silver content of the standing fixed payments to pre-
1384 levels. But how far did those laws avoid the devastating effects of 
inflation? The answer to this question requires that nominal prices and their 
approximate metallic content are correlated. Indeed, metallic value means 
nothing in itself, let alone when fiduciary coinage increased in importance. 
Lacking concrete evidence on the side of the nobility, the only workable method 
would be to weight the effect of these ordinances on the purchasing power of 
58 HMMP, pp. 122-4. 
59 OA, Book IV, title 1 § 56. 
60 HMMP, pp. 122·4. 
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the currency. Fig. 23 uses average wine prices as an indicator for price 
inflation.61 
Fig. 23 - Metallic Content and Purchasing Power of 100 I., 
1385-1435 (logarithmic scale) 
Note: It should be noted that these weights refer to the standard bullion. Obviously, from 1414 
onwards payments contained little silver as copper coinage dominated. 
Source: Fig. 19 for metallic content, adjusted according to the laws systematised in Fig. 20; for 
prices, Viana, 'Alguns Preyos de Vinho:62 
In spite of faltering wine prices, the results are eloquent. Firstly, it is clear 
that in the long term nominal prices of wine (the best-known market commodity) 
were largely a function of the silver content of the nominal unit - the I .. In fact, 
for all the lacunae of the data, the first two series, metallic content in nominal I. 
and the wine units paid by 1000 I., draw almost parallel courses. As such, the 
updating of the metallic content in order to recover the purchasing power made 
perfect sense. But did it work? 
The restoration of 1393 managed to keep the purchasing power at 
reasonably equal terms to the pre-1385 one, after a decade of swift decay. In 
81 In order to moderate the uncertainty caused by the fact that prices for wine were taken from highly heterogeneous 
lists rather than from series, each yearly figure plotted stands for the average price of the last five years. It has not 
been possible to fully access the recent list of wheat prices compiled by Mario Viana: 'Alguns PreQOs de Cer~ais.' 
62 In order to fit the data into the graph, the 112 I. for each almude of wine were transformed in 1384 into 100 I .. 
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contrast, that of 1398, discussed in Cortes, was powerless to stop the effects of 
inflation, which reached less than 10%.63 It would be up to the Law of 1409 to 
assure that rents conserved somewhere between 55% and 80% of the 
purchasing power and would not drop to the severe 10% of the previous 
decade. The effects of the radical updating ordered in the ordinances of 1417 
and 1422 were even more beneficial for the rents, which were kept at 80%. The 
Law of 1435, passed on request of 'those who hold rents', did even more: it 
protected purchasing power from 'natural' price inflation, independent of 
debasements. 
Fig. 23 already left in evidence that by the late 1410s and early 1420s the 
metallic content paid in rents even exceeded that paid in the reign of Fernando 
I. Thus, nominal adjustments were more than a 'just' attempt to compensate the 
losses in metallic value. They aimed at compensating rent-holders for the 
decrease in purchasing power. This is made clear by the ordinance of 1417.64 
Indeed, the details of the conversions made in 1417, 1422 and 1435 implied a 
de facto reinforcement of the rents' purchasing power. This assured that 
purchasing power was kept at a respectable level- respectively 89%, 95%, 83% 
of that of 1384. 
Ultimately, ordinances were reinforcements of the metallic content of the 
rents that preserved their purchasing power from the damages of inflation. 
Thus, when seen from the angle of purchasing power, the laws appear as intent 
on fighting the effects of debasement-fuelled inflation and recovering the rent-
holders' purchasing power. More than a simple compensation for the loss of 
metallic content, the ordinances of nominal conversion were intent on 
preserving the acquisitive power of the rents. Even if, as Coelho claims,65 this 
was a period of difficulties for the seigniorial economy, it is wrong to regard 
monetary policy as its structural agent.66 After the wars, from 1409 to 1435, the 
monetary policy of the crown clearly sided with the seigniorial party. 
Given the wide-ranging impact of these laws, it is vital to check to what 
extent whether they were merely prerogative decisions or whether they had 
some intervention by the Cortes. To do so, we can compare the dates when 
63 H should be noted that the series 'almudes of wineJ100 I.' starts at 112 in 1384; n was not indexed at 100. 
64 This law claimed that prices had increased fivefold in three years, OA, Book IV, thle 1 §28. 
85 Coelho, 0 Baixo Mondego nos Finais, vol. I, pp. 286, 320, 332; 
202 
Cortes met with the dates of the 'ordinances of equivalence'. Although this is 
the same method used to track the relationship between Cortes and 
debasements, the present task is easier, given that all except one of the 
ordinances of equivalence are dated with precision. The ordinance of 1393 was 
not approved in Cortes as no parliaments met in 1392 or 1393. By contrast, a 
mention to the opinions of 'some of the municipalities of the realm in the Cortes 
in the introduction of the orders of the ordinance sent to the municipalities of 
Coimbra and Lisbon indicate that the second ordinance of conversion was 
published in the sequence of the Cortes of COimbra/1398.67 
Yet, the consent given in the Cortes of Coimbra would prove to be 
exceptional. In the very text of the law, the monarch proclaimed his total 
independence in relation to the 'counsels' of the 'parts,.58 The subsequent 
decisions confirm the absence of any constitutional limitation to royal 
prerogative in this regard. The possibility that the laws of 1409, 1417, 1422 and 
1435 were approved in Cortes can be safely precluded. All of them were issued 
in the royal courts, as their very texts state. Additionally, they did not closely 
follow any meeting of Cortes. No Cortes had recently met when the ordinance 
of 1409 was issued in 'the king's court';69 Similarly, the law of 1422 was issued 
during an audience of the same court and cannot be related to any parliament; 
the text of the law of 1435 presented it as a response to a collective 
representation outside the Cortes of the noblemen ((idalgos), the queen and all 
'those who held lands,' plainly hinting at where landlords' interests laid. 
After the prerogative adjustment ordered by Duarte I in 1435, the 
question became dormant for three and half decades. From 1436 onwards the 
real became the default money of account, contracts were no longer struck in 
libras, but in reais or, alternatively, in strong gold coinages and the frequency 
and intensity of debasement decreased. Moreover, the growing predominance 
of copper coinage on everyday transactions made the problem less acute. Yet, 
the difficulties of the royal finances in the middle of the fifteenth century 
66Gonoalves, 0 Patrim6nio do Mosteiro, pp. 515·9. 
67 AML, Livro I de D. Joao I, C6dice 10, fol. 88. OA, Book II, title 59 §7. A 6st8 responde el·rey que ja sobre esto 
fallou com os prelados e fidalgos e com os procuradores das cidades e vilas que vieraom as sobreditas Cortes e 
ouviu as ,azOes que foram alegadas pelas partes segundo eles bem sabem.' 
68 OA, Book II, title 59 §7. E ouviu as raz6es que (oram alegadas pelas partes segundo eles bem sabem e que 
porende com seu conselho pora tal meio, qualentender, que cumpre a seu servi90 e a prol de sua terra. 
• OA, Book II, title 59 § 27. 
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prompted the monarchy to improve its revenues by this mean. As Armindo de 
Sousa detected,70 in Santarem/1468 the Povos had protested against another 
issuing of a conversion ordinance and received the assurance that the king 
would not do it without first listening to the advice of the municipalities in Cortes. 
Three years later, Afonso V finally decided to expressly summon the 
municipalities in order to discuss 'the upgrading the content of the /ibras.71 In 
these Cortes, the advice of the towns was adverse to a new regulation and the 
Povos held their ground against Afonso V with arguments that remain unknown 
but could hardly have been constitutional.72 Finally, the law of 1473 was issued 
after being opposed by the Povos in the Cortes of Coimbra-Evora/1472-3 and 
Lisbonl1473. Although, as Armindo de Sousa has critically established, this 
ordinance was published days after the official closure of the Cortes, its content 
had nonetheless been debated in the meeting, as hinted in the prologue and in 
other textual references.13 
While the laws of 1398 and 1473 were discussed in Cortes, between 
1409 and 1435 the Cortes took no part in the approval of the ordinances 
regulating conversions. After the war years these were issued by the crown 
without the consent of Povos, nobles and prelates. In sum, there was no 
working constitutional obligation of the monarch to seek consent for these laws 
whose consequences were comparable to debasements. This pattern closely 
resembles that of the debasements: intense war coincided with more debate on 
coinage being brought to the Cortes, while times of peace saw a more 
independent rule. 
The discretion enjoyed by the kings in matters of coinage seems 
surprising when one considers that the Cortes of Coimbral1385 reinstated the 
principle that changes in coinage had to be approved by those affected by it. 
Post-Fernandine monarchy freed itself from the monetary limitations of the fiscal 
constitution of the old kings. Not only the limitations on the minting prerogatives 
were altogether forgotten, but also the very claim in Coimbra/1385 that 
70 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 393. 
71 'As cidades e certas vilas de nossos reinos que houvessem de vir a nossa vila de Santarem ( ... ) sobre 0 
acrescentamento das libras.' quoted in Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 393. 
72 According to by A. de Sousa, the demand of the king met with flat refusal, wnhout any \egal or moral argument. 
Tellingly, in the document of the law of 1473, the king merely says that in parliament the Povos 'had said nothing that 
mattered'. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 394. 
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decisions on 'coinage' ought to be brought to the Cortes failed once the wars 
finished. In political terms, the debasements, conversions ordinances and the 
other modifications might have been popular or at least acceptable measures, 
but in constitutional terms, they were purely prerogative. Eventually, as a result 
of constant, unopposed debasements everyday coinage would be assured by 
copper coins with no trace of silver, while the purchasing power of the rents was 
assured. At any rate, the stringent constitution that was invoked against 
Fernando I made little sense in a context dominated by fiduciary currency and 
nominal adjustments remaining firmly within royal prerogative. 
The death of bullion contributed to the prevention of disagreements 
between Povos and king on monetary issues. Indeed, Portuguese copper 
currencies were indexed to strong and stable silver coins. On the other hand, 
Joao I and his successors were far less vulnerable to the harms of debasement 
than the 'old kings' had been, as the former possessed an antidote to price 
inflation in the form of sisas. It is thus small wonder that the monarchy could 
organise his financial policy - which was simply to assign the number of copper 
coins to silver standard - without a single hint from the Cortes. Post-1484 
monetary policy was not based in debasement but in the definition of official 
rates of exchange between Portuguese copper, gold and silver coins and 
between Portuguese and foreign currencies.74 
Section 6.3 - Unite and Rule: The Cortes and Extraordinary Taxation 
In Coimbral1385, the very first petition presented by the Povos to the 
king they had just elected and acclaimed was that all subsidies held from the 
time of King Fernando should be cancelled.15 Two reasons were backed this 
demand: the 400,000 I. pedido that the Povos had already advanced and the 
'scandal' caused by the sisas. The petition was deferred by Joao I 'given that 
73 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 393; Azevedo, Pedro de, 'A lei de 13 de Ma~ de 1473 sobre as Libras', 
Arqueologo Portuguez, n. 10, 1905, pp. 176-85. 
74 Dias, Joao Alves, 'A Moeda,' in Marques, A. H. de Oliveira (ad.) Portugal do Renascimento a Crise Dinastics, 
lisbon, 1998, pp. 254-7, 260-5. 
75 The petition to end with King Fernando's levies is in the 6th article but, as caetano and Sousa agree, the first four 
general articles of Coimbra/1385 are resolutions and the fifth is an appeal (m~o). Thus, article 6 ends up by being 
the first 'petition' proper. Sousa, 'OOiscurso Politico', p. 16. 
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they [the people] have promised what was needed for the war ... he [the king] 
does not envisage to introduce on the Povos other payments, pedidos nor sisas 
and he cancels all the sisas that are now being collected,.76 As was mentioned 
earlier, Joao I only accepted the kingship after being assured that those who 
elected him would 'help him with their bodies and goods to pay the expenses 
and the services needed to upkeep the kingly condition and honour as well as 
to continue the war,77 As the Povos made their word good by granting 400,000 I. 
to the cause,78 the cancellation of all sisas and pedidos demanded by Fernando 
I was a more than reasonable request. Moreover, the newly-elected king had to 
accept that instead of being delivered to the king's treasury, the receipt of the 
pedido would be managed by a treasurer appointed by the Povos who would 
watch the destination of the monies collected. How far would this model stand 
as a precedent to the ulterior fiscal-constitutional relationship between the 
monarchy and the kingdom, embodied in the Cortes to whom ultimately it owed 
the throne? 
Extraordinary subsidies were the subject of the pioneering, and still 
unsurpassed, work of Iria Gonc;alves in the 1960s. Yet, by using the 'Middle 
Ages' as a timeframe, she focused on the Similar features of the kingdom-wide 
subsidies from the thirteenth to the late fifteenth centuries. The synchronic focus 
on all 'medieval' subsidies was certainly an adept approach to a meagre and 
scattered archive, but it entailed the risk of overlooking subtle but significant 
shifts in both constitutional and technical aspects of general taxation. Given the 
chronological imbalance of the 'archive', well-documented features of the 
fifteenth-century pedidos were projected onto the poorly-known subsidies of the 
previous centuries. Iria Gonc;alves' emphasis on the fifteenth--century pedidos, 
which were taxes on property, had also the consequence of putting the sisas 
aside. While this is acceptable from the 1400s onwards, in the previous epoch, 
76 Pois os povos Ihe prometeram aquello que Ihe compria pra sa guerra, ... , que nam entende /allYar aos povos 
daqui em diante outras peitas, nem pedidos nem sisas, e a~ todas as sisas, que se em estes Reinos por ele 
co/hem. Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 112. 
77 Ajudar com os nossos corpos e beens e a ssosteer os encarregos das desspesas e seru~ que Ihe eram 
compridoiras para manter ° estado e honra de rey e para outrossi /euar sua guerra em deante. Caetano, 'As Cortes 
de 1385,' p. 98. 
78 The sum is known through a royal letter of 1392 sent to the municipality of Porto, published in Cruz, Ant6nio, '00 
Auxilio Prestado a Lisboa pelos Portuenses no Cerro de 1384,' Duas Cidades ao Ssrvi90 de Portugal, vol. I, Porto, 
1947, doc. VIII, p.1>2. Very likely the sum of 400,000 I. was the equivalent to the global yield of the kingdom-wide tax-
farms of the sisas for 1383. 
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both property and sales taxes were merely understood as forms of redeeming a 
subsidy or a 'service'. While sisas and pedidos are technically different forms of 
taxation, in constitutional terms they are indistinguishable and cannot be studied 
separately. Measuring the impact of late-fourteenth-century wars demands a 
more analytical stance and, fundamentally, a closer consideration of the subtle 
traces left by pre-1385 extraordinary taxation, mostly by vocabulary. The 
present section will examine the fiscal unification of the king in the Cortes that 
started with the Fernandine subsidies and ended up in the pedidos of the reign 
of Afonso V. 
As has been hinted, the constitutional profile of the pedido of 1385 
cannot be understood without some careful consideration on the previous 
instances of extraordinary subsidies. In the absence of coherent administrative 
or financial evidence, the words and discourse used in the few remaining 
municipal and royal letters provide the best window into the constitutional 
changes brought by the wars of the 1380s and 1390s. As has been argued 
above (see supra section 2.3), the extraordinary subsidies to which the 
predecessors of Fernando I occasionally resorted were not negotiated at the 
level of the kingdom. Extraordinary taxes had certainly to be approved by the 
taxpayers, but this took the form of negotiation between the king and individual 
municipalities, rather than a reunion of the Cortes. In the few cases of 
extraordinary taxation that are known, two features seem to have been common 
to all these subsidies: their designation as servi~o ('service') and the fact that 
this designation did not apply to a specific form of levying the money (see 
section 2.3). 
The preparation for the last Fernandine War brought, albeit heSitantly, 
two major changes. to the financial relationship between crown and 
municipalities: firstly, extraordinary subsidies were presented as requested by 
the king to the realm, rather than to the individual municipalities; secondly, and 
accordingly, they were uniformly levied throughout the whole of the kingdom. 
These two changes can be seen as the result of a primordial major modification: 
consent by a representative institution. 
As seen earlier, the sisas were discussed in the Cortes of Leirial1372 in 
October of that year and there is evidence supporting the hypothesis that, 
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however grudgingly, they were conceded by the POVOS?9 As a letter of 
exemption passed to a small North-eastern municipality reveals, the sisa 
collected between the 1 November 1372 and 1 November 1375 had had the 
consent (consentimento) of the municipalities.80 It is not impossible that the 
sisas collected in 1373-5 resulted from separate negotiations between the 
crown and each municipality.81 However, the fact that the Cortes of Leiria had 
place a few weeks before this date seems conclusive enough about the role of 
the Cortes in approving these three-year sales tax (see chapter 2). The principle 
of consent was also implicit in the 'gathering' (ajuntamento) of municipal 
proctors in Evora, possibly in December 1374,82 with the sole aim of 
'moderating' of the sisas. This was summoned in response to allegations of the 
municipalities that the sisas caused a surge of prices and the breakdown of 
trade. In the agreement thereof obtained, the king halved the rate of the sales 
taxes for the last year of the sisas. 
At any rate, the first instance of general sales taxes implied the direct 
relationship between consent and taxation of the king's subjects, something 
decidedly absent from the country's fiscal constitution up to then <see sections 
2.1 and 2.2). Indeed, in the old monetagia of 1254 and 1261 what was at stake 
was the king's minting prerogatives, for which those taxes were a compensation 
agreed by the king and the Cortes. Differently, the levy of 1372 was 'requested' 
to the realm.83 
Probably, the request to the Cortes applied municipal ideology and 
practice to the scale of the kingdom. In fact, in the well-established tradition of 
the sisas, the idea that the taxpayers had to approve taxation was as old as the 
sisas themselves. Indeed, in the first known sisas at the municipal level, the 
consent to be taxed was expressed by the taxpayers themselves. Leaving aside 
the collective decision of the commune of the Jews of the kingdom to hold sales 
79 Evidence of the siss being collected in many municipalities throughout the reign exists and a terse chancery 
register in 1375 seems to imply that a general sisa had been imposed in 1372. TT, Chanco Fernando I, livro 1, fol. 
183v. 
80 Two documents from March and April 1375 describe this negotiation: Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 141-3; Arquivo 
Distrital de Bragan~a, Pergaminhos, doc. 032. 
81 This is also the opinion of Iria Go~lves. Goncalves, lria, 'Sisas', DHP, Vol. 6, p. 1·2. 
82 The editors of Cortes Portugueses considered that the meeting in Evora was a proper meeting of Cortes. However, 
the documents quoted in last footnote do not use this word. In the first one the term is 'fizemos juntar em Evars,' 
while the second one explicitly uses the technical term 'ajuntamento.' On the instnutional difference, see Sousa, As 
Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 432-63. 
83 Mandaramos,m cisas {my underlining). Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 126. 
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taxes,84 the first known instance of a municipal sisa clearly shows that its 
collection required the direct consent of those taxed. The expressions of the 
1336 tax-farming instrument kept in the Lisbon municipal archive are 
unambiguous: 'the castellan, the judges and the concelho unanimously said that 
this pleased them and commanded and authorised (outorgaram) the collection 
of a sisa [ ... ] and all of them said, commanded and authorised (outorgaram) 
that the sisa be tax-farmed, as this was better for the king's service and profit of 
the municipality,.85 In the very terms of that instrument we can understand who 
composed the municipality or concelho: the notary recorded the presence of 
municipal and non-municipal authorities (the general judges, the municipal 
treasurer, the king's admiral, the almoxarifes, knights), and commented that 
'also attending [were] many others knights, citizens and craftsmen all together 
in the municipal palace after the meeting had been proclaimed to all men.'86 In 
other words, the approval by the concelho implied 'universal' consent. In 1355, 
the principle of consent of the taxpayers was even more clearly stated: in need 
of a great sum of monies that could not be obtained except from the talha or the 
sisa on wine, the municipal government 'seeing that this could be done without 
the authorisation of the said concelho commanded that it should be called.'87 
Throughout the fourteenth century the administration of the sisas qua subsidies 
remained firmly in the hands of the municipality. Only Joao I would try to create 
offices independent from the municipality.88 
. The 1372-75 sisas were not the only kingdom-wide extraordinary taxation 
collected under King Fernando: sisas were collected again in 1376-8 and 1382-
3 and an extraordinary tax was held in 1382.89 The intervention of the Cortes In 
84 The sisa was choosen as the way of writing off their collective (The 'service' of the Jews) and individual debst. n, 
Chane. Dinis, Livro 3, fol. 104. 
85 LM-2, doc. 3, p. 14. 
88 Estanclo presentes outros muytos cavaleyros e ~idadaaos e muytos meesteyraes cia dita ~idac:le, tados juntos no 
Pa~ c/o Con~elho seenc/o 0 Con~elho tocIo apregoac/o. LM-2, doc.3. p. 13. 
87 LM-2, doc. 6. pp. 24. 
B8 Confirm the privlilege granted to Lisbon by Joao I letting the city chose the judges of the sisas 'as they had done 
under King Fernando: AML, Livro dos Pregos. doc. 152 (January 1389). 
89 These dates require some explanation. For 1381-3, documents registered in Chane. Fernando I, Livro 3, fols. 1v-
2, 2v show that the right to tax-farm the sisas from 1 January 1382 to 1 January 1385 was being auctioned since 
October 1381. For 1376-8, see the agreement with the tax farmer of Obides, in n, Chane. fernando I, Livro 4, fol. 
28. For 1372-5, v. documents cRed in the next footnote. 
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the remaining sisas is less clear.9o Although consent by the Cortes remains a 
possibility,91 the content of an ordinance reducing the sisas hints at the 
opposite, given that the reduction of the sisas rate was presented as having 
been.moved by the 'mercy' of the queen towards the 'aggrieved' municipalities. 
This situation is in flagrant opposition to the halving of the sisa agreed in the 
ajuntamento of Evora in 1374. In 1378 opposition to the taxes was dealt with by 
the qualms and scruples of the queen, rather than by summoning a meeting of 
those who had granted the sisas. Additionally, unlike the references present in 
the documents that allude to the 1372-5 sisas, not once in the ordinance does 
King Fernando allude to the consent of the municipalities. Even if taxes had 
been decided in the Cortes, the management of the sisas evaded their 
participation. Even if, or precisely because, it was presented as an act of mercy, 
the ordinance of 1378 was purely prerogative. 
The chances that the last general sisas of King Fernando I, those of 
1381-3, were consented in Cortes are even more remote. At least in the case of 
Lisbon, the crown abruptly wrestled the sisas from the municipalities and their 
tax-farmers without notice, let alone consent.92 The public auction for the tax-
farmers started in October 1381, whilst the last Cortes had last met in August 
1380 and, even then, with the sole business of binding the proctors of the 
Povos to the recent peace treaty with Castile.93 
The absence of Cortes and gatherings between August 1380 and 
September 138394 indicate that the general subsidy first mentioned in March 
1382 did not have the approval of the taxpayers. The documents relating to it 
present a striking feature: this subsidy was newly labelled as a pedido (literally 
'request,).95 The first documented occurrence of the term - a letter of exemption 
issued to the municipality of Vimieiro- reads the 'pedido we [the King] are now 
90 The sisa on wines of 1376-8 is known only through two documents: a plea conceming the tax-farming in the town 
of C>bidos in the king's court that, for some reason, was registered in the chancery and, crucially, an ordinance 
reducing the rate of the sisa. TI Chane. Femando I, Llvro 4, fls. 9 and 28. 
91 In the hypothetical Cortes of Atouguia in September 1375. Cott. Femando I, I, p. 145. 
92 v. the 1382 judicial letter of complaint (carta de requerimento) about the king's officer who ordered in August 1382 
that the sisas were collected in the name of the king, thus wrestling Its income from the hands of the tax4armers 
working with the municipality since November 1381 in AML, Livro I de Sentenyas, Doc. 18. 
93 Cort. Femando I, vol. I, p. 165. 
94 Cort. Femando I, vol. II, p. 11. 
95 TI, Chanco Femando I, Llvro 3, fol. 7v. 
210 
ordering to be introduced in our realms.,96 This sentence and, moreover, the 
use of the verb lan~ar (translated as 'to introduce' but literally meaning 'to 
throw') precludes any chance of parliamentary consent, a circumstance that 
would have been signalled by the verb outorgar (literally, to authorise) or by a 
reference to the consentimento. In consequence, in no way can this tax be 
related to the formal parliamentary consent in Cortes. The same can be said 
about another pedido collected in May 1383 'in order to pay for the wedding of 
the queen of Castile my daughter.'97 
For all the fragile evidence, the introduction of this new word pedido has 
constitutional implications and hints at a different political relationship. Instead 
of 'promised' by a municipality for the 'service of its lord the king,' (see section 
2.3) it was 'requested' of the realm by the king. The stress is now on the 
monarch's initiative. Taxation was thus presented as a demand of the monarch, 
rather than as a voluntary offer. It would be a step too far to assume that this 
change in vocabulary implies a total inversion of the political relationship that 
presided over the servi~os.98 In fact, the pedidos inherited the features of the 
older 'services.' Similarly, just like most of the servi~os, the pedidos took the 
form of property taxes and employed the assessments made for the servi~os.99 
The proximity between these two subsidies is explicit in the designation of 
pedido e servi~o once used for the levy of 1382. 
What is relevant in the Fernandine subsidies is the universal liability of all 
municipalities. Even if the new subsidies retained features of their older 
counterparts, the kingdom-wide approval and application was in stark contrast 
with the servi90S. This practical innovation can be associated with a doctrinal 
novelty: the king's necessity. Both kingdom-wide collection and the idea of a 
96 Nom poders pagar no pidido que ora manciamos lanvar em os nossos reynos. TT, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 3, fol. 
7v. 
97 TT, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 3, fol. 69. 
98 Already services 'promised' by the municipalities could also be a response to some special circumstances hinted 
at by the monarchy. The municipality of Lisbon's decision to pay the servi90 of 1357 was preceded by a delegation 
from the king 'to speak of things concerning my service.' AML, Livro I de Servi90s a EI-Rel, doc. 2. In 1381, King 
Fernando wrote to the Lisbon municipal leaders to make its dwellers to provide what he called a serv~ : paying the 
wine to Edmund Langley and his army. AML, Livro I de Sente~s, doc. 19. It is telling that the marriage of the elder 
daughter, a strong case for a voluntary S8rv~, was replaced by a pedido. 
99 See the case of Santarem. TT, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 3, fol. 8. 
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pedido are subtly linked to the introduction of this concept.1OO Not only is this 
term absent from the letters relating to the old servi90s, but it contrasts with the 
notion of 'voluntary' grants that dominated the discourse of the relevant letters. 
The notion of necessity had played no part in the promise of the sevicos in 1336 
and 1357. The service-for-reward trade-off between the municipalities and their 
sovereign and countryman present in the servi90s seems incompatible with the 
unilateral, vague 101 necessity of the ruler. Nonetheless, in the first mention of 
royal necessity, made for the sisas of 1372-5, King Fernando combined the two 
notions by saying that he would not lack his 'service from which we could not 
exempt our naturals and our municipalities given our necessity from which we 
are not yet freed, as would be fitting to our [royal] condition'.102 
The reconstitution of the Fernandine subsidies indicates that his 
innovations in fiscal matters were intent on bypassing the role of the 
municipalities. By summoning the whole of the municipalities together and by 
employing notions like 'necessity' and pedido, Fernando I was creating the 
realm as a fiscal entity .. In fiscal terms, the 'realm' had barely made sense under 
the old kings whose servi90s resulted from direct negotiations with the 
municipalities. Like his adventurous monetary policy, King Fernando's 
extraordinary taxation pushed the standing constitutional limits. While he 
stepped back in matters of coinage, he did not in terms of taxation and even 
managed to impose almost nine years of uninterrupted sisas, despite the 
'scandal' and 'grievance' alleged by the municipal proctors. How radically would 
the Cortes of Coimbral1385 change this situation? 
Fiscal negotiation in the Cortes COimbral1385 was as much a negation of 
the Fernandine modifications as it stemmed from them. The principle that the 
financial requests of the ruler would only be valid if consent was sought from the 
100 First occurring in 1375, when the rates of the sisas were reduced. Cort. Femando I. I, pp. 141·3. On the 
contemporary interpretations of this concept, see Scordia, Lydwine, Le Roi doit Vivre du Sien. La thBorie de I'Imp6t 
en France (Xllle·XVe si6eles) Paris, 2005, pp. 131·52. 
101 In the four letters mentioning h, there is no hint of a rationale or a justification for the 1382 pedido. It must have 
been of milhary nature, as some men fighting as knights secured exemption, while some municipalities obtained from 
the king that hs proceedings would be applied in improvement works in the city walls or other fortifications. TT, 
Chane. Fernando I, Livro 3, fols. 7v, 11v, 12, 1Sv. 
102 'servivo que nom podiamos scusar dos nossos naturaes e dos ditos concelhos por nossa n898ssidade de que 
Binda nom somos fora nem livres como compria ao nosso est ado. ' The text appears in two letters sent to different 
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ruled would henceforward be associated with the famous Cortes where the 
kingdom chose its ruler. In Coimbral1385, the voluntary 'service' of the 
individual vassals to which Afonso IV and Pedro I resorted and the prerogative 
imposition to the realm by the autocratic King Fernando had apparently found a 
middle route: consent by the whole kingdom. Like nearly three centuries 
beforehand in the times of Afonso III, the foundation for a new fiscal constitution 
took the form of a royal promise. As we learn from a later petition brought in the 
Cortes of Lisbonl1389, Joao I himself admitted that when he 'was made king' he 
'promised not to collect sisas nor taxes without the authorisation of the 
people,.103 Thus, in contrast with the dubious dealings of Fernando I, the Cortes 
of Coimbral1385 authoritatively set a principle: extraordinary taxation had to be 
granted by the Cortes assembled. Did this principle take hold? Again, the 
answer to this question implies a crude task: to relate the known instances of 
extraordinary, kingdom-wide taxes with the known meetings of Cortes, as set 
out in Fig. 24. 
municipalities: Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 142 (11th March 1375); Arquivo Distrital de BragallQ8, Pergaminhos, Doc. 
32 (29th Abril 1375). 
103 'Outrossy ao que dizem no xxiiijl1 artigo que quando 'amos al9Bdo por ,ey que prometernos de nom poe' sisas 
nem enposi¢es sern outo'gamento do poboo.' This claim was totally opposed to the very 'Act of Election.' As 
mentioned earlier, in this 'Act of Election' "was the kingdom that promised to sustain 'the royal condb and honour 
and to continue the wa( to a reluctant Joio I. Yet, there are no reasons to discount the very words of the king. See 
abridgement at Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, p 233 and text at BACL, S6rie Azul, COdice Azul 410, pp. 279-
280 (it was not possible to check the original, kept in the University of Coimbra). 
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Fig. 24 - Cortes and Extraordinary Taxation, 1372-1525 
CORTES Year GENERAL CORTES Year GENERAL 
TAXES TAXES 
Leiria 1372 3 yrs Sisas Leiria/Sant. 1433 
1375 3 yrs Sisas Evora 1436 P 
(=S) Leiria 1438 
1382 3 yrs S & Torres Novas 1438 
Pedido Lisbon 1439 
Coimbra 1385 Pedido (=P) Torres Vedras 1441 P 
Porto 1387 Evora 1442 P 
Braga 1387 1 yr S Evora 1444 P 
Lisbon 1389 S&P Lisbon 1446 
Coimbra 1390 S&P Evora 1447 P 
Evora 1390-1 Santarem 1451 P 
Viseu 1391 P Lisbon 1455 P 
Coimbra 1394 P & S (?) Lisbon 1456 P 
Santarem 1396 P (?) Lisbon 1459 P (rejected) 
Coimbra 1397 P Evora 1460 P 
Coimbra 1398 S Guarda 1465 P (?) 
Porto 1398 P Santarem 1468 P 
Lisbon 1399 P Santarem 1471 
Coimbra 1400 P (?) Coimbra/Ev. 1472-3 
Guimaraes 1401 P&S Lisbon 1473 P 
Montemor 1402 Evora 1475 P 
Santarem 1402 Montemor 1477 P (rejected) 
Lisbon 1404 P. Santarem/Lisb. 1478 P 
Santarem 1406 Loan EvoraIViana 1481-2 
Evora 1408 Permanent S Santarem 1482 P 
Lisbon 1410 Evora 1490 P 
Lisbon 1412 Lisbon 1498 
Lisbon 1413 Lisbon 1499 
Estremoz 1416 Loan Lisbon 1502 p 
Lisbon 1417 Torres Novas 1525 P 
Lisbon 1418 P 
Lisbon 1427 P 
1429 P Notes: With the pedidos of 1478 and 1490 
Santarem 1430 loans were also collected, but there is no indication that they were mandatory. 
Sources: PEP; Sousa, As Cortes Medievais 
PortuguBSas, I, pp. 291-461; Cort. Duarte t, 
Cort. Manuel I, vols. I-III; Serrao, Joaquim 
Verissimo, 'Lis boa, Cortes de (1502)" DHP, 
vol. IV, pp. 25-6; Serrao, Joaquim Verlssimo, 
'Torres Novas, Cortes de (1525)', DHP, vol. 
VI, p. 178; AML, C6diee 10, fol. 72 (for the 
pedido of 1394), TT, Chane. Joao I, Livro 5, 
fls. 10-11 (1,5 pedido of 1387 and 1 pedido in 
1390); Chane. Joao I, 11-3, doc. 1091 (pedido 
in 1401); 
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Fig. 24 makes clear that the pedido conceded by the Cortes of 
Coimbral1385 turned out to be a powerful, virtually unchallenged precedent: 
taxation could not be levied without being formally granted in the Cortes.104 The 
strength of this practice cannot simply be ascribed to precedent or even to Joao 
I's alleged 'promise', The principle that taxation had to be approved was already 
well established at the municipal level and in 1384 the war was fought with the 
very sisas accepted by the populace of the municipalities that stood against 
Castile.105 Though seldom formulated, this principle qualifies as a constitutional 
rule because it was accepted by both parts as prior to concrete political and 
military decisions, as the well-documented discussion about expansion in 
Morocco between 1432 and 1438 shOWS.106 The same idea was reinstated in 
the Cortes de Leiria-Santarem/1433 where the proctors claimed that pedidos 
could only be made in case of 'great necessity' and with the consent of the 
Povos, a claim that the king did not chalienge.107 
However, as one of the few contemporary texts which touches the 
matter, there was also an obligation for the Povos to consent, provided that 
extraordinary taxes had an acceptable goal. As the agreement between the 
monarchy and the Cortes in 1408 read, 'if the revenues that the king now has to 
uphold his status and the defence of the realm decrease, the said lord [the king] 
should summon the Cortes for this reason, as he has just done, and there what 
is lacking will be given in goodwill to uphold his status and that of his wife and 
sons and the honour of the realm, as they [the Cortes] have thus far done','os 
After the war, the notion that paying taxes was not part of their individual 
legal status was deeply ingrained among the representatives of Portuguese 
municipalities. The doctrine articulated by the Povos throughout this period was 
consistent: payment without consent was as an infringement of 'liberty.'109 This 
dimension emerged nowhere else clearer than in the negotiation between the 
104 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol.U, p. 233; BAeL, serie Azul, C6dice 410, pp. 279-280. 
106 Evora (TI, Gaveta XU, mayo 1, doc. 13) and Montemor (RED, doc. 1). 
106 See the letter given by the Count of Arraiolos to King Joao I on the need to obtain taxation through the Cortes in 
MH, vol.lV, doc. 21, p. 106. On the context, in English, Russell, Henry 'The Navigator,'pp. 141-3, 160-1. 
107 See 13()1h article and answer, BNP, C6dice 6969, p. 549. 
108 'E se fays algiius mingua das rendas que ora el Rei tem pera manteer 0 seu estsdo e defenssom do regno per 
razom deste ter~ que se ora mais acreyents, que 0 dito senhor mande chamar sobreste a Cortes, asi como ora 
chamou, e que entom se proveja 0 que mlngusr, asi pera el, como pera os infantes, donde se aja, e tho darom de 
boon ta/ante pera manteer seu estado, e de sus mother, e Ii/hos e hanrs do reino asi como ata aquy fezeroni. RED, 
doc. 6, p. 49. 
109 123th article presented at 1481lEvora Viana· TI, Cortes, Mayo 3, doc. 5. 
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crown and the men of Madeira for the pedido of 1478. Given the recent 
settlement and exceptional administrative status, none of the municipalities of 
Madeira was entitled to a place in the Cortes. As such, these municipalities 
used this circumstance to show that this was an imposition. In a series of 
letters, the islanders claimed they were 'being coerced to pay as mere tributary 
Jews', as 'unlike the humblest town of the kingdom,' they were not summoned 
to go to the Cortes.110 Again, paying without consent was regarded as an 
offence to their 'liberties.,111 
As several episodes throughout the period make clear, approval of 
extraordinary subsidies by the Cortes was far from an idle formality. A good 
example of the binding strength of consent in the eyes of the monarchy is 
provided by Joao I's decision of not collecting a subsidy when preparing his 
secret expedition to Ceuta in 1415. When considering his options to finance the 
attack, he had to discard the possibility of a subsidy because this would require 
convincing the Cortes of the goal and, would he have done so, the operation 
would cease to be secret, as he and his counsellors wished. Instead, Joao I 
preferred to resort to other methods of funding unhampered by constitutional 
limitations such as debasement.112 Consent, indeed, was not automatic. There 
are even examples of refusal to the demands of the monarchy by the Cortes: in 
Lisbonl1459 and in Santarem/Lisbonl1477.113 The sole all-out exception, the 
collection of a subsidy for the wedding of Princess Isabel with the duke of 
Burgundy in 1429, ends up by confirming the rule: in a letter to the municipality 
of Porto, crown-prince Duarte declared that his father started the collection of 
the pedido given the urgency and the confidence that this demand would be 
attended.114 In the next year Cortes were summoned to obtain post-factum 
consent and in the first Cortes of his reign, the Cortes of Leiria-Santarem/1433, 
110 'Como a mais pequena vila ... judeus peiteyros.' None of the municipalities of Madeira was summoned to the 
Cortes, as technically Madeira was separate from the kingdoms of Portugal and Algarve (as Afonso V stated In the 
Cortes of 1460, BNP, C6dice 2639, fol. 93). Its administration was headed by a donatory lord, capltao-donatarlo. On 
the administrative status of Madeira, in English, see Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 91-4. 
111 'Tombo 19 do Registo Geral cia CAmara Municipal do Funchal. Primeira Parte,' ed.luis Francisco Cardoso de 
Sousa Melo, Arquivo HistOrico da Madeira, serie Documental, vol. XV, 1972 funchal, 1972. 
112 Zurara, Cronies da Tomada de Ceuta, chapter XIII, p. 71. 
113 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 350 and 411. 
114 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 344. 
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King Duarte heard from the concelhos that taxes could not be imposed without 
'great necessity and consent of the people.,115 
In the answer given to the chapters presented in the Cortes of 
Lisbonl1389, Joao I granted that 'he promised not to impose sisas or 
extraordinary duties without the authorisation of the people (outorgamento do 
pOboO).,116 Although the present heuristic conditions do not allow for a 
methodical analysis of vocabulary employed in the Cortes, there is a tendency 
on behalf of the monarchy to employ using the term povo while elaborating 
abstract principles.117 The use of the term 'the people' is intriguing, as 
technically consent was given by the representatives of the municipalities. 
Indeed, in stark contrast with England or France, where the representation of 
the realm was based in discrete administrative units (shires, elections) which 
virtually covered the entire kingdom and could be said to represent the 'people' 
or the 'community of the realm', Portuguese assemblies convened the 
kingdom's municipalities, not the kingdom's almoxarifados. This is a crucial 
difference as, notwithstanding their fundamental subordination, municipalities 
were not simply administrative districts; they were political institutions with 
autonomous instruments vis-a.-vis the crown. For this reason, the technical term 
for the popular member of the Cortes was Povos (literally 'populations'). 
In short, Povos was not synonymous with Povo. This feature expressed an 
important feature of Portuguese fiscal politics. Municipalities possessed a very 
articulate memory of their individual military or material contribution to the 
crown.118 Just like individual vassals, the concelhos hoped for retribution for 
their 'services' to the king. While monarchical persuasion was equally 
comfortable employing the language of 'service',119 there was a fundamental 
116 'Vos pedymos.que Ieixees vosso poboo de taaes emcarreguos, e quando ouver de seer seyja por gram 
necesssidade e comsentimento do poboo: BNP, C6dice 6969, p. 549 (article 13()1h). Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, 
vol. II, p. 314. 
116 24th article: 'disseram quando fomos a~do por rey que prometemos de nom poer sisas nem enposi¢es sem 
outorgamento do poboo.' 
117 As Joao II said, 'that [the payment of the sisas] the entire povo is bound by law (isso mesmo todo 0 povo deve e 
he obrigado per dereito). Article 123 in 1481IEvora Viana· n, Cortes, ma~. 3, doc. 5, fol. 15. The legal.compilation 
by Manuel I also stated that 'authority to mint coin,' to collect a pedido when he or his daughter wed' and 'to collect 
pedidos and imposifoens in timw of war or of any other great necesssity' were Direitos Reais. Ordena¢es 
Manue/inas, Book II, title 15 § 4. 
118 See the impressive list of 'services' (material and military) rendered by the city of Porto to the ~rown in five 
decades (1384-1436) that was presented to king Duarte in the Cortes of Evora. Cort. Duarte /, pp. 89·92. 
119 See the debate between the oligarchy of Madeira and the crown as pr.esented by Pereira, Femando Jasmins, A 
Participa~o da Madeira no Pedido e Emprestimo de 1478, Lisboa, 1980. 
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cleavage between the values and constitutional principles evoked by both parts 
and the practicalities of tax-collection. Unlike the old one-off 'services' 
negotiated between the monarch and the concelhos, the subsidies approved in 
Coimbral1385 and in the subsequent assemblies were collected according to 
kingdom-wide regulations rather than delivered to the municipalities. Moreover, 
these subsidies, labelled pedidos, were collected according to assessments of 
individual wealth. The very term pedido acquired the technical meaning of an 
individual contribution 120 and by 1436 subsidies were managed at the level of 
the almoxarifado, rather than that of the municipality.121 
In this new context, municipalities lost their power to allocate the burden. 
The sisas also underwent a similar evolution. Indeed, despite that Gama 
Barros, Iria Gon<;alves and Armindo de Sousa all emphasised the consistent 
opposition to the sisa on behalf of the Povos, in practice as it clearly emerges 
from the compilation of the latter, it was only in 1439 that the very collection of 
the sisa was challenged by them. Until then, the bone of contention had been 
the existence of the judge of the sisas, a non-municipal judicial instance of fiscal 
litigation. That is to say, rather than ending up with taxation, the concern of the 
Povos was with the control of local instances of power. It was only when the 
almoxarifado and the king's personnel took hold of the various fiscal processes 
that a united, kingdom-wide opposition to the sisas emerged. 
By imposing a kingdom-wide fiscal framework, the monarchy managed to 
impose a uniform structure rather than negotiate, moving towards a 'fiscal 
sovereignty' and effectively ending what can be called 'fiscal suzerainty:122 The 
notion of collective vassal which the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
municipalities projected made less sense. Subsidies were not about collective 
vassals but about individual subjects which together formed the Povo. 
The drive towards a more fiscally uniform kingdom was also felt in the fight 
against privileges and exemptions. No privilege, even when clearly stated In the 
municipal charter, privilege or contract, was valid when it was 'necessary to 'Pay 
120 Based upon the quanti as, the wealth assessment of free-tenants that was used for military summons. 
121 There are indications that management by a/moxarifado was already used in 139 TI, Chanco Afonso V, livro SO, 
fol. 133-37v (Lamego, 1437); PEP, XV, p. 228 (Torre de Moncorvo, 1441). 
122 See on this respect, O'Brien, Patrick, 'Historical Conditions for the Evolution of a Successful Fiscal State. -Great 
Britain and its European Rivals from the naaty of Munster to the Treaty of Vienna,' La FlscalitS nell'Economia 
Europea. Secc. XIII-IV. Atti, vol. I, Florence, 2008, pp. 142-3, 145-7. 150-1. The ~rm 'fiscal suzerainty' was used by 
Prof. O'Brien in the conference but n does not appear in the written version. 
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for the defence of the realm,.123In the 1460s and the 1470s there were attempts 
to make the nobility participate in the fiscal efforts. The trend is first visible in 
1460, when the lower tier of the nobility, which had the privileges of exemption, 
was called to share the burden, even if using alternative methods of 
assessment. 124 A meaningful example of this can be found in the Cortes of 
1477 Santarem-Lisbon. This assembly met to approve of a new tax, where the 
future Joao II, then acting as regent, suggested that for the sake of unanimity, 
nobility, clergy, municipalities and two representatives of the king would meet as 
a commission. Indeed, as the crown-prince Joao said, 'as in the Cortes we are 
set to work for the commonwealth (bem comum) , I believe that it would be fit 
that nobles, clergy and people (povo) be all together in one sole will and 
agreement.'125 The, largely unsuccessful, attempt to involve the nobility in the 
tax-base, rather than simply demanding military service, is very close to the 
dilution of the municipal fiscal autonomy, in the sense that the monarchy sought 
to create the povo as a fiscal identity. This was the culmination of a long 
process in which, to invert a famous aphorism, the Portuguese monarchy 
'united to rule'. 
Section 6.4 - The Rise and Fall of 'Public' Finances 
In post-war Portugal, the fiscal constitution functioned in the form of the 
obligation of summoning the Cortes for participating in 'in-period' decisions 
concerning extraordinary taxation. In this respect the legacy of the Cortes of 
CoimbraJ1385 was clear: taxation had to be approved because the declaration 
of royal 'necessity' was not enough. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the municipal 
representatives who asserted the right to choose the king did more than simply 
consent. Thus, the Povos chose the form of taxation, namely the pedido instead 
of the dreaded sisas. 
Choice of taxation poses a fiscal-constitutional problem that has not so 
far been discussed. Indeed, the precedent of CoimbraJ1385 implied that the 
Cortes had also the power to choose the type of taxation used. Considering 
123 Tombo IQ do Registo Geral, doc. p. 96. 
124 BNP, C6dice 2639, pp. 91·97. 
125 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais Portuguesas, vol. I, p.250. 
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that, as Fig. 24 made clear, the Cortes did not have simply a fiscal role and that, 
for all his reserves in 1385, Joao I summoned the Cortes for deciding on 
political military matters. As with contemporary England, whose constitutional 
system was admired by the POVOS,126 late fourteenth-century and early fifteenth-
century Cortes could claim a measure of 'partnership in government.,127 Did this 
participation go beyond passive consent or negative refusal? 
Fig. 24 made evident that the early stage of the war saw the coexistence 
of sisas and pedidos. As it has been stated, in 1385, the Povos preferred to pay 
a property tax as a pedido rather than to continue the collection of the sisas that 
was under way since 1382. They even proposed that the dreaded sales taxes 
would not be demanded again.128 Sisas, the proctors grieved, brought 'scandal 
between the Povos and the rulers who introduced them.'129 Joao I conformed to 
the choice of the Povos and had to be content with obtaining the 400,000 I. he 
expected to get from the sisas (see supra section 5.1) through a pedido. 
The arrangement of 1385 would not last as two years later the sisas 
would be collected with the consent of the Povos. The problem emerged in the 
Cortes of Porto/1387, when freshly-married Joso I required help to assemble 
his and the queen's households and to organise a expedition against Castile. In 
this parliament financial help was perhaps refused or delayed, but, as Armindo 
de Sousa clarified, the sisas would be agreed months later in the ajuntamento 
of Coimbra in 1387.130 As a contemporary prologue to a royal letter reads, the 
purpose of this reunion was to devise how to assemble 'with the least damage 
to the people' the needed monies for 'men-of-arms, fleets, wages for his and the 
queen's households and for officers and for all other required expenses.' The 
option for the sisas, if indeed it was one, was formally stated by the king and the 
Povos in the document known as the 'Authorisation for the Double Sisas 
128 Caertano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' pp. 108·9. 
127 These words are taken from G. L. Harriss, ('Financial Policy', Henry V. The practice of Kingship, Oxford, 1985, p. 
179). The standard account of fifteenth-century Portuguese Cortes is obviously Armindo de Sousa's opus magnum 
(As Cortes Medievais, 2 vols., Porto, 1990). The best analysis of the Cortes of Coimbra and the best adition of the 
relevant materials remains Caetano, Marcello, 'As Cortes de 1385,' pp. 9-90. On the Portuguese Cortes, in English, 
see Duarte, I. M., 'The Portuguese Medieval Parliament: Are we asking the right questions?', The E-Joumalof 
Portuguese History, vol. 1, n. 2, 2003, pp. 1·12. 
128 'E porque as peitas pididos sissas /an~daS do senhor aos sogeitos geerom escandal/o antre os que as pooem e 
as poboos moor mente nas terras em que nom foyacustumado; e por areciar damtre vos e nos este escandalo'Text 
in Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 79. 
129 Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 79. 
130 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 295-8, 432-4. 
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('Outorgamento das Sisas Dobradas' in the Cortes of Bragal1387. This 
document declared that, according to the same source, in flagrant opposition to 
1385 the municipalities chose the sisa as the 'less harmful' form of subsidy, in 
order to avoid the least possible 'scandal and harm of the people' .131 
The grant made in Braga was not permanent, as the collection of the 
sisas had to be halted on 1 January 1389. However, sisas were collected on a 
nearly-permanent basis since 1387. In spite of the agreement struck in Braga, 
Joao I gave orders to continue their collection past this date, without consent 
being given in the Cortes or elsewhere.132 This decision would be later 
legitimated as extensions of the sisas were formally consented: a one-year 
extension was agreed in Lisbon/1389, followed by another, probably two-year, 
extension in COimbral1390, as established critically by Armindo de Sousa.133 
These Cortes were summoned precisely in order that the king could obtain the 
outorgamento for the keeping up with the sales tax.134 
From 1390 onwards the concession of the sisas becomes very opaque 
for the present-day observer. A later chapter presented to the Cortes in 1481-2 
mentions a formal grant of the sisas signed on 22 February during the Cortes of 
Coimbral1390. Although this document has not been found and the precise 
conditions of the concession remain unknown, it is clear that it was also short-
term.135 In 1394, the foundations for the regulation of the sisas were organised 
in Cortes, largely in response to the grievances and proposals of the POVOS.136 
Sousa and Goncalves are not entirely coincidental as to when the Cortes gave 
away their prerogative to consent on the sisas.137 Nonetheless, the last 
131 AML, Livro I de Cortes, no. 7, fol. 63. (14th November 1387). 
132 A quail [sisal nos foy outorgada em salvo ataa este primeiro dia de Janeiro que ora foy desta presente era e que 
sem outorgamento {manda?Jamos tirar e correr as sisas por nos. BACL, Serie Azul, C6dice 410, p. 279. 
133 Sousa claims that the purpose of the Cortes of Lisbonl1389, Coimbral1390, pp. 300-3. The Cortes of Viseul1391 
met only late in 1391 and negotiated a pedido rather than sisas. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 306-7. 
134 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 300-3. 
135 Days after the Cortes of Evoral1390-1391, a charter of privilege for the fair of Coimbra mentioned the need to pay 
for the sisas 'if they are to be collected.' 'em sisas se em as no dicto tempo hi ouuer'. Chane. Joao I" 11-1, doc. 11-486 
(23rd February 1391). 
136 Broad agreement on the form of levying the sisas had been obtained in 1394 with the responses given by the king 
i n CoimbraJ1394 to a large section of the articles dedicated to the powers of the tax-farmers Sousa, As Cortes 
Medievais, vol. II, pp. 249-51) which formed the so-called 'settlement of the sisas {according to article 5 in 
CoimbraJ1400, Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, p. 255). On the Cortes of CoimbraJ1394, Sousa, As Cortes 
Medievais, vol. I, p. 309. 
137 Sousa considered likely that the document mentioned was a temporary grant and that new prorogations followed 
in the Cortes of Viseul1391 and in CoimbraJ1394 and that speculates whether the sisas were finally alienated to the 
monarchy In Cortes of Guimaraesl1401. Iria 'Gonyalves, on the other hand, thinks that the sisas would only be 
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documental evidence of a grant (outorgamento) of the sisas dates from the 
Cortes of Coimbral1398, possibly making it the definitive concession of the 
sisas.138 Whatever its precise date, later debates suggests that this concession 
was some sort of precarious authorisation, possibly with the king's promise of 
giving it back as soon as the necessity had passed. 
However, apart from the brief period between 1385 and 1388, it would be 
wrong to think that the sisas replaced the pedidos or even that these forms of 
subsidy' alternated. Taxes on property were agreed in the Cortes of 
Lisbonl1389, Coimbral1390, Viseul1391, Coimbral1394, Coimbral1397, 
Porto/1398, Lisbonl1399 and Lisbonl1404 (see Fig. 24 and Fig. 25). Kingdom-
wide pedidos were collected along with the sisas, as they were consented in 
some of these assemblies where the concession of the sisas as extended 
(1389,1390 and 1394). 
The coexistence of sisas and pedidos, not to mention debasements, 
seems to indicate the relative strength of the monarchy vis-a-vis perfectly 
compliant Cortes.139 The Povos could negotiate the apportioning of the tax 
burden, but the defence of the realm by Joao I provided an irrestible argument. 
The rate of the sisa was reduced 213 when a truce was signed in 1401, but 
eventually Joao I got the old rate back with the explicit consent of the Povos. 
The purpose was redistributive rather than military: to acquire monies for the 
permanently granted in the Cortes of Coimbral1398. PEP, p. 198; Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 302-3, 321-
2. 
138 see the prologue to the regulation to the sisBs contained in the chancery register of Joso I. TT, Chane. Joso I, 
Uvro 5, fol. SOv. At any rate, the concession was prior to the date of the truce of Segovia signed In January 1402 as 
there is another formal grant of the sisas in Cortes which mentions the cutting clown of the value of the sisas 'when 
the truces were struck. (RED, doc. 6, pp. 48-50). The promulgation of truces between Portugal and Castile in early 
1402 caused the monarch to cut two thirds the rate of the sisas (roughly 40,000 I.) possibly before the municipalities 
in the Cortes of Santarem. 
139 The coexistence of sisas and pedidos had a good technical reason. After the early years of clogged defence, war 
finances became based upon estimates of total expenditure, which the Povos had to meet (and/or perhaps lower 
down). One- or two-year Sisas, like those chosen by the Povos in 1387, implied contingent income, whereas 
traditional taxes, like ta/has, fintas or pedidos, were more apt to apportion a known quantity amongst the taxpayers. 
Indeed, with some exceptions, pre-war fourteenth-century sisas were held for a year, instead of collected until a 
certain sum was reached. This situation implied that both the Povos and the monarchy had to foresee the possibility 
of further taxes on rent or property in order to reach the demanded sum. The problem is hinted at in the 1387 grant of 
the sisas as it was antiCipated that if the municipamies understood that sales taxes would be insufficient, other taxes 
had to be collected, namely ta/has and fintas. Os dictos COflfelhos ou cada huum del/es hussem ou entenderem que 
per estas ssisas nom poderem aver comprimento daque/Io que Ihes acont896r de pagar da dicta quantia aos dictos 
tenpos que elles cada huuns em ssuas comarcas possam poer e /an~ar e tirar dinheiro per ta/has ou per fintas ou 
per moedas ou per outras quaesquer imposi9aes que entenderem por mais sua pro/ e sem scandollo do poboo sse 
pode fazer taaes e tamanhas quanthias a cada peSS08 ygualmente ssem nenhuma mali9ia nem engano que 
possam chegar e aver comprimento das dictas pagas e que destos enposi¢es ou fintBS eta/has que assy /aflfBrem 
nom sseiam escusadas nenhumBs peSS08S (AML, Uvro I de Cortes, doc. 7, tol. 63) In this hypothesis, the pedidos 
worked as complimentary revenues to the sisas. 
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lands that would maintain households of the three elder infantes, and there was 
no hint of compensation, except the promise that this rate would be changed 
again as soon as the required lands would be obtained. The promise was not 
kept.140 Indeed, the fiscal negotiations of the war years of Joao I resulted in an 
undoubted success for the monarchy which obtained perpetual sisas with 
negligible, elusive commitments.141 
A great deal of importance was ascribed by Faro and Goncalves to the 
notion that the choice of the sisas was a no-brainer, given its superiority in 
terms of justice and efficiency (see section 5.1). By dOing so, they attributed the 
choice of the sisa to the mutual interest of monarchy and Povos. Yet, the notion 
that sisas were a self-evident option ignores the 'choice' made by great Cortes 
of 1385 of the pedido instead of the sisas. Both the rejection of the ongoing 
sisas in 1385 and their dismissal as a 'scandal' fly in the face of this hypothesis. 
Possibly, as the term 'scandal' seemingly confirms, the experience of the sisas 
collected by King Fernando I loomed heavily in the POVOS.142 Nevertheless, by 
no means it can be said that the sisas were intrinsically negative to the Povos. 
The grant of the sisas of 1387, which followed a long negotiation throughout the 
year, justifies the use of sisas as of all taxes this was the 'least devoid of 
scandal.'143 Moreover, the hypothesis of Faro and Goncalves finds some 
confirmation in the perfectly autonomous 'choices' made by the municipal 
governments (and confirmed by the populace) that supported Joao in the hard 
days of 1384.144 
The conflicting visions of the sisa show that it would be wrong to mistake 
the choices of the Povos with the, somewhat a-historical, search for the just or 
140 According to Silva de Sousa, the patrimony of the household of Dom Henrique was defined In 1411. Sousa, Joao 
da Silva de, 'Dos Rendimentos FundiSrios da Casa do Infante D. Henrique,' Do Infante a Tordesi/has, Cascais, 1995, 
p.75. 
141 Historians have regarded the integration of the sisas in the permanent revenues of the kings as a flagrant 
alienation from what had been a municipal 'tax'. The genealogy of this narrative is long and Illustrious: the Povos 
articulated it first in the Cortes of Lisbonl1439, followed by other parliamentarians and, crucially. by chronicler Femao 
Lopes, whose chronicles moulded the way academic historians regarded the sisas{see section 5.1). 
142 'Scandal' was chosen by the proctors of Lisbon in the negotiation of the 'service' in 1373 and 1375 to describe the 
antagonism of the gentes to the collection of the sisa. AML, Livro I de ServiQos a EI-Rei, doc. 4. Even In the 
settlement of 1387 there is a reference to need to moderate the sisa In order to scale down the 'scandal of the 
people'; AMl, Livro I de Cortes, no. 7, tol. £3. 
143 AML, Livro I de Cortes, doc. 7, fol. 63. 
144 Sisas were chosen by some municipalities to help futur.king Joao in his early days as 'Ruler and Protector of the 
Realm'. In 1384 he pleaded with the municipalities 'to provide succour through a loan, through sisas or through any 
other form'. This plea is only known through the letters sent to the municipal govemment of evora and Montemor In 
1384 which choose the sisa. Evera • TI, Gaveta XII, m8QO 1, doc. 13; Montemor • RED, doc. 1, p. 4. 
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the efficient tax. Indeed, if collecting a municipal sisa to pay for a subsidy to the 
king, self-interested municipal governments would maximise equality at the 
expense of efficiency, while in raiSing money for building local infrastructures 
efficiency would become more important. The early fourteenth-century 
Portuguese municipalities that devised the sisas were not merely interested in 
equality but also in efficiency. Whilst cities had deemed sisas just and equal 
while sharing a burden within their inhabitants, it does not follow that, on the 
level of the kingdom, sisa was thought an adequate form of distributing a 
subsidy.145 The problem of conflicting evidence can only be solved by 
understanding why concrete decisions were taken: for instance, why isolated 
municipalities chose the sisa in 1384 and the Povos rejected it in 1385? 
The cleavages in the discourse on the sisas are intelligible. As the 
example of the disputes on taxation in fourteenth-century France shows. the 
distribution of the fiscal burden was felt very differently by the different interests 
within the assembly and even within traditional groups.146 The choice of the 
municipal governments of Evora and Montemor for the SiSBS with popular 
approbation in 1384 can be understood as a form of minimising the impact of 
their subsidy in the farmers and landlords. By contrast. mercantile centres, like 
Lisbon or Porto, had more to lose if taxation tapped trade instead of land. 
property or rent (the case of pedidos). This is first suggested in the substitution 
of the sales tax by a direct tax, which had been the response of Lisbon to the 
demand of sisas of Fernando 1.147 Although information on the value of taxation 
is scarce, it can be argued that sisas bore first and foremost on Lisbon and 
Porto, even if the latter is less documented. The notional general accounts used 
in the previous chapter are very clear about the role that the Lisbon SiSBS 
played in the revenues of the kingdom (Fig. 13). In 1401. when sales taxes 
were still being consolidated, the sisas collected in Lisbon accounted for nearly 
145 Add"ionally, one could claim that a municipality would be willing to sacrifice tax-efficiency when collecting the 
monies to redeem a subsidy. 
146 According to Raymond Cazelles, the negotiations of taxation in early fourteenth-century France, saw a tlesr 
alignment of the 'burgeoisie' with direct taxation against sales taxes and of knights and the popular representatives 
with sales taxes. Cazelles, Raymond, 'Les Variations du Preievement et de Ia Repartition selon les Equipes au 
Pouvoir,' Genese de I'Etat Modeme. Pr{Jievement et Redistribution, Genet, Jean-Philippe and Le Menet, Michel, 
eds., Paris, 1987, p. 205. Henneman Jnr, John Bell, 'France in the Middle Ages', RFS pp. 101-122. 
147 AML, Livro I de Serv~os a EI Rei, doc. 4 (9'" August 1371); R is not a long-shot to suggest that the preference for 
direct taxes was a suggestion of the Lisbon proctors. Indeed, as A. de Sousa argued, Lisbon had a leading role in the 
framing of the petitions and in 1385. Sousa, '0 Discurso Politico,' pp. 19-20. 
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two-thirds (65.9%) of the country's sisas, and in 1473, when the disparities of 
wartime had long ceased, the proportion was still 24.8% of the sisas of the 
whole country.148 The figures for the pedidos are equally telling: the contribution 
of Lisbon to the subsidy of 1478 was 4,245,886 r. that is to 7% of the required 
sixty million; in 1482, the figure was 2,765,440 r., an even lower 5.5% of the 
total tax.149 By contrast, we can understand why more agrarian municipalities 
like Montemor or Evora went for the sisa in 1384. In 1478, the almoxarifado of 
Evora, where Montemor was also included, paid 6% of the total.150 In terms of 
kingdom-wide ordinary revenues, which depended on the sisa, the almoxarifado 
of Evora contributed with only 4.7%.151 As these figures indicate, the sisas of 
Lisbon secured to this city the unwanted status of fiscal powerhouse under Joao 
I. 
Thus, the choice of the pedido in Coimbral1385 instead of the sisa can be 
read as a manifestation of the well-known political leadership of Lisbon in the 
early days of Joao 1.152 The pedido did not enjoy any popularity among the 
landowners who made up the vast majority of the Povos and this made sisas 
the consistent choice of the Cortes. Indeed, at kingdom-wide level, the sisa 
offered a condition that made it adequate to these interests: it was universal and 
knew no privilege. Unlike what the happened with the pedidos which excepted 
noble and church property and, as time wore on, even some individuals by 
special grace of the crown, sisas managed to tap the wealth of the privileged 
and, as such, they would result in the faster collection of the sum wanted.153 
The internal struggle within the Povos allows us to perceive the alleged 
acquiescence of the sisas Cortes to the demands of the monarchy in a totally 
different way. Indeed, as with coinage, there were no complaints against the 
collection of the sisa by the crown in the reign of Joao I. Although often referring 
to the institutional frame and to practicalities of sales taxes' collection, the 
general chapters of the Cortes did not grieve the very existence of the sisas. In 
148 9,479,000 r. out of 38,175,500 r. RED, doc. 8, p. 83 
149 1478: PEP, p. 173, nt. 86; 1482: COM, n. 999. 
150 1478: PEP, p. 173, nt. 86 (3,598,801 r.); 1490: COM, 515~2,276,500 r.). 
151 1,799,000 r. out of 38,175,500 r. RED, doc. 8, p. 83. 
152 On the Lisbon's influence in shaping the articles of 1385, see Sousa, '0 Discurso Polltuco,' pp 19-20 
153 Moreover, as the grant of 1387 rGad: the municipalities would be Gxempt of military service ~or taxes in lieu 
thereon. 'because of this they [Povos] can be exempt from serving the king at wa(, por esto sejam 6scusados todos 
os dictos cones/hos de sarvir 81 rey na gue"a. AML, Livro I de Cortes, doc. 7, fol. ~. 
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sum, resorting to the texts present in the Cortes of 1439, 1459 and 1481-2, Iria 
Goncalves, Jorge Faro and Armindo de Sousa fundamentally regarded the 
sisas as an alienation of the municipalities. However, this overlooks the fact that 
the adoption of the sisas by the municipalities contained an element of choice. 
For the vast majority of the Povos what subsequent political actors and 
chroniclers and historians after them regarded as the permanent alienation of 
the sisas meant, to some extent, a good choice. It crucially meant that the fiscal 
burden would be met by truly universal taxation and that it would be trade rather 
than agricultural rent that paid for it. That justifies why only in 1439, the 
permanence of the sisas is finally opposed by the Povos. 
The level of participation of the Povos in royal finances is nowhere 
clearer than in the way the monies from the subsidies were spent. In 1385, the 
granting of the pedido was very conditional. One of the limitations it imposed 
was that monies thereof collected would indeed be spent in the war. The Povos 
obtained that the revenue of the pedido was to be handled by a treasurer of 
their own appOintment who would organise the military payments.154 Similarly, 
the first sisas, approved in the Cortes of Braga/1387, were to be stored in 
separate coffers and so were the extended sisas of 1389.155 The aspiration to a 
war-chest managed independently from the ordinary receipt was common to 
both forms of subsidies. However, the participation of the municipal 
representatives in the sisas and pedidos followed very different routes. 
The consignment of the receipt of the subsidies to warfare was not an 
unrealistic aspiration as it had been the normal practice in the tradition of sales 
taxes when held within the municipality, even in the sisas paid to King 
Fernando.156 However, evidence for such guarantees disappeared from the 
sisas regulations of 1394 and 1398. In the absence of relevant sources, these 
regulations show that less than ten years after the first concession of the sisas 
its administration became integrated in the accounts of the almoxarifes and 
154 Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 89. 
155 As" is made clear in AML, Livro I de Cortes, 7, fol. 63 (14th November 1387): sisas rendem 0 dicto ano pera dar 
todo ao dicto pera dar todo ao dicto senhor rey ou a sseu 98rto recado aos tempos sobredictos e que sse;a todo 
posto em aress de duas ou Ires chaues em l/ogares seguros como se hussam nos seus almoxarifsdos e que estes a 
que esto cometerem seiam os meihores homes e mais dias e melhores famas que ouuer em esda huum dos dictos 
con~eihos e que os dictos co~/hos possam arrendar. 
156 n, Chanc. Fernando I, Livro 3, fols. 1v-2, 2v, 10, 1Ov: 1373, Aug, 09, TT, Chane. Femando I, Livro 1, fols. 135-
135v (original em AML, Livro I de Serv~ a EI Rei, doc. 4). 
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accountable to the Contos. The negotiation for tax-farming was centralised by 
the Vedores da Fazenda and litigation thereof by the judges of the Contos, as 
had happened with the sisas imposed in 1382 by King Fernando.157 In spite of 
their tradition, the municipalities had no institutions able to deal with permanent 
revenues and the ad hoc appointment by all the Povos of a kingdom-wide 
'treasurer of the sisas would certainly have been a cumbersome alternative to 
the pre-existent state institutions.158 The perpetuity of the post-1408 sisas which 
had been formally granted for a specific end (the acquisition of lands to 
constitute the households of the infantes) and were put at the hands of an ad 
hoc treasurer is the ultimate example of the monarchy's free rein when it came 
to handle the subsidies received. 
Whilst there is no doubt that in constitutional terms the monarchy clearly 
won over the ambitions of the Povos regarding the sisas, there remained ample 
ground for negotiation with individual municipalities. It was not impossible for 
municipalities to divert part of the income of the sisas to offset their own debts. 
Porto got this privilege in 1460 on account of the city's impeccable credentials 
of serving the crown with men and monies.159 These cases notwithstanding, it is 
clear that the control of the expenditure was not an essential ambition of the 
Povos. The grievances presented to the Cortes aimed at the collection of 
revenues rather than at the receipt. In this field, the Povos managed to achieve 
some guarantees such as the prerogative of the municipalities to confirm the 
judge of the sisas (professional judges, paid with the profits of the sisa).160 In 
the Cortes of Lisbon/1439, the municipalities even obtained from the king that 
no coercive inspections could be used in the sisas.161 
Municipal control on the sisas was thus minimal. The monarchy achieved 
what it aspired to: the substition of the Direitos Reais by the sisas. Municipalities 
retained far more autonomy in the pedidos than in the sisas. In broad terms, as 
mentioned, a pedido could not be lightly demanded of the Povos and, unlike the 
sisas, was at times regarded as a last resort. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to 
157 TT, Chanco Fernando I, Livro 3, fols. 86v-91v (2O'h September 1383). 
158 The same can be said about the legal jurisdiction. Already in 1339 h is the royal court that judges a plea between 
the tax-farmer and the municipalhy (111 September 1339); Livro I de Mfsticos, no. 4, pp. 17-18. 
159 Gon~lves, I., As Finsf)9ss Municipais do Porto na Segunda Metade do S8culo XV, Porto, 1987, pp. 49-51. 
160 By special privilege, Lisbon in 1423 was entitled to appoint the scribe of the sisas, even n subject to the 
confirmation of the tax-farmer. AML. Livro dos Pregos, doc. 114, fl. 126v. 
161 See the letter of infante Pedro to the city of Coimbra on this matter, BACL, Sene Azul, C6dice 409, pp. 167-8. 
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regard the constitutional discussion on the pedidos in the second half of the 
fifteenth century as a whole and four distinct phases can be typified, using the 
explicit motives for taxation as depicted in Fig. 25. 
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Fig. 25 - Extraordinary Taxation, 1385-1525 
Sisas 1387 'double sisas 
Sisas & Pedido 1389 Defensive War 6,000,000 I. 
Sisas & Pedido 1390 Defensive War ? 
Pedido 1391 Defensive War 3,500,000 I. 
Sisas 1394 ? ? 
Pedido 1397 [Defensive War] 2 pedidos 
Sisas 1398 Defensive War 'double sisas 
Pedido 1398 [Defensive War] 2 pedidos 
Pedido 1399 ? 1,5 pedidos 
Pedido 1400 Defensive War 1,5 ped/dos 
Pedido 1401 [Defensive War] 2 or 1,5 pedldos 
Pedido 1404 Princely DowrylHousehold 1,25 pedidos 
Loan 1406 Acquisition of Silver 24,000,000 I. 
Sisas [permanent] 1408 Constitution of households 60,000,000 I. 
Loan 1416 Acquisition of Silver ? 
Pedido 1418 Defensive War (Castile) 1,5 ped/dos 
Pedido 1427 Princely DowrylHousehold 1,5 pedido 
Pedido 1429 Princely DowrylHousehold 1 ped/do 
Pedido 1436 Offensive War (Africa) 1,5 ped/dos 
Ped/do 1441 Acquisition of Silver 1 ped/do 
Pedido 1442 Offensive War (Castile) 1,5 pedidos 
Padido 1444 Offensive War (Castile) 2 pedidos 
Pedido 1445 Offensive War (Castile) 1,5 pedidos 
Pedido 1447 Princely DowrylHousehold 2,5 pedidos 
Pedido 1451 Princely DowrylHousehold 2 pedidos 
Pedido 1455 Princely DowrylHousehold 1,5 ped/dos 
Padido 1456 Offensive War (Crusade) 3 pedidos 
Pedido 1459 Annuities in arrear 300,000 dobr. 
(rejected) 
Ped/do 1460 Annuities In arrear 150,000 dobr. 
Pedido(?) 1465 Offensive War (Castile) ? 
Pedido 1468 Princely DowrylHousehold 60,000 florins 
Pedido 1473 Princely DowrylHousehold 50,000 dabr. 
Pedido 1475 Offensive War (Castile) 5 pedidos* 
Pedido 1477 Offensive War (Castile) 3 pedldos+ 
Padido 1477 Offensive War (Castile) ? (rejected) 
Pedido & loan 1478 Defensive War (Castile) 60,000,000 r. 
Pedido 1482 Payment of War Debts 50,000,000 r. 
Pedido & loan 1490 Princely DowrylHousehold 100,000 cruz. 
Ped/do 1502 Defensive War (Africa) 50,000 cruz. 
Ped/do 1525 1 cruz. 
Notes: 1\ • notional estimate; • • only 3 pedidos consented; + • only 2 pedldos consented; 
cruzado, a gold coinage, used as money of account valued at 400 r. 
Sources: Fig. 24 and sources cited there. 
182 Caetano, Marcello, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 111; 'pera manter a guerrd, Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 
301. 
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The first phase corresponds to the period of effective war against Castile 
(1385-1401). In this period, the pedido acquired its fiscal profile that it would 
retain for the more than a century. Indeed, in face of the quick and abrupt 
devaluations ordered by Joao I, the 400,000 I. granted in Coimbral1385 and 
probably again in 1389 were of little help. In the Cortes of Coimbral1391, Joao I 
demanded a fixed sum (3,500,000 I.) which ought to be shared amongst the 
various almoxarifados of the realm. The share of its almoxarifado was then 
allocated to the municipalities which organised the collection according to the 
regulations emitted by the crown.163 MuniCipal governments remained essential 
in this process because they had the instrument for assessment that they used 
for their own finances and for organising their military host.164 The efficiency of 
this design is proven by the fact that pedidos became standardised in the next 
century or so. 
The standardising of the pedido testifies how limited was the range of 
negotiations between the monarchy and the Povos, a factor which cannot have 
failed to promote consent. But it points to another powerful reason for the 
relative ease with which Joao I resorted to direct taxes. Although it involved a 
great deal of thrusts well into enemy territory and its outcome had been decided 
in 1385, this war could aptly be labelled by Joao I as one involving the 'defence 
of the realm'.165 War with the Castilian invader provided King Joao I with a self-
evident 'necessity' for demanding a string of one-year subsidies along with the 
sisas. Subsidies were the raison-d'etre for nearly all the Cortes convened in that 
period (Fig. 24). The frequency indicates that the Cortes were compliant to the 
royal demands but, on the other side, they discussed, or at least were informed 
of, the military and diplomatic plans before they committed to pay the pedido.166 
After the end of the hostilities and the definitive concession of the sisas 
between 1398 and 1401, pedidos became sporadic: four plus two loans in the 
163 See Henriques, 'Pedido, Gloss .. 
164 According to the instructions of the pedido stated that the annual income of individuals (the renda, lit. rent) rather 
than their wealth, was to the object of tax. The contribution of each individual In 1391 became a unit called the pedido 
and subsequent taxes were described as 'two pedidos' or as 'one and a quarter pedido.' 
165 The term 'defence of the realm' occurs in the Cortes of Coimbral1385, see Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 97; 
while In 1389 the pedido was intended 'to sustain the war' ('pera soportar 8 guerra') Sousa, As Cortes Medlevals, vol. 
I, p. 301. 
166 This Is clear in the well-documented Cortes of Braga/1387, Usbonl1389, Viseul1391, SantaremJ1396 and 
Coimbral1400 and SantaremJ1402; cf. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 297-325. It should be noted that there 
are no signs of direct influence of the Cortes on the decision tal<en by Joao I. 
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following three decades (1402-1435). However, despite the rarity of fiscal 
demands, the Cortes kept a relevant political role (see Fig. 24). In this respect, 
this period mirrored that of the 'old kings'. The difference was that instead of a 
rich domain, the monarchy could count on the permanent sisas (with an 
increased rate since 1408) and with the debasements. An old customary rule 
that was applied with the old kings, namely the wedding of infantes, provided 
the case for three of the four pedidos. By contrast, the busy military ventures in 
North Africa did not deserve a single extraordinary tax. 
It can be said that the first general tax held to finance royal offensive 
expeditions, the pedido and half of 1436 collected to finance the conquest of 
Tangiers, opened a new period. t67 This period had two distinctive features: the 
legitimate reasons for the pedido were enlarged in order to Include offensive 
war, against Christians and against Moors and the rules of assessment and 
collection became standardised after the pedido of 1436. 
The extension of the reasons acceptable for a pedido cannot be 
dissociated from the fact that, for political reasons, the Cortes met very often in 
this period.t68 Neither the acquisition of silver nor the financing of small scale 
military interventions in Castilian internal conflicts had before been 
contemplated with payments. As such, another defining feature of this phase is 
the intensity of the fiscal burden: in the twenty-three years between 1436 and 
1459, there were eight subsidies whose collection lagged on for fifteen years. 
However, the empowerment of the Cortes is not the only possible 
explanation for the intensity of taxation. The fast succession of pedidos between 
1441 and 1445 coincided with the mid-century blip in royal revenues. This Is 
especially clear in the pedido of 1441 for which there are four letters of acquittal 
in four almoxarifados (Abrantes, Guarda, Ponte de Lima and Torre de 
Moncorvo). Whilst the original purpose of the pedido was the acquisition of 
silver, in these districts only a quarter of the money found the way to the 
treasury.t69 Half of the revenue was employed in prerogative royal gifts (gr~a), 
187 The relatively small sum demanded, the traces of internal opposition to the plans and the mention to anti-tax 
'murmurs' in the chronicles of Rui de Pina all hint at difficutt negotiations. The Povos were unambiguously contrary to 
offensive warfare. BNP, C6dice 6969, p.554·5 (141" article prfiented at Leiria·Santareml1433). 




while 20% was diverted to offset standing redistributive payments, some of 
them in arrears. In Guarda at least 12% of the previous pedido (1436) was also 
channelled to permanent expenditure. The hypothesis that extraordinary 
taxation was employed to tap the crown's financial crisis has a good argument 
when one considers that in 1459 Afonso V summoned the Cortes to consent in 
a payment of 300,000 dobras, the equivalent to ten (I) pedidos, destined to pay 
arrears of his redistributive payments (casamentos and ten~as). As in the 
subsidies of 1436, 1441, 1442 and 1444, this was a motive that customary rules 
did not condone. This time, however, the Povos alleged that they were not due 
to pay this sum.170 
The negotiations that followed the refusal of 1459 started a new period, 
characterised by a growing tax burden and greater participation of the Povos in 
both the size and the apportioning of the fiscal burden (see Fig. 24 and Fig. 25). 
In the Cortes of Evoral1460, the Povos held their ground and offered no more 
than the same 150,000 dobras proposed in Lisbon. Further, the very grant of 
the subsidy was conditional. Although most conditions were indeed very 
favourable to the municipal representatives,171 the twelfth Is particularly 
relevant: Afonso V promised never to ask for pedidos again, except if he had a 
'reason' that could not be met by the ordinary revenues and that the Povo was 
due to pay.172 This largely unnoticed promise of Afonso V represented a 
constitutional defining moment because it evoked two criteria for the crown to 
resort to taxation: the duty of the Povo (defined by precedent and custom) and 
the shape of royal finances. Although there is no indication that this promise 
Torre de Moncorvo Abrantes Ponte d. Guards 0(%) 
Lima 
purpose of the pedido 0 56 56 0 28 
Grs~ 74 40 10 67 48 
Redistributive Payments • ten~s, 24 3 20,5 31 20 
moradias, assentamentos 
Africa 0 0 12,5 0 4 
other/unknown 2 1 1 2 1 
170 See the 3rd article presented at the Cortes of Lisbon/1459. TI, Cortes, ~ 2, doc. 14, fols. 22·39. The king's 
version of the discussions held in this assembley is summarised in the prologue to the instrument of the concession 
of the pedidoof 1460. BNP, C6dice 2639, fols. 91·97. 
t11 The 1()1h condnion forbade the king to concede te~s (annuHies) in case the finances did not allow ~; the 14th 
condHion forbade the monarchy to manipulate the municipal borders. 
172 'Item que nos nom Isncemos dsqui em diante pedido algum a nosso povo miUdo salvo em tal C8SO que com 
rSlom 0 posssmos fazer e 0 dito Povo 0 cleva pagat. BNP, C6d1ce.2639, fol. 95. 
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would not be called upon in later negotiations, it implied a different stance on 
royal finances. The previous discourse emphasised the Povos 'service' to the 
kings in times of need, inspired by the 'loyalty', 'love' or 'goodwill' towards the 
king.173 While this notion of the payment of the pedido as an undeniable service 
to which 'loyalty', 'love' or goodwill' bound the Povos would not disappear, after 
EvoraJ1460 debates on the legitimacy of extraordinary taxation revolved around 
the king's 'necessity', not of whether the Povos would perform their 'service'. 
In stark contrast to the previous phases, after Lisbon/14S9 and 
EvoraJ1460 a great deal of the pedidos involved negotiations on the sums to be 
paid and on the methods of collection. Even the pedidos demanded to pay for 
the expeditions against the traditional enemy that took place from 1475 
onwards, conveniently presented as acts of 'defence of the realm', had to be 
reduced by municipal opposition. When the threat of a Spanish counter-attack 
came, the monarchy demanded a huge effort from the Povos in the name of the 
'defence of the realm'. However, in the pedidoof the sixty-million of 1478,174 the 
Povos made a conditional acceptance: they would only pay the pedido if the 
privileged paid together with them, even if with different rates.175 Similarly, they 
forced the monarch to suspend all individual privileges of exemption from 
taxation. The same was attempted in 1481-2. In the pedido of 1478 a 
centralised professional structure headed by a high-receiver (recebedor-mor) 
and his scribe made its appearance. The wages of these officers were decided 
by a meeting of representatives of the Povos and were paid by each 
almoxarifado in proportion to the sums apportioned.176 The monarchy retained 
173 After Fernando I, there are few explicit discourses on the ideological foundations of extraordinary taxation. The 
two most explicit (by Regent Pedro in 23'd October 1440 and by the Povos in the instrument of concession of the 
sisasof 1408) both appealed to the 'goodwill' (RED, doc. 6; BACL, serle Azul, C6dice 409, fol. 148). 
174 Indeed, this sum was that paid by 'the pouoo que pedido sooe de paguar e a todollos prIuillegiados e vasallos'; 10 
million had to be paid by the 'grandes e fldalgos', 4,5 millions by the clergy and 4,1 million by the Jews, while 
Madeira had to pay 1,2 million and the remaining islands 200,000 r .. Pereira, Pa~o cia Madeira, p. 6. M. H. 
Cruz Coelho eLM. Duarte ('A Fiscalidade em Exerclcio: 0 Pedido dos Sessenta MilhOes no A1moxarHado de Louie', 
Revista cia Faculdade de Letras do Porto. HistOria, Vol. XIII, Porto, 1996, pp. 209-12) considered that this pedido fell 
short on the purported 60 million as in his letter of acquittal of the master-receiver (recebedor gera~ of the pedido 
was only accounted for 24,595,000 r., less than half of the 60 million and including the monies of the Jews. This 
opinion ignores the fact that the recebedor Pedro EstaQo is only acquitted of the money he effectively handled, as the 
local receivers could also be forced by the crown to defray some specific expenses with the monies collected. 
Indeed, sums of the receipt for some B/moxarifados are known: Coimbra (TI, Chane. JoAo II, Livro 3, fol. 104) 
SetUbaI (TI, Leitura Nova, Uvro 2 de Guadiana, fol. 195v) and Guirnaries (TI, LN, Leitura Nova, Uvro 3 de Alem 
Couro, fol. 112). 
175 Pereira, PBrtic~o cia Madeira, p. 6. 
178 TI, Chane. JoAo II, Livro 3, fols. 90 e 104 (letters of acquittal of 0i0g0~1ves and VasooGiI). 
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only the final accountability, which was trusted to the Contos and not to the 
commission elected by the Povos. 
Although the Povos proved unable to use their subsidies as a war-chest 
institutionally autonomous to the Direitos Rea is, the transfer of subsidies to the 
crown made the Povos more aware of the way the crown spent its revenues. 
Demands for tighter expenditure discipline that were voiced first during the 
Fernandine Cortes were heard again in the reign of Joao I. There is ample 
evidence that the elected monarch gave a few steps towards downscaling 
standing expenditure, after the end of the wars in the Counsel of Coimbra in 
1401 (see section 8.1). Yet, Joao I deemed necessary to merely summon his 
restricted counsel, rather than call the Cortes or promote an ajuntamento. The 
Cortes of Leirial1439, reunited to choose a regent, presented an ambitious 
limitation of expenditure that was accepted and, possibly, observed (see Infra 
subsection 8.3.3). 
The sustained growth of the burden of extraordinary taxation in the 1440s 
and 1450s (Fig. 25) would open the way to greater participation of the Povos in 
the fiscal ruling of the country. In this respect, the Cortes of Evoral1460 stood 
for a major change. The municipal proctors complained that the permanent 
rents of the monarchy were ill-spent and that the monarchy gave away too 
many annuities. These critiques were embodied in the conditions of the 
concession of the subsidy of 1460, in which Afonso V promised, albeit in vague 
terms, to 'moderate' his redistributive payments. Soon afterwards, a real 
ambition to design the financial policy by the Povos was manifested in the 
writing up of a separate group of twenty-two chapters called Da Fazenda COn 
Finance,).177 These constitute a wide program of reform aimed at controlling the 
crown's expenses item by item. Most of them set a rule for the crown to observe 
relating a particular type of expenditure: not accepting household members after 
January (article 69th), return of the subsidies to levels of Joao I (article 52nd) , 
abolition of annuities conceded by services in Castile, unless they were 
performed by members of the household (article 55th), etc. This set of chapters 
ended with a project of an audacious fiscal constitution stating that the all future 
expenses had to observe the limitations set by the Povos and that decisions on 
t77 n, Cortes, Mao<> 3, doc. 5, fols. 14v·25. See abridgments in Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, Votll, pp. 459-64. 
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expenditure taken in Cortes could only be suspended by other Cortes. 
However, Joao II was evasive and eluded most of the proposals. 
The chapters 'On Finance' would be followed in 1498 by more severe 
criticism of the expenditure of regular revenues along the same Iines.178 These 
would prove the apex of the intervention of the Povos in the finances. Indeed, 
their growing influence was halted under Joao II, Manuel I and Joao III as these 
monarchs seldom summoned the Cortes. While summoning the first Cortes of 
his reign in 1498 Manuel I declared that, while he needed, he tried to concile 
with the Povos the means to improve his rule, without asking for a subsidy.179 
Indeed, two years later, while preparing an attack on Morocco, Manuel I 
decided to borrow at interest, rather than venturing in the time-consuming and 
politically laborious negotiations for a pedido. In the words of the chancery 
registers of the contracts, 'while in need of a great sum of money, which could 
not be immediately assembled, and unwilling to impose upon his Povos neither 
fatigue nor oppression' King Manuel borrowed from his closer vassals.180 
178 Cort. Manuel I, vol. I, pp. 64·5. 
171 Cort. Manuel I, vol. I, p. 301. 
















Fig. 26 - Notional Burden of Extraordinary Taxes, 1385-1495 
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. After having been challenged by the authoritarian rule of King Fernando, 
the fiscal constitution of the old kings was to be overturned In the long war that 
marked the reign of Joao I. Under Joao I, the principles of royal taxation 
became so contrasted with those of two generations earlier that not even an 
author as erudite as Fernao Lopes could grasp the limitations on the royal 
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prerogatives of the 'old kings'. The oblivion of the old fiscal constitution was 
seemingly total. The finances of the 'old kings' were certainly recalled in the 
discourses brought to the Cortes, yet that was but an evocation of a mythical, 
perfect past, not a memory of a constitutional experience that once bound the 
monarchy. The death of the old fiscal constitution is not to be interpreted as a 
failure of the Povos. As the monetary context of the fifteenth century was totally 
different from that of the old kings, the interests of the Povos shifted and 
became closer to the monarchy. 
Even if limitations on coinage that had been so important in the thirteenth 
century were ignored, there was still a principle that embodied a fiscal 
constitution: the consent to kingdom-wide direct taxation. This principle, 
unknown in the time of the old kings stood throughout this period. However, the 
great difference between the 'old' and 'new' fiscal constitution lies in the 
institution that watched its observance. While in the fourteenth century, the 
crown required the institutional apparatus owned by the municipalities to 
operate within their spaces, in the post-war the monarchy did not seek the 
agreement of the conce/hos. The constant summoning of the Cortes and 
imposition of direct taxes had resulted in the invention of the realm as fiscal 
entity. This enabled the Cortes to negotiate with the monarchy and to use its 
faculty to consent to intervene in royal finances, even if tentatively. As 
elsewhere,181 the late fifteenth century was a period of fiscal innovation based 
upon ethical principles. In Portugal this period saw an Increasing intervention of 
the Povos in the shaping of the royal finances, namely by defining some 
principles of expenditure. The times of fiscal buoyancy, however, ended up with 
these attempts. 
By the late fifteenth-century, the death of bullion and the decision of Joso 
" and Manuel I of avoiding general taxes opened the way for an entirely 
different setting. Enjoying a buoyant fiscal situation, these monarchs tried to do 
without direct taxation and Cortes seldom met in their reigns. In forty years, no 
more than three subsidies were collected (Fig. 24). This resulted in the 
decrease of the popular intervention in the royal finances. For this reason the 
legal compilation of King Manuel, the Ordenay6es Manuelinas, claimed that 
1811senmann, 'The Holy Roma Empire,' pp. 263·71; Ladero Quesada,'castHe,' pp.190-194; Schofield, Roger, 
Taxation Under the Early Tudors, 1485-1547, Malden, 2004. 
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pedidos in the case of war and of royal and princely wedding were Direitos 
Reais.182 
182 Ordena¢es Manuelinas, Book II, title 15 § 3-4. 
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Chapter 7 - War and Royal Finances: a long-term perspective 
Chapters 5 and 6 have shown the role of End-of-Century Wars in creating 
fiscal and fiscal-constitutional settings that were totally different from those 
ruling the time of the old kings. The present chapter aims to show that, fifteenth-
century Portugal was also entirely different from the previous period in the 
sense that war, and war-related taxation, became far commoner than it had 
been under the 'old kings.' 1 Yet, the role of war is not that of a primum mobile. 
As argued for the period of the 'old kings,' state finances had a decisive 
influence on how, and on if, wars were fought. Section 7.1 will show how the 
End-of-Century Wars transformed the relationship between war and royal 
finances. Section 7.2 will show how far expansionist war was regarded as the 
king's rather than the kingdom's project. Finally, section 7.3 will point to the 
relationship between royal finances and military expansionism. 
Section 7.1 • The Sinews of War: Debasement and Grants 
The End-of-Century Wars terminated the long century of relative peace 
of the 'old kings,.2 Their sheer duration alone· these conflicts took place In 
1369-70, 1372-3, 1381-82 and 1383-1411 - made them highly significant affairs; 
but these clashes were not simply lengthier than those undertaken by the 'old 
kings'; they were starkly different and these differences stand for wide long-term 
consequences. The scarcity of surviving quantitative evidence should not 
prevent an analysis, albeit brief, of these conflicts on a fiscal perspective. 
The wars were fought with different strategic goals In sight and with 
wholly different tactics. As discussed, the bases of the grand strategy prior to 
1 The exposition of the military and political events and the wider context of the late fourteenth-century would be out 
of place in this dissertation. The period has recently inspired some important works in Portuguese military history: 
Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugaf, Monteiro, A/jubarrota. A Batalha Real, Lisbon, 2003; Monteiro, JoSo Gouveia, 'N, 
campanhas que Fizeram Hist6ria', in Sarata, Manuel Themudo and Teixeira, Nuno Severiano, eds., Nova Historia 
Militar de Portugsl, vol. I, lisbon, 2003, pp. 245-87; Martins, Miguel Gomes, Usboa e B Guerra. 1367·1411, Lisbon, 
2001. In English, there are the two extremely accomplished works by Sir P. E. Russell, The English Intervention and 
Prince Hemy. Chronological information is based in these works and those ~ited for Appendix 1. 
2 'End-of-Century Wars': this phrase that can be used as shorthand for two related «>nflicts, fernandine and the 
Independence or Interregnum Wars. 
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the Fernandine Wars have already been identified: limited warfare, opportunistic 
alliance with Castile and avoidance of extra-Peninsular commitments. Apart 
from the design of the border and some questions of relative hierarchy between 
the crowns, in the wars fought by Afonso III, King Dinis or Afonso IV, no 
structural antagonism between Portugal and Castile was at stake. By contrast, 
in the late fourteenth century wars were related to European conflicts. It is 
important to reiterate what many historians have concluded: the course of the 
Fernandine Wars was largely dictated by the main Anglo-French conflict. War 
and peace were decided according to the current state of the Portuguese and 
English alliance.3 These conflicts were innovative insomuch as, unlike previous 
cases, they were entangled with wider continental struggles.4 Fernando's father, 
Pedro I, avoided taking sides in the ongoing Anglo-French confrontation and 
successfully synchronised his political and military choices with the Castilian 
options. Avoiding taking sides in the major European conflict became difficult 
when a bitter dynastic struggle broke up in Castile damaging this country's 
remarkable diplomatic consistency.5 
Together with higher geopolitical objectives, the influence of Duguesclin 
and his Compagnies in Castile and, to a lesser extent, of the Earl of Cambridge 
in portugal led the old rivals to leave their old ways.6 Fernando I tried to lure the 
English might in support of its bid to be made king of Castile, while Joao I, after 
striving to obtain some military and diplomatic support. assisted John of Gaunt's 
3 Without the agreement of mutual help from England, the young Fernando would not break the favourable peace 
treaty of Alcoutim and start his second war, the most disastrous of the three. Similarly, the third war was a joint 
Anglo-Portuguese invasion to install John of Gaunt in the throne of Castile, by force of Fernando's tempting proposal 
in 1381. Russell, The English Intervention, p. 296-344. 
4 The two contenders for the throne of Castile were aligned with contrary diplomatic options: Pedro the Cruel was 
firmly allied to England, whereas his bastard brother Enrique of Trastamara depended on French, and to a lesser 
extent Aragonese, support. The eventual victory of the Trastamara tumed Castile Into a determinedly pro-French 
power and evaded for good the alliance with the Plantagenets, far too connected with the reign of Pedro the Cruel. 
This diplomatic domino affected the English crown. For the Plantagenets an entirely pro-French Peninsula would be 
a crucial strategic liability, given the sensitive position of Aquitalne and, furthermore, by the threat that the three 
Peninsular galley fleets combined would pose to the Insular kingdom. As sensibly more powerful Aragon had too 
much to lose in a struggle against France, Portugal became the only potential ally to edward III and Richard II. As 
soon as lancaster's non-attendance became clear, the negotiations between the Portuguese monarch and Castile's 
Juan I were precipitated. See Monteiro, 'As Campanhas que Fizeram a Hist6ria,' p. 260. The mechanisms of 
European balance of power did not operate In Isolation. During the reign of Fernando I, there was also Intemal 
pressure for war by the nobility which had already been felt by Pedro I. Nonetheless, without the elusive spectre of 
English collaboration, the pro-war faction in Portugal could hardly have persuaded the king Into aggression against 
Castile, which was solidly allied to France (see section 3.3). 
5 Afonso IV the grandfather of ill-fated King Fernando could claim the feat of assisting with his fleet the french crown, 
while keeping good relations with England. This diplomatic orientation would break when the civil war of Castile 
opposed two parties with wholly different views on external poJicy. 
II On the direct military influences of the English, see Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, pp. 87-88. 
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ambitions in Castile. In the second and third Fernandine Wars, the kings of 
Castile fought not to absorb Portugal but in order to force this kingdom to join 
the fold of the Franco-Castilian alliance and recognise the papacy of Avignon. 
These high-brow objectives called for incisive full-scale invasions in order to 
seize control of the country or at least of its external policy rather than the old 
'dodging wars'. 7 
In the grand strategy of the old kings, the densely fortified border had a 
key strategic role (see supra section 3.1). The dominance of fortification in the 
art of war meant that swift, broad strategic movements were unwieldy, except at 
sea. The rugged borderlands were the ideal ground for the 'dodging wars'. The 
grand, pan-European objectives that involved the End-ot-Century Wars 
changed the tactical landscape of the conflicts as they demanded more incisive 
attacks on the enemy land and for conquest rather than attrition. 
Under the 'old kings', that is to say from Afonso III to Pedro I, structures, 
both physical and institutional, were the real sinews of war. Naturally, financial 
strength was far from irrelevant. The gold and silver amassed in the royal 
treasuries assured that the money-intensive galley fleet could be sustained 
during long periods and finance offensive expeditions demanded by diplomatic 
commitments, like those by Pedro I. The treasury even allowed Fernando I, like 
Edward III of England to use Aragon in an attempt to fight a war-by-proxy 
against Castile.s Nonetheless, within the broad strategic concept of the 'old 
kings', money could hardly deserve to be called the sinews of warfare, as it 
would be in centuries to come. Ultimately, the capacity to lead the enemy into a 
stalemate did not depend on it. In case of aggression, municipalities were 
bound to serve their lord arms in hand and the border had the adequate 
institutional and physical structures to be defensible. The contla system assured 
that could the monarchy could summon without further investment a reasonable 
number of equipped knights distributed throughout the realm the unlikely event 
of a battle.9 
'In this context of war as continuation of diplomatic pressure, lisbon, the political centre of the kingdom, became the 
essential strategic target. It is symptomatic that Lisbon ltseH lacked proper fortHications, as the Second R3mandine 
War would show. Martins, Lisboa e a Guerra pp. 67·8. 
8 Russell, The English Intervention, pp. 154-65. 
I Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, pp. 23. 
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King Fernando's vain attempts to seize the throne of Castile challenged 
the military framework built by the old kings. Probably aware that the occupation 
of Castile would be far more money-intensive than the previous conflicts, 
Fernando I and his advisors ignored fiscal-constitutional tenets and issued a 
heavily depleted coinage during the first conflict. Widespread opposition barred 
the way to Fernando I who was forced to backtrack closer to the standard of the 
old kings. For his second and third wars Fernando sought subsidies in the form 
of sisas which should have allowed for a rough 50% increase in royal revenues 
(see supra section 5.1). In theory at least, the 400,000 I. provided by the sales 
taxes would suffice to pay the contias for the '3,000 or 4,000 knights' which 
despondent Fernando I expected to field in a looming battle against his 
Castilian counterpart in 1372.10 Indeed, Fernando I would have them in 1381 for 
the battle of the Caia (see infra Fig. 29). The pursuit of the decisive battle was 
also a novelty brought by the English and French to the Fernandine Wars and 
would have been an unfamiliar scenario for the cautious 'old kings. A battle 
required more knights, better gear and its strategic benefits were doubtful In the 
context of thirteenth-century and fourteenth-century 'dodging wars.' The 3,000 
or 4,000 knights to which Fernando I aspired would have been a lUxury for the 
'old kings.' 
The changes wrought in the Fernandine Wars continued throughout the 
Independence War, albeit with a crucial difference: while King Fernando 
ultimately failed to uphold this monetary policy (see supra section 2.2), Joao I 
benefited from the support of the Povos in his debasements. The elected king 
was free from the severe constitutional constrains that dictated the monetary 
policy of his predecessors, including Fernando I, and could debase the currency 
more or less unhampered by constitutional opposition (see supra section 6.1). 
Indeed, monetary manipulations would prove crucial in the war. 
The sisas also appeared with the wars. In their mid-fifteenth-century 
interventions in the Cortes, the Povos claimed that the sisas had been the 
backbone to the victory of King Joao. This claim encapsulated a specific 
constitutional view: the sisas were granted to the crown as a form of subsidlsing 
the defence of the realm and, as such, they ought to be abandoned by the 
10 Lopes, Cron. Fernando', chapter LXXII, pp. 251·5. 
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crown as peace had been obtained. However, this view, which became 
acquired wisdom amongst historians, does not hold when confronted with the 
primary sources. Paradoxically, the decisive victories of the war -notably, the 
resistance of Lisbon in 1383-4 and the battle of Aljubarrota (1385)-" were 
financed through more or less improvised devices; not by fiscal expediency. 
The die-hard defence of 1383-5 against a militarily stronger Castilian army 
called for radical means: extortion of subsidies, confiscation of goods, the 
melting of the churches' silverware, Jewish, ecclesiastical, municipal or traders' 
'spontaneous' grants and even hoaxing London merchants into providing 
loans.12 Of the particularly notorious list of expedients resorted to by the crown, 
debasement was the most important.'3 
Two casual references in Fernso Lopes's chronicle of Joso I suggest that 
at least some campaigns were subsidised by ad hoc debasements.'4 This 
hypothesis can be tested by comparing the dates of the issue of debased 
coinages with those of the military offensive operations.'5 In this respect, the 
recent works on the period's military history, the oft-quoted synthesis by M. 
Gomes Marques on Portuguese coinages and the already-quoted works on 
direct taxation provide solid scholarly foundations for this exercise. 
11 Usbon's resistance to a 4 months siege (May·September of 1384) and the defeat of the Juan I In A1jubarrota (14 
August 1385) practically ended with Castilian chances of victory in the conflict. Immediately afterwards, all the castles 
controlled by partisans of Castile in the centre of the country and around Usbon fell or capitulated, whilst a first 
Portuguese thrust into enemy territory took place in October. As military historian Gouveia Monteiro argues, the 
annihilation of the Franco-Castilian army at AJjubarrota aU but terminated Castilian chances of victory in the conflict 
(Monteiro, Aljuba"ota. A Batalha Real, p. 118-9). To use an outdated but eloquent expression, AJjubarrota was 
indeed a 'decisive battle' as henceforward the kingdom of Castile and leon would prove unable to launch any 
s~nW~ntoffensive. 
12 Monteiro, A Gue"a em Portugal, pp. 162-70. Russell, The English Intervention, pp. 369-73. 
13 In the initial stage Joao I considered the negative repercussions of the debasements and he is said to have said In 
1384 while the first debased coinage was minted, 'It is better for the country to suffer than to disappea~.lopes, Cron. 
JoBo " part 1, chapter XUX, p. 101. 
I. 'estas muda~s the fez fazer as n8Q6ssidades das guerras, que muitas vezes com elRel de Castle ouve' (lopes, 
Cron. JoBo " part 1, chapter XUX, p. 101): 'daquelas maedas aviao de fazer outra ni tam boa, de guisa que por sua 
multripicaQA ouvese ahy avomdo pera soldo das gemtes e das n8Q6S8r1as despesas' (lopes, Cron. JoBo " part 2, 
chapter III, p. 11). 
15 I have merely included offensive operations. By 'offensive' I do not include solely those aimed at Invading enemy 
land but also those organised to either ~t the invaders or to recover lost lands within the kingdom. In other words, 
those that implied some deal of central planning, rather than reactions to enemy operations or expedhions organised 
autonomously by border municipalities. 
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Fig. 27- The Financing of the Independence War, 1383-1401 
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Sources: Fig. 24; Monteiro, 'As Campanhas que Fizeram', pp. 264-282; HMMP, pp. 106-112. 
Fig. 27 shows that, albeit precise chronology on the coinage emissions is 
lacking as well as the exact period of collection of the pedidos, coincidence 
between debasements and military operations is marginally more frequent than 
that between these and subsidies. This observation hints at a peculiar 
mechanism of war finance. The insinuation by Fernao Lopes that military 
operations were funded by debased bullion minted ad hoc makes perfect sense 
when one considers how frequently new issues took place before military 
expeditions, as the years 1385, 1385, 1387 and 1396-8 hint. The relationship 
between subsidies and military expeditions seems less direct. Some subsidies 
are unrelated to the campaigns and when they anticipated actual operations It Is 
244 
doubtful that the monies collected were available to the paymasters of the 
campaign. Very likely, not a penny of the innovative pedido approved in the 
Cortes of Coimbral1385 which took place in April was at the disposal of Joao I 
in the decisive battle of Aljubarrota, three months later.16 
While, as Gouveia Monteiro put it, soldiers required cash,17 the 
assessment and collection of a pedido, let alone when held for the first time, 
were lengthy affairs. The sisas were only marginally better, as typically they 
were paid in three instalments, rather than two. In the contemporary mechanism 
of war finance, direct taxation appears to have had two roles: a) to provide a 
guarantee for delayed payments 18 or, more likely, ad hoc loans contracted to 
pay wages19 and b) to bring metal to the royal mint. In the first case, we could 
liken the grant of a pedido as the opening of a credit account in the name of the 
king destined at paying deferred payments. However, given the urgent need for 
soldiers' wages, it is more logical to think that subsidies were held to feed the 
furnaces of the royal mint.2o Indeed, the progressively thinner bullion coined by 
Joao I required appreciable quantities of silver and copper which could only be 
obtained through taxation. 
All in all, the argument of the Povos that Joao I sustained the wars with 
the sisas is misleading. The differing roles of direct taxes and debasement 
stand for a subtle difference in relation to other contemporary settings where 
wars were fought by diverting a growing proportion of the country's wealth to 
military purposes. In the present case, instead of increasing the revenue, Ireal', 
metallic costs were reduced. Ingenious as this method was for the monarch, it 
could have negative effects on many subjects, not least on some members of 
the nobility whose rents abruptly decayed with inflation.21 
16 According to Femao Lopes, the 400,000 I. obtained in the pedido of 1385 were destined to be 'munip/ied' into I. of 
weaker league (Lopes, Cron. Joao I, part 2, chapter III, p. 11). 
17 Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 163. According to the same author Joio I introduced the habit of paying in 
advance to the municipal crossbowmen uni1s (Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 60). 
18 In the instrument of grant of the s/sas of 1387, the Povos clearly affirm that the product of the s/sas was destined 
to 'pay what [the king] owed to his men' ('pagsr aquello que deuya a ssuas gentei) AML, Uvro I de Cortes, doc. 7. 
Ie See several examples of loans for wages in this period, Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal. pp. 167·8. 
20 This goal is not explic" in any of the pedidos collected during the war. However, this goal is explicn In peacetime 
loans of Joao I. That of 1406 was held to 'to men the coins of real de 3,51ms and to mint from" the r6al cruzados 
(pera se desfaz8r a moeda de tres livras 8 mea, e S8 tornar em cruzados de mta 8 cinquo soIdos). RED, doc. 6, p. 
SO. It can be presumed that that of 1417 was also used to obtain the silver for minting the new real de tfintB 8 cinco 
soIdos. PEP, pp. 156-7 
21 See OA. Book II. mle 59 §7.ln 1398, three leading nobles, Joio Rodrigues Pimentel, Gil Vasques da Cunha and 
JoSo Fernandes Pacheco, deserted Joio I to join Enrique III of Castile. This desertion, which brought along a few 
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The abrupt debasements started by Fernando I and continued by King 
Joao responded to new military circumstances. As Gouveia Monteiro has 
argued, the presence of state-of-the-art English and French hosts with better 
gear and more fluid organisation was instrumental in shaping a new approach 
to war.22 It was possibly under the influence of English 'indentures' that 
Fernando I from 1372 onwards contracted most of his nobles to provide a 
number of fully-armoured knights for which one of them a sum (contia) of 100 /. 
was assigned in the old Direitos Reais. These agreements became known as 
contias. The Fernandine contias meant a radical shift from older practices: 
henceforward, contias would be paid in the form of tenure of the lands, mainly 
municipalities.23 
Although little is known about these older contias or mara vedis, the 
Povos in the Cortes of LisbonJ1371 provide a crucial reference when claiming 
that the kings of old used to pay their privileges with monies from the treasuries 
instead of giving away municipal rents.24 This is confirmed by a complaint 
presented in the Cortes of Coimbral1398 by the nobles who claimed that lit 
never occurred in the times of the other kings that the lands granted to them 
( ... ) were in price of the contias.'25 A detailed study of the unpublished 
Fernandine letters of contia is obviously beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation. However, in the forty contracts recorded In the chancery books 2 
and 3 of Fernando I, referring to the period between November 1382 and 
September 1383,26 we confirm that in only one case the contia was to be paid 
key castles and a few hundreds of vassals, has been explained by the 'ingratitude' of Joao I towards these men and 
even to personal motives of some of them (Sousa, Bernardo Vasconcelos e, Os Pimentels. Percursos de uma 
Llnhagem Medieval Portuguesa. S8culos XII/-XIV, Lisbon, 2000, pp. 294-302). Nonetheless, h would be tempting to 
associate this collective shift of loyalty to the issue of yet another debased coin, the Real de 3,51ms that took place 
in that year (HMMP, p. 112) against which the nobles protested in Cortes 10A, Book II, title 59 §7). 
22 Monteiro, Joio Gouveia, Armeiros e Armazens nos Finais cia IcJade WKlia, VISeU, 2001, pp. 13·5. 
23 This term was used at least since the days of King Oinis to designate the standing annuhles received by 10me 
members of the nobility great and srnall (also called maravedis). Working within a synchronic perspective ('the ends 
of the Middle Ages'), neither Joao Gouveia Monteiro nor Rita Costa Gomes questioned whether there were 
institutional differences between the well-documented Fernandina and the little·known older contias or maravedis. 
Yet, as n will be argued, 
24 Cort. Femando I, vol. I, p. 131 (15th article of the Cortes of Leirial1372). This grievance is repeated In the Cortes of 
Lisbonl1389. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, p.231. 
25 Holding lands as contia' 0 que nunca foi em tempo dos outros Reyx, Be nom clas Terras, de que Iha fazia6 mefC8, 
aviam-nas isentas, e nom em fX890 das conthas.' OA, Book II, title 59 §22. 
2e TI, Chane D. femando I, Uvro 2 (from fol. 95 onwards) and Uvro 3 (integral). 
246 
by assigning monies to a local officer.27 All the remaining contias were paid by 
transferring the administration of municipalities to the vassals.28 
The concession of revenues without the intermediation of the royal 
administration is an essential detail. Indeed, as complains in Cortes declare and 
as we can confirm by other means, the concession of a municipality to a noble 
opened the door for more pressure on the local resources. There are multiple 
instances of this. In Braganza, held by Joao Afonso Pimentel from the days of 
Fernando I to 1402, the 2,700 I. paid since 1253 by the villages of the 
municipality were multiplied and, furthermore, the tenant collected extraordinary 
tributes.29 The tenure of some small municipalities from Beira granted by Joao I 
to the Coutinho family resulted in the trespassing of their old fiscal privileges by 
the greedy tenants.30 An undated law of Joao I also indicates that the tenants 
and prelates collected subsidies and general taxes in the lands granted to 
them.31 
By giving municipal administration away to the nobles, Fernando 
apparently solved two problems simultaneously: the contia would be met, or 
even added up, by the local revenues and nobles would be placed In the 
frontier.32 Nonetheless, by doing so, Fernando I shattered the system built In the 
reign of King Dinis.33 As the rents and powers in specific territories were given 
to leading vassals as payment of their contias, tenure overcame custody again. 
Royal administration no longer screened the municipal taxpayers from the 
nobility. The concession of municipalities in order to pay for the contias was In 
stark opposition to previous practices, as the Povos reminded the King.34 No 
informed speculation can produce any sort of numerical evidence, but chancery 
21 The contis of Vasco Lourenyo de Ura was payable In the warehouse of the Almoxsrlfado of Porto. TT. Chane. 
Fernando I. Livro 3. fol. 55v. 
28 Not all lands granted as contiss were municipalities. There are cases of individual villages and large estates given 
as contiss. TT. Chane D. Fernando I. Uvro 2 (from fol. 95 onwards) and Uvro 3 (Integral). 
28 See the opression of the men of Braga~ caused by the tenure of Joio Afonso Pimentel In Sousa. Os Pimenteis. 
pp.296-8. 
30 Fernando I had already issued laws preventing the abuses of the nobles (See Law of 1375. OA. Book II. title 63 
§2-14). In 1389. the Povos asked the monarch to forbid the tenants to collect pedidos In the lands granted by the 
crown and to forbid their prises (5" and 28" article of Usboall389; BACL. serie Azul. C6dice 410. fols. 78-80). See 
also the pleas on 'innovation of custom' between the municipalities of Tavares (14 December 1426) and Sernancelhe 
(26 June 1430). TT. Gaveta VII. ma~ 7. doc. 7 and Go~1o Vasques Coutlnho. TT.-Gaveta XIV. ma~ 3. doc. 13. 
31 PEP, p. 27, OA, Book V, title 95 § 1-3. 
32 Tavares. 'A Nobreza no Reinado de Fernando I,' p. 65. 
33 For a case of transmon from royal custody to noble tenure in 1385-6. see Henriques. 0 Rei 6 a T6rra. pp. 153-63. 
34 Cort. Fernando', vol. I, p. 125. 
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registers of King Dinis, Afonso IV and Pedro I virtually ignore grants of 
municipalities. According to the municipal representatives in the Cortes of 
Lisbon/1371, grants to the nobility ought to be paid in money by the fiscal 
administration, as it had been done under the old kings, and not by giving land 
away for his vassals.35 
There is another difference between the old and the new contias. From 
the brief description provided by Fernao Lopes,36 it becomes clear that the 
military nature of the old contia was less pronounced. According to the 
chronicler, the value of the contia was defined by birth and the sons of vassals 
were entitled to these payments from their craddle, irrespective of their age. At 
least until Pedro I, the contia remained the preserve of nobles.37 By contrast, 
the Fernandine contia established a contractual relationship, as Imminent, 
effective military service was exchanged for a given sum, regardless of the 
nobility of the recipient. Moreover, while under the Fernandine system, the 
vassal had to bear the cost of the equipment, in the old contia, the horse and 
armour were provided by the king and had to revert to the crown by the death of 
the vassal. These features show that the rationale of the old contia was to 
provide the means for the military capacity of the nobles. By contrast, hard-
pressed Fernando I aspired at reinforCing his own military capacity by 
externalising the costs of equipment. In short, the redistributive nature of the 
contia was attenuated and the emphasiS shifted to military efficiency. 
The Fernandine contias and their military context implied a profound 
change within the nobility. Historians of the nobility, like Mattoso and 
Vasconcelos e Sousa, highlighted the 'professionalization' and 'militarisation' of 
the Portuguese nobles in the reign of Fernando 1.38 The Fernandine program Is 
particularly clear in one chapter of an ordinance issued in 1374. Considering 
that 'the honour of nobility was given in exchange for the responsibility of 
defending one's land of birth', the king determined that the nobles who did not 
receive contias from the king or from a vassal would lose their privileges and 
35 See on this the 43rd article of the Povos presented at Lisbon/1371.Cort. Fernando, vol. I, p. 35. 
36 Lopes, Cron. Pedro I, chapter XI, pp. 49-51; see also comments by J. Gouveia Monteiro (A Guerra em Portugal, p. 
35) and R~a Costa Gomes (The Making of a Court Society, p. 223, note55). 
37 Lopes, Cron. Pedro I, chapter I, p. 8. 
38 For a concrete case in Joao Afonso Pimentel, see Sousa, Os PimentBis, pp. 285·302. 
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had the same obligations as the municipal men.39 Besides being an attempt to 
curb the numbers of the privileged within municipal lands, this order can be 
seen an attempt to mould all nobles into fighters. Moreover, Fernao Lopes is 
very clear in how Fernando I and his wife attracted the 'best' of the municipal 
men to become either their direct vassals or to enter the service of their direct 
vassals.40 In other words, Fernando I sought to merge the notions of 'knight', 
'vassal' and 'noble'/fida/go: all knights had to be vassals to the king and all that 
served the king as vassals were ipso facto noble. 
The dismantling of the 'old king's' redistributive system brought by the 
Fernandine Wars continued during the wars sustained by Joao J. In the first, 
uncertain years of his rule, when few nobles were on this side, Joao I abolished 
the contias.41 During the decisive years, noble military service became purely 
stipendiary.42 After a brief interval, in which diminished contias were paid,43 the 
reign of Joao I saw the consolidation of the stipendiary relationship between the 
king and his fighters, notably his knights.44 In 1398, answering to the complaint 
that the conti as were small and that they did not respect the nobility's Internal 
hierarchies, like the old kings had done, Joao I answered that he paid his 
contias according to the number of men-at-arms and not according to the 
rank.45 The Povos adverts in the Cortes of 1408 and 1410 show that the crown 
no longer paid the contias by then and in 1427 it is said those payments had 
disappeared 'long since'. 46 Unlike the 'old kings' who kept paying the contias 
during peacetime, Joao could not bear the costs of paying them.47 
39 OA, Book IV, title 26 §S. The nobles are referred to as 'fidalgos naturaees.' 
40 Lopes, Gran. Femando, chapter LXV, pp. 228·9. 
41 Lopes, Gran. Joao I, vol. I, chapter CXXVIII, p. 295. 
42 This is an understandable decision, given that debasement provided means to pay for wages and that a war· 
ravaged and divided country could hardly have produced the necessary revenues for the contias. It should however 
be noted that Joao I continued to grant lands and rents to the nobles; however, this patronage aimed at political 
cooperation and had no direct relationship with mHitary service. 
43 The interval is between 1387 and, at least, 1402. In 1387, when the military initiative was firmly In the hand of the 
Portuguese and when more nobles had joined the ranks, Joao I renewed the contias and the system was still 
working in 1398 (as revealed in the grievances presented by the nobles In the Cortes of 1398, OA, Book II, title 59 
§24). The 1401 decision of the monarchy to store 4,060 Individual arrnours for Its 'vassals' can be Interpreted as a 
continuation of the contia system (Lopes, Gran. JoBo I, II, chapter CC). They can be deemed 'diminished' because 
while Pedro I and Fernando I paid between 100-150 I., 1188-1782 Ag 9 In metal terms, per knight, Joao I after 1387 
paid 400 I. (max. 305 9 Ag) with about 14 of the purchasing power. 
44 Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 43. 
45 OA, Book II, titJe 59 §24. 
45 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, pp. 261, 265, 281.AJso, Chane. Duarte I, vol. III, doc. 491, p. 351. 
47 It is Indeed striking that the sole estimate for the contias, dating from 1402, has h that these were equivalent to 
9.9% of the total revenue. Considering that In 1402, there were 4,080 knights due to set\I8 the king and that the 
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The claims of historians of nobility and of warfare about the consolidation 
of the stipendiary relationship in Portugal, along with the general trend in 
Europe, have not been yet quantified. In contemporary Aragon, as studied by 
Jorge Saiz Serrano, the military service was increasingly well-paid and offered a 
real opportunity to partake in the crown's growing fiscal capacity.48 While 
evidence for wages of Portuguese soldiers are sparse and unsystematic, it is 
still possible to group some disparate cases of the flat wages paid to 'mounted 
and well-equipped' men-at-arms from 1369 to 1514 (Fig. 28). 
Fig. 28 - Men-at-Arms Wages, 1369-1514 
Year Context Monthly gAg Purchasing 
Wages (approx.) Power 
(Wheat Units) 
1369 Royal Expedition, Castile 45/. 390 90 
1386 Royal Expedition, Castile 300 I. 382 41 
1415 Royal Expedition, North Africa 700 I. 15 2 
1437 Royal Expedition, North Africa 100 r. 26 11 
1438 Garrison, Ceuta, North Africa 83 r. 22 8 
1472 Garrison, Tangiers, North Africa 100 r. 12 5 
1474 Defence of the Border, Castile 210 r. 25 11 
1506 Garrison, North Africa 200 r. 20 5 
1511 Garrison, Safim, North Africa 185 r. 18 6 
1511 Garrison, Ceuta, North Afrcia 350 r. 34 12 
1514 Garrison, Indian Ocean 100r. 10 3 
Notes: Soldiers stationed in North and East Africa garrisons had free rations; In order to ease 
the distortion caused by 'good' and 'bad' agricultural years, the purchasing power relates to the 
average of the previous five years' prices, as In Fig. 24. 
Sources: For wages: 1369 - Lopes, Gran. Femando I, chapter XXXVI, p. 119; 1386 - Lopes, 
Cron. Joao I, part 2, chapter LXV, p. 168; 1415 - MH, vol. II, doc. 57, p. 136; 1438 - Duarte, 
Livros dos Conselhos, doc. 42, pp. 169-70; 1472 - DP, vol. III, doc. 82, p. 110; 1474 - Chaves, 
Livro de Apontamentos, doc. 3, p. 51; 1506 - Re/azione, Prologue; Cosme, JoAo, A GUBm~o 
de Safim em 1511, Lisboa, 1994, p. 138. 1511 (Ceuta) and 1514 (India) - Santos, JoAo 
Marinho dos, A Guerra e as Guerras na Expansao Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1998, p. 277; for silver 
weight: HMMP and Dias, Joao Alves, A Maeda, Marques, A. H. de 0., ed., Portugal do 
Renascimento a Grise Dinastica, Lisbon, 1998, pp. 254-76; purchasing power: calculated from 
the wheat prices in Marques, Introdu9Bo a Hist6ria da Agrlcultura, pp. 214-23. 
value of the contia four years earlier was 2,000 I., the result would be 8,120,000 I., a tenth of the crown's revenues by 
them Lopes, Cran. Joio I, part 2, Chapter CC. 10% was roughly the average yearly expenditure with North Africa 
(see infra section 8.3.1) 
41 Sail, Guerra y Nobleza, pp. 646-8. 
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The data are far from serial and values differ according to circumstances 
(Indian Ocean garrisons had a decent possibility of prizes; those in the desolate 
outposts of North Africa did not). Yet, when read diachronically, the values of 
Fig. 28 make manifest that the value of military wages in the fifteenth century 
strongly decayed. The lavish wages paid by a still wealthy Fernando I in his first 
war, presumably reflecting the custom of the 'old kings,' make for a perfect 
contrast with the meagre wages of the North African garrisons. Giving these 
figures, it is hard to conceive the military nobility as benefiting from stipends 
and, consequently, as a vested interested pushing the monarchy for military 
ventures. 
The institution of stipendiary service and the militarisation of the nobility 
were accompanied by wide changes of the municipalities In their military 
dimension. As argued, under the old kings, war was a potential burden for the 
towns of the realm, either in the form of summoning of their municipal militia or 
in the form of extraordinary 'services' in lieu of direct military participation. In the 
municipal tradition subsidies, notably the sisas, were in themselves a 'service' 
to the king and, as such, they could be understood as payments In lieu of 
military service (see supra section 5.1). Fernandine Wars disrupted this 
alternative by imposing these two burdens simultaneously on the Povos. When 
discussing for the first time the concession of the sisas to the king in the Cortes 
of Leiria of 1372 the Pavas claimed that the payment of the slsas made little 
sense as they sustained the war effort by fighting and, through debasements 
and purveyances, by paying.49 Under Joso I this burden did not disappear, only 
became constitutionally legitimate for in the very Act of Election written in the 
Cortes of COimbraJ1385 the Povos agreed to uphold the regal status of Joso I 
with blood and monies (see supra section 6.1). Indeed. at least In the well· 
known cases of Lisbon and Porto, municipal service made a significant military 
contribution in the decisive years of 1383.7.50 
After the decisive early fighting, military and financial services became 
again mutually exclusive. By granting the sisas to the monarchy in 1387, the 
Povos obtained a great reduction of their military obligations. Indeed, the 
49 Cort. Fernando I, vol. I, p. 126. 
150 Ct. The case of Lisbon in Martins, IJsboa e B GusmJ, pp. 52-4. 
251 
instrument that granted the sisas in 1387 explicitly exempted the military 
contribution of the municipality, unless a full-scale invasion materialised.51 This 
can be read as a response to the complaint voiced by the Povos in the Cortes 
of Elvas/1372 that the Povos both fought for and paid for the defence of the 
realm. The division between fighting nobles and tax-paying municipalities 
represented a clear break from the military past of the Portuguese towns and 
cities and from their self-concept of collective vassals to the king. This 
separation derived clearly from the Fernandine attempt to sharply distinguish 
his vassal-knights from the rest. However, the 1387 grant of the sisas did not 
abolish the quantia and the Castilian threat was not yet totally extinguished. 
Indeed, as it will be explained, the end of municipal collective service did not 
result in the simple exclusion of the municipal men from warfare. The 
relationship is singularly more complex. 
The military concerns that led the crown to develop armed service among 
the nobles led to similar attempts within the municipalities. As it will be 
remembered, municipal membership implied the participation In the war with 
onerous equipment according to the wealth, as set in the quantia system (see 
supra section 3.3). Thanks to the research of Miguel Gomes Martins It Is 
possible to obtain a notional evolution of the quantia that defined the liability to 
horse ownership in Lisbon until 1418 (Fig. 29). 
Fig. 29 - Minimal Qusntis to Own 8 Mount applied In Lisbon, 1317-1418 
Nominal GofAg Purchasing Power 
(Wheet Units) 
1317 1,000 I. 11,080 4,000 
1367 900 I. 9,972 1,800 
1390 10,000 I. 7,640 2,857 
1396 10,000 I. 2,070 1,428 
1397 10,000 I. 1,620 
1415 100,000 I. 2,200 317 
1418 32 marks of Ag 7,344 1,600 
61 AML, Livro I de Cortes, no. 7, fol. 63. It should be noted that exception was made for specialist units, as bowmen 
and galley mariners, and unequipped infantry. tv. such, the exemption served the interests of the municipal elites. 
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Notes: notes at Fig. 28 apply; the quantia in 1415 is not specific for Lisbon as it was applied 
kingdom-wide. 
Source: nominal values - Martins, Lisboa e a Guerra, p. 23 and, for 1415, MH, vol. II, doc. 57, p. 
136; metallic equivalences - HMMP, purchasing power calculated from the wheat prices in 
Marques, IntrodufBo a Hist6ria da Agricultura, pp. 214-23. 
The evolution of the quantias, although fragmentary, is eloquent about the 
difficulties caused by the state of war combined with debasement and inflation. 
As is clear, the men forced to own horse became considerably poorer in both 
metallic and purchasing terms than they had been in the early decades of the 
fourteenth-century. Liability to free military service became more widespread. 
This enlargement had a direct military rationale which was served in two ways: 
by boosting the numbers of municipal cavalry and by inducing men to join the 
ranks of the nobility. Indeed, the enlargement of mounted military service added 
up to a tendency that had started in the early days of the Fernandine Wars: the 
exodus of men from the onerous municipal condition to the ranks of the nobles 
hosts as waged fighters or even as vassals.52 This is clearly stated In the 
grievances presented at the Cortes of Coimbral1385 and continued throughout 
the wars. The tendency was already felt in the second Fernandine Wars, as 
revealed in a 1373 ordinance analysed by J. Gouveia Monteiro.53 It was still a 
reality in 1398.54 The propensity of the municipal knights to join noble service 
was economically rational: as they were forced to keep horses and weapons, 
joining a noble military retinue or serving in the wars represented an opportunity 
to profit from these unwanted possessions. 
The converging changes in the military profile of the aristocracy and of the 
municipal oligarchies led to the progressive Identification between fighters, 
vassals of the king and nobles. While legal and administrative vocabulary is not 
entirely coincident, with the words 'vassal', 'knight' and 'noble' ('ida/go) keeping 
their distinctive undertones,55 fifteenth-century Portugal saw the consolidation of 
52 In the 1385 Cortes of Coimbra, one article complained against the exemption of municipal dues by those who 
joined the noble retinues (acostados). In the reign of JoAo I these complaints became regular In the Cortes whose 
deputies called for the control of the number of vassals. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, p. 225. For the 
continuation of the exodus, see Monteiro, A Guerra em Portuga~ p. 57. As mentioned, Fernando I himself took some 
high-profile members of the municipalities and made them his vassals. lopes, Cion. Fernando, chapter XXXIX, pp. 
228-9. 
53 Monteiro, A Gue"a em Portugal, p. 35. According to Gouveia Monteiro, The seml-autonomous companies formed 
as a consequence of the prolonged state of war drawn their men both from municipalities and from vassals. 
6' OA, Book II, title 59 §21 and §26. 
&6 Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, 'A Estrutura Social e 0 seu Devir'. in Marques, • A. H. de Oliveira Marques, ed., Portugal 
do Renascimento a Crise Din8stica Lisbon, 1998, pp. 290-301. 
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an aristocratic military class very different from the old contia-earning nobles.56 
Chronicler Zurara famously portrayed the young men who felt disheartened by 
the peace treaty of 1411 and wondered how they could earn their means and 
honour.57 All in all, the different factors referred to above contributed towards 
the post-war swelling of the number of vassals, that is to say those who served 
the king with horse and armours (Fig. 30). 
Fig. 30 - 'Vassals' Serving the King, 1372-1483 
Battle of Chao de Couce (1372) <3,000 
Battle of Caia (1381) c.3,OOO 
Battle of Aljubarrota (1385) 2,000-2,500 
Muster in Valariya (1386) 4,500 
Muster in Evora (1396) 4,000 
Muster in Ponte de Lima (1398) 4,000 
Siege of Valencia (1400) 4,000 
Ordinance of 1401 4,400 
Before Ceuta (c. 1414) 4,685 
Siege of Ceuta (1415) 5,385-
Siege of Tangiers (1437) 3,500Q 
Expedition in Castile (1445) 2,000 
Battle of Alfarrobeira (1449) 4,000 
Expedition in North Africa (1463-4) 2,000 
First Attack on Castile (1475) 6,000 
Muster of Pedra Boa (1476) 5,600 
Battle of Toro (1476) 3,500 
Ordinance of 1483 2,000 
Siege of Azemour (1513) > 5,000 
Notes: bold - ordinances, thus only counting nobles; • • including 700 newly-raised vassals to 
the category;!! • only a part of the 3,500 summoned for the campaign in Tangiers actually 
embarked. 
Sources: 1372 - Lopes, Cron. Femando I, chapters LXXII; 1381 • Cron. JoAo I, part 1, chapter 
LXX; 1385 • Monteiro, Aljubsrrota, p. 98; 1386-1402 - Cron. Joao I, part 2, chapters CLX, 
CLXVII, CLXXXIII, CCIII; 1414 and 1415 - MH, vol. II, doc. 57, p. 135; 1436 - MH, vol. V, doc. 
104, p. 208; 1437 - MH, vol. VI, doc. 27;1445· RED, doc.6, p. 68; 1449 ·1449 - Monteiro, 'Organjz~o e 
Forma~o Militares,' p. 207; 1463-4 - Rui de Pina, Cr6nies de Dam Afonso V. chapter CXLVlI, p. 21; 1476 -G6is, 
Oaimao de, Chronica do Prin9ipe Dom loam, Graca Almeida Rodrigues (ed.) Lisbon, 1977, Chapter l, p. 117. 
Duarte" Nova Historia Militar, pp. 375-390; 1475-BA-22-X· 51, fois.119-119v; 1483· PEP, doc. XXXIV; 1513 
56 'Vassal' denoted the receiving of contla. In 1439, the privileges of reform are given to a non-noble and ft Is explicitly 
said that he would still be ranked as a 'vassal whom we give contlas.' even W contlas were non longer given. 
Ms"ocos, vo!.I, doc. LVI, p. 86. 
57 Russell, Prince Henry, p. 40. 
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- Geis, Oamiao de, Cr6nica do Felicfssimo Rei Dom Manuel, part 3, J. M. Teixeira de Carvalho and 
David Lopes (eds.) Coimbra, 1926, chapter XLVI, p. 164. 
Fig. 30 shows to what extent, Fernandine efforts to boost the number of 
knights would set a trend. According to Fernao Lopes, in 1372 Fernando I 
complained that he was not able to field the '3,000 or 4,000 knights his honour 
required:58 In 1386, by contrast, Joao I, after his initial victories, mustered 4,500 
cavalry, without paying contias. Three decades later, the monarchy was able to 
embark around 5,000 across the Strait of Gibraltar, along more than the double 
of foot soldiers. By the early sixteenth century, such grand expeditions were still 
possible. The growth of vassals should be ascribed to the wars. Indeed, the 
lowering of the quantias made military capacity more common across SOCiety. 
Moreover, North African campaigns and, most of all, the continuous war 
sustained by its garrisons led to more frequent knighthoods (and privileges 
thereof) by means of military prowess. For such reason, Joao II voiced a 
concern that would never cross the mind of the 'old kings' when he claimed In 
1482 that 'most people in this realm are knights, a circumstance which was both 
disrespectful for that order [of chivalry] and detrimental to our service:59 
However, unlike Fernando presumably intended these forces were not 
self-sufficient. Like the 'old kings', these men had part of their equipment 
subsidised by the monarchy. As Gouveia Monteiro documented, after the 
conquest of Ceuta, the Portuguese monarchy extensively bought weaponry, 
including fire weapons, from Flanders.50 During the fifteenth century, both 
Duarte I (in 1436) and Joao II (1483) attempted to renew the contias system 
and provide plate armour to all noble knights.61 
Recently, Sir Peter Russell wondered on how a country with short 
manpower and resources like Portugal could sustain an aggressive, money-
intensive imperial expansion from 1415 onwards.62 Assuming that the first 
premises are correct, part of the answer lies in the combination of cheap price 
58 Lopes, Cran. Fernando I, chapter LXXII. 
59 Monteiro, Armeiros e Armazens. 
eo 'A mor parte da gente destes reinos sam csualejros 0 que stem de se, menosprfJ90 da dlta ordem, he cousa de 
grande deseruico nosso.' Chaves, Livro de Apontamentos, p. 170 (draft of a letter to the captains In North Africa, 
dated 1482). 
61 There were paid from 1387 until at least 1401. Lopes, Cron . .IoBo', part I, Chapter CXXVIII, p. 285, part II, cllapter 
eel, pp. 245·7; OA, Book II, title 59 §24, 
&2 Russell, Prince Henry, p. 30. 
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and abundance of military labour framed by a tight cohesion between the 
monarchy and his knights. Expensive wages and exclusive quantias meant that 
war under the old kings was more capital-intensive. By contrast, cheap wages 
and inclusive quantias made war far more affordable to the monarchy. To add 
up, absence of contias made permanent costs even lighter. This did not deter 
the military because they regarded service as a means of social advancement. 
This combination would be a sufficient cause for more frequent warfare; a 
trigger-happy monarchy would provide the necessary cause. 
Section 7.2 - 'Smoke in the Air' 
'It is rather small profit to hoard in our treasuries one or two hundred 
millions [I.], such is the wealth of this land, as these monies have a sort of 
gunpowder in them so that with the Slightest hint of war or festivities or the such 
they smoke into the air, leaving nothing but their dirty bags.'63 Thus did Infante 
Joao dismiss the financial objections raised against further crusading warfare in 
Morocco in an epistolary advice to his royal brother Duarte lin 1432 or 1433.64 
Money was not the problem. Not that Joao was eager to pursue the conquest: 
his advice, elegantly balancing the theological, legal, strategic and financial 
issues surrounding the project and without a clear, decided verdict, Is all but an 
exhortation to war. Simply, to the thoughtful infante, heavy expenditure should 
not be regarded as a major problem; whatever the decision, monies were 
destined to 'smoke in the air.' 
Infante Joao's stance hints at a total inversion of the approach to finance 
displayed by the pre-Fernandine kings whose dynastical treasury was 
transmitted and accrued in each royal succession. In his will of 1322, King Dinis 
bequeathed to his successor the treasury he accumulated for 'the defence 
against the enemies of the faith.'65 The accumulation of these treasuries 
suggests that fourteenth-century Portuguese kings regarded military monetary 
resources as difficult to renew. Considering the high wages and the cost of a 
83 'He assaz pequeno proueito ler em nosos thesouros 9fnlo ou duzentos contos que he a ,;queza clests te"a, 
porque polo azogue que ests moeda tem com hum pouco de foguo d'emborllho de guerra ou de festas ou outras 
cousas seme/haueis asy se uayem fumo que a/ dela non fica senon os sacos ~.' See Duarte, King of Portugall, 
'Resposta ( ... ) polo Jfante Oom YohAo', Livro dos Conselhos de e/-rel D. Duarte {Livro da Cartuxa}, ed. Joio Alves 
Dias, lisbon, 1982, p. 47. See Comments in English by P. E. Russell in Prince Henry, p.139. 
84 On the context and the underlying debates, see Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 137·140. 
e5 Provas, YoLl, part 2, doc. 11, p. 130. 
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fleet of galleys paired to Castile it appears natural that they thought so. The 
speed by which Fernando I, as Lopes intently highlighted, dissipated the 
treasury patiently hoarded by his predecessors in his first two wars with Castile 
testifies this.66 By contrast with the old king, as far as we can gauge from their 
wills, neither Joso I nor his successors strove to constitute a treasury; rather the 
opposite: most of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century royal wills were concerned 
on how outstanding debts were to be paid.67 In the death of Joso I in 1433, 
there were still allusions to the monies he owed from the Ceuta expedition, 
eighteenth years before. Afonso V, for instance, left about two-thirds of the 
annual revenue, 50,000,000 r., of debts at his death in 1481.68 In his will of 
1495, Joso II still had to put aside 4,000,000 r. per annum to pay for his father's 
debts contracted in the invasion of Castile.69 
The end of hoarding is a defining feature of the 'new kings.' 'Silver famine' 
and the monetary situation were perhaps strong factors behind this. The 
debasements wrought by Joso I cannot have failed to alter the monarchy's 
attitude towards hoarding. Not only were the 'old kings' bound to the fiscal 
constitution but also they actively favoured the minting of solid gold and silver 
coinages destined for hoarding. With thin silver content and fickle purchasing 
power, corrupted fifteenth-century bullion was unfit for that purpose. This 
strength of the 'new kings', free-hand in coinage manipulations, was also a 
weakness, as it made unwise to store up monetary reserves. It cannot fail to 
have given 'new kings' a sense that monetary resources were easily renewable, 
as the light-hearted comment of the infante Joso hints at. Full authority In the 
constitutional acceptance of coinage manipulation (see section 6.1) made the 
decision to declare war easier in two ways: first, because it supplied the 
monarch with ready funds with the political negotiation and the morosity of the 
pedidos; second, because it did not gravely affect the sisas and, thus, ordinary 
royal income. 
Deciding war and peace remained a firm prerogative of the monarchs, 
even if complaints against it can be found in the articles of the Povos from the 
time of Fernando I to Joso II. Participation of the Cortes in questions of war and 
e6 Lopes, Cron. Fernando I, Prologue, p. 5. 
17 Azevedo, Epocas, p. 39; Marrocos, I, doc. XXIII. 
e6 Chaves, Livro de Apontamentos, p. 266. 
18 Provas, vol. II, doc. 28, p. 211. 
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peace was only occasional. The Povos managed in some periods to keep their 
representatives in the royal counsel (after 1385 and after 1438). Yet, it is harder 
to find among fifteenth-century monarchs, the rational choices of the old kings 
concerning external policy. Even a monarch whose personal convictions 
opposed war in Africa, Duarte I, embarked in his brother gung-ho plans of 
invasion of North Africa. Two decades later, his son, Afonso V asked to the 
Cortes money to fight in the Mediterranean in a crusade that was eventually 
called off. Still, Afonso V used the resulting pedido to obtain a new base in 
North Africa. But the most paradigmatic example of fickle decision-making is the 
attack on Tangiers and Asilah in 1471. The king's initial objective was Tangiers, 
possible on advice of his brother. The royal counsel opposed but Afonso V 
persisted. The Povos called for Asilah instead. In the words of G6is, Afonso V 
'willingly accepted this because his purpose was to go to war anyway.'70 
Eventually, he captured both with his 20,OOO-strong army. This erratic decision-
making emphasises the fact that, unlike the precedent period, a great deal of 
Portuguese fifteenth-century military ventures appear totally disconnected from 
any consistent strategic rationale. 
Extraordinary expenditure is the main theme of a surviving memorandum 
entitled as 'Expenses Made by the King from the Conquest of Ceuta [1415] to 
the Present Day [1473].'71 The memorandum contains the items of 
extraordinary expenses expressed in dobras, a gold currency which worked as 
unit of account, separated by reigns and divided In two categories: mere 
'expenses' (despezas) and 'embassies', with the former comprising various 
items that we could group into military expeditions, household endowments, 
armadas and dowries.72 In view of a few other sources, the figures present In 
70 G6is, Chronica do Prin¢pe, chapter xviii, pp. 57-6. See also, the case of Al-Ksar. G6is, Chronlca do Prlnv/pe, 
chapter x, pp. 31-2. 
71 RED, doc.S, pp.66-82. This title, if it is indeed a title, falls weN short of the actual content, as the memorandum is 
actually part of a miscellany comprising many other financial accounts. Besides the announced list of expenses, the 
document comprises also a summary of revenues for the year 1473, a map of the set-up expenditure for the same 
years, a list of the 'gracious' annuities conceded from 1460 onwards, a list of the annuities granted for services, an 
Hemised list of permanent expenses and, finally, a list of 'other' ordinary expenses of the kingdom. 
72 Its organisation Is, however, far from perfect: not all these entries are easily recognisable and some minor 
expenses with embassies have inconsistent figures and units of account; among the list of expenses, there Is also a 
mention to what was technicaUy one Hem of revenue (the general subsidy of 1460.) RED, p. 117. From the wording 
of this miscellany, however, H is clear that it was not sent to the ruling monarch In 1473, as Afonso V is always 
referred to in the third person. As the year compilation ends In 1473, "is tempting to relate it to the Cortes of 1472-3 
(ColmbraJEvora) where excessive financial demands, uncontroUed expenditure and the maintenance of North African 
strongholds were a major theme for the proctors of the Povos. Indeed, the breakdown of the different types of 
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the memorandum appear broadly reliable.73 Moreover, the statement can be 
complemented by the estimates of the Prior of the Hospitallers Dom Vasco de 
Atafde for the war with Castile from 1474 to 1478 and other similar payments.14 
As the only legitimate son of Joao II, prince Afonso, had not yet married and 
thus had its own household, the figure of the seventh decade should be read 
with the caveat that there is no information available on armadas and on the 
hypothetical household endowment for the heir of the throne. 




1400 • Endowments j: BDowrles 
CJArmadas 
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o • Military 
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1488 
Sources: RED, doc. 8 pp. 66-82; Fig. 32 
Fig. 31 shows that after emerging victorious from the Independence war, 
the conquest of Ceuta set a pattern of constant extraordinary expenses, even if 
annuities In parts four, five and seven of the document directly answers the abolition of the 'gracious' and the 
annuities demanded by the ninth article or capitulo geral. Equally, the breakdown of the permanent expendtture • 
comprising the wages of officers of such dubious utility as the catchers of vulture's feathers -seem to substantiate the 
Cortes' complaints against excessive expenditure. In the words of the Povos' representatives: the king should give 
men to the offices, rather than offices to men. Sousa, Cortes Medievllis, I, p. 387. 
73 Eight items may be 'controlled' by the later and much Incomplete memorandum of the Prior of the Hospitallers 
Dom Vasco de Atalde (Pravss, vol. II, part 1, p. 21) and the difference of values is never very wide (between 6.25% 
and 17%) and the 1473 text presents normally lower figures. The quittance of the dowry of Princess Isabel (LM·1, 
doc. 15, pp. 69-71) gives the value of 154,000 coronae surl for the dowry alone (excluding celebrations and the 
voyage) instead of the 250,000 dobras given by the memorandum. The memorandum estimates the cost of the 
Asilah expedition in 34,000 dobrss, slightly less than the 39.000 dobras that sixteenth-amtury chronicler Joio de 
Barros claimed to have seen in the Contos books, See Barros, Joio de, Okadas da Asia, ed. Thomas Earle. Lisbon. 
1998. The values shown in the list of expenditure kerns for the reign of King Duarte are also very similar (MH. vol. VI. 
doc. 90, pp. 253-4). All these differences can also be ascribed to the oscillations of the conversion of r. Into dobras. 
There is a less reassuring account in the surviving letter of acquittal of the armada sent under fernando de castro 
against the Genoese in 1441 which estimates the cost of alimentation and wages at 710.000 r. or 5,916 dobras (TT, 
Chanco Afonso V, Uvro 2, 101. 102) while the memorandum reckons the total ()()st of the expedition In 9,000 dobras. 
This difference oould be ascribed to investment in shipbuilding and other materials. 
74 Published in Provss, vol. II. part 1, doc. 8, pp. 21-28. 
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there is a sensible diminution of extraordinary expenditure after the first two 
decades which are alone in exceeding the average expenditure per decade 
(364,000 dobras). Together with the data provided by Dom Vasco, the 
memorandum confirms the importance of military expenditure which accounts 
for 58% of the total extraordinary expenditure, or to 61.5% if the, essentially 
military, armadas are included. Furthermore, these figures show that dowries 
and other endowments to the princely households slowly lost their importance In 
relation to war and naval expeditions. The proportion of military expenditure and 
armadas grew at expenses of other items, such as endowments and dowries. In 
the last decades considered (from 1465 to 1484) military expenses alone 
represented 83% of the total, while war-driven expenses were around 45% in 
the first two. 
The impact of this expenditure can only be understood if these figures are 
somehow compared with the existing notions of receipt. In very broad terms, the 
1415-44 trend of decreasing expenditure can be related with the dip In royal 
revenues that has been observed (see Fig. 14), while the subsequent gradual 
growth of the expenditure roughly parallels that of the ordinary revenue from the 
middle of the century onwards (see Fig. 16, 17, 18). The main reason behind 
this was Portuguese involvement in North Africa which alone accounts for 
793,000 dobras, that is to say more than a third of the total extraordinary 
expenditure. The burden supposed by the monies spent in North Africa is 
particularly impressive: the cost of Cauta, 280,000 dobras, exceeded the annual 
revenue of 204,000 dobras for 1401; the 57,000 dobras paid in the 'Tangiers 
Disaster', exceeded the annual revenue of 1432, a mere 47,000 dobras. The 
expedition of Asilah and Tangiers in 1471 costed around 104,000 or 112,000 
dobras, while the kingdom's revenues were about 180,00 dobras in 1473 (see 
'sources' on Fig. 14), it is clear that these expeditions supposed immense 
resources that the ordinary receipt, even if unencumbered, could not absorb. 
It appears as if the key deCisions, both military and political, were taken in 
consideration of the shape of the finances. It would appear that rather than 
'causes' for moving the crown Into demands, these are pretexts for accesSing 
the kingdom's wealth. The obvious solution was to obtain extraordinary 
revenues in the form of subsidies paid by the Povos. But did It work? 
260 
Fig. 32 - Extraordinary Expenditure and Extraordinary Revenue, 
1415-84 







1415-24 1425-34 1435-44 1445-54 1455-64 1465-74 1475-84 
Source: Fig. 25; Fig. 26; Chaves. Livro de Apontamentos. p. 266. 
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The comparison of receipt and expenditure makes it clear that, after the 
decade of 1415-24, resort to subsidies to offset the expenses became the norm. 
Moreover, Fig. 32 shows that, after the second decade, the receipt of the 
pedidos appears designed in order to match extraordinary expenses.75 If we 
consider the case of the campaign of Ceuta, whose wages were paid with 
depleted cOinage,76 and the changes in monetary policy (see supra section 6.1) 
it is clear that until the mid-1430s the monarchy resorted to debasement in 
order to offset extraordinary charges. The proceeds of the subsidies were, at 
least in theory, sufficient to allow the Portuguese crown to pursue its goals, 
provided that extraordinary expenditures uncovered by taxation were kept within 
reasonable Iimits.77 While armadas and embassies did not give place to 
extraordinary taxation, the endowment of the princely households, the dowries 
sent to Portuguese princesses and all Portuguese military interventions in 
Castile were subsidised by the Povos. However, the sixth decade appears to be 
very different in this respect with its extraordinary expenditure untapped by 
75 It cannot escape mention the fact that the broad coincidence between the expenses for which taxes were collected 
and the notional revenue of the pedidos hints at the consistency of these data. 
76 Other expenses were made with more or less arbitrary expedients. Cargo ships. mostly foreign. were obtained 
through a prise of salt. Moreover. as P. E. Russell remarks. the monarchy became strongly indebted because of this 
campaign. Russell. Prince Henry. p. 44. 
77 The evolution of embassies can be interpreted as particularly revealing of a progressive restriction of conspicuous 
expenditure. Each of the four embassies between 1415 and 1424 -cost 7.000 dobras. a sum sevenfold the average 
for the entire period. In the times of JoSo I (died 1433) embassies are few but sumptuous. whe~s In the reign of 
Afonso V (1438-81) they are frequent but sober. The same is true about the «ldowments and other transfers In 
favour of the infantes. Whatever the cause (diminishing J:eturns or rationalisation of costs) the kings manage to 
organise less costly embassies and expeditions. Even the heir to the throne prince JoSo (future JoAo II) had to 
content himseH with a household endowment of 25.000 dobras (1472) equal to what the fourth male son of JoSo I 
had received back in 1424. 
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subsidies. The reason can be found in the conquest of Asilah and Tangiers in 
1471 which, like with Ceuta, was not subsidised by pedidos. This case and that 
of Ceuta bring out a crucial problem: the financing of North African imperial 
expansionism. 
Fig. 33 - North Africa Extraordinary Expenditure and Extraordinary 
Revenue, 1415-84 (In dobrss) 
Expedition 
1415 - Capture of Ceuta 
1418 - Succour to Ceuta 
1437 - 'Tangiers Disaster' 
1458 - Capture of AI-Ksar 
1458 - Fortification of AI-Ksar 
1463 - Expedition to Ceuta 
1471 - Capture of Asilah 
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Totals: 793,000 210.510 34% 
Notes: • = 1.5 pedidos (10,500,000 r.) with the dobra at 120 r .. It can be assumed that the 
money from the pedido of 1418 was applied in the succour to Ceuta once the original motive for 
the subsidy - the threat of a Castilian attack - proved to be unfounded (Sousa, As Cortes 
Medievais, vol. I, p. 340). Indeed, the estimated value of the reinforcement sent to Ceuta 
(85,000 dobras) was almost exactly the same as the notional value of one and half pedidos 
(89,375); II = 1.5 pedidos (13,125,000 r. with the dobra at 150 r.) (OA, Book IV, title 2 § 13)." = 
3 pedidos (21,550,000 r. with the dobra at 230 r.) (PEP, doc. 23); these pedidos were initially 
agreed in the Cortes of Lisbon/1456 and were destined to a projected papal crusade against the 
Turks in the Mediterranean; as the expedition failed to materialise for extemal reasons, the 
money was diverted to an expedition in North Africa (Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 
377). 
Sources: Fig. 31; Fig. 14. 
Fig. 32 shows that extraordinary taxation had a limited role In North 
African expansion, the crown's most intensive and successful military 
endeavour. The yield of the pedidos covered less than one-third of the total 
costs. This pattern was not changed significantly under kings Joao II and 
Manuel I whose Moroccan expeditions of 1489,1501,1506,1507,1508,1513, 
1514 and 1515, some of which involving more than 20,000 men, were not 
financed by any pedido or subsidy. 78 
In Portuguese history, a single subsidy was knowingly conceded to fund a 
North African expedition, that of 1437, and even the legitimacy of this procedure 
78 On these dates, Costa, Joao Paulo Oliveira e, D. Manuel I, lisbon, 2005, pp. 2n-299. 
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did raise many doubts.79 The expedition to relieve Ceuta from the siege of 1418 
and the conquest of AI-Ksar were financed by subsidies approved in the Cortes 
for other, albeit not entirely different, purposes.so The lack of extraordinary direct 
taxation in North Africa reflects the general stance of the Povos towards 
external offensive warfare. Indeed, while the municipal elites in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth century regarded their negotiated contributions to royal 
campaigns as an aid to the lord, the Povos as a whole questioned the 
justification for the campaigns. There were legal and religious objections to the 
legitimacy and the justness of the war.81 Contemporary political writing regarded 
wars of conquest as objectives contrary to regal duty. 82 For the Povos, the wars 
in Africa followed goals and aims that were alien to the interets of the 
kingdom.83 
The Cortes reluctance to finance other conflicts than those taking place In 
the borders of the realm meant that the monarchy had to resort to ordinary 
revenues to fund campaigning in North Africa, lest it would continue with the 
dubious expedients as those found by Joao I in 1415 (massive debasements) or 
Afonso V in 1458 (diverting subsidies paid for different reasons). From the late 
1460s, the monarchy proved able to build and manage an empire without 
resorting often to extraordinary revenues, namely constitutionally expensive and 
administratively cumbersome pedidos with practically disappeared In the 1480s 
(see Fig. 24). Although no letters of acquittal of the treasurers of expeditions 
survive,84 it is clear that late fifteenth· and early sixteenth-century conquests In 
North Africa were financed by the buoyant ordinary revenues (see supra 
chapter 5). 
The transformations wrought by the late-fourteenth-century war finances 
placed new instruments in the hands of the monarchy. The Inflation-Immune 
79 Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 135-61. King Duarte is said to have said that the pedido 'came from my will rather than 
from necessity'. Pina, Rui de, Cronica do Rei D. Duarte, ed. Ant6nio Borges Coelho, Usbon 1985, chapter XIII, p.91. 
80 The subsidy of 1456, which financed the expedition of Al-Ksar was intended to pay for a naval campaign in the 
Medherranean against the Turk in succour of the Pope. As CoItes Medievals, vol. I, pp. 3n·380. 
81 Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 153-4, 161-4. 
82 See the already-quoted memorandum of Infante JoAo in 1432 and the letter of the Kingdom's Constable Dom 
Pedro in Fonseca, luis Adao da, 'Uma Carta do Condestavel Oom Pedro sobre a Polltica Marroquina de D. Afonso 
V, Revista da Faculdade de Letras. Hist6ria, vol. I, Porto, 1970, pp. 83·96. 
83 BNP, C6dice 6969, p. 554-5 (141" article presented at leiria·Santariml1433). 
84 There are two letters of acquhtal to Rul Pires who was commissioned to buy wheat and other materials in Spain 
when Manuel was planning an expedition to Africa in 1501. However, most of the money he received on the two 
occasions was from Fernando Afonso, the central officer charged whh assembling the monies for this campaign 
(called both tesoureiro and recebedor; treasurer or receiver). TT, Chane. Manuel, Uvro~, fol. 57v. 
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sisas and the end of the stringent fiscal constitution of the 'kings of old' 
emancipated the crown's external policy from the interests of the kingdom and 
allowed it to follow its own interests, however fickle they could be. Expansionist 
campaigns in North Africa clearly show that the external policy, unlike that of the 
old kings, was designed with little consideration for the revenues. The very 
building of the empire has a very close relationship to the changes that followed 
the Fernadine Wars. 
Section 7.3 - The Empire of the Sisas 
When, in 1498, asked by the Cortes to give away the sisas, unlike all his 
predecessors, who lectured the Povos on their legal and political legitimacy, 
King Manuel adroitly remarked that the proceeds of the sisas did not languish in 
the royal treasuries, rather they went 'back to where they came from:85 Unlike 
infante Joao, King Manuel understood that money did not smoke in the air; it 
ended up in the hands of his subjects, most of all of the 'nobles, knights and 
squires' who contributed to the current imperial ventures.86 Without the sisas, he 
argued, the realm would be defenceless. Also, how many privileges, grants, 
dowries, gifts would not be given had the monarchy abdicated of the sisas? If 
the crown abandoned the sisas, King Manuel's answer continued, the Povos 
would want it back. 
In this answer, it is clear that the king, or at least his representatives, 
regarded the profits of taxation most of all as a form of redistribution. The role of 
this section is to point to a peculiar relationship between royal redistribution and 
military empire-building. While quantitative analysis of expenditure will be left for 
the next chapter, this section will aim at understanding the influences of the 
End-of-Century Wars in the construction of the empire. Considering the state of 
the empire by the temporal limits of the dissertation, the 152Os, attention will be 
limited to North Africa and, to a lesser extent, to the Indian Ocean, as the 
American territories were still unimportant whilst the realm, along with the 
Atlantic Islands, involved a reduced military activity.87 
85 Cort. Manuel I, vol. I, pp. 254·255. 
86 'Fidalgos, cava/eiros and escudeiros.' Cort. ManUf//, vol. I, pp. 254. 
87 Diffie, Bailey and Winius, George, Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580, Minneapolis, 1977, pp. 74· 
112. Boxer, Charles Ralph, The PortugUfse Seabome Empire, London, 1969, pp. 27·33. 
There can be no doubt that the war, offensive, defensive or predatory, in 
North Africa was very important for the Portuguese monarchy. All Portuguese 
fifteenth-century kings crossed the Mediterranean to fight in North Africa at least 
once in their lifetime. For the last hundred years or so, countless historians have 
discussed plausible 'reasons' and 'causes' to explain what appeared to be 
inexplicable: the Portuguese attack on Ceuta and the subsequent expansion in 
North Africa.88 Indeed, it is particularly surprising that a country devastated by 
decades of wars was to embark on a perfectly unnecessary expedition, barely 
two years after a hard-won peace.a9 
Although it was captured, sacked and occupied with minimal losses within 
a single August day of 1415, Ceuta involved an impressive operation by 
contemporary standards. The 19,300 men recorded in the muster exceeded the 
12,300 indented for the Harfleur-Agincourt campaign in the very same year.90 
Accordingly, as we have seen, costs soared. 
When, in the early 1430s, the possibility of a second campaign in Africa 
was debated by the advisors of Joao I and Duarte I, the defence of a distant 
and isolated city possession of Ceuta was regarded as an economic absurdity 
or, as infante Pedro said, Ian indiscretion.'91 
Indications that Ceuta, and the whole North African affair, did not benefit 
the crown in financial are both frequent and credible. In the exceptionally well-
documented debate about further conquest In Morocco all the consulted 
courtiers taCitly agree that Ceuta was a burden.92 Infante Pedro, the future 
regent, claimed that Ceuta was la good drain of men, weapons and monies.,93 
In his chronicle of the deeds of Dom Pedro de Meneses, the first captain of 
Ceuta (1415-37), Zurara could confidently claim that three thousand men were 
88 See, in English, the brief accounts of this debate In Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 135-60 and Diffie and Winius, 
Foundations, pp. 62·3. 
88 It is that from 1413 an amphibious military operation against a secret erlemy was under way. See, In English, 
Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 29-58. 
90 Indentured soldiers totalled 12,311 but soldiers fielded by the captains fell Significantly short of those agreed. 
Curry, Anne, Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, Woodbridge, 2000, pp. 422·3. Of the many figures provided by 
fifteenth-century authors, the lowest reckoning of ships is the one by Castilian chronicler Santamaria, who counted 
190 vessels. Duarte, 'Africa', p. 406. 
91 MH, votll, doc. 143, p. 329. 
82 See the analysiS of the memoranda sent by key figures of the crown by Russel, Prince Henry, pp. 136-48. 
93 'Sumydoiro de gente de uossa terra e d'arrnas e dinheiro' MH, vol. II, doc. 143. On this letter, In English, see 
Russell, Prince Henry, p. 68. 
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stationed in Ceuta 'continuously fighting against the infidels by land and sea.'94 
In 1471, the total figure was closer to 5,000 which supposed considerable 
costS.95 When mentioning the African strongholds in the context of his 
description of Portuguese kingdom and its revenues, the ever-perceptive 
Venetian spy Ca da Masser highlighted the burdens these territories imposed 
on the monarchy. In his words, 'of which lands he [the king of Portugal) has 
neither any profit nor any revenue but continuous expenditure to defend them 
against the Moors,.96 
With the North African conquests, the crown had to face permanent 
military expenditure, something few other fifteenth-century European 
monarchies knew. That is why chronicler Zurara could claim, perhaps rightly, 
that Ino other king in Christendom has continuously nearly three thousand men 
of war fighting by sea or by land or both,.97 Despite the organisation it 
stimulated, Ceuta and the remaining conquests in North Africa were a heavy 
financial burden for the crown. Large garrisons in the payroll and constant 
support from the mainland meant direct military expenditure. The financial 
strains of the monarchy made things even more costly. 
Military wages were not the sole ordinary costs of North African 
fortresses. Their defence involved the shipping across the strait of tons of 
wheat, wine and a vast array of manufactured goods ranging from crossbow 
bolts to bottles. The function of acquiring, concentrating and sending these 
materials was borne by the Cass de Ceuts, or Ceuta Agency from whose 
treasurers a pair of letters of quittance survive to show that this Institution spent 
annually in the region of 750,000 r. in the 1450s, a sizeable proportion of the 
notional total income of 5,700,000 r .. 98 In 1424, wheat supply alone was 
estimated at 1,680,000 r .. 99 The total cost of Ceuta was probably higher, as 
King Duarte wrote to the Portuguese abbot of Santa Maria of Florence claiming 
84 Quoted in Duarte, 'Africa', Nova HistOris MiNtar de Portugal, vol. I, p. 440. The figure Is perfectly acceptable 
considering the first news about a 2,OOO-strong garrison of Ceuta. see in English, Russell, Henry the Navigator, p. 
57. 
86 Duarte, 'Africa', p. 440. 
86 Relazione, prologue: 'delle qual te"e non hB profitto ne intrada alcuna, rna spesa continua per guardsrl6 ds Morl.' 
87 Quoted In Duarte, 'Africa', p. 440. 
98 The figure for expenditure includes the value of wheat and Wine and current prioes. Both letters are published in 
Marrocos, I, pp. 168·172. Estimates of total revenue are in Fig. 18. 
99 Chanc. Joao II, Uvro 25, fol. 101. This sum could acquire, at low price (14 r.) 120,000 a/queires of wheat. 
Considering the monthly allowance of 4 a/queires in 1472 for Tangiers ([)p, vol. III, doc. 82) this would supply a 
garrison of 2;500 for the entire year. 
that the crown's ordinary expenditure for Ceuta amounted to 28,500 ducats 
(4,560,000 r.) whilst the city did not contribute with a single real to the royal 
finances.10o 
It is clear that the conservation and defence of Ceuta against a 
permanently hostile enemy had no possible economic rationale. While the 
theses suggested by other authors - geopolitical demands, chivalric mentality, 
noble demographic excess, or crusading piety - are all very relevant, it is clear 
that military-redistributive pressures played a part in the political decision. 
Political literature, including the chronicles of Fernao Lopes, often 
expressed the notion that the monarchy was bound to bestow material honours 
on those who served it.101 Knights were expected to advance their condition by 
serving in the war. The crown was bound to offer opportunities for this 
advancement. This relationship is central to the origins of the Portuguese 
empire. 
This counter-intuitive reasoning is often found among fifteenth-century 
Portuguese texts. According to chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara, Joso I 
defended the possession of Ceuta in these terms: 'you [the infsntes and 
advisors] know that when I am asked permission to let {noblemen] to depart to 
France or to England to fight arms in hand, I am obliged to equip them and 
subsidise them for this venture; it happens that I would spend less If I send 
them to Ceuta where they would be of greater service to me.'102 This curious 
comment is consistent with the emergence of an under-paid military class 
detected in the End-of-Century-Wars. Indeed, the chronicles of Rul de Pina and 
Gomes Eanes de Zurara do refer to high-rank nobles willing to seek fortune 
abroad being diverted to Ceuta.103 Already in 1393, hearing news of a long-term 
truce with Castile, Constable Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira arranged his men In 
100 MH, vol. VI, doc. 10. The exchange conversion of 1 ducat: 400 I. suggested by Russell (Prince Henry, pp. 379-
80, nt.8, based on MSffocos, I, p. 475) is not acceptable, as he is using an exchange rate of 1416, when the metallic 
content of the I. amounted to 0.022 gAg, whereas the I. of the 14308 had only 0.007 9 Ag. 
101 Lopes, Cran. Femando I, Chapter XXVII, pp. 93-5; Lopes, Cron. JoSo I, Part 2, Chapter U, p. 138, Chapter CU, p. 
332. Pedro, Uvro da Vertuosa Benfeytoria, Book II, Chapter IX, pp. 78-9. 
MH, vol. VI, doc. 10. The exchange conversion of 1 ducat: 400 I. suggested by RusseU (Prince Henry, pp. 379-80, 
nt.8, based on MSffocos, I, p. 475) is not acceptable, as he is using an exchange rate of 1416, when the metallic 
content of the I. amounted to 0.022 9 Ag, whereas the I. of the 14308 had only 0.007 9 Ag. 
102 France and England are explicitated as the destinations of the Portuguese. Zurara, GrOnIca da ramada de Ceuts, 
chapter XCVII., p. 278. Other examples of this reasoning can be found in Cruz, Abel dos Santos, A Nobreza 
Portuguesa em MSffOCOS no Seculo xv (1415-1464) Porto, 1995, p. 246. 
103 References collected by Cruz, A Nobreza e Marrocos, pp. ~46-7. 
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order to leave the kingdom and 'look for a Iiving.,104 Similarly, the objection 
against offensive wars fired by the Povos in the Cortes of 1433 stated that 'in 
case some lords seek that which we do not envisage [war, presumably in 
Morocco] it would be better that they looked for it in other kingdoms and lands, 
as it used to happen.,105 
As we have seen, in the early sixteenth century, noble military service in 
North Africa required no wages, unlike the permanent garrison. Thus, this 
circumstance only mitigated the immediate burden that the fortresses of Africa 
represented; indeed the monarchy was bound to give grants and rewards to the 
warriors. The burden was felt not only directly through high standing charges, 
but also indirectly, providing the chivalric ground for rent-seeking nobility. 
While it was economically disastrous to the crown, Ceuta could be 
lucrative to the noblemen who volunteered to serve there. Noblemen who went 
to Africa could earn their living as privateers and use the ravaging of the 
Moroccan hinterlands as a way of seeking individual fame and profit. 106 As an 
excellent base for privateer activity, early fifteenth-century Ceuta could be of 
some profit to enterprising noblemen and sea traders.107 It also provided an 
opportunity for social ascent for the high echelons of municipality elites.108 But 
not only that: the African campaigns of Joso I, Afonso V and later Manuel I 
resulted in the creation of ex novo titles, which had been very rare until then.109 
As LUIS Filipe Oliveira and Miguel Jasmins Rodrigues state 'most titles granted 
by Afonso V followed the tenure of military posts in the African conquests.,110 
104 Lopes, Cron. Joao I, part 2, Chapter CLUJ, p. 335. 
105 14111 article. BNP, C6dice 6969, p. 555. Abridged in Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. II, p. 316. The sievelng of 
the late fourteenth-century and early fifteenth-century Burgundian accounts by Jacques Paviot has provided ample 
empirical confirmation for this claim. Paviot, Jacques, Portugal et Bourgogne au XVe si6cIe, Paris, 1995, pp. 86-130. 
Similarly, there were Portuguese in the garrisons of English Normandy. Curry, Anne, 'The Nationality of Men·at·Arms 
serving in English Armies In Normandy and the 'pays de conqu6te', 1415-1450: a Preliminary SurveY', Reading 
Medieval Studies, n. 18, 1992, pp. 130-166. Aragon seems to have been another frequent destination for Portuguese 
men-at-arms during the first haH of the fiftenth-century. Sail Serrano, Jorge, GUfHTS y Nobleza en Is Corona de 
Aragon. La Cabal/erla de los Ejercitos del Rey (siglos XIV-X\1 Valencia, 2003, pp. 387, 4n, note 109. 
106 See biographies In A Alta Nobreza e s Fundapao do Estado cia India, Costa, Joao Paulo Oliveira e and 
Rodrigues, Victor Luis, eds., Lisbon, 2004. 
107 See the comments of Sir Peter Russell on Pedro de Meneses, Russell, Prince Henry, p. 73. On the opposition of 
Lisbon, Porto and Algarve against the abandon of Ceuta, see Russell, Prince Henry, p. 188. 
106 See the list of men knighted after deeds in Morocco by Abel Cruz. Cruz, A Nobrezs Portuguesa, pp. 246-9. 
109 Of the eleven counts and marquises mentioned by Lunardo Da ca Masser, at least five (Marquis of Vila Real, 
counts of Borba, Tarouca, TentUgal and AIcoutlm) had won their fortune and title serving in North Africa. see studies 
on these men in the work by Costa and Rodrigues, eds., A Alta Nobrezs. 
110 Oliveira, Luis Filipe, 'Um Processo de ReeStrutuf8980 do Oomfnio Senhorial da Nobreza: A Tit~o na Segunda 
Dinastia', Revista de Histdria EconOmics e Social, n. 22,1988, pp. n-as. p. 83. 
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Deeds and prowess in North Africa would also move the less warlike King 
Manuel to create five new titles of counts (Tentugal, Portimao, Penela, Borba 
and Tarouca).111 
In 1506, the Venetian spy Lunardo Ca da Masser observes that the 
noblemen fought for free in North Africa in the hope of a lifelong grant from the 
king.112 According to him, the costly African strongholds were sustained by 600 
knights who 'served the king for love and for free' (el forzo de loro gratis et 
amore) for two or three years winning nothing but the product of their 
marauding. By doing this, the knights hoped to gain some grants and privileges 
from the monarch, apart from the profit of their predatory fighting. This was 
taken to the extreme when powerful men like the dukes of Viseu or the duke of 
Braganca, employed their vast resources in expeditions against Larache (1463), 
Anata (1472) and Azemmour (1513). 
The opening of the maritime route to India in 1498 created a very 
different military setting. Whereas in North Africa the king's funds were used in 
the service of chivalry, crusades and restlessness of the military nObility, in India 
the policy was the polar opposite: war was in the service of financial interests. 
Military expenses in India could, at least occasionally, be regarded as an 
investment. The instructions given to the first Viceroy, Franciso de Almeida, 
revolved around economically rational principle: to occupy the strategic 
positions that controlled trade routes.113 This was the opinion of an Englishman 
traveller criticising the options of Emperor Charles V: 'It {the navigation and 
trade of spicery] may bee without doubt of great profit, if, as the king of Portugal 
doth, he would become a merchant, and provide shippes and their lading, and 
trade thither alone, and defend the trade of these Islands for hlmselfe' (1527).114 
The diversion of the spice trade from the Moors was an explicit and 
conscious aspect of King Manuel I's grand strategy. By ~Ioslng the Red Sea, 
the Portuguese hoped to strangle the key revenue of the Egyptian Mamluk 
finances and prevent the reinforcement of Muslim states in India. Ultimately, the 
ambitions of Manuel I were the recovery of Jerusalem (from the Red Sea) and 
111 Oliveira, 'Um Processo de ReestruturaQAo,' pp. n-as. 
112 Relazione, Prologue: U quali vanno a semr a Sua AItezza, el forzo de Ioro gratis fit amore; staranno de /I annl cJ6, 
over tre, e dapoi tomano allB corte di Sua Altezza, sperando conseguir qualche onor et merce dal Re. 
113 Oiffie and Winius, Foundations, pp. 227·230. 
114 Robert Thome quoted in'Godinho, Os Oescobrlmentos, vol. I, p. 57. 
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the annihilation of the Muslim military power through the conquest of Mecca, the 
fall of Jerusalem and the conquest of Egypt. The destruction of the Muslim 
presence in the East was the cornerstone of the Emmanueline imperial project. 
The strategy was fourfold: blockade of the Muslim spice trade, attack against 
Mamluk Egypt from the Red Sea, crusade in the Holy Land and conquest of 
Morocco.115 
What made this bold, extravagant project look practicable was that it 
allied the interests of the military nobles with the lofty imperial conceptions of 
King Manuel's close circle.116 Indeed, the Portuguese achieved the control of 
the former trade routes thanks to their naval supremacy after the battle of Diu 
(1509). After securing naval power, a few key ports and cities were taken by 
force and occupied in the 1510s. However, unlike the North African strongholds, 
Portuguese military outposts and fleets in the Indian Ocean had good chances 
of being self-subsidising. This was the plan designed and partly Implemented by 
viceroy Albuquerque (1510-1518). In 1512, the wages, annuities and military 
expenses of the Portuguese garrisons in India were sustained by privateer 
activity and there was no need of important cash injections from the 
metropolis.117 As Albuquerque was told by his antecedent In the dignity, 'all the 
honour of the conquerors lies in profit; if expenses overlap the receipt, all feats 
of arms are in vain'.118 In spite of the revenues produced by the customs in the 
Indies, the provision of wages by the Crown was slow and cumbersome. There 
was nothing like a general paymaster at each fortress, like In North Africa·119 
To some extent, this strategy was conducted with the same noblemen 
that had acquired a name in the African Coast. Recently, Vasco Resende 
brought some empirical confirmation of the assumption by Diffie and Winlus that 
the Moroccan Wars had been a 'school of cutthroats' whose lessons would be 
put into practice in the East.12o Indeed, throughout the period, foreign observers, 
115 Thomaz, 'l'ldee Imperiale,' pp. 41-44. 
116 Thomaz, 'l'ldee Imperiale,' pp. 41-44. 
117 Godinho, Os Descobrimentos, vol. III, p. 12. 
118 Undated letter of Dom Francisco de Almeida to Afonso de Albuquerque: 'A onrra dos conquistadores toda esta 
no proveito; porque se a despeza passa pella ,eceita, toda a obra fica vaan,' quoted In Santos, Joio Marinho dos, 
Sobre a guerra e as guerras na expsnsao portuguesa: seculo XVI. "Revista de Hist6ria Econ6mica e Social", lisbon, 
26, Maio-Agosto 1989, p. 74. 
119 Santos, Joso Marinho dos, A Guerra e as Guerras na Expsnsao Portuguesa. Skulos XV e XVI, LIsboa, 1998, 
pp.274·8. 
120 Resende, Vasco, A Sociedade de Expansao no Reinado de D. Manuel I, Lagos, 2007, pp. 12, 189-244. 
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like the Count of Foix,121 Antoine De La 5alle,122 Gilles Bouvier123 or Luciano Ca 
Da Masser,124 alluded to the prowess of the Portuguese noblemen. However, 
their Portuguese contemporaries as the Constable Dom Pedro and even King 
Duarte feared most of all the indiscipline of their countrymen.125 Rash, young 
aspirers to royal favour did even created tactical problems when they sought 
individual prowess, instead of following the instructions. This was common to 
both India and North Africa. Reporting on the assault on Adem in 1513, viceroy 
Albuquerque reported to the king that he had lost many of his scarce men when 
the excessive number of knights 'eager to serve the king' had caused the 
assault stairs to crumble.126 As Resende noted, obedience to chivalric codes 
took the form of disobedience to hierarchy and military rationality and 
efficiency.127 
Historians of the expansion, notably Vasco Resende and J. P. Oliveira e 
Costa, noted that the intention of the first generation of eastern empire-builders 
was to earn a good claim to royal patronage rather than to plunge themselves 
into the riches of the Indies. India, like Morocco beforehand, was the shortest 
route to royal rents. To quote the former: 'the chance of royal patronage was 
indeed the main motivation for the migration to the North African strongholds 
and, from the 1510s onwards, to the East'.128 
The End-of-Century-Wars followed by the Moroccan ventures disrupted 
the 'old kings" tight combination between redistribution and military service. In 
the first half of the fifteenth century, military service would only be paid through 
wages for effective service which turned noblemen and aspirants to nobility into 
the most likely interested in offensive expeditions. War became a route towards 
rent-seeking, instead of being the counterpart for permanent patronage and 
121 Froissart noted down the Impression of the Count of FoIx, a survivor of Aljubarrota: 'Les Portingalois sont dura 
gens' .Quoted in Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 518. 
122 Russell, Prince Henry, p. 49. 
123 The authour of the Livre de Ia description des Pays of 1447: 'Et ont f6 gens de ce royautme [PortugaQ ont une 
cite nomme Suste {Ceuta] es pais des Sarrazins delA fa mer; taquelf6 .est au royau1m8 de Veze delA Is mer 
Mite"enne. Le roy de Portinga/Is fait sogneusement garder cis gens de son royaulm8, st font guerre toujours aux 
Sa"asins. Les nobles de ce royau/me sont vaillants hommes en guerre, , quoted In Godinho, Vitorino Magalhies, 
'Portugal no Comeo<> do Seculo XVI: Institui¢es e Economia', Revista de Hist6ria Econ6mIca e Social, n. 4, Jullho-
Dezembro 1979, p. 86. 
124 'Valentissimi Cavalieri.' Relazione. Prologue. 
125 Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 140, 171. Fonseca, 'UmaC8rta do Condestiver, p. 95. 
126 Resende, A Sociedade de Expansao, p. 23. 
127 Resende, A Sociedade de Expansao, p. 38 
128 Resende, A Sociedade de Expansao, p. 183. 
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privilege of the established families. This was recognised by the monarchy who 
had to consider the aspirations to improve condition by the royal service. It Is 
probably impossible to demonstrate that these men had indeed a say in 
decision-making. However, the present argument is not that the military nobility 
as a permanent, uniform vested interest or a deus ex machina that was the 
'reason' or 'cause' behind concrete political decisions. This would be a futile 
oversimplification. The argument is that there would be few occasions for 
redistribution of the royal revenues, which the wars had expanded, without war. 
Ultimately, the new relationship between patronage and war would not have 
existed without the Fernandine Wars and the Wars of Independence. The fiscal 
buoyancy brought by the sisas provided a sufficient cause for the rent-seeking 
drive of the militarised nobility. As shown, though measurable evidence is 
lacking, there is something to be said for the argument the imperial naval and 
military effort was revenue-driven. 
The empire represented a total inversion of the relationship between war 
and redistribution in relation to the time of the 'old kings': whilst the contia 
assured the nobility rents prior to, or even regardless of, any military activity, 
throughout the fifteenth century military service was a condition for 
redistribution. The fiscal buoyancy of the monarchy turned war into a shortcut 
for rewards and privileges. Hence, while in 1372 Fernando complained that he 
lacked the knights that 'his honour required', one hundred years later, Joso II 
lamented how the excessive number of knights was very detrimental to our 
service.'129 
129 Chaves, Livro de Apontamentos, p. 170. 
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Chapter 8 - A Redistributive Monarchy? 
Historians working on Portugal regarded the introduction of permanent 
taxation in the form of sisas as the Pavas' and the crown's direct response to 
the Castilian military threat. It cannot be denied that war provided an adequate, 
perhaps the only, constitutional setting for the adoption of extraordinary 
taxation. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to ask why a monarchy that could master 
its extraordinary military expenditure by means of debasement (see supra 
section 6.1) or through its prerogative definition of the military wages and 
cantias (see supra section 7.1) strove to keep the sisas after the war. In this 
chapter it will be argued that the permanence of the sales taxes was motivated 
by the an entirely different conception of royal finances in relation to that of the 
old kings. As explored in section 7.2, for Joao I and his followers, the riches 
collected by the crown were to be redistributed rather than hoarded. Unlike what 
Iria Gon~alves or A. H. Oliveira Marques have assumed, the permanence of the 
sisas was not a consequence of the monarchy's revenue-maximising drive. 
Instead, as it will be argued, the permanence of the sisas can be regarded as a 
determined step towards a redistributive monarchy. This argument rests on the 
analyses of both qualitative and quantitative sources. First, there will be an 
analysis of the political discussion that went on about the monarchy's right to 
collect sisas (section 8.1). Then, the general accounts of expenditure from the 
second half of the fifteenth century onwards will be overviewed (section 8.2). 
The exploration of other quantitative sources will test these conclusions {section 
8.3}. 
Section 8.1 - The Conservation of the State 
As already mentioned, sisas were the subject of an intermittent debate in 
the Cortes from their inception by Fernando I and Joao I (in 1372 and 1387, 
respectively) until the day when their administration was devolved to the 
municipalities and they became a wholly different type of tax (1538}.1 A few 
1 Cruz, Os Vedores da Fazenda, pp. 242-4. 
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well-documented instances indicate that throughout this confrontation the Po vas 
resorted to the cessante causa, cessat effectus argument. They considered that 
since sales taxes had been granted to pay for the defence of the realm against 
Castile, their continued collection by the monarchy was illegitimate. Sisas had 
been collected because of the war but the monarchy chose to perpetuate them. 
This narrative, labelled the 'popular history of the sisas by Armindo Sousa, was 
advanced in the later Cortes of 1439, 1459, 1481-2, 1498 and 1535 and was 
addressed in the writings of Fernao Lopes in the 1430s.2 In her influential 
dictionary entry on the sisas,3 Iria Gorn;alves reproduced its essential lines and 
the relevant authors regarded the sisas as a subsidy granted to pay for the war 
that would be later alienated by the monarchy. For all the sympathy it aroused 
in twentieth-century historians, this version of fiscal history Is inconsistent with 
the surviving documentation. 
The written debate between the crown and the Povos arising from the 
Cortes of Evora-Vianal1481-24 seems particularly enlightening in this respect. 
In their 123th general chapter, the Povos once again urged the king to release 
the permanent sisas with the familiar cessante causa, cessat effectus 
argument. King Joao II did not simply give one of those considerate, evasive but 
ultimately negative replies that his father and grandfather had given. Instead, he 
required the Povos to produce documentary evidence of their assertion that the 
sisas were to be collected only during while the wars lasted. The Povos 
accepted the challenge and presented five instruments granting the sisas, 
which Joao II sent to his legal experts in order to be analysed.s It is worth 
quoting in full the king's conclusion after listening to their advice: 
'it was clearly found out that the Povos had granted the general slsas to 
Joao I not only once but often; and they did so not only for the burdens of 
2 Barros, Hist6ria cia Administra~o PUblics, vol. IX, pp. 509-28. For the Cortes of 1498, G6is, DamiAo de, Cronica do 
Feliclssimo Rei D. Manuel, J. M. Teixeira de carvalho and David Lopes (ed.) part I, 2"d ed., Coimbra, 1926, chapter 
XXVI, pp. 49-53. For the Cortes of 1438, Cruz, A GoV8ma~o de D.Joao III, doc. XXIX, pp.242-4. 
3 Go~lves, 'Sisas', pp. 1·2. 
4 TT, Cortes, MaCO 3, doc. 5. 
5 While noteworthy, resorting to independent legal advice was not exceptional for the conscientious fifteenth-century 
Portuguese monarchs. Important decisions on North Africa were taken after the discussion of legal advices produced 
by foreign experts commissioned by the monarchs. Russell, Prince Henry, pp. 162·3. On the subject of finances, 
King Duarte also commissioned his chancellor, Vasco Fernandes, to produce a report on the legitimate revenues that 
a king could resort to. Femandes' report, which was based on Roman Law sources and ignored Portuguese 
contemporary doctrine and practice, was included in the great compilation of the 0rcIena¢es Atonsinas in the 14408 
(OA, Book II, title 24). 
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war but also to keep and uphold the estado of the king and that of the 
queen and of his sons and to give them land to constitute their 
households and to pay the judges and justices and many other people, 
and this was done both during and after the war. It is thus manifest that 
the necessity of war was not the single cause for Joao I collecting the 
sisas; rather, the upholding of his estado was the other main cause for 
doing SO.'6 
Given that since Fernao Lopes the sisa has been regarded by the 
historiography primarily as a war subsidy, the last sentence is particularly 
unsettling. And yet these terms are perfectly in tune with previous discourse on 
the sisas. When, in 1442, the crown was dealing with the slump of the revenue 
of the sisas (see supra 5.2), regent Pedro wrote to the municipality of Coimbra 
that these taxes were essential for the 'upkeep our (royal] estado.'7 When the 
Povos protested against the collection of sisas in 1459 and 1497, Afonso V and 
Manuel I resorted to the same argument that the collection of the sisas was not 
in the interest of the kings but of those who benefited from the kings' 
payments.s 
For this reason, it is vital to analyse the texts of the instruments that 
granted the sisas. Of the five grants alleged by the Povos in 1481-2, those that 
have survived confirm the opinion of the legal experts: wars were not the single 
rationale for Joao I's collection of the sisas. Both the original grant of 1387 and 
the increase of the sisas of 1408 mention the conservation of the 'estado of the 
king' on pair with the 'defence of the realm' as the destination of the sales 
taxes.9 In sum, the legal experts' claim that the concession of sales taxes was 
not destined to fight the war fits available documentary evidence. This moment 
in the fiscal-constitutional debates on the origins of the sisas indicates that 
e 'Achou que os povos destes reinos per muitas e desvairadBs V8Zes e modos outorgarom e outorgavam ao dlto rei 
D. Joham seu bisavo sisss gerais e esto nom somente pera os emcarregos dB guerra mas ainda durando ella e 
despois de cesadB avemdo is hi paz pera manter e soporar seu stsoo e dB R'sua moIhsr e dos ifantes MUS fiIhos e 
pera aos dictos ifantes dar casa e Ihes comprar casas terras e pera prover 80S desembargadores e oficlais dB 
jusfi9a e outras muitss pessoas donde magnifestsmente se mostra que a necessldBde dB guerra nom foI a so causa 
de el rey Dam Joham aver as siBBs mais nom menos principal causa era por poder soster seus estsdo.' TI, Cortes, 
Maca 3, doc. 5 (123rd article). 
7 'manter nosso stado nem gouemafl98 dos jfantes meos jrmalos e tyos nsm donde sa fa98m as despesas que sam 
necessarias pera gouemafl98 e defensom de nossos regnos.' 8ACL. serie Azul, C6dice 409, pp. t60-2. 
e TI, Cortes, Maca 2, doc. 14, fol. 23; G6is, Cronica do Felicfssimo ReI D. Manuel, Part 1, chapter XXVI, p. 51. 
8 Although the grant of 1408 was destined to the acquisition of lands to uphold the .estado of the Infantes, thefe Is 
also mention to the rationale of the sisas: 'as rendss que ora el Rei IBm pera manteer 0 seu estsoo e defenssom do 
regno.' RED, doc. 6, pp. 49-50. The two other documents mentioned by Joio II, pubtlshed in the Cortes of 
ColmbraJ1387 and ColmbraJ1390, have not been identifl8d. Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 303 and 432·5. 
275 
whilst war had constituted the appropriate constitutional setting for granting the 
sisas, it cannot be said that the sisas were destined for the war. Instead, since 
1387, not to say since the election of Joao I, taxes were also demanded for a 
distinctively non-military purpose: the maintenance of the king's estado or honra 
e estado. 
Like state, its modern English equivalent, the term estado and its 
variants, which can be found since the late thirteenth century,10 combined two 
distinct but concurring ideas: the status of king and the befitting conditions of 
that dignity, namely his entourage and his subordinated instltutions.11 The 
answer of Joao II in 1482 goes already a long way to explain what the estado 
was. Similarly, the 'state of the king' was defined in the 1387 instrument 
granting the sisas to fund the war and 'the sustenance of the queen and that of 
his household and his officers and other necessary expenses.12 On one way, 
estado conveyed the idea that the king's status would be enhanced by the 
number of dependants; on the other hand, those dependants maintained this 
social status by the proximity to the king. This idea was clearly articulated by a 
beneficiary of royal favour, infante Pedro, the second son of Joao I, In his 
political and moral treatise. While discussing the maxim 'know thyself', he gave 
the example of kings: 'if you hold royal power, while observing your own nobility, 
grant privileges like your estado demands.,13 
The sisas granted in 1387 directly responded to the recovery of the 
contias, after being ignored by Joao I in his early years as regent and king and 
10 'Sua honra e estadd, letter of King Dinis quoted in Pina. Chronica do ... Principe Dam Dinis. chapter VI. p. 46. 
11 The election of Joso I was described as the moment when he 'assumed the state of king': 'nas Cortes que fez em 
Coimbra quando tomou estado de rei' (TI, Chane. Joao I, Uvro 5, 101. 86; Cruz, Ant6nio, 'Do Auxilio Prestado a 
Usboa no Cerco de 1384', Duas Cidades ao Serviyo de Portugal, Porto, 1947, pp. 51-71). However, the term estado 
or even estaclo e honra is not reserved to the monarch. In a 1368 sentence about a land held by a royal vassal, It is 
mentioned that the land was important to upkeep his state and honour: manter seu estado e honra. Chane. Femando 
I, Uvro 1, fol. 27v. The men serving a vassal were also deemed part of his estado. Lopes, Cron. Joao I, chapter 
CXXVIII, p. 285. 
12 mantimento e sostimento da sua guerra que auyam com aquel que se cJjz rey de Castella BSSY pera gentes de 
armas como pera frotas e mantimentos seus e da raynha e das ssuss cassas e o~aes e pera outras despesss 
n6gesaryas. AML, Livro I de Cortes, doc. 7, fol. 63. 
13 The full passage: 'Respondeo 0 ydollo aque/Ia breve sent6fI9B que todos avemos mester, convem a saber. 
"Conhece ty meesmo-. Desta conclusom prougue tanto a muytos que logo fay scripta en a porta do tfJmpIo e avuda 
geers/mente por compridoyra en toda/las obras que os homeens fezessem. Porsm ~ cads huum quem he e 
de que geers9f)m. E, sse for posto em senhorio reBI, sguardando sus nobrezs fa~ benfeytorias quejandas seu 
stado requere.' Pedro, Infante de Portugal, Livro cia Vertuosa Benfeytoria, ed. A. Almeida Calado, Coimbra, 1994, 
Book II, Chapter XIII, p. 90. 
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to the creation of Queen Phillipa's household.14 Indeed, in financial terms, the 
king's estado implied first and foremost the organisation of the household 
(casa) , which included central officers of the higher courts (like the Rela~ao)15 
as well as an abundant affinity. Because they bound high-ranking men to the 
king, redistributive payments like the contias, the annuities and the 'gracious' 
gifts can be seen as part of the estado. 
Even if in the wake of the constitutional ideas of fourteenth-century 
Portugal the Povos conceded and perceived them essentially as a war subsidy, 
a closer look at the circumstances of the establishment of the permanent sisas 
makes clear that, for the monarchy, the sisas were regarded as a permanent 
solution for its ordinary expenses.16 The royal need for a permanent tax to add 
up to the Direitos Reais transpired in the 1385 'Act of Election' where the 
Povos, prelates and noblemen assured the monarch of their commitment to 
'sustain the charges of expenses and services that were required to keep the 
royal estado and honour and to pursue the war.'17 More importantly, the notion 
that the upholding of the estado depended on the revenues paid by the subjects 
was already visible in the Fernandine period. Indeed, as an ordinance dated 
1377 claimed, the Direitos Reais existed to provide for the maintenance of the 
royal estado.18 Ten years later, with rampaging debasement and Inflation, the 
sisas would have appeared as the solution for upholding the estado of the 
monarch and not merely to meet the demands of war. Indeed, it was only after 
Joao I obtained kingdom-wide sisas in 1387 that he organised his household19 
and resumed the regular payment of contias and other payments.2O Similarly I 
the king's downsizing of his household in 1401 while 'guarding his honour and 
14 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 298. 
15 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 295-8, 432-4. 
18 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, p. 295 and 432. 
17 Offer~endo nos Sobredictos pllalados Csualeiros ffldalgos e procuracloFes dos Cofl961hos peno podsr que cJonos 
pera ello tragiamos em nosso nome e eem sseu de nome cJonos / I 0 ljudar com nossos -carpas e beens e I 
$$Osteer os encarregos das desspesas e sseru~ que /he eram -comprldolras perl manteer 0 estado e honra de 
Rey / E pera outrossi leuar sua guerra em deante.' Caetano, 'As Cortes de 1385,' p. 98. 
t8 'Nossos direitos que sempre ouuemos pera mantimento do nosso stadd. TT, Chane. Fernando I, Llvro 2, fol. 14. 
19 'Tomar nassa casa, segundo a nossoatadocumpre.' Lopes, Cron. Jojo " chaplet's II, XCV, XCIX, C; Sousa, As 
Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp.295-8, 432-4. 
20 Lopes, Cran. JoBo I, vol. II, Chapter CXXVlII, p. 285. 
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state' was a direct consequence of the two-thirds reduction of the rate of the 
sisa in that year.21 
The emergence of the kingdom-wide sisas as the form of upholding of 
the estado in 1387 did not derive from the military circumstances. Unlike the 
sisas of 1387, the pedido of 1385 was due to be spent entirely on the war, as 
the conditions set by the Povos show.22 As Fig. 27 has revealed, although the 
purported aim of extraordinary taxes was to pay for the war effort, debasement 
appears the decisive resource. 
The ten-year truce between Portugal and Castile signed in 1401 was a 
decisive moment for subsequent Portuguese fiscal experience. In the ensuing 
'counsel of Coimbra' Joao I took the advice of his counsellors and lowered the 
rate of the sisas from 10% rate to 6.(6)%.23 A thorough structuring of the 
expenditure ensued, as Joao I prepared himself to organise his expenses In 
accordance to the available revenues, just like the 'kings of old'. According to 
the description of this counsel left by Fernao Lopes, the royal household was 
also severely downsized, as it had been demanded by the Povos since 1372.24 
The number of vassals receiving contia was set at 4,060. Also in clear continuity 
with past practice, Joao I sought to reserve 10,000 dobras (4,400,000 I. of 
1401) for the treasury which would take some 5% of the revenue.25 The drastic 
attempt to curb permanent charges in response to a cut of 33% shows that the 
sisas had been essentially diverted to keep the king's est ado. Judging from the 
decisions taken in Coimbra, peace hardly appeared as a relief to the king's 
finances. War, at least, provided the constitutional background for demanding 
taxation. 
The counsel of Coimbra was a determined effort to bring back the 
monarchy to the fiscal status of the 'old kings'. However, the wide changes 
wrought by war (see supra chapters 6 and 7) would soon be reflected In the 
finances of the monarchy. Indeed, we are not entirely ignorant of what 
happened to the reforms made in Coimbra thanks to the survival of an account 
21 The only source for the financial reorganisation of the realm after the truce of 1401 is lopes, Cron. JoAo " II, 
chapters CC-CCI. See Jorge Faro's crHical notes on Femio lopes narrative in RED, doc. 3. 
22 Caetano,'~ Cortes de 1385,' p. 107. 
23 Can this be interpreted that only a third of the sisas was spent on warfare? 
24 8th Article of the Cortes of Usbonl1371. Cort. Fernando " vol. I, p. 19. 
25 Lopes, Cron. Joao', II, chapters CC-CCI. This was less, both in percent and in absolute terms, than the 15,000 d. 
left by the old kings (which would fall between 6% and 10% of the revenue, depending on the value of the dobra). 
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of the pensions paid to the royal household members (Cademo dos Moradores 
da Casa Rea~ dated 1405.26 Besides revealing current composition of the royal 
household,27 this document has the virtue of contrasting it with what had been 
decided in the counsel of Coimbra, about three years earlier. The content of this 
list can be systematised, along with other available, if very incomplete, figures 
for two later periods, the last of which is the reform designed in the Cortes of 
COimbra-Evoral14 72_3.28 
Fig. 34 - The Growth the Royal Household, 1402-73 
1402 1405 1462 1473 
n. leost In r. n. cost In r. n. cost In r. n. coat In r. 
Counsellors 4 [34,2851 4 34,285 rt4 876912 50 [953,600] Knights 0 0 20 59,725 nea 2,594,225 
Squires 80 1[29,531] 103 38,022 101 rt,097832 129 [1402101] 
Chaplains 15 1[8,485] 20 11,314 ? r? ? ? 
Grooms 12 ? 0 ? ? r? 24 ? 
Hunters 57 ? 77 ? i? r? ? ? 
Notes: for calculating the costs of 1402 and 1473 it was assumed that In these years the 
pensions paid in 1405 and 1463 respectively were those applied. 
Sources: RED, doc. 3 (for 1402), doc. 5 (for 1402 and 1405-6), doc. 22 (for 1462) and n. 23 (for 
1473). 
Despite the lacunae, Fig. 34 makes clear that soon after the severe 
limitations imposed by the counsel in Coimbra, the numbers of the members of 
the royal household swelled. The financial weight of the categories that can be 
compared (Counsellors, Knights, Squires and Chaplains) doubled in three years 
(from 1402 to 1405). As far as the scarcity of data allows any understanding, 
the intense redistributive pressure between 1402 and 1405 was not an Isolated 
case. The considerable burden attained in 1462 shows that the growth of the 
royal household was a long-term process. The austere restrictions of 1473, 
made in the context of constitutional confrontation with the Povos, show how 
limited was the scope for reform and how the expansion of the dependants of 
the crown appears ineluctable. 
Constant enlargement was not the sole pressure building upon the 
household: in the end of the 1405-6 list of the klng's and queen's affinities, there 
26 RED, doc. 5, pp. 48·50. 
27 Gomes, The Making of a Court Society. pp. 242·3, 245. 
28 Sousa, As Cortes Medievais, vol. I, pp. 395-6. 
279 
is a small list of the officers and nobles serving the infantes.29 These had not 
been part of the set-up royal household agreed in Coimbra; yet, as the list 
shows, they were being paid along with the king's men. The presence of 
redundant household members shows that the set-up of 1402 did not 
accommodate the redistributive responsibilities for the monarchy. The problem 
persisted: by 1435 the households serving infantes Pedro and Fernando had 
each 372, that is to say 97 more than what was agreed with the monarchy. 
Within the household, 147 had a knightly status.30 This situation can be read In 
the commentaries of contemporary F. Lopes who clearly that while it was 
agreed that, like the 'old kings', Joao I had to hoard say 5% of the total income, 
'all he spent and he did not have enough to uphold his condition (estado):31 
The grant of 1408 by the Povos makes explicit that the sisas aimed at 
organising the households of the three princes so that these befitted their 
'honour and estados.'32 Once more, we find the conservation of the estado 
implies the funding of an entourage. By granting the sisas to pay for the 
households of the infantes, the Cortes of Braga/1408 continued what the 
Counsel of Coimbra had tried to halt: the enlargement of the redistributive 
responsibilities of the monarch. Unable to keep up with the contias,33 in the 
Cortes of Bragal1408 Joao I resorted to the sisas to finance the lion's share of 
his three elder sons' households or casas.34 These large entourages were 
markedly military: in a total of 886 individuals identified by Joao Silva de Sousa 
as members of the household of Henry the Navigator, half (54%) of Its members 
had a knightly status.35 In the reign of Duarte (1433-8), of the 746 members of 
the infantes Pedro and Fernando, more than a third (286) were milltary.38 
Resorting to concrete cases, Rita Costa Gomes argued that the princely 
households allowed the monarchy to take up the noble families which fought 
with Joao I for an entire generation.37 These new households funded by the 
29 RED, doc. 5, pp. 44-45. 
30 Duarte I, Livro dos Conselhos, pp. 179-180. 
31 Lopes, Cron. Joao I, II, chapter CCIlI. 
32 RED, doc. 6, pp. 49. 
33 See supra p. 244. 
M MH, vol. I, doc. 134, pp. 316-319. 
35 That is to say, all the 'rlda/gos ", 'cavaleiros,' and 'escudeiros.' Sousa, A Gasa Senhoria/, p. 302. It should be noted 
that the total figure given by Joao Silva de Sousa is not based on a list of members in a given period but on 
individuals found in different documents between 1401 and 1460. 
36 1 include the cava/eiros and escudeiros. Duarte I, Livro dos Conselhos, pp. 179-180. 
37 Gomes, The Making of a Court Society, pp. 285-6 
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crown provided the swollen ranks of vassals with the rents that contingencies of 
war and peace could not.3S 
The overview of the political context of the introduction of the sisas 
showed that from the moment of what would prove to be their definitive 
introduction in 1387 the monarchy did not perceive the sisas simply as a war 
subsidy. While the defensive war against Castile provided the appropriate 
constitutional setting to extract the sisas, their primordial goal was to allow for 
the crown to maintain its court and institutions and to exert its patronage. 
Moreover, the adoption of the sisas by the crown was not a determined aim of 
the crown, which seems to have envisaged a return to the status quo of the old 
kings, including hoarding. The household accounts show that Joao I was 
pressed to backtrack the 'conservative' deCisions taken in the Counsel of 
Coimbra. As Portuguese monarchs would claim from the second half of the 
fifteenth century onwards, the ultimate beneficiaries of the sisas were the 
subjects, not the crown. 
Section 8.2 - General Accounts 
Heuristic contingency makes the hypotheSiS built in the last section 
particularly hard to verify. There has been no scholarly attempt to understand 
the whole of fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century expenditure of the 
Portuguese crown. Again, there are important lacunae. Yet historians can count 
on four general accounts, of which three have been published and analysed by 
Jorge Faro and Joao Cordeiro Pereira and a fourth that had not been 
identified.39 As these accounts can only be interpreted after the mechanics of 
38 In English, Gomes, The Making of a Court Society, pp. 280-286. Sousa, Joio Silva de, A Casa Senhorial do 
Infante D. Henrique, Lisboa, 1991, pp. 191-4; Sousa, 'Dos Aendimentos Fundiarios eta Casa do Infante D. Henrlque,' 
Do Infante a TorcJesilhas, Cascais, 1995, pp. 73·6, 79-83; Sousa, Joio Silva de, 'Casas Senhoriais no Portugal 
Quatrocentista,' Do Infante a Tordesi/has, Cascais, 1995, pp. 55-64. Fontes, Joio Luis, Percursos e MemOria: Do 
Infante D. Fernando ao Infante Santo, Cascais, 2000, p. 26-45, 207-54. Besides curbing the number of vassals, the 
monarchy fought the internal hierarchies of the nobility. Joio I attempted to fight the war-triggered reconfiguratlon of 
the nobility by forbidding any lord other than the king having vassals. Monteiro, A Guerra em Portugal, p. 45 .. 
39 RED, doc. 6, pp. 82·6, doc. 25, pp. 225·9; Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, 'A receita do €stado Portuguh no Ana de 
1526. Um Oroamento Desconhecido', in Estudos de HistOria de Portugal. Homenagem a AH. de Oliveira Marques, 
vol. II, Lisbon, 1983, pp. 13·55; Pereira, Joao Cordeiro, '0 OrQamento do €stado Portuguh no Ana de 1527, Nova 
Hist6ria. Sacula XVI, pp. 27-65. The Uvro de Sumario of 1511 can be found at NA, 352. The document is In very 
poor condition, with considerable sections only readable with UV light and Ink has disappeared from a few folios in 
the beginning and end. 
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expenditure are adequately understood, a brief glance at how expenses were 
known, decided and operated is indispensable.40 
As far as surviving sources go, from the first half of the fifteenth to the 
mid-sixteenth centuries budgetary technique remained essentially the same, 
rooted as it was in older traditions.41 The importance awarded to the prediction 
of expenditure is perhaps the most interesting feature of Portuguese budgetary 
methods and accounts. The linking of revenues and expenses was based in two 
complementary documents compiled in the office of the two Vedores da 
Fazenda throughout the first months of the year: the 'summary' and the 
'register' books. The 'summary' gathered the almoxarifados estimated 
revenues for the incoming year by means of calculations or in knowledge of the 
tax-farming auctions led by the regional accountants in the end of the year.42 
This document was drawn according to the fiscal organisation of the realm 
which followed in a customised order (almoxarifados first, then Lisbon revenues 
and, at last, overseas territories). The priority items of permanent expenditure, 
the king's household, the queen's household, the treasury, the North Africa 
fortresses43 and regular subsidies to the nobles (assentamentos),44 were duly 
assigned to the almoxarifados and other sources of revenue, particularly to the 
most valuable and/or geographically convenient. In the first phase of 
compilation of the summary, only these payments and the 'ordinary expenses' 
of the almoxarifado (minute expenses with stationery and the considerable 
wages of the almoxarifado personnel, as well as the wages of local judges and 
other officers) were offset against the predicted revenues. 
While the 'summary' was being drafted by the team of the first Vedor, the 
personnel of the other Vedor was busy compiling the 'register' (the • Livro de 
40 Except if stated otherwise, the following account is based upon the regulations of the Fazenda issued in 1516 and 
upon its commentaries by Joao Cordeiro Pereira in '0 Or~mento do Estado Portuguh no Arto de 1527, pp. 30-34. 
41 Pereira, '0 Oryamento do Estado', p. 33, nt. 35. 
42 The word for estimate (verb or~r, noun olV8mento is currently the Port. equivalent to state budget). h consisted in 
the average of the previous five years. This was carefully done, so that the income of a particular district could 
provide the means to pay for the assigned expenses. 
In other occasions, the predicted income was based in the tax·farms auctioned in the last months of the previous 
years. Auctions took place before the regional auditors, the Contador8S das oomarcss or centrally, before the 
Veda,es. 
43 Since the 14305 at least, the permanent expenditure of the North African fortresses were also paid by 
assentamento. 
44 In the 'general account' of 1511 there are assentamentos for the treasury, for the courtier's pensions (moradias), 
for the courts (the Relacao and the Desembargo do Pa~), the ooastal flotilla and the great dynastic monastery of 
Batalha. 
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Registo' also called 'Livro da Fazenda') in order to be ready in the first months 
of the year, though delays were frequent.45 In essence, this document listed 
annuities and other standing payments (organised by entities, offices and 
individuals) due in a particular year.46 These expenses differed from those 
assigned in the 'summary' because they required the (normally) private 
recipient of the payment to produce before the Vedor da Fazenda's office a 
token (the padrao letter) of his right to receive it.47 Though the 'register' started 
as an amended copy of last year's equivalent, it implied the confirmation of 
every token presented before the Vedor and a verdict on its validity. In more 
troubled times, as in the 1470s, it would also imply the prioritising of some 
annuities at the expense of others on legal grounds.48 
After its completion, the 'register' was sent to the team working the 
'summary' so that expenses could be assigned to sources of revenue. Thus, in 
each entry of the summary, expenditure was inserted, following a set order, as 
shown on Fig. 35, based on the only summary so far identified, that of 1511. 
When the summary was completed, specific 'aSSignment booklets' (cadernos 
de assentamentos) were sent to each almoxarife so that he knew whom and 
how much to pay.49 This was not, however, the single function of the 'summary'. 
As can be seen in the document of 1511, the compilers of the summary, after 
deducing the volume of both standing and exceptional expenses for each 
source of revenue, calculated the remainder and inserted it in the 'summary'. 
This remnant was not be used by the almoxarife but by an especially appointed 
45 In theory, n had to be ready by the end of the first quarter of the year, as this was date that the first instalments of 
the annuities were due. Nonetheless, the fact often annuities granted in June were to be paid stili 1rom January of 
the present year' show that annuities granted in June could still enter next year's 'register', meaning that its 
compilation lagged well into the year. v.g. TT, Chane. Afonso V, livre 8, fol. 135 (1464), livro 11, fol. 79v (1480), 
livro 26, fol. 72 (1451). 
46 Only the register for 1523 was identified so far. AHP, vol. II, pp. 221·7. 
47 See the privilege of transferring the monies paid to the count D. Pedro de Meneses as annuity to aSS6fltBmento 
'because of the services to the realm' in 1480 (TT, Chane. Afonso V, livro 32, foI. 152). 
46 See the advice of the Count of Penela, Vedar cia Fazenda to Afonso V, on which annuities ought to be paid and 
those that could be done without it in 14n. RED, 25. If laments from the VecJores cia Fazenda of JoAo III (1521-55) 
are to be believed, this was the most tiresome task of these officers. It should be noticed that the training of the 
Vedores was eminently legal. The Vedor Count of C8stanheira, Vedar in 1553, claimed that this office was far more 
difficutt than being judge of the higher courts, 'because in all decisions he (the Vedoll has to justify with his reason 
instead of excuse himseH with Bartolus or Baldo: Cruz, A Govema9oio de D. Jo4o III, p. 57. 
49 As J. Cordeiro Pereira noticed, H all the c. 150 'assignment booklets' issued annually had survived, their data 
would allow to estimate the total budget wnh some precision. Needless to say, they have not. Only 212 survived for 
the period of 1499-1542. Pereira, '0 OrQamento do&18do', p. 32; AHP, vol. II, p. 21·26, vol. VI, pp. 233-40, 443-4, 
vol. VII, pp. 220-6,291·2, 376, 478·80, vol. VIII, pp. 7()' 75, vol. X, p.60-208. 
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'receiver' or 'treasurer,50 who collected the remnants and some contingent 
revenues throughout the year. This individual brought together the revenues 
that were the king's net or operational revenue. 
Fig. 35 - The Almoxsrifsdo of Colmbra In the 'Summary' 
Book of 1511 (In r.) 
Total receipt 2388650 
Ordinary expenses 44600 
Annuities and compensations for annuities 1417500 
Extraordinary/irregular 347000 
Subsidies to nobles 200000 
Remainder 379550 
Debts and wedding subsidies 334810 
To be collected by the klng's treasurer 44740 
Source: IT, NA, doc. 352, fat. 33. 
The work of the office of the Fazenda provided the monarchy with an 
adequate notion of the state of its finances each year. Estimates of income, at 
least those based in tax-farming, were reliable. However, historians must bear 
in mind that the content of these three concurring sources, the 'summary', the 
'register' and the 'assignment booklets', reflects only what contemporary jargon 
called the 'organised expenditure' (despesa ordenada). In one way or another, 
all surviving budgetary documentation is related to the 'summary' books whose 
purpose was to organise predictable expenditure. With the sources available to 
us, the ultimate ends of the important proportion of the receipt taken by the 
treasurer remain largely opaque. As such, in the general accounts of 1473, 
1477 and 1527 the king's operational revenue does not appear, though in the 
first two it might be hidden in the vast sums assigned to the royal chamber. 
In other words, rather than factual budgets, the general accounts reflect 
the administrative options for that year. Yet, their composition and their 
organisation also hint at the fact that financial planning was made in attention of 
the expenditure. The 'summary books' testify to an attempt to accommodate the 
interests of the monarchy with those of the payees. The fact that the monarch's 
50 These are synonyms. In the two letters of acquittal passed to Ru! Pim he is both called 'tre8SUfe( and 'receive( of 
the-same function. n, Chanc. Afonso V, Livro 29, fol. 207v. 
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operational revenue was largely contingent, while the key redistributive 
instances were assigned suggests that the finances were managed and 
designed not simply to concentrate economic power in the hands of the 
sovereign, but also to distribute it. While today the Vedores da Fazenda 
together with the whole institutional apparatus of the royal finances are 
regarded as agents to the crown, this was not how they perceived themselves. 
The Vedores, accountants, scribes and judges of the sisas swore that they 
would both defend the 'service of the king' and the 'good of the parts.'51 The 
legal training of the Vedores made them judges: more than simple arithmetic, 
their role was to evaluate the legitimacy of private claims to the revenues of 
taxation. While the available summaries of expenditure compiled for 1477 and 
1527 provide an invaluable quantitative perspective of the monarchy's financial 
situation, their design and their organisation also provide a political insight: royal 
finance was not purely at the service of the crown. Ultimately, careful 
coordination of expenditure with the revenues limited royal prerogative.52 
Fig. 36 - The 'Set Expenditure' In 1473, 1478, 1511 and 1527 (In %) 











51 On the regulation of the office of Vector cia Fszends of 1516, see Cruz, A Gove~ de D. JoAo III, pp. 55-74 
and see also an example from the Contos book of Joao I: TT, Chane. Joao I, Livro 5, fol. n. From 1442, there the 
oath of the Vectorand the accountant. TT Chane. Afonso V, livro 23, tol. 38. 
52 The contrast with contemporary French budgetary documentation is dear. According to Alain Goory, French 
monarchs between 1492 and 1665 set the expenditure without worrying too much with its practibility. Goory, 'l~s 
Finances de Ia Monarchia,', n. 33,1978, pp. 223-8. 
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Sources: 1473 - RED, doc. 5; 1477- RED, doc. 25; 1511 - TI, NA 352; 1527 - Pereira, '0 
Or~mento de Estado,' pp. 61-5. 
While interpreting Portuguese expenditure in this period, it is important to 
remind that these numbers are set against a backdrop of fiscal buoyancy. The 
volume of total expenditure grew nearly four times between these two dates. As 
such, most, if not all items of expenditure became more costly in nominal terms. 
Yet, Fig. 36 shows that, despite of the accelerated growth of the receipt, 
the distribution pattern of standing expenditure remained broadly stable 
throughout these five decades. Visibly, expenditure on the judicial system 
apparatus remained relatively unimportant,53 as did alms54 and public works. 
Military expenditure, in the shape of the North African fortresses, the coastal 
fleet and the Indian Armada (appearing only in 1527, totalling 3.3%), remained 
very stable throughout the period, taking around a tenth of the set expenses 
(between 9.7 and 12.2%). 
Redistributive payments· the subsidies to the estados of royal family 
members and of great nobles, annuities, household pensions and the 
scholarships and dowries - covered two-thirds of the set expenditure 
(respectively, 63%, 68%, 74% and 62%). As a whole, redistributive payments 
grew in line with the increase in the king's finances. Changes within the 
redistributive items are certainly worth mentioning. The share of the finances 
covered by subsidies to great nobles and to members of the royal family 
declined. This is perhaps the most important change in the structure of the 
expenditure from 1473 to 1527 lies in the decrease of the share of monies 
assigned to the royal family and to the great nobles. This did not entail any sign 
of hostility towards the nobility, as the assignments grew in nominal terms.55 
However, the growth of the subsidies to the royal family members and high 
63 Annuities also benefited 'employed' individuals and there are cases of annuities payable to officials while holding 
this office.' Nonetheless, these grants were considered annuities, as they stemmed from the monarch's me~ 
(recognition of merit) and were not integral to the office, as wage (mantlmento e vesti~ were. The Royal Chamber 
paid directly some offices, the Fazenda and the Contos, for Instance, while the chancery was financially self-
sufficient. The costs of a functioning fiscal administration (almoxarifes and his personnel) were regarded as 'ordinary 
costs' and do not appear in the accounts of 'set expenditure.' 
54 Alms resembled annuities but, given that they were perpetual and conceded to Institutlons, rather than to 
individuals, they ought to be distinguished. Though most of the alms benefited monasteries, the largest were 
destined to hospitals and to other charitable institutions. 
56 Pereira, 'A Estrutura Social,' pp. 298-315; Gomes, The Making of a Court Society, p . .246. 
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nobility was marginal in nominal terms and, consequently, their overall 
importance did decrease. 
The granting of dowries and scholarships, which were destined to the 
former members of the royal household, also stagnated. However, the crucial 
redistributive payments, pensions and annuities, did grow at an alarming rate 
for the crown. Only in 1527 are there signs of a diminishing share of the total 
expenditure; but still the annual burden of the annuities grew in absolute terms 
from 32.1 million r. to 42.75 million r. in those 16 years. Nonetheless, 
throughout the entire period, annuities would be the single most important items 
of expenditure (between 18% and 34%). In fact, annuities were only the most 
eminent of other items of expenditure whose goal was redistributive. The 
predominance of redistributive expenditure, and most of all the growth of the 
share of the annuities up to 1511, is even more noticeable because of the 
booming of royal finances. While inflation is partly to blame for the growth in this 
period, fiscal buoyancy (a growth of 6.8% per annum between 1473 and 1527) 
was more than simply a function of the inflation.56 
From 1473 to 1527 revenues grew by 370%, yet the monarchy's effective 
hold on the collected money did not improve decidedly. The formidable increase 
of the revenue did not alter the conditions prevailing in 1473 and the different 
items of expenditure grew more or less proportionally. This indicates suggests 
that the monarchy did not capitalise on the growth of the income and that the 
political equilibriums and the interests that dominated the king's finances in 
1473 were very much similar to those fifty-four years later. Indeed, the most 
striking result lies in the percentage of revenues reserved by the king to the 
treasury and/or royal chamber. These sums which were the crown's net, 
'expendable' money, sharply decreased from 21 % to 6.5%. This figure implied 
the continuation of the similar nominal values in broad terms (7.5 million r.) and 
in that his great-grandson, Joao III (8.9 million r.). At least in part, this was a 
consequence of the money diverted to debt-serving, as the original purpose for 
these debts had been the funding of an expedition in North Africa.57 
66 Between 1473 and 1527 the annual rate of inflation, as measured in wine and wheat prices, the only~mmodities 
for which there is available data, was grew between ().31wheat) and 1.8% (wine). Viana, 'Alguns PreQOs de Vinho'; 
Viana, 'Alguns preQOs de cereais'. See also section 5.3 supra. 
57 TI, {;hanc. Manuel I, Livro 13, fols. 9v, 10, 48v, 49, S'Sv·$v. {all <latecl between february and December 1500). 
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At first sight, it appears intriguing that contemporary empire-building was 
not reflected in the accounts of set expenditure of 1511 and 1527. After all, in 
this period Portugal acquired the status of a major power and had to keep 
permanent fleets in two oceans in order to conquer and defend possessions in 
four continents. Even assuming that the monies entered in the accounts, as 
assignments to the 'royal chamber' or to the treasury or to arrears and debt-
servicing, were integrally applied in the imperial ventures, how it is possible that 
the gigantic empire-building effort of the Portuguese crown only involved about 
30% of the state's predictable expenditure? 
There are many answers to this problem. To some extent, fiscal 
buoyancy justifies the apparently modest place of the empire in the country's 
finances. Indeed, such was the growth of the revenues that the 29.7% destined 
to the North African fortresses, navy, coastal defence and 'operational' money 
in 1527 equal the whole of the 'set expenditure' in 1477 and correspond to 
125% of that in 1473. However, this is not quite the answer. The revenues 
inserted in the only surviving summary book of 1511 provide a different view on 
the position of the empire in Portuguese finances. Where, at the end of the 
'summary' of 1511, the provision of the expenditure items are defined, it is 
perceptible that the assentamentos of the queen and some high nobles and 
other minor payments are met with overseas revenues, including Indian spice 
and West African gold.58 There is also a note indicating that in the next fiscal 
year part of the annuities would be paid from the incoming shipment of Indian 
pepper.59 Thus, in this period, the fiscal role of the empire is to provide for yet 
more revenue to meet the demands of the kingdom's elites. This stands for an 
obvious difference between Portugal and its rival empire which relied on the 
mobilization of the internal resources to meet its growing costs. 60 On the 
contrary, Oriental and African revenues were mobilized to sustain the king's 
obligations towards his entourage. 
In addition, as the reader of section 3.3 will recall, there are other, less 
circumstantial reasons for the apparent absence of the empire from these 
accounts. In the first quarter of the sixteenth century the empire in the Eastern 
san, NA352, fls.176, 1n, 179, 180, 181. 
59 n, NA 352, to!. 173. 
60 Muto, Giovanni, 'The Spanish System: Centre and Periphery', ESSF, pp. 233-6 and 254·9. 
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Indies and the armadas were largely self-sustaining and did not require 
significant diversion of resources.61 Notwithstanding this self-sufficiency, the 
growth of annuities cannot be dissociated from imperial expansion. As argued 
before, redistributive payments of annuities were to a large extent a delayed 
reward for the military, empire-building service. As such, the growing cost of the 
annuities is a subtle fiscal reflection of Portuguese imperial ventures. In sum, to 
answer this question it would be important to look closer at the more detailed 
accounts of expenditure (see section 8.3). 
The analysis of the 'set expenditure' backs the claim that Portuguese 
finances were at the service of a redistributive monarchy. What other label can 
there for a monarchy that directly handed in to particular individuals 2 in each 3 
r. spent? What designation for a monarchy which planned an ambitious strategy 
of Oceanic dominance committing less than a fifth of its resources? 
This view can be tested against yet other sources. While general 
accounts allow for a comprehension of the expenditure as a whole, letters of 
acquittal supply a temporally wider perspective, even if less systematic. Indeed, 
as previously discussed, the four available general accounts deal only with set, 
rather than effective, expenditure. By contrast, letters of acquittal of officers 
spending the king's money present effective expenditure. 
Section 8.3 - Meaningful Fragments 
Although letters of acquittal of officers and paymasters are in short 
supply even in the relatively well-documented reign of Manuel 1,62 there is 
enough information to look closely at two key items of expenditure: North 
African possessions and the household pensions. In addition, resorting to a 
81 See supra p. 271, note 117 
82 The audit of these officers was based in the books of receipt and expenditure (Iivro de receita e despesa) kept by 
the scribes of the almoxarifados. The fact that the words receipt and expenditure are so close to their modem 
equivalents (both in English and in Portuguese) should not tum the historian's head away from their precise technical 
terms. Indeed, the accounting had not a kingdom-wide rationale: receipt implied money received in the officer's 
account, not in the king's general account. Thus, a sum collected by an a/moxarife, then delivered to the king's 
treasury and paid to a a/moxarife of a North African outpost would have appear three times as a receipt in the four 
letters of acquittal issued to these four accountable officers. 'Similarly, this imaginary sum would also appear three 
times as despesa or expenditure, since all the four officers disbursed n. Typically, these letters show only the total 
caSh-flow ('dinheiros que recebeu e despendetl). 
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different type of sources, it will be possible to trace how annuities emerged to 
become the most important items of expenditure for the Portuguese crown. 
Subsection 8.3.1 - North Africa and Military Expenditure 
Permanent military expenditure covered two areas: the contias and the 
defence of North African possessions. However, these two expenses did not 
coincide in time. The timing of the disappearance of the contia system, between 
1402 and 1408, roughly coincides with the beginning of Portuguese expansion 
in North Africa and with an age where military service became essentially 
stipendiary, as mentioned earlier. It has been argued that the monies spent in 
Ceuta replaced the notional 10% paid in contias to the nobles (see supra 
section 7.1). At an early stage, the permanent financing of the defence of Ceuta 
appears merely to have diverted the monies formerly paid on contias. However, 
being isolated in a hostile continent, deprived of its previous commercial routes, 
Ceuta became a notorious 'drain of arms and monies', as infante Pedro 
dramatically wrote from Flanders to his father in 1426. 'Wise men' from 
Flanders and England, Pedro continued, 'who had praised the storming of the 
city, now condemned the insistence on keeping it as sheer folly.63 A 1432 letter 
of soon-to-be King Duarte to his agent in Italy reveals that the yearly 
assignment for Ceuta was 28,500 ducats, which correspond to c. 4,560,000 r .. 64 
This is vital information because by 1473, the year for which the next estimate 
of cost is available,65 a sum of 4,380,000 r. was assigned to defend the 'cities of 
Africa.' As such, there is some indication that the nominal cost of North Africa 
was not significantly altered from 1432 to 1473. This is even more surprising as 
from 1471 onwards, Portuguese North African comprised four rather than one 
stronghold (Ceuta plus AI-Kasr, Asilah and Tangiers). In view of these figures, it 
is wise for historians not to regard contemporary claims that North African 
expansion was a drain of resources as reflections of the effective financial 
imbalance. This suggestion can be tested by the systematization of the letters 
83 Duarte, Livro dos Conselhos d'( ... ), ed. Dias, J. J. Alves, Lisbon, 1982, doc. 4, p. 37. 
14 MH, VI, doc. 10, p.17·22. 
85 There are three letters of acquittal to the treasurer of the Casa de Ceuta for the years 1437·41, but tt is very 
unlikely that their extremely modest values reflect the whole expenditure made in North Africa. Marrocos. I. XCVI 
(one of the extra documents added in the end of the vol.) CXXXI and CXXXII. 
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of acquittal which reflect the effective expenditure on the African strongholds 
after 1470. 
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Sources: Ceuta· COM 182,359,547,599,600,601,667,690; AI·Kasr· COM, 169,327, Coelho, J. Manuel Laranjo, 
Documentos da Chance/aria de D. JoAo /I Respeltantes a Marrocos, Usboa, 1923, doc. CLXXXVIII, pp. 197-8; Asilah • 
COM, 82, 117, 287, 337, 432, 708; TT, Leitura Nova, Uvro llhas, fol. 107v; Tangiers· COM 559, 5n, 666, DP, vol. III, 
doc. 82; All North Africa/Casa de Ceuta· COM, 301, 302, 537, 523, 709. 
The figures of effective expenditure provided by the letters of acquittal 
are coherent in showing that, rather than an ever-expanding drain of resources, 
North African possessions were a late-comer to the benefits of fiscal buoyancy. 
Apart from some exceptional years - Asilah in 1471 (the first year of Portuguese 
rule) and 1499 and Tangiers in 1478 - the expenditure in most of the African 
cities experienced a very modest growth, or even stagnation, between the 
1470s and c. 1500. The average nominal spending in the decade 1486-96, 
4,687,387 f., did not differ significantly from the 4,560,000 f. at which Duarte I 
estimated the cost of North Africa in 1432. Considering the effects of inflation 
and the end-of-century growth of the revenue, it is clear that the defence of the 
African strongholds was an increasingly lighter burden. It is only after the turn of 
the century that Asilah, AI-Kasr and Ceuta finally hit unprecedented levels of 
expenditure, as a reflection of the intense military activity in the second decade 
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of the sixteenth century.66 Nonetheless, expenditure grew at a relativefy slow 
pace and only by the end of the first quarter of the century did North African 
possessions recover the share of c. 10% of the kingdom's expenses that they 
once held. 
Subsection 8.3.2 - Household Pensions 
The pension (Port. moradia) was an allowance for those who effectively 
shared life in court, ranging from the most important nobles to the offspring of 
domestic officers and servants.67 The practice of providing regular pensions to 
the of the members of royal household, as distinct from the remunerations paid 
to offices, was well in place from the late fourteenth century. Its varying value 
was expressed in both money and kind. In the former case, the allowance could 
be bread, barley, wine or cloth. Whatever the value (expressed monthly) the 
payment was made directly by the king's officials instead of assigned to any 
source of revenue. 
It has been discussed how the establishment of 1402 failed to curb the 
redistributive pressures that affected the court of Joao. Barely three years after 
the counsel of Coimbra, the set limits for the household had been disregarded 
(see supra Fig. 33). Nonetheless, in 1405, the 357,994 r. paid to the members 
of the royal household amounted to only 6.2% of the revenues. Would this 
percent rise? 
86 See Costa and Rodrigues, Batalha dos Alcaldes, pp. 24-6. 
67 Gomes, The Making of a Court. pp. 241·2. 
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Fig. 38 - Expenditure on Royal Household Pensions, 1446-1527 
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Sources: Fig. 14; n, Chanco Afonso V, Livro 3, fl. 85v-86 (1446-9); RED, doc. 5 (1473), doc. 22 
(1462), doc. 23, doc. 24 (1478); Lobo, Hist6ria da Sociedade, p. 430 (1490); n, Chanco Manuel 
I, Livro 6, fol. 70v (1500-1), Livro 11, fol. 115-116v (1510-3), Livro 28, fol. 52-53 (1475-9), Livro 
35, fol. 130v (1520); Livro 36, fol. 8v (1505-6); Livro 41, fol. 18v (1507-9); COM, 46 (1494-6), 
174 (1507-9), 200 (1519),229 (1498),317 (1475-9), 322 (1505-6), 413 (1500-1); n, NA 352, 
fol. 173 (1511); AHP, vol. II, p. 430 (1523); Pereira, '0 Oryamento do Estado' (1527). 
As with the North African possessions, household pensions did not grew 
during the middle decades of the century. As Fig. 38 testifies, between 1446 
and 1480 there was a very slight tendency for the burden of the household 
pensions to swell. However, in the early 1470s that tendency seems to have 
stopped, hypothetically curbed by the austerity measures imposed by the 
Cortes and executed by the Vedores da Fazenda.68 However, in the decades of 
fiscal buoyancy, household pensions went steeply upwards: between 1480 and 
1490, their total volume increased by 63,3% and between the latter year and 
1494 they grew 60% more. While this steep growth cannot be dissociated with 
the increase of the revenues, it is important to notice that household pensions 
also enlarged their share of the royal payments, going from 10,6 % in 1473 to 
16,2% in 1511. 
68 The austerity measures suggested by one of the Vedores da Fazenda, the count of Penela, -can be seen at RED, 
doc. 25, p. 225-9. 
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The expenditure on the royal household, however, had a decisive role in 
the military and imperial efforts of the monarchy. While only a prosopographic 
study could clarify the substitution of the contias by the moradias as claimed by 
Rita Costa Gomes, the moradia retained a distinctively military nature in the 
reign of Manuel I. Members of the household formed provided the military and 
administrative elite of the empire. According to the data compiled by Teresa 
Lacerda, between 1497 and 1521 60% of the ships' captains in the Indian 
Armadas were members of the royal household.69 As Lunardo Ca Oa Masser 
noticed, and documents confirm, the royal household also provided the cavalry 
in Portuguese Morocco without receiving payment and undergoing severe 
hardships. 800 of the 1,800-strong garrison of Azemmour were young members 
of the royal household?O This number is not surprising given that since c. 1500 
the monarchy offered the privileges and the pension of royal household to 
whoever appeared in India or in North Africa with adequate equipment 
(including horses) and fought 'at his own COSt.,71 Extraordinary expeditions also 
drew on the members of the royal household which dispensed with wages.12 
The household pensions were the counterpart for a large and cheap army, with 
only the costs of logistics, guns and shipbuilding being sustained by the crown. 
The monies paid to the members of the royal household assured that the state 
had a permanent 'nobility of service'. As such, household pensions were an 
investment that would be recovered in form of free military service. In practice, 
they deferred the cost of the imperial expansion to future expenditure. 
89 Lacerda, Teresa, Os Capitaes das Armadas da india no reinado de D. Manuel I. Uma Analise Social, lisbon, 
2006, p. 79. 
70 Documentos do Corpo CronolOgico Relativos 8 Marrocos (1488 8 1514) ed. Ant6io Baiao, Coimbra, 1925, pp. 61, 
64 and 125. 
71 See laws and ordnances collected in Inventario dos Livros de Portarias do Reino, ed. Pedro de Azevedo, 2 vols, 
Usbon, 1909-12; Inventario dos Livros de Matriculas cias Moradias cia Casa Real, ed. Pedro de Azevedo, 2 vols, 
Usbon,1911·17. 
72 See the order for all the members of the household living in Entre Douro e Minho to serve under the duke of 
Braganza in the coming expedition in Documentos do Corpo CronolOgico, p. 55. 
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Subsection 8.3.3 - Annuities 
Letters of acquittal for the paymasters of annuities are very scarce. 
Those for the years 1508 and 1509 confirm the growing trend through the 
sixteenth century, as presented on Fig. 36. In these years the ten~8S totalled 
already 21,500 million " and reached 32 millions in 1523 before getting 42,750 
million ,. of 1527. 
Fig. 39 - Total Expenditure on Annuities, 1473-1527 








Sources: RED, doc. 4, p. 85, doc. 25, pp. 226-7; COM, n. 27, n. 28; n, Nucleo Antigo, doc. 352; 
Pereira, '0 Or~amento do Estado,' p. 65. 
While letters of acquittal provide no substantial information for the 
decades before 1473, it was still possible to understand their growth through an 
alternative source: the chancery registers. These figures can be complemented 
by a temporally wider point of observation: the chancery registers. As 
mentioned, before payments of annuities were assigned in the ·summary' books 
because the private holders of annuities had to present a token or certificate of 
the king's grant which had to be issued by the royal chancery. Given that entire 
annual chancery registers survive for the reigns of Afonso V and Joso II, it is 
possible to assess the expansion of annuities. 
Like other redistributive payments, notably the household pensions and 
the dowries paid to members of the nobility, annuities (ten98s) emerged in the 
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first decade of the fifteenth century, after the truce with Castile.13 However, 
unlike dowries and scholarships, which were considered gra~as, that is to say 
arising out of the mere will of the monarch who had obligation to do it, annuities 
were merces, that is to say recompenses for 'merits:74 Indeed, fifteenth-century 
annuities appear explicitly as the counterpart to 'services performed and to be 
performed', with sometimes a brief mention to what those (mostly military) 
services were. 
The ideology present in the tokens is very eloquent in this respect, as 
most use one of the countless variants of the idea that 'it is proper of kings to 
reward and benefit those who deserve and who have served him.' Indeed, 
obtaining an annuity implied that the prospective beneficiary actively invoked his 
services in, say North Africa or in the War with Castile (1474-8), and demanded 
to be rewarded by the king. For this reason, more than with any other expense, 









Fig. 40 - Value of New Annuities Granted, 1473-91 
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Notes: Fig. 38 comprises only years for which there complete chancery registers; these are 
misSing, or very incomplete, for the years 1447-9, 1457-8,1460-1,1470,1474,1477-9,1481, 
1485,1489. Indexes for year 1459 and 1481 were very incomplete. 
n The oldest known annuity dates from 1409 and is known because h was mentioned in a letter of confirmation in 
1476. TT, Chane. Afonso V,livro 7, fol. 98. 
74 On these distinctions and their legal foundations, see Olival, As Ordens Militares, pp. 23·5. 
75 The monarchy was aware of this pressure: on the wake of entering Castile in 1474 Afonso V ordered that the 
concession of a tef19B higher than 10,000 r. required the approval of his son. G6is, Chronica do PrinVipe, chapter 
xlviii, p. 116. 
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Sources: IT, Chane. Afonso V, Livros 1-34; Chane. Joao II, Livro 1, fl. 22; indexes used: 
Mendonca, Manuela, A Chance/aria de D. Joao /I - Indices, 2 vals., Lisbon, 1993; Freire, A 
Braancamp, 'A Chancellaria de D. Joao II', AHP, vol. II, pp. 337-43; Freire, A Braancamp, 'A 
Chancellaria de D. Afonso V', AHP, II, pp. 479-87, vol. III, pp. 62-74, 130-54,212-26 and 401-
40; http://antt.ttonline.pt; 'A Chancelaria de Dom Afonso V,' ed. Humberto Baquero Moreno 
[database]. 
Unlike what we can infer from the letters of acquittal on household 
pensions, the concession of annuities did not grow at a regular pace. They were 
given away sparingly by Pedro, in his capacity as regent (1439-48), as they had 
been under Joao I and his sons King Duarte?6 After this period, their weight 
grew Significantly. During the reign of Afonso V, most of the peaks are 
identifiable: 1439 - ascendancy of Afonso V to the throne and regency of 
Pedro; 1450 - victory of Afonso V over his uncle the regent; 1472-3 - aftermath 
of the conquest of Tangiers and Asilah; 1475-6 - offensive against Castile. 
However, from 1482 onwards, the military settings that provided opportunities 
for the vassals to seek the king's favour no longer seem to explain their 
concession. In the reign of Afonso V civil strife (1440 to 1449), African 
campaigns and fighting with Castile (1475-8) resulted in concessions of 
annuities at an annual average of 495,411 r .. 77 By contrast, concessions by 
Joao II during his largely peaceful and economically buoyant regnal years 
averaged 1,155,322 r. per regnal year, an increase of 233%. After all, it was 
under Joao II, who attacked the privileges of the nobility censored his father's 
profligacy and tried to expunge the annuities from the 'registers books' payroll in 
1481-2, and not under the, allegedly profligate, Afonso V that the concession of 
annuities grew more intensely. As such, the reasons for the increase in the 
volume of the annuities should be sought in the growth of revenue, rather than 
in military or political circumstances. 
As mentioned beforehand, in the early 1460s and 1470s, the crown had 
let its expenditure grow disproportionately. The Cortes of 1460 and of 1472-3 
both addressed this problem and proposed a programme of austerity which 
implied both the diminution of existing annuities and the suspension of further 
grants. These m~asures, which were defended by the Vedores and the Cortes 
76 e. g. a knight called Joham Landrim who had served Afonso V, Duarte I and Joao I received as single reward the 
exemption of extraordinary subsidies in 1442. TI, Chane. Afonso V, Uvro 23, 73v. Many other examples could be 
provided. 
77 Despite his decree demanding that in time of war, any annuity worth more than 10,000 r. had to be confirmed by 
him and by his son. G6is, Chronica do Prin¢pe, chapter xlviii, p. 116. 
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alike,78 explain the weak increase in annuities. Yet, the war with Castile broke 
the impetus of these financial reforms. In the first stage, times of war were a 
justification for cutting all annuities by 20% or 25% and other extreme 
decisions?9 Similarly, dowries were only paid to those whose families had not 
benefited from earlier annuities or gra9as.80 Nonetheless, war was the eminent 
occasion for serving the king. 'Service in the wars of Castile' was the explicit 
reason for the concessions of numerous annuities that were still being 
demanded in 1484 or 1485, ten years after the start of the war.81 However, 
there was a different trend underway. As mentioned above, money payments, 
ten9as, were a substitute for land tenures that Joso I had so liberally bestowed. 
This process continued until 1499, when Jews were expelled. However, from 
the 1430s onwards, chancery records testify to a process of gradual 
emancipation of the ten9as from specific sources of revenue. In the 70s, 
payments were no longer assigned to almoxarifados or to specific sources of 
revenue, ·but merely in the 'register books,.82 It was up to the Vedores da 
Fazenda to execute their payments. While on the one hand this seemed to 
strengthen the power of the Vedores, on the other hand, tenures ended by 
contaminating the annuities that supposedly replaced them. In the reign of 
Afonso V, annuities were either lifelong or precarious, that is to say removable 
at the king's will. Under Joso " a decisive change occurred: te~as hereditary 
were granted from 1490 onwards.83 From the reign of Joao \I onwards, 
annuities underwent a decisive mutation that would make them a dead weight in 
the Portuguese finances. 
The accounts of expenditure of the Portuguese monarchy are a powerful 
reminder for historians that state finance does not always pursue the ends of 
78 E. g. RED, doc. 25, p. 225·9. 
79 On the prohibition in 1475 of paying dowrie to whom already had annuities, see TT, Chane. JoAo II, Livro 21, fol. 
155v; on the cutting of 'quarters' and fifths of the annunies still in use in 1480, see TT, Chane. Joso II, Livro 8, fol. 
213v. 
80 TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 33, fol. 175v. 
81 e. g. TT, Chane. Joao II, Livro 8, fol. 213v (1486). In most of the documents coneeeding tefl98s the nature of the 
'services' are not explicitated. 
82 'Nos assent amos ora per nossas remiss e direitos desse almoxarifado de Ponte de Lima a Femando Pereira de 
ten~ 1,100,000 tibras em pr890 de 3000 dobras de ourd; TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 18, fol. 34 (1432); 'os quaes 
the seram paguos aos quartees defies no nosso a/muxarifado d'Estremoz per nossa carta que the em cada huum 
anno sera dada em a nossa fazenda.' TT, Chane. Afonso V, Livro 13, fol. 174. (1454). 'e mandamos aos vedores da 
fazenda que assentem os ditos dinheiros nos nossos livros della [fazenda) ... e mandamos dar carta de desembargo 
cada ana TT, Chane. Joso II, Livro 1, fol. 2 (1480). 
83 The oldest being given to the dowager of Joao da ~unha in August 1490 {Chane. Joao II, Livro 11, fol. 1). 
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the state. Indeed, it was the rising annuities, not treasury-bound money, that 
tapped the economy-fuelled fiscal buoyancy. Yet, it would be wrong to regard 
the huge share of the expense claimed by the higher and lower nobility as a 
reflection of their economical or political strength. As Ca Da Masser shrewdly 
remarked, the nobles whom the kings so magnificently bestowed were poor 
and, apart, from the royal disbursements and from lands held from the crown, 
they had little rent of their own.84 By liberally granting the profits of internal 
taxation, the Manueline state was assured that nobles, great and small alike, 
were bound to serve the crown. In 1513, of the 18,000 men enrolled to storm 
Azemmour 3,000 were, as Damiao de G6is noticed, paid by the duke of 
Braganza, even if the rent of the ducal household was about 4% that of the 
king.as 
The monarch brought up his men in the household, obtained more or 
less free service from them and after this he was bound to grant annuities. This 
peculiar exchange of military and administrative service for ante-factum 
upbringing and post-factum grants on depending on merits (merces) was the 
very fabric of state and empire alike. As such, Joao I was right when he claimed 
in 1407 (see section 8.1) that the sisas were destined to finance not war but his 
estado. 
84 'Sono poveri de dansr; universalrnente tutti; ne per grando che sis in questo regno, ne per grsnd'intrada che Ioro 
sbbino, non s'sttrovano uno ducat, perche tutti viveno sopra que/fa pocs d'intrada de questo ra.' Refaziona, § 6. 
85 This was a flagrant contrast to contemporary Castile where in 1501, the income of the noble households put 
together was smaller than the royal income. ladero Ouesada, Castile', p. 190. 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the periods pre- and post- the End-of-Century-Wars 
largely confirmed the stark difference between that which, borrowing from 
Fernao Lopes, we could call the times of the 'old' and 'new' kings. These two 
phases can also be identified with, respectively the 'domain state' and the 'tax 
state' of the Bonney-Ormrod model.1 Given that these authors did not take into 
account Portuguese state finances, the present case contributes to strengthen 
the model. Yet, on the other hand, the dynamics and the features of the two 
systems appear considerably different from what the model anticipates. The 
present conclusion will first articulate the changes between these two systems 
in the four aspects studied in this thesis - revenues and the economy, fiscal-
constitutional aspects, warfare and the autonomy of the state - and will end up 
by addressing the forces for change that influenced this case. 
When the varying relationships between economy and revenues are 
considered (see chapters 1 and 5), the key difference between 'old' and 'new 
kings' lies in the combination of sales taxes with the prerogative of debasement 
in the hands of the latter. The sisas made for between 75% and 90% of royal 
income, while free-hand in coinage allowed the monarchy to limit the real costs 
of its payments without affecting its sales-tax-dependant revenues. These major 
introductions, which occurred in 1385-7, do not reflect any alteration In the 
country's economic life. For at least half century, sales taxes were already 
efficient at the municipal level. While transition from the 'tribute state' to the 
'domain state' responds to new economic conditions (the reflux of gold and the 
material decay of the adversary and of self-subsidising warfare), the emergence 
of the tax state is not the effect of such changes. As suggested by Bonney and 
Ormrod, contrary to Schumpeter's views, the transition to a tax state did not 
directly correspond to change of economic systems. If so, what has caused this 
change? 
Military burden is an obvious candidate and historians that dealt with the 
sisas thought 50. As the model predicted, wars were a turning point in the 
1 For what follows, consider Table 0.2 in Bonney and Ormrod, 'Introduction: Crises, Revolutions', pp. 4·8. The 
addition of two factors - fiscal constitution and transformation of local administration - will be argued supra. These 
changes could be added to the model without it losing any of its consistency. 
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transition from domain revenues to taxation. Nonetheless, it was debasement, 
rather than military expenditure, that brought the dissolution of the domain state. 
Given that the domain had been constituted in the second half of the thirteenth 
century, in a period of stable coinage and strong municipalities, its customs and 
taxes largely based on nominal terms and, possibly outdated, lost their 
significance with debasement. 
While the Bonney-Ormrod model ascribes relatively little importance to 
constitutional aspects, in the Portuguese case these problems are essential in 
distinguishing the two periods. Whereas the itinerant, predatory monarchy of 
Sancho I, that fits so well the notion of a 'tribute state', lived off prerogative, the 
'domain state' was structured according to limits. The existence of the 
constitutional agreements, already hinted at by the Laws of 1211, defined the 
limits of internal predation. Thirteenth-century municipal development allowed 
municipalities to limit some aspects of royal intervention and, ultimately, to 
negotiate a constitutional definition of the monarch's fiscal prerogative. By 
repeatedly negotiating taxation with the monarchy and by altogether prohibiting 
monetary manipulations, the municipalities limited the crown to its customary 
revenues. Indeed, the establishment of permanent sisas made it possible for 
the monarchy to go over a limit that old kings had not trespassed: municipal 
administration.2 The correlative 'inventions' of the Povo and universal taxation 
deprived municipalities of their obstructing strength. On the other hand, 
municipalities participated more actively than beforehand in shaping fiscal 
policies and instead of limiting the state, they directed their energies in 
influencing, as revealed by the discourse on finances that surfaced in the 
Cortes. The transition towards the 'tax state' cannot be dissociated from war. 
However, it must be noted that Fernando's offensive ambitions and military 
expenditure failed to trigger a fiscal revolution similar to that of England or 
Castile. Fiscal demands only succeeded in the constitutional settings brought by 
a context of alJ-and-out defence of the realm . 
. The military organisation and strategies of the 'old kings' as well as the 
important hoards respond to the end of profitable war. Expensive wages, 
exclusive quantias and the importance of maritime warfare meant that war 
2 It should be stressed that the first complains against the sisas do not attack the tax itseK but ~s administrative and 
judiciary structures. See supra p. 216. 
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under the old kings was capital-intensive. The hoarding of monies for the 
'defence of the realm' was a means of meeting the intensive demands of 
warfare without forcing both constitutional limitations and the little elasticity of 
the revenues. Constitutional and economic restrictions contributed to a prudent 
external policy that, unlike other cases, was designed in accordance to 
revenues. Unlike the better-known contemporary states which embarked in 
costly political and military ventures irrespective of their own resources, in 
Portugal war appears contingent on the available resources. Again, more than 
taxation, it was debasement that changed this picture. Cheap wages and 
inclusive quantias made war far more affordable to the monarchy and decision-
making less thoughtful. Debasement allowed the monarchy to finance an 
aggressive expansion with occasional contribution from extraordinary taxes. 
Indeed, there is evidence that, contrary to the old kings hoarding habit, the 
extremely frequent Portuguese offensive warfare would not be possible without 
the availability of wider revenues. 
To a large extent, the formation of the hoarding 'domain state' is the 
emergence of the 'state' proper. From the second half of the thirteenth century 
to the second will of Oinis I (1322), the crown built a system of autonomous 
revenue-collecting territorial institutions, the almoxarifados, that spanned the 
entire kingdom, along with a comprehensive system of customs. These local 
organisations were linked by regular procedures to the central institutions 
(Contos and, later, Vedor da Fazenda). Thus, territorial almoxarifados, together 
with the Lisbon revenue-specific almoxarifados and the customs, formed a 
system orientated to the capacity of produce 'expendable revenue' either to be 
hoarded or allocated to specific ends defined by the political centre. Moreover, 
even if details from expenditure are missing, it is clear that by the early 
fourteenth century, the monarchy had managed to screen the king's nominal 
landed revenues from the participation of the nobility. Redistribution took the 
form of payments from the treasury with an ultimately military rationale (contias 
and ten~as) and was destined to the upper ranks of the nobility. Redistribution 
merely touched a thin layer of society. 
End-of-Century-Wars, by contrast, left the monarchy structurally indebted 
to the military nobility. Wars contributed to the formation of a large military class 
that dominated the channels of royal redistribution, namely the royal and 
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princely households, funded by the sisas. Their hold on royal revenues was 
such that the monarchy benefited little from the late-fifteenth-century fiscal 
buoyancy. On the other hand, the Portuguese system of 'fight first, receive later' 
is very different from other European expenditure-driven systems. By 
sponsoring permanent war in North Africa, the crown both served the interests 
of some of its subjects and used them for a policy of territorial expansion. 
Portuguese imperialism simultaneously provided what can be deemed a 'public 
good' - war - and obtained new territories in return. This peculiar system did 
not result from unilateral decisions of the monarch but from the post-war 
conditions of cheap military labour and acute inflation 
The fact that roughly two-thirds of the expenditure was used up in 
redistributive payments and that military effort did not consume more than a fifth 
of the recorded expenditure justify that Portugal's finances were run principally 
on a 'redistributive' model (see supra chapter 8). The Portuguese 'tax state' was 
more than an agent of the dominant class. Redistribution was not an end in 
itself. The recipients of royal redistribution were ipso facto involved in the pursuit 
of imperial projects and, crucially, with their emphasis on post-factum rewards, 
allowed the crown to mobilise impressive coercive means with low short-term 
costs. However, as wars and expansion dragged on the crown's available 
revenues became more and more indebted to these services and, unlike the 
'old kings', rulers did not have the capacity to re-structure their expenditure and 
adopt a stipendiary force. 
In sum, the fourfold analysis of the transition from 'domain' to 'tax state' 
denies that expenses in wars really were a primum mobile for the changes in 
the Portuguese case. It was the 'defence of the realm' by Joao I that allowed 
the monarchy to combine the sisas and minting prerogative, not Fernandine 
expansionist military expenditure. Moreover, ample reasons were provided to 
regard warfare as revenue-driven, that is to say determined by the receipt. 
Indeed, debasement and sisas contributed to fickle decision-making and the 
stringencies of the fiscal constitutions and the hundred-years-old customary 
limitations definition of the domain calling for a limited military intervention. 
As mentioned, the dynamics are different from what is anticipated in the 
Bonney-Ormrod model. Indeed, redistribution was an .essential element in the 
adoption of the sisas which were requested for the purpose of upholding the 
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estado. Indeed, in the better-studied cases, military effort did rely in the 
allocation of a fraction of the kingdom's resources obtained by taxation to pay 
for stipends. Monetary prerogatives, coupled with control over the municipalities 
and with a serving nobility, allowed late fourteenth-century and fifteenth-century 
Portuguese monarchs to pay for an army at the scale of a major power with 
their small tax-base. However, the monarchy was bound to compensate the low 
wages and the fidelity of its vassals and thus resorted to the sisas to pay for 
annuities, pensions and similar payments. Thus, Portuguese monarchs, in order 
to field their grand armies deferred the real costs of war making military costs 
and redistribution hard to disentangle. 
The redistributive role of the post-war monarchy hints at a different 
understanding of this transition that is not simply the outcome of particular 
military events or even a particular country. Indeed, it pOints to the increasing 
participation in the state of wider groups of society. In England, intense 
demands for taxation resulted not in the expansion of the crown's attributions 
but to an increasing interaction between the king and the local elites.3 Similarly, 
in Portugal, royal favour is more widespread, political partiCipation via the 
Cortes as well. On the other hand, the monarchy is closer to these interests, 
instead of retiring itself a situation of great autonomy vis-a-vis the other power 
organisations. 
The state of the 'old kings' was certainly more autonomous than the post-
war monarchy. It had a firm hold on the more cashable segments of the 
country's economy: the maritime customs, mostly those of Lisbon, the wheat-
fields of the Tagus and urban housing. Even if these revenues could prove both 
inflexible (given customary norms and rates) and precarious (given the 
fluctuations of trade and harvests), the stability of the coinage kept their fiscal 
yields at acceptable levels. Furthermore, the monarchy was autonomous 
enough to hoard up to 7.5% (more likely 5%) of the income. That is to say, 
Portuguese kings were able to yearly take out of circulation a sizeable 
proportion of the metallic flow. Indeed, the formation of the domain state as 
described here (see chapters 2 and 4) is a process of dividing 
3 This opinion was expressed by G. L. Harriss in response to the excessively stark separation division between 'war 
state' and 'justice state.' For a review on the various theories on the change of the nature of the state In fourteenth-
century and fifteenth-century England, Harriss, G. L., 'Polttical Society and the Growth of Government in Late 
Medieval England', Past and Present, n. 138, Feb., 1993, pp. 28·57. 
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Domain state defined itself as an autonomous institution by distinguishing 
its interests from all others. In the discussion of the coinage in 1254 and 1261, 
the interest of the king was diametrically opposed to that of the realm. The 
resulting monetary constitution defined a strict boundary between the king and 
the realm. Afonso III and Dinis took away lands and houses to constitute the 
king's domain. The formation of a network of almoxarifados further 
encapsulated of royal revenue and the hoarding habits set apart monies to be 
used by the king with perfect autonomy. 
The strong autonomy of the 'domain state' meant that its power was 
merely 'distributive.' That is to say, the old kings were very powerful if power is 
regarded as a zero-sum game. However, in terms of 'collective' power, that is to 
say the capacity of one party to combine its strengths with other party in order 
to achieve something, the post-war monarchy is stronger. Universal taxation, 
the Cortes representing the Povo, the mechanism of the pedido, the 
considerable, but cheap, armies of more than 5,000 knights, the participation of 
the municipalities in decisions are all factors that testify to the emergence of 
common causes between the dynasty and the 'realm' . In the relationship 
between the monarchy and the low-cost military nobles receiving pensions and 
annuities, the mutual advantage is obvious. It was the abundant subsidised 
nobility that made the bold imperial projects more than geopolitical 
daydreaming. On the other hand, the nobles depended on the monarchy's 
riches. Indeed, sixteenth-century general accounts do not depict the crown, 
unlike the time of Afonso III or Dinis, or a force striving to separate its revenues 
from the rest of society by creating autonomous institutions. Sixteenth-century 
state finances testify to an increasing interaction between the state and the 
remaining sectors of society. The shortness of 'expendable revenue' depicted in 
the general accounts does indicate that the new kings were less autonomous. 
However, if weaker in distributive terms, fifteenth-century and sixteenth..century 
monarchs had the means to integrate both municipalities and nobles in its 
projects. The development of the symbiotic interaction was not possible without 
the sisas. Indeed, both Fernando I and Joso I demanded the sisas not only for 
war but also to uphold their estado. This was the name that fifteenth-century 
Portuguese used to denote the relationship between the monarchy and the men 
to whom it redistributed. 
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Appendix 1 - Timeline: War and Taxation in Portugal and England, 
1245-1525 
The extent and rhythm of the military projects of the Portuguese crown 
can be grasped without recurring to narrative. The annexed timetables 
(Appendix 1) show a relationship between the occurrence of wars (defensive, 
offensive or 'civil') and the collection of general taxes. In order to provide some 
comparative background, the extraordinary taxes and the participation in wars 
should be contrasted with those of another country. England would provide a 
good example, since it is arguably the best-known case of a warfare-led 
development of the fiscal system in the period studied, and it was regarded by 
fourteenth-century Portuguese as the example of a warlike country.4 
These time lines aim to reflect the long term oscilations between war and 
peace and its relation with general extraordinary taxes and some decisive 
technical and administrative changes. In order to focus on the long run, provide 
a clear image and, most of all, allow for comparison, the usual intrincacy of 
military confrontations was reduced to four different categories: peace, civil war, 
defensive war and offensive war. This categorisation was made after the 
historigraphical narratives and specialised chronologies.s After the most 
encompassign Inevitably, this implied a great deal of simplification which was 
undertaken according to determinate lines that require further analysis: 
Peace does not imply a formally constituted peace, like a truce or a treaty, but 
the absence of expeditions defensive efforts of some magnitude. Occasional 
outbursts of violence in the borders of the two kingdoms are not consider~d. 
4 In 1383, future king of Portugal Joso I, then Great-Master of the military order of Avis, compared his country with 
England, a nation which 'often have wars and seldom peace [ ... ] whereas we often have peace and seldom wars.' 
The suggestion by the future Joao I in 1383 can be followed. In a spirited dialogue with widow queen leonor, told by 
Fernao Lopes, widow queen Leanor seeing Joao in full armour advised him to be more like the English who in 
peaceful days wore gentle clothes: '[JoSo, Great-Master of Avis:] lsso [to wear armour] fazem eles porque ham a 
meude guerras, e poucas vezes paz, e podemno [the English] mui bem fazer; mas a nos he polio comtrairo, ca 
avemos mui a maude paz e poucas vezes guerra; e sse no tempo da paz nom husarmos as armas, quamdo 
vehesse a guerra nom as poderiamos soportar. Lopes, Cron. JoAo I, Part I, chapter IX, p. 21. 
5 For England, the works used were: Powicke, F. M., The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307, Oxford, 1953;McKisack, 
May, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399, Oxford, 1959; Saul, Nigel, Richard II, London, 1999; Ramsay, Lancaster 
and York: a Century of English History (A.D. 1399 -1485) Oxford, 1892; Schofield, Taxation Under the Early Tudors; 
For Portugal: Port. Def. and Marques, Portugal na Crise; Costa, D. Manuel I; Buescu, Ana Isabel, D. JoAo III, Lisbon, 
2005. 
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Such 'chronic border feuds', as Tout dubbed them, do not imply any 
organisation in the central level and thus are not relevant to the purpose here, 
not to mentions the impossibility to track them systematically. It is only used 
when none of the following kind of military episodes occur in that year. 
Civil War was applied only when actual confrontantion (a long siege, one battle, 
devastation of adversary lands) between two parties took place. Civil unrest 
was not counted as a civil war. 
Defensive war implies the defense of lands held against an ennemy attack. The 
emphasis is on the military aspect, and not on the legal nor on national aspects. 
Thus, the defense of English-occupied territories in France or Wales (as In 
1294-1295 or in 1400) or of the captured cities by Portuguese in the North of 
Africa (the great sieges of Ceuta in 1419 and Alcacer Ceguer in 1459) all fall 
within this category. 
Offensive war covers expeditions independently of financial arrangements 
having been made or not. This clarification would be useful but, unfortunately, 
most of the Portuguese events are insufficiently documented in this aspect. For 
the same reason, expeditions organised which did not fight (as in 1253 against 
a non-existent Castillian invasion of Gascony or Henry Ill's 1255 military 
demonstration in the North) are also included as a financial effort should be 
presumed. This category applies both to land and seaborne expeditions 
(involving transport or combat fleets). Portuguese incursions in Castille in the 
period after 1384 were considered offensive war, despite the ultimately 
defensive stance which inspired them. The Flemish war by proxy with France 
financed by England in 1339-40 was included because of the intense financial 
burden it caused and for the same reason activities of English mercenaries for 
other causes (the Black Prince in Castile fighting for Pedro r, the English army 
of Edward Balllol) are excepted. Excluded as well are the 'spontaeous' battles 
fought without royal initiative or organisation on either party, as the naval fight of 
St. Mahe 1293 between Bretons and English seamen. 
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The distortions caused by the use of the year as the time unit in 
defensive and civil wars were limited and operations in the end and beggining of 
the year. For instance, the invasion of Portugal by Juan I which lasted all the 
year of 1384 started in the 13 December of the previous year, which saw 
military activity. The peace of Malestroit which ended the first phase of the 
Hundred Years War was signed in 13 January 1343 and thus, as no other 
conflict ocurred that year, it was categorised a peace year. Whenever there 
were two wars of different category in the same year, they were signalled but 
without no proportionally. Similarly, no differenciation was made even for years 
with two or more operations of the same category (1355 is an extreme case 
with Lancaster preying Normandy, the Black Prince in expedition in Aquitaine 
and Edward plundering the Lothians). It also should be added that to categorise 
these conflicts, the emphasis was laid on the military dimenSion, not on the 
legal. Thus, a year of war is one with invasions, expeditions or civil war, 
regardless of the terms of truces and peace treatises. 
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Appendix 2 - The Libri de Recabedo Regni 
The first documented step taken by Afonso II to organise the tax-collection 
of the kingdom was the creation of the four Libr; de Recabedo Regni. These 
books - referred to five times in diploms between 1216 and 1222 _6 were to be 
held by the three high-officers of the Curia (steward or maiordomus, constable 
and chancellor) and by a special book-keeper known only as iIIe qui tenet 
quartum /ibrum.7 The precise nature of this record has challenged the efforts of 
many institutional historians disturbed by the little-known term recabedum and 
by the contrasting types of the documents to be included in it.8 All of them, 
nonetheless, identified the books of recabedo as a register of revenues, or a 
rental record. 
However, a closer look can clarify things: the term dare recabedum is used 
in a 1221 royal charter from with the clear meaning of delivering the revenues. 9 
The first letter mentioning the Recabedo books, dated July 1216, is indicative of 
one of possible functions: it commanded that the king's oven~a;s should only 
collect the rights (fora) that the king had assigned to them.10 Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that it contained a list of the sources of revenue of the 
kingdom with the officers to whom each of those was ascribed.11 Possibly, this 
81n July 1216 - DCC, vol. I, n. L, p. 263; in May 1217· ANTI, Chane. Afonso III, L Q 3, f. 25; in May 1221 • Ribeiro, 
Disserta¢!es Chronologicas e Criticas, vol. IV, 2nd part, 2"ded., Lisbon 1810, doc. L, p. 263 and, vol. IV, n. XV, p. 
187; in November 1221· TT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 3, fol. 6-6v; in June 1222· PMH, Leges, p. 179. 
7 Ct. Ribeiro, Disserta¢!es Chronologicas e Criticas, vol. I, 2nd part, 2nd ed., Lisbon 1810, doc. L, p. 263. The 
chancellor, the constable (signife~ and the high-steward (maiordomus curiae) were the three main palatine officers. 
Homem, Armando Luis de Carvalho, 'A Corte e 0 Govemo Central', Port. Del., p. 533. 
8 Joso Pedro Ribeiro, followed by H. da Gama Barros, Virginia Rau and Herminia Vilar. To Ribeiro, the Recabedo 
Regni books alluded in a few thirteenttKentury documents were equivalent to the late rentals, the late-fourteenth-
century Livros dos Pr6prios. Rau acknowledged these books as records of revenue without further enquiry about 
their features and even the, rather opaque, term recabedo was left unexplained. Recently Herminia Vilar, while 
considering that the word recabedum had to be related with the collection of revenues, commented the fact that the 
four documents whose copying in the Libri de Recabedo was demanded have all different typologies. Ribeiro, 
Memorias Authenticas, p. 77-9; Barros, Hist6ria da Administra~o Publica, vol. III, 2nd, Lisbon, 1928, p. 212; Rau, A 
Casa dos Contos, p. 4; Vilar, D. Afonso II, pp. 199-200. 
9 'Comendatores qui tenent uel teneuerunt bailuias Hospitalis in regno mea dent recabedum unusquisque de bauilia 
bonis ipsis de omnibus redditibus ipsarum bauilarum et dent inde totum recabedum hominibus meis' TI, Chanco 
Afonso III, Livro 3, fol. 6-6v. 
10 Ribeiro, Disserta¢Jes Chronologicas e Criticas, vol. I, 2nd part, 2nd ed., lisbon, 1810, doc. l, p. -263; n, Chane. 
Afonso III, Livro 3, fol. 7v-8. 
" The hypothesis that ~ the quadruplicate book De Recabedo contained the assignment of revenues, and 
expenditure thereof, is coherent w~h the type of documents which the king ordered to be alpied in the Recabedo 
Regni books. The inclusion in the books of the 1221 writ (by which the king sent 600 moraootins to the castellan and 
judges of Evora in order that they should purchase a field and convert ~ into a vineyard whose r.ender would be 
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included tenures as much as the custody or the tax-farming by oven~ais. As all 
the members of the Curia had one of these register, it is very likely that it was 
related to the audit of these officers. By referring to the ILibri De Recabedo 
Regni and to the Libri Repositi Mei, the 1216 ordinance tells us what the former 
are not: registers of the sums perceived by the royal person. In fact, the 
expression Libri Repositi Mei clearly pertains to the money or kind effectively 
receipted (reposifus) by the monarch's household. while recabedum relates to 
the kingdom.12 Although the functions of these elusive records remain in doubt, 
from the statute of 1216 it is obvious that one of their functions was to clarify the 
assignment of revenues and rents. 
Even if this reference does not reveal the precise nature of the Recabedo 
records, it casts some light on them. On one hand, this helped the king to 
control better the distribution of tenures by the steward, on the other hand, it 
made possible the audit of the custodians. The compilation of the Recabedo 
Regni books cannot be dissociated from another important change in the 
management of the king's receipt. In a series of charters dated from November 
1218, Afonso " granted to each bishopric of the realm the tithe of the king's 
revenues (regalia iura) within the diocese.13 This implied the knowledge of the 
king's revenues and. more importantly, their territory-based management. 
Although the only evidence of a close relationship between the grant of the 
royal revenues' tithe and the Recabedo Regni books is merely the two-year 
sequence between their surfacing, it is patent that the two imply the same 
perception of the king's revenues as a unit divided in different cells. Even if the 
Recabedo Regni had not a territorial organisation, the diocesan organisation 
supplied the monarchy with the only system of lundifferentiated' territorial 
system available throughout the kingdom: the diocesan organisation. 
assigned to the works ot the local cathedral) can be justified as this would expand the list of sources ot income. In 
addition, the order to insert in the Libr; de Recabedo Regni the two household statutes ot 1216 and 1221 seems 
justified as both included the court officers' wages, pretty much as happened with Henry I's earlier manuscripts ot the 
Constitutio Domus Regis that were kept ad usum in the Exchequer. Cf. Johnson, Charles (ed.) 'Introduction', 
Dia/ogus de Scaccario. The Course of the Exchequer by Richard, Fitz Nigel and Constitutio Domus Regis. The 
Establishment of the Royal Household (Oxford, 1983) pp. xi-xii, xlix. Afonso II's eommand may well have derived 
trom the exceptional character ot the regulations. 
12 This distinction probably reflects the division between the king's household and the curia which had begun in the 
late Twelfth Century and consolidated by Afonso II with his household reorganisations of 1211, 1216 and 1222. This 
had started with with the appearance of a dapifer [§,gf§. in opposition with the maiordomus curiae Mattoso, Jose, 
Identifica~o de um Pals (2nd, Lisbon, 1991) vol. II, p.102-103. 
13 On this grant, see Vilar, D. Afonso II, p. 181-2. 
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Appendix 3 - Almoxarifes and Almoxarifados 
Almoxarife is the Portuguese version of the Islamic learned word for tax-
collector (al-mushri~. A royal charter of 1195 conceding immunity to the houses 
of a particular religious community in Lisbon was addressed to the deputies of 
the pre tor (Latin word used for the Port. aleaide, castellan) and of the 
maiordomus. This documental emergence of the almoxarife is as problematic 
as it is significant. Does this mean that a new office had been introduced or was 
this a mere terminological variance, at the mercy on the peculiarities of each 
scrivener's vocabulary? Possibly, maiordomus, a term of powerful Carolingian 
resonances, merely translated the Arabic almoxarife into Latin,14 a usual 
procedure in the writings of the twelfth-century Portuguese chancery.15 In a 
letter issued four years later about a similar question in the municipality, Sancho 
I addressed himself to the 'castellan [a lea ide] , judges, almoxarife and the men 
of the municipality [bonis homines]'. This is the first appearance of the word in 
Portuguese documentation, quickly followed by a letter of 1200 where the king 
refered to his mea almoxarifo. However, in another letter the almoxarife again 
appeared among the municipal authorities in 1206.16 Did the almoxarifus of the 
1195-1206 merely translated into Latin the oral, Arabic almoxarife, revealing 
thus a survival from Muslim administration, or did it mean the maiordoums 
mentioned in the municipal charter of 1179? 
The etymology is not particularly relevant in terms of institutional history. 
Recent researches have shown that the Islamic classical vocabulary was 
loosely, when not arbitrarily, applied to the diverse fiscal institutions 
disseminated throughout the Mediterranean.17 Christian conquests created 
further distance between classical Islamic paradigms and the usage of their 
words. 18 Moreover, even within Arabic-speaking areas, al-mushrif was a very 
broad term translatable as a courtly 'overseer' whose functions comprehended, 
14 The addenda to the municipal charters of Santarem, Sancho I styles the three municipal authorities as pretor ville, 
maiordomus, aluaziles (DR, doc. 335) but in this king's later letters the trio is called pretor, alvazilis and almuxarifo 
(OS, doc. 116, p. 180). Thus, n can be questioned whether maiordomus translated the everyday term almoxarife. 
15 Similarly, the oral Arabic term affereslafferaz was styled in solemn chancery charters as signifieror vaxilifsr, while 
the castellan (alcaide) was designated by pretor(a Roman dignity). Mattoso, Identifica980 de um pais, vol. 2, p. 102. 
16 OS, doc. 79,116,214 and 237. 
17 See oral presentation by Josep Torr6 Abad 'Las conquistas latinas y los 6rdenes fiscales antiguos an el 
Mednerraneo (siglos XII-XIV)' presented at the Congress Fiscalidad y sociedad en e/ Mediterraneo Bajomedieval 
(Malaga, 19th May 2006) (forthcoming). 
18 See Torr6 Abad, 'las Conquistas Latinas y los ordenes fiscales antiguos' (forthcoming). 
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but were by no means restricted to, the functions of collector of revenues. 
Within AI-Andalus, the word designated first the tenth-century inspectors sent to 
the provinces by the central treasury. By the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries, the al-mushrifwas concerned with the levying custom duties.19 
Beyond this terminological difficulty the question remains on whether the 
almoxarife was indeed a custodian of the king's interests or rather a 
representative of the municipality. Indeed, in the surviving royal letters directed 
to the councils, the almoxarife appears in the address immediately afterwards 
other municipal authorities, the castellan and the judges,20 making difficult to 
ascertain how far he is not a representative of the municipality rather than a 
custodian. On the other hand, the use of the designation meus almoxarifus 
makes very likely the possibility that he was the king's representative before the 
higher municipal instances. The fact that the almoxarife in 1210 was a Jew and 
that the Castilian almojarifes were Jewish financiers21 makes the 
The concentration of all the first mentions of almoxarifes in the 
municipalities and terrae (Feira and Faria) is presented on the following table. It 
shows that only in the reign of Afonso IV there is the possibility of a perfect 
kingdom-wide coverage and that the 'specialisation' of the Lisbon revenues was 
already set in 1317. Furthermore, it clearly shows that the spread of the 
almoxarifes went both northwards and southwards from its origins in the centre 
of the kingdom - Lisbon, Coimbra, Santarem and Evora. 
19 Bosworth, C. E., 'Mushrif', 1. In the Arabian and Persian lands', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, ed. C. E. 
Bosworth, E. van Dozel, W. P. Heinrichs, Ch. Pellat, Leiden, 1993, vol. VII, pp. 678·79. 
20 In the twelfth century, these were generally elected by the concilium. On Coimbra, See Caetano, A Adm;nistr~o 
Municipal, p. 10. 






(1185- Lisbon (1195) 
Afonso II (1211-23) 
Sancho II (1223-48) 
Afonso III (1248-79) 
Dinis I (1279-1325) 
Afonso IV (1325-57) 
santarem (1220), 
Coimbra (s.d.) Evora (s.d.) 
Alenquer (s.d.) Gulmaries (1254), Leiria (1255), Beja (1259), Felra 
(1264) 
Tavlra (1282), Torres Novas (1282), Louie (1290), Porto (1299), 
Estremoz (1314), Moura (1314), Slives (1314), Guarda (1315) 
almoxarlfe das ovenfas of Lisbon (1317),· Faro (1321) 
Valen~a (1325), Ponte de Lima (1326), sintra (1326), Avelro (1328), 
Vlseu (1329), Portel (1331), Muge/'of the lez(rlas (paddy fields) of 
the Tagus (1337), Felra with Faria (1338), Torres Vedras (1338). 'of 
the wood In Lisbon' (1338), 6bidos (1339), 'klng's lands In 
Sa cavern and Frlelas' -near Lisbon- (1338), Bragan~a (1338), 
Alvalazere (1338), almoxarlfe/1 of Lisbon (1339). Elvas (1339), 
Montemor-o-Velho (1340), Terena (1342), Arganll (1344), Chaves, 
Torre de Moncorvo, Vila Real, Portalegre, Serpa, Setubal (all S.d.). 
Sources: Chane. Afonso IV, 3 vols., Chane. Pedro /; DP; DR; DR; LL, PTt, Portvgaliae 
Monvmenta Historica. Leges et Consuetodines, vols. I-II, Lisbon, 1858-60; TAII/; Vimaranis 
Monumenta Historiea, ed. Joao Gomes de Oliveira Guimaraes, vol. II, Guimaraes, 1931; IT, 
Chane. Din is I, Livros 1-4; IT, Chane. Afonso II, Livro 1; IT, Chane. Afonso III, Livro 1. 
• The slmoxsrife of Lisbon is last mentioned in 1318. TT, Chane. Dinis, Livro 3, fol. 12Ov. 
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Note on Currencies 
In this dissertation I. stands for the libra(s) , s. for soldo(s), d. for 
dinheiro(s) and r. for real or reais; non-Portuguese currencies are written in full. 
Libras, soldos, dinheiros are the Portuguese terms for the old Carolingian 
reckoning system of librae, soldi, denarii. Libras and its multiples became the 
standard money of account in the second half of the thirteenth century in 
substitution of the morabitino. Although older forms of reckoning were remained 
in place (most of all in the north of country), the libra remained the dominant 
money of account from c. 1260 until c. 1437. As elsewhere in Europe, the libra 
was equivalent to 12 soldos and to 240 dinheiros. However, it should be noted 
that the dinheiro as a coin was minted only up to the 1250s. From then up to 
1369 the standard coin in circulation was the dinheiro novo or afonsi (first 
minted in 1261) valued at 1.(3) dinheiros. After this date, the new types of 
currency emerged were valued in the old I., 5., d. system. As such, from 1261 
onwards the dinheiro was in practice a money of account. In the reign of Duarte 
this system was abandoned because of the strong debasement. 
From c. 1437 onwards the money of account used was the Port. real 
(plural: reais). This designation had been applied to three bullion coins: a) the 
Real de Dez Soldos first minted in the reign of Pedro I (1357-67), valued at 10 
s. or half I.; b) the Real de rres Libras e Meia, minted from 1398 to 1406 with 
the value of 3.5 I.; c) the Real Branco, with the value of 35 I., minted from 1416 
onwards. The name Real Preto or Simply Preto ('black' real) was also used for 
the copper cOinage worth a tenth of the r .. , one which, given its extremely low 
value, does not appear on this thesis. Thus r. stands always for r. as a money of 
account, equivalent to 35 I. 
Two other coinages will be often mentioned in this thesis: 
Morabitino was the Latin designation used for diverse gold coins minted by 
Muslim, Castilian, Leonese and Portuguese rulers between the early twelfth 
century and the 1220s (in Portugal last minted in 1226). In Portugal this term 
was the standard money of account until c. 1260. After that date, it survived in 
some specific cases, however in this thesis such values will be converted to 
Iibras. 
Dobra was a generic name for mostly Muslim and Castilian gold coins 
which circulated in Portugal (it was also applied to a rare Portuguese coin which 
had little circulation and use and is not relevant for this thesis). In their Castilian 
version, the dobras were used by chroniclers and administrative documents, as 
a means to express the value of old coinages and monies of account. 
Accordingly Its value in Portuguese coinage varied between 3 I. in 1357 and 
370 r. in 1521. 
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Glossary 
For technical terms used once in Portuguese or Latin (alfitra, /an~ar, jugata), a 
direct translation was immediately provided. The Portuguese words in the 
Glossary are used more than once in the text without immediate translation. In 
the cases where a detailed explanation of the term is given in the text, it was 
deemed better to provide reference for the page(s) where the term is presented 
or discussed. 
Ajuntamento - Meeting of the municipal representatives without the formal 
features of the Cortes. See pp. 189 and 209 
Almoxarife and Almoxarifado - see pp. 24-7, 108-49 and 314-6. 
Cavaleiro - this term word means both a man who has been knighted and a 
man who fought on horseback. See also' Escudeiro' and 'Fidalgo' below. 
Conce/ho - The term was systematically translated as municipality except 
where it occurs in the, slightly different, sense of municipal assembly (see p. 
205). 
Contos, Casa dos Contos - see pp. 22-31, 13744 
Contia - see p. 100 
Cortes - Representative Assembly with a varying composition. : Povos, nobles 
(fidalgos) and clergy. 
Dinheiros Novos - see pp. 72-80. 
Direitos Reais - literally 'royal rights'; legal term used for royal lands 
(reguengos) , jurisdiction of municipalities, customs and royal prerogatives. It 
was normally used in opposition to sisas and pedidos. 
Dom - literally 'lord'; address used for high-ranking nobles 
Escudeiro - In functional terms escudeiro translates as 'squire.' It was 
applied to the lower level of nobility, immediately below the knight. See also 
Cava/eir~ and Fidalgo. 
Fidalgo - It means 'hereditary noble'. In the second half of the fifteenth 
century, it designated the rank above knight. In this Fidalgos, like Escudeiros 
and Cava/eiros were grouped together in the word 'nobility.' 
Finta - see p. 151. 
Gra~a - see p. 233, 296. 
Infante - Title given to the sons and daughters of kings. 
318 
Merce - see p. 296 
Moradia - see pp. 292-4. The term was normally translated as ·pension.' 
Outorgar- pp.212 and 222. 
Pedido - pp. 207-34 
Povos - Term used in Cortes for the proctors of the municipalities when acting 
as a whole. 
Quantia - see pp. 102, 252-3. 
Sisa, Sisas - see p. 145-62 
Talha - see p. 151 
Ten~a - see p. 99. In the sense of annual payment, it was translated as 
annuity. 
Terra - see pp. 102, pp. 252-3. 
Vedorda Fazenda - see pp. 26-9 and 138-9. 
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